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…Hay miles de pedazos de esta tierra 
Con miles de ocasiones de injusticia 
Hay una isla chica en que la guerra 
Roba tiempo al amor y a la caricia. 
 
Un día que mi canción se hizo oleaje 
Un día que reposé en la blanca arena 
Le dí mi corazón y mi coraje 
Al pueblo y al sentir de la Isla Nena. 
 












































To Abuela Paca, 
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and expressed her political claims through the pro-statehood party. 
Her stories silenced by cancer are not written in history books. 
Yet they survive in the memory of those she touched and nurtured. 
 
To my father and my mother, 
for keeping the stories alive while weaving new, 
and for believing in the infinite possibilities of the real-maravilloso, 
even when it might be less painful not to believe. 
 
To their combined memories, 
which I have made mine or that have made me theirs, 
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The dissertation follows the five-century struggle of peoples to inhabit the 
Caribbean island of Vieques and of empires to control it.  This is a history of 
displacement and militarized imperialism, and an examination of the power of historical 
narrations in the struggle of colonized peoples to claim a place of their own.  It is 
therefore also a study of memory, and of the symbolic and material practices that inscribe 
with local meaning spaces from where to negotiate collective identities.  As a history of 
longue durée, this dissertation is structured through foundational conjunctures central to 
the late 20th century Viequense collective memory of themselves as an island-community.  
I trace this history through the imagining of Vieques as Isla Nena (Girl Island), the 
gendered and infantile representation of the island-community.  The dissertation, in turn, 
delves into colonial-imperial negotiations surrounding Vieques through an organic 
account of Isla Nena’s life starting with the conception of an island-community worth 
dying for in 1514 with the Spanish massacre of the indigenous population, going through 
its birth and baptism as Isla Nena at the turn to the 20th century when the prosperous 
sugar colony was incorporated to Puerto Rico, and culminating with the Nena’s near 
extinction brought about by the U.S. Navy’s activities in the island since the mid 20th 
century. 
Historicizing Isla Nena, as an island-community inseparable from the multiple 





fringes and imperial centers, of memories and histories, and of the historical making of 
Vieques and the inner contradictions of Puerto Rico’s colonial history.  I explore these 
intersections through an interdisciplinary lens merging historical and autobiographical 
genres meshed through the lives of four Viequense women, of which I am the last 
generation.  The tracing of my own Viequense genealogy allows an approach to Vieques 
through multiple narratives, including personal memories and postmemories.  This 
interlacing of narratives also acknowledges my role as a weaver of historical narratives 
that bridge the abstract character of a long history with the intimacy of its ongoing 
























But many forget, as they disguise themselves as cheap magicians, that the marvelous 
begins to be in an unequivocal manner when it surges from an unexpected alteration of 
reality (the miracle), from a privileged revelation of reality, from a non-habitual or 
singularly becoming illumination of the unnoticed riches of reality, from an amplification 
of scales and categories of reality, perceived with particular intensity in light of an 
exaltation of the spirit that leads it to a kind of “extreme state.”  To begin, the sensation 
of the marvelous presupposes a faith.  The ones who do not believe in saints cannot be 
healed by miracles from saints, neither can the ones who are not Quixotes submerge 
themselves, in body, soul and wealth, in the world of Amadis de Gaula or Tirante el 
Blanco…Yet what is the history of all America but a chronicle of the real-marvelous? 
Alejo Carpentier, Prologue to El reino de este mundo (1949)1 
  
Sometimes, what appears real seems so marvelous as to defy any clear 
distinctions between what we understand as fiction and reality, as natural and 
supernatural, as memories and stories, or as myths and histories.2  Sometimes, one is 
faced with histories that are difficult to understand or even believe.  Yet, as in any good 
episode of the X-Files, reality reveals itself only to those with the will to believe in the 
                                                 
1 “Pero es que muchos se olvidan, con disfrazarse de magos a poco costo, que lo maravilloso 
comienza a serlo de manera inequívoca cuando surge de una inesperada alteración de la realidad (el 
milagro), de una revelación privilegiada de la realidad, de una iluminación inhabitual o singularmente 
favorecedora de las inadvertidas riquezas de la realidad, de una ampliación de las escalas y categorías de la 
realidad, percibidas con particular intensidad en virtud de una exaltación del espíritu que lo conduce a un 
modo de ‘estado límite’.  Para empezar, la sensación de lo maravilloso presupone una fe.  Los que no creen 
en santos no pueden curarse con milagros de santos, ni los que no son Quijotes pueden meterse, en cuerpo, 
alma y bienes, en el mundo de Amadis de Gaula o Tirante el Blanco…¿Pero qué es la historia de América 
toda sino una crónica de lo real-maravilloso?”  [Translations, unless noted, are mine.]  Alejo Carpentier, 
“Prólogo,” El reino de este mundo (San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1998) 1-8. 
2 My use of the term history throughout the text refers to stories and legitimated historical accounts.  
These two historical narratives cannot be completely separated.  The separation of histories from stories 
implies a problematical hierarchization of sources that empowers some voices to the detriment of others.  
It, furthermore, can silence the narrative character of all historical accounts.  For a study of the narrative 
quality and literary tropes of historical thinking see Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical 






fantastic, the nightmarish, the serious and the ludicrous of the everyday.  As for myself, 
growing up between San Juan and Vieques has made me a believer in the everyday 
workings of the magical and the real.3  My grandmother, perhaps the greatest of 
storytellers, introduced me early on to such a world where the dead transfigure into 
butterflies to keep company to the living.  Indeed, I remember the nights spent as a child 
with my grandmother in Vieques, when a small butterfly used to flutter around us until 
finally settling in front of the television screen.  Despite the interruption to her soap 
operas, my grandmother happily welcomed the visits and would always tell my brothers 
and me, “Greet your Aunt Aleja, who has just come to visit us.”  The ceremonial greeting 
granted refuge to the butterfly, to our Tía Aleja, one of my grandmother’s 11 siblings, 
who had died when my mother was still very young.  Tía Aleja, however, had then not 
renounced to the realm of the living and came back every night to take over my 
grandmother’s television in the caserío (public housing project).  Her reincarnation as a 
butterfly was only one of the many miracles my grandmother unveiled for me from a 
world populated by such characters and histories that defied and melded with my middle-
class and San Juan-based education. 
My grandmother, Abuela Paca, tuned my perception to those “unnoticed riches of 
reality” Alejo Carpentier once identified in northern Haiti.  As the Cuban scholar was a 
firm believer in the intertwinement of the marvelous and the real in America, I am a 
believer in the real-marvelous of the San Juan-Viequense world.4  Engaging the real-
marvelous, Carpentier wrote, presupposes a faith.  The real-marvelous, he further argued, 
is not accessible through the artificial wielding of reality.  On the contrary, it comes forth 
                                                 
3 See Appendices 1-5. 
4 The word America, as employed by the Cuban scholar Alejo Carpentier, refers to the hemisphere 






to those willing and able to perceive particularities, or miracles.5  These miracles may not 
be readily identifiable or logical, and, I would add, are certainly not exclusive to 
America.  Thus, the real-marvelous, more than a description of America in all its 
historical richness and contradictions, is ultimately about the perception of particularities.  
In my case, what miracles am I willing and does my San Juanera–Viequense identity 
allows me to perceive about the world I grew up in?  The following historical narrative is 
the result of a very personal exploration delving into 500 years of miracles surrounding 




Vieques, an 18 by 3.5 mile island, has been for thousands of years a steppingstone 
for human crossing through the Caribbean.  In the midst of the crossings, different 
peoples have attempted to establish themselves in the small island.  Forging a community 
in this heart of the West Indian island-arc, however, has been for the would-be settlers an 
equally long-term process.  For varied reasons in different contexts, the act of 
establishing a stable community in this remote speck of the Caribbean has met with 
resistance from the part of powerful historical actors, including the rulers and 
bureaucracy of the Spanish and the U.S. empires.7  Such empires have, through invasions, 
                                                 
5 Carpentier, “Prólogo,” El reino de este mundo 1-2. 
6 My usage of the term narration refers to the telling of a history through verbal as well as other 
material and symbolic practices.  My employment of the term is further intended to suggest the literary 
character of historical accounts. 
7 The term U.S. Empire, at least before the events of September 11, 2001, has been cause for 
discomfort within the U.S. academia perhaps more accustomed to thinking of empires in terms of, 
northwestern, Europe.  The discomfort almost mandates that the usage of the term be accompanied with 






diplomatic arguments and even massacres, made evident that colonial fringes like 
Vieques can be the stage for imperial dramas of global scope.8  Vieques, in fact, rose to 
prominence at different moments posing both challenges and opportunities to 
metropolises.  Spain’s early 16th century crusade against the Caribs, for example, was 
redefined through Vieques.  The 17th-19th century rivalry between Spain and Great 
Britain for the control of the Caribbean was fought in Vieques.  Even the United States’ 
1960s pan-American campaign was rethought through Vieques.  Thus, Vieques has been 
                                                                                                                                                 
exceptionality of the U.S. Empire.  While the term U.S. Empire might not raise eyebrows in other 
academias around the world, it is still a worthwhile intellectual exercise to defamiliarize from the familiar, 
and perhaps vice versa for the U.S. academia, by thinking about the particularities of the U.S. Empire as it 
has been built through, for example, discourses of democracy and freedom, the naturalization and 
hierarchization of difference, the creative exercise of hard and soft power, the employment of colonial 
subjects in the exercise of violence and domination, and indirect modes of control not dependent on 
outright possession.  Yet, these particularities can only reinforce the argument that the U.S. Empire does 
not differ significantly from the articulations and discourses surrounding other empires like the British 
Empire that, for example, also appropriated notions of citizenship and freedom to legitimate imperial 
endeavors across the globe.  Such was the case in the mid 19th century when British officials repeatedly 
intervened in Vieques saying to act in the name of the black British citizens whose freedom was being 
infringed by the Spanish Government.  The motives for the interventions, however, were more complex 
and cannot be separated from the territorial pretensions of the British Empire over the island of Vieques.  
Therefore, I understand that the U.S. Empire resembles, more than differs, from other empires, even though 
it must be studied in its historical specificities.  For an argument about the discomfort within the U.S. 
academia with the term U.S. Empire see Amy Kaplan, “‘Left Alone with America:’ The Absence of 
Empire in the Study of American Culture,” Cultures of United States Imperialism, eds. Amy Kaplan and 
Donald E. Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) 3-21.  For a study of the academic debates 
surrounding the “American Empire” after September 11, 2001 see also Amy Kaplan, “Violent Belongings 
and the Question of Empire Today Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, October 17, 
2003,” American Quarterly 56.1 (March 2004): 1-18.  For an assessment of the categories empire and 
imperialism and their relevance to think about the U.S. in its long imperialist relationship with Latin 
America and in the post-September 11, 2001 context see Fernando Coronil, “After Empire: Reflections on 
Imperialism from the Américas,” Imperial Formations, eds. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan and 
Peter C. Perdue (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007) 241-274.  For a study of the U.S.’ 
“new imperialism,” as it was first implemented in Latin America, specifically in Central America, during 
the Cold War and has evolved to the post-9/11 period, see Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin 
America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).  
For a study of contested meanings of freedom in the U.S., and its roots in Great Britain, see Eric Foner, 
“The Meaning of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation,” The Journal of American History 81.2 (September 
1994): 435-460.  For the discussion of British officials regarding the treatment of black British citizens in 
Vieques see President of the Virgin Islands Isidore Dyett, letter to Governor in Chief of the Leeward Island 
B. Hamilton, 7 October 1861, Sovereignty over Vieque or Crab Island and Culebra or Pasaje Island, vol. 1 
1846-1862, FO 72/1119, National Archives, London, 174-175. 
8 My usage of the term empire refers to the rulers and bureaucracies of empires.  The usage does not 
acknowlege historical agency to an abstract empire or assumes the internal coherency of empires.  On the 
contrary, I understand that people make empires and that these peoples making up empire clash as well as 
coincide upon the enactment of imperial policies.  The term imperial dramas refers to the schemes, 






a space where imperial dramas have been acted out.  What happened in the island 
manifested as well as affected the global narratives these empires were weaving. 
The present dissertation follows the five-century struggle of peoples to inhabit the 
Caribbean island of Vieques and of empires to control it.  This is a history of 
displacement and militarized imperialism, and an examination of the power of historical 
narrations in the struggle of colonized peoples to claim a place of their own.  The 
inhabitants of Vieques have engaged the struggle to survive as a community through 
histories that tie their people to the island.  They have geographically imagined, 
especially over the last two centuries, the island as an enclosed space inscribed with local 
meaning.9  These historical narrations needed to inscribe, or perhaps scar, the island and 
its map so as to convince empires that Vieques was not just a void representation of land 
produced by imperial cartographers.  Contrary to places like Thailand where imperial 
cartography had a central role in classifying the people into a community, the map of the 
island preceded by 300 years the inhabitants who arrived in the 19th century to formally 
colonize the island.10  The community, in fact, grew by trying to appropriate that island-
                                                 
9 Geographical imaginings, as formulated by Pat Jess and Doreen Massey, are: “frequently based on 
interpretations not just of the present character of a place but also –and often more importantly- of its past.  
The implication is that the character of this history (or, more precisely, this particular interpretation of the 
history) should be used as a guide for, indeed is the justification for, what should happen in the future.  In 
this sense, what is being named, or interpreted, is not just space or place, but a space as it has existed 
through time: what one might think of as an envelope of space-time.”  Thus, geographical imaginings refer 
to interpretations of the past and present and character of a place that can guide or justify the future of the 
same place.  Pat Jess and Doreen Massey, “The Contestation of Place,” A Place in the World?: Places, 
Culture and Globalization, eds. Doreen Massey and Pat Jess (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 134. 
10 While at times denying humans of the agency endowed to technology, Thongchai Winichakul 
argues that the Siamese nation, or geo-body, was initially brought about by modern geography.  He defines 
geo-body as a territory inhabited by “nationals” and delimited by “non-nationals.”  Winichakul’s 
interdisciplinary work, which led to the formulation of my dissertation topic, recognizes the role of empires 
in the creation of national communities because, as shown in the case of Siam, empires established 
categories and boundaries that were later appropriated by nationals or nationalists in the forging of new 
nations.  Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994).  For a discussion of the 300 years prior to the official foundation of the 







map disputed until 1864 by Spain, England and Denmark.  I use the term island-map 
because from the 16th to the 18th century no alternative representations of Vieques 
circulated within the aforementioned empires.  With the exception of some isolated cases, 
Vieques was just a silhouette on a map to imperial officials contented with representing a 
void space.11  As long as the space was officially void of people, different empires could 
claim the island-map.  The representational void, however, facilitated the invisibility of 
peoples who actually inhabited the island from the 16th to the 18th century.  The void also 
made easier the endeavor of would-be Viequenses to fill the space with their own 
narratives.12  The 19th century endeavor to claim the space, in turn, resulted in the 
privileging of the geographical representation of Vieques as an island-community. 
The narratives of the island as distinctively Viequense have been articulated 
through specific gendered discourses.  These discourses, built through kinship metaphors, 
transfigured Vieques into an island child and gave life to Isla Nena (Girl Island): the 
daughter of the Puerto Rican main island.  Isla Nena is the gendered and infantile 
representation of the Viequense island-community.  In the following chapters, I trace the 
life of Isla Nena starting with the conception of an island-community worth dying for in 
1514 with the Spanish massacre of the indigenous population, going through its birth and 
baptism as Isla Nena in the late 19th and early 20th century as the prosperous sugar colony 
was incorporated to Puerto Rico, and culminating with the Nena’s near extinction 
brought about by the U.S. Navy’s activities in the island since the mid 20th century.  The 
                                                 
11 The space, however, had been occupied before the European arrival to the Caribbean and 
continued to be so well into the 19th century before, for example, the Spanish Empire recognized it was not 
an empty space.  See “Chapter 2: Myths of Origin and Foundational Figures, 1514” and “Chapter 3: Claims 
to the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th Centuries.” 
12 I define Viequenses as the people who identify with the category and/or inhabit the island of 






capacity to be conceived and born, evolve, and several times almost die portrays Isla 
Nena as a living being.  The life I acknowledge in the representation, however, has been 
endowed by generations of both Viequenses and non-Viequenses.  Their narrations have 
established an organic relationship between the island and the community Isla Nena 
embodies.  In this sense, Viequenses and Isla Nena are thought to have lived together as 
one throughout the last five centuries in the northeastern Caribbean.  The temporal and 
spatial character of Isla Nena has legitimated the islanders’ claims over the history and 
landscape of Vieques.  To the extent that Isla Nena occupies and is the island as it has 
evolved over the past centuries, so Viequenses have too come to inhabit that time and 
space.13  Thus, in the long struggle to inhabit Isla Nena, Viequenses have met imperial 
dramas with historical narrations of the island as distinctively Viequense. 
The present study is a longue durée history structured chronologically from the 
1514 massacre of indigenous population in Vieques to the 2003 closing down of the U.S. 
Navy facilities in the island.14  Two of the recurring themes are the strategic importance 
different empires have assigned to Vieques in regards to European maritime voyages to 
the Caribbean, and the subordination of Vieques to the Puerto Rican main island.  Yet, 
                                                 
13 The separation of time from space and vice versa, as Manuel Castells, David Harvey and many 
others argue, while sometimes analytically useful, is a theoretical illusion.  The one is implied in the 
existence and comprehension of the other.  Borrowing Castells’ definition, “space is a material product, in 
relationship to other material products –including people- who engage in [historically] determined social 
relationships that provide space with a form, a function, and a social meaning...space is the material 
support of time-sharing social practices.”  The argument that time-based practices depend on space for 
support and spaces in turn are shaped by the same time-based practices favors Harvey’s usage of the 
concept of time-space as a single analytical category.  Manuel Castells, The Castells Reader on Cities and 
Social Theory, ed. Ida Susser (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2002) 343-344.  David Harvey, The 
Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1990). 
14 The French historian Fernand Braudel pioneered the concept of longue durée as a history of long 
chronological extent divided between geographical, social and individual times in his 1949 work La 
Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II.  My own use of the concept longue 
durée refers to a long chronological history mindful to the influence of geography on such a history.  
Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II (Paris: Colin, 






even though the island and its Caribbean-ness have dictated a particular brand of 
colonialism, this is really not the history of a place.  It is the history of peoples and of 
their imagining of an island-community, and by imagining I mean both the long socio-
historical process marked by violent displacements and uneasy mergings of peoples in the 
island and the 20th century historical narratives that have structured and given sense to the 
process.  As such, this is also a study of memory, or of the collective memories of 500 
years.  This history of longue durée, in turn, is structured through foundational 
conjunctures central to the late 20th century Viequense collective memory of themselves 
as an island-community. 
The historical agency in the following narrative is not lost in structures, 
geography and long historical processes, but can be found in those ephemeral and 
everyday struggles of individuals to survive.  Individuals, I argue, are not lost in their 
milieu.  On the contrary, Viequenses are users who, following French historian Michel de 
Certeau, have creatively woven Isla Nena through walking and other everyday 
practices.15  They actively adapted and molded an island otherwise claimed by empires.  
People, in the process of imagining a community, establish organic relationships with 
places and their histories that allow them to create a sense of belonging.  It was, after all, 
people in their everyday practices who gave life to their milieu through the imagining of 
Isla Nena.  I, as a historian, have just written down my interpretation of the real-
marvelous miracle that brought life to an island-community. 
                                                 
15 Michel de Certeau argued that users, people who lack a place for empowerment, engage in tactics 
like walking and other everyday practices to creatively weave spaces they are otherwise disempowered to 
claim.  The tactics of the disempowered, in turn, are characterized by a sense of spontaneous mobility that 
creatively disrupts and redefines spaces users are nonetheless unable to possess.  Michel de Certeau, The 






My intertwining of long historical processes and everyday practices is meant to 
shed light on the intimate workings of empires in Vieques.  Following the cultural turn, 
historians have portrayed empires as articulated and experienced intimately by people.  
The change has entailed a redefinition of the relationship between the micro and the 
macro and between the metropole and the colony, and a more nuanced understanding of 
the everyday workings of power.16  I am precisely interested in the everyday workings 
and challenges to imperial projects because it is in those everyday struggles that empires 
manifest their most intimate hegemonic pretensions and vulnerabilities.  The convergence 
in Vieques of global imperial dramas with the everyday narratives of inhabitants allows 
for such an exploration.  In Vieques, for example, a walk through the town of Isabel II 
during the 1950s could not be separated from the Cold War that the U.S. Empire waged 
on a global scale.17  The U.S. Cold War initiatives encouraged spatial geographies users 
had to navigate in order to survive.  Mistakes in judgment had concrete consequences on 
the bodies of colonial subjects, and of servicemen.18  Empires and their schemes, in fact, 
bridge the 500 years of this history.  Their imperial designs in Vieques have been 
exceedingly militaristic and have subordinated the welfare of the island’s inhabitants to 
                                                 
16 For an assessment of the historical writing of Latin American-U.S. Empire encounters see, for 
example, Gilbert Joseph, Catherine Legrand and Ricardo Salvatore, eds., Close Encounters of Empire: 
Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).  
For a discussion of metropolitan-colonial connections see Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, “Between 
Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
Bourgeois World, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 1-
56. 
17 See Appendices 1 and 2. 
18 I define colonial subjects in this context as the inhabitants of Vieques and Viequenses who were 
not part of the U.S. Armed Forces or representatives of the federal government in the island.  By the usage 
of the term colonial subjects, however, I do not wish to imply that these people shared a stable identity 
based on colonial subalternity.  On the contrary, I understand that subalternity, not reduced to the category 
of proletariat, depends on context based positionalities, and that colonialism does not necessarily define 
every aspect of the lives of colonial subjects.  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1988).  271-313.  For a discussion of the effects of the onset of the Cold War in Vieques 






the needs of distant and not so distant metropolises.19  Imperial designs, in turn, also 
reveal the other side of the coin, people’s struggle to survive.  Empires may have come 
and gone from Vieques over the last five centuries, but the narrative thread of this history 
remains the same: imperialism and survival. 
Imperial narratives cannot be separated from the everyday practices of 
Viequenses.  Their intimate connection makes evident that the seemingly marginal can be 
global in scale.  My delving into the miracles surrounding the island of Vieques 
illuminates the particularities of the Puerto Rican archipelago and the Caribbean region in 
general.  The militarized imperialism exercised in Vieques has been but an acute 
manifestation of Spanish and U.S. imperial designs towards Puerto Rico and the 
Caribbean.  As the Jamaican-born sociologist Stuart Hall has argued, the Caribbean is a 
diasporic space historically constructed through violent ruptures, constant movement and 
interchange.20  The 1514 massacre of the indigenous population and the late 19th and 
early 21st century migratory waves between Vieques and neighboring islands attest to a 
Caribbean history marked by violent displacements and the clashing and mergings of 
peoples.  These events further attest to a Caribbean history where surviving is many times 
an act of defiance.  The miracles surrounding Vieques, therefore, tell something about 
Puerto Rico, the Caribbean and other seemingly marginal and very much colonized 
communities across the globe such as Guam. 
The particularities of Vieques, however, are global in different ways.  These do 
not only have echoes in other parts of the world, but have affected the global narratives of 
                                                 
19 In the last 500 years San Juan has also functioned as a metropolitan center for Vieques, and the 
government of the Puerto Rican colony and later commonwealth has often formulated adverse measures for 
the island-community. 







empires.  The Operation Portex carried out in Vieques during February of 1950, for 
example, shaped the actions of U.S. troops in Korea.21  Or perhaps, the opposition from 
the part of the Puerto Rican government and the Viequense people to the 1958-1964 
plans to expropriate the complete island of Vieques made the Department of Defense 
(DOD), and specifically the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in office from 1961-
1968, to think twice before attempting another complete expropriation of a community of 
U.S. citizens.22  The opposition may have encouraged the DOD to rest its gaze upon non-
U.S. territories like the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean.  The British citizens of the 
Diego García atoll may have then borne the brunt of military expropriations, carried out 
during the years 1967-1971 by the British Empire for the U.S.  The British Empire, 
through this gesture of transatlantic imperial solidarity, quietly moved the Chagossians to 
Mauritius and saved the U.S. from the problem of having to face colonial citizens of the 
empire appropriating discourses of freedom and democracy to demand the return to their 
home island.  The Director of the Center for Defense Information, Rear Admiral 
(Retired) Gene La Rocque, in fact, testified to Congress in 1974 about the transfer of the 
Diego García atoll that, “the British lent their name to the project as a cover for actual 
U.S. control and dominance.  This was perhaps due to bashfulness on the part of the 
United States about hanging on to some remnants of the crumbled British colonial 
empire.”23  The U.S., whether embarrassed by taking spoils or by acting like an empire, 
                                                 
21 William Warner Harris, Puerto Rico’s Fighting 65th Infantry: From San Juan to Chorwan (San 
Rafael: Presidio Press, 1980). 
22 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was in office from 1961 to 1968.  He headed part of the 
confidential talks between the White House, the DOD and the government of Puerto Rico during the years 
1958-1964 on the DOD’s plans to expropriate the complete islands of Vieques and Culebra.  For a 
discussion of the 1958-1964 expropriation plans see “Chapter 7: Isla Nena, Island of Memories and the 
Dead, 1953-2003.” 
23 “Diego Garcia: New Imperialist Roost in the Indian Ocean,” Arabs in Israel, spec. issue of MERIP 






could definitely be imperial through the British Empire.  Although as the ex-Mayor of 
Vieques Radamés Tirado argues, it may just be the custom of the U.S. Navy, and DOD in 
general, to get somebody else do its dirty work.24  In return for taking care of the dirty 
work, the U.S. assumed part of the British millionaire share of research and development 
costs of the Polaris missile system.25  The transaction paid off for the U.S. that has since 
then denied responsibility over the welfare of the Chagossians by claiming, among other 
things, lack of jurisdiction in foreign soil.26  Such a washing of imperial hands of the 
problem of colonial subjects, as evidenced in the 2003 closing down of the naval bases in 
Vieques, would have been impossible for the U.S. in the case of the Viequenses.  
Particularities surrounding Vieques, therefore, have marked shifts in imperial policies.  
The shifts suggest the intricate relationship between metropolis and colony and the 
vulnerability of empires to the actions of colonial fringes.27 
                                                 
24 Radamés Tirado, personal interview, 28 February 2001. 
25 The British Empire, some say secretly and with the compliance of the U.S. DOD, expropriated the 
approximately 1,000 to 2,000 inhabitants of the Diego García atoll during 1967-1971 in order to lease the 
island to the U.S.  For a comparison of the history of Vieques with that of the atoll Diego García of the 
Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean see “Chapter 7: Isla Nena, Island of Memories and the Dead, 1953-
2003” and “Chapter 8: Conclusion.”  “Diego Garcia: New Imperialist Roost in the Indian Ocean,” Arabs in 
Israel.  Jack Fuller, “Dateline Diego Garcia: Paved-Over Paradise,” Foreign Policy 28 (Autumn 1977): 183. 
26 Chagossians filed suit in 2001 against the ex-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the 
United States for their expropriation from Diego García, and the effects that the expropriation have had on 
the displaced population.  U.S. courts have repeatedly dismissed the case claiming, among other things, no 
sovereignty over the foreign territory of Diego García.  Bancoult, et al. v. McNamara, et tal, no. 05-5049, 
Court of Appeals District of Columbia of the U.S., 21 April 2006, Georgetwon Law Library, 2008, 
Georgetown University, 24 January 2008 
<http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/dc/opinions/05opinions/05-5049a.pdf >. 
27 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri propose that competing imperialist powers are being replaced 
with a single unitary power that overdetermines and structures them all.  The result is the creation of a 
transnational Empire that has no definite center.  Since the new Empire has no true center, Hardt and Negri 
argue, any margin, like Vieques, can be used to deal a fatal blow to the Imperial heart.  The lack of a center, 
in turn, implies a corresponding lack of fringes.  The global is in the local and vice versa.  Michael Hardt 






Empires, especially in the late 20th and 21st century, have proven very vulnerable 
to the power of histories.28  It is ultimately histories, in their verbal, physical and 
symbolic forms, which create and legitimize the organic relationship of people to places.  
histories then have the power to portray empires, no matter how central their role in the 
community, as foreign aggressors and in the process transform the identities of groups 
and individuals from imperial subjects into colonized ones.29  In other words, historical 
interpretations have the power to transform, for example, Spanish subjects into colonized 
people under the Spanish empire.   People in general wield the power of histories in 
their everyday narrations.  Yet, historians claim a privileged access to legitimated, as 
opposed to everyday, histories.  These are the verbal narratives approved by dissertation 
committees, published in books and read by communities of scholars.  These are the 
narratives people in colonial contexts like Vieques have limited opportunities to either 
consume or produce.  The problem, in turn, is one of representation and power.  How can 
colonial subjects access legitimated spaces of representation from which to narrate their 
community?  This precise question, bringing to the forefront the political divide between 
history and memories and stories, led to the formulation of this dissertation. 
This research project has its roots in 1978, when I was born to Viequense 
emigrants in San Juan.  My parents were also marked by displacements, but perhaps less 
violently so than my grandparents, who were expropriated by the U.S. Navy in the 
                                                 
28 For a discussion of the late 20th century proliferation of representational spaces where to narrate 
alternative histories see “Chapter 7: Isla Nena, Island of Memories and the Dead, 1953-2003.” 
29 Even though I argue that for centuries different empires have opposed the establishment of a stable 
community in Vieques, the Viequense island-community cannot be separated from imperial narratives.  
The island-community was established in relation to these imperial narratives.  Therefore, empires are not 






1940s.30  My parents, nonetheless, wove for me such compelling histories about life in 
Vieques, U.S. imperialism and violent displacement that I inherited their histories as my 
own.  I could not escape them.  Following Marianne Hirsch, I understand memory as an 
act in the present negotiated with collective histories.  Memory, she argues, does not need 
to be based on lived experiences because time and space can conflate as through a 
superimposition of disparate images.  The conflation, however, requires acts of 
identification and affiliation with, in this case, the traumatic histories my parents 
narrated.  My identification with my parents’ histories transformed their memories into 
my own postmemories.  Postmemory, as formulated by Marianne Hirsch, describes: 
the relationship of children of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to 
the experiences of their parents, experiences that they “remember” only as 
the stories and images with which they grew up, but that are so powerful, 
so monumental, as to constitutes memories in their own right.  The term is 
meant to convey its temporal and qualitative difference from survivor 
memory, its secondary or second-generation memory quality, its basis in 
displacement, its belatedness.  Postmemory is a powerful form of memory 
precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not 
through recollection but through projection, investment and creation.  That 
is not to say that the survivor memory itself is unmediated, but that it is 
more directly connected to the past.  Postmemory characterizes the 
experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that preceded 
their birth, whose own belated stories are displaced by the stories of the 
previous generation, shaped by traumatic events that they can neither 
understand nor re-create.31 
 
Postmemories are therefore powerful non-witness or second-generation memories that 
inform personal and collective identities.  I then informed my San Juanera-Viequense 
identity with postmemories of street brawls, extreme poverty and killings that I never 
witnessed but that I clearly identified as integral to life in Vieques with the U.S. Navy. 
                                                 
30 For a discussion of the 1940s expropriations carried out by the U.S. Navy in Vieques see “Chapter 
6: The Arrival of the U.S. Navy, 1930-1950.” 
31 Marianne Hirsch, “Projected Memory: Holocaust Photographs in Personal and Public Fantasy,” 
Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present, eds. Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe and Leo Spitzer 






The present research project started to take shape during a 2001 conversation with 
the community activist and personal friend of my parents, Ismael Guadalupe.  I was 
writing a paper about the 1953 murder of an old man, and he told me not only about the 
murder but also about what he thought was the importance of my work for the Viequense 
community.  He emphasized to me how urgently they needed the text I was going to 
write in order to contradict the “lies” the U.S. Navy told about their 60-year presence in 
Vieques.  It was clear to me then that the Viequense community needed the work of a 
historian, not to tell them their history, but to legitimate it to the U.S. Navy and other 
interested parties.32  Perhaps they needed the written text of a San Juanera-Viequense 
historian from the University of Michigan who was not exactly a member of, but also was 
not foreign to, the Viequense community, and who was working in the midst of the U.S. 
Empire.  The borders of imperial-colonial encounters were therefore diffused in me as I 
embodied the U.S. trained Viequense-Puerto Rican historian who could narrate histories 
melded with postmemories, or perhaps wield the power to transform Viequense 
memories into legitimated histories.  The practice of history in colonial contexts, I further 
understood then, can involve the very urgent telling of narratives upon which people rely 
for survival.  Histories can be weapons and back in 2001 I was about to write one.33  I 
decided to explore the tensions of the historical discipline and engage my own personal 
task in a self-reflexive manner.  Thus, I set out to write a study both of Vieques and of the 
narration of its history. 
                                                 
32 Ismael Guadalupe, for example, did not need me to tell him that in 1953 an old Viequense man 
had been murdered by U.S. servicemen.  He was convinced of the factuality of the event.  He did not even 
need me to interpret the murder for him because he contextualized it very well within the larger relationship 
of the Viequense community with the U.S. Navy.  He needed only the written text of a historian that could 
validate his claims.  Ismael Guadalupe, personal interview, 28 February 2001. 
33 For a discussion of histories as weapons of the Spanish Empire see “Chapter 4: The Spanish 






One of the first challenges I encountered in the writing of a history of Vieques 
was where to find it.  I soon realized that to find the history of my seemingly marginal 
colony I had to visit the imperial archives and engage 500 years of imperial knowledge 
production surrounding the island of Vieques.34  I therefore conducted research in San 
Juan, Puerto Rico; Washington, D.C.; London, United Kingdom; and Nantes in France.  
In San Juan I frequented the General Archive of Puerto Rico, the Luis Muñoz Marín 
Foundation, the Center for Historical Researches and diverse collections of the José 
Lázaro Library.  The Center, part of the University of Puerto Rico along with the Lázaro 
Library, held documentation from the National Historical Archive, Overseas Section in 
Madrid and the National Library of Madrid.  In Washington, London and Nantes I 
researched in the respective U.S. and U.K. National Archives and in the Center of the 
Diplomatic Archives.  In the end, I had constructed my own trans-imperial archive that 
portrayed competing visions of Vieques.  The Foreign Office of the British Empire, for 
example, suspected that the 19th century “Founder of Vieques” Teophile Le Guillou was 
a deserter from the French Navy, while the Spanish Overseas Ministry embraced him as a 
refugee from post-revolutionary Haiti.35  In Vieques I visited the Museum and Archive 
Fortín Conde de Mirasol and the Office of the Special Sub-Commissioner for Vieques.  
While imperial archives safeguarded, for the most part, abundant documentation 
                                                 
34 For a discussion of the problem with the production of knowledge and imperial archives see, for 
example, Cooper and Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony,” Tensions of Empire.  See also Michel-
Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995). 
35 The Spanish Overseas Ministry was created by the Royal Decree of May 20, 1863.  Its creation 
took place 20 years after Teophile Le Guillou’s death.  Nonetheless, the Ministry safeguarded and 
commented on documents related to the passing of Le Guillou through Vieques.  The British Foreign 
Office also safeguarded and commented upon documents produced, in this case by the British Empire, of 
Le Guillou’s passing through Vieques.  Agustín Sánchez Andrés, “El Ministerio de Ultramar en España: 
estructura administrativa y política colonial (1863-1899),” Historia y Sociedad VIII (1995-1996): 52.  For a 
discussion of Teophile Le Guillou’s role in the foundation of the Spanish colony of Vieques see “Chapter 






produced by their officials, the Fortín offered a variety of texts produced by colonial 
subjects.36  I wanted to recover and respectfully convey the texts produced by the 
inhabitants of Vieques, not to rescue expressions of pure subaltern voice, but to find 
subaltern histories embedded within imperial narratives.37  In turn, I conducted 34 
interviews that I combined with a wide array of sources ranging from maps, newspapers, 
journals and government-produced documents to Internet sites, murals, monuments, 
novels, songs and sayings.38  The extended archive I created, perhaps guided by the ideal 
of an ever-elusive total history, bridges five centuries, different imperial archives and 
traditional divides between historical and ethnographic research. 
The diversity of sources, while central to the interdisciplinary and trans-imperial 
project, still lacked the intimacy I wanted to convey about imperialism and survival.  I 
therefore decided to expose myself, and my family, to the reader and engage this history 
                                                 
36 I define colonial subjects in this context as the inhabitants of Vieques and Viequenses who were 
not imperial officials or those persons directly employed in the imperial bureaucracy.  In terms of archives 
and the representation of colonial subjects, the Luis Muñoz Marín Foundation in Trujillo Alto, Puerto Rico, 
has safeguarded a variety of texts produced by the inhabitants of Vieques and Viequenses in general.  I 
think the populist stance of the Puerto Rican Governor Luis Muñoz Marín favored the surfacing of these 
voices appealing directly to him for help.  In addition, the archive with the documents pertaining to Luis 
Muñoz Marín’s political career is not exactly an imperial archive to Vieques.  Part of the problem with 
finding texts produced by Viequense colonial subjects, especially before the 20th century, is the reigning 
illiteracy of the population when imperial archives have privileged the written text, and therefore the 
writings of imperial bureaucrats. 
37 My search for texts produced by colonial subjects is ultimately a search for subaltern histories 
embedded within imperial narratives.  The search for such texts and histories should not imply the belief 
that I can give voice to the subaltern.  My purpose is rather to strategically essentialize, and in the process 
be guilty of epistemic violence (violence exercised through the production of knowledge), so as to write a 
narrative about the effects of imperialism in Vieques.  As the Indian literary critic and theorist Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak has argued, the category subaltern is situational and elusive, especially for intellectuals 
seeking to represent the subaltern who cannot speak, or be heard, because there is no shared language.  The 
impossibility of representing the subaltern, further following Spivak, should not lead to the renounciation 
of intellectual endeavors and political projects, but rather lead to conscious and strategic essentializing and 
alliances that do not naturalize identity positionalities.  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Postcolonial 
Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. Sarah Harasym (New York: Routledge, 1990) 140-142.  
Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Marxism. 
38 Not all of the people I interviewed can be classified as Viequenses.  There were some Puerto 
Rican main islanders and U.S. North Americans that had made Vieques their home or their vacation 
getaway.  These persons, for the most part, had no desire nor were they identified by other people with the 






through my memories and postmemories.  My insertion into the narrative, I hope, 
accomplishes different objectives I am committed to in the practice of history.  First, the 
insertion makes my presence felt and opens up my role as a weaver of histories for the 
reader to question.  Second, my acknowledgement as a knitter of histories makes evident 
that the imagining of Isla Nena has been a transnational collective effort.  My parents and 
thousands of Viequenses have for years imagined Isla Nena from San Juan, St. Croix, 
New York and other spaces, as I have been imagining Isla Nena from Michigan.  Thirdly, 
my privileging of postmemories as primary sources in their own right, to be avowed and 
questioned, problematizes the divides between legitimated versus non-legitimated 
sources, written versus oral texts and between history versus memory.39  Lastly, my 
postmemories allow me to write a history about Abuela Paca. 
My grandmother endured displacement, extreme poverty and finally succumbed 
to cancer.  The English historian Carolyn Steedman once wrote about the death of her 
mother that, “to have cancer was the final unfairness in a life measured out by it.”40  So 
was it for my grandmother.  Yet, while Steedman was concerned with the exclusions that 
                                                 
39 The debate about the relationship of history and memory is a long and heated one.  Peter Burke, 
for example, argues that historical writing, like memory, is the product of social groups who determine 
what is to be remembered and how.  He, in turn, characterizes memory as historical but, due to its non-
written character, particularly malleable and selective.  For Burke, history is achieved when memory is 
performed or maybe transformed by the act of writing.  Writing is central for him because it is the main 
instrument to assist memory in the resistance of manipulation.  In the end, both are understood by Burke as 
political forms of collective remembrance.  Yet, history is privileged over a supposedly weak memory.  
Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” Varieties of Cultural History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997) 43-59.  The debate on the Western privileging of the written word is extensive.  For an example of an 
argument against the artificial divide between text and image see W.J.T. Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, 
and Ideology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986).  For a problematization of the divide 
between written and oral languages of cultures see Gordon Brotherston, “Towards a grammatology of 
America: Lévi-Strauss, Derrida and the native New World text,” Literature, Politics and Theory: Papers 
from the Essex Conference, 1976-84, ed. Francis Baker (London: Methuen, 1986) 190-209.  Or see Jacques 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1976). 
40 Carolyn Kay Steedman, Landscape for a Good Woman: A Story of Two Lives (New Brunswick: 






gender and class had inflicted on her mother’s life, my grandmother endured the 
exclusions of class, gender, race and colonialism.  Her experiences with displacement, 
poverty and cancer were arguably results of the U.S. Navy’s presence in Vieques.  Still, 
my grandmother expressed her political claims through the pro-statehood party.  Her 
allegiance to the United States, not unlike the allegiance of Steedman’s mother to the 
conservative party, perhaps revealed a desire to move out of the fringes, or borderlands as 
Steedman calls it, and into the center of the imperial community.41  This was a center that 
she identified in Hollywood, for my grandmother never spoke of Washington or politics.  
Yet, she was fixed on visiting Hollywood, and take a peek of lives lived out far away 
from apartments in caseríos. 
The everyday struggles of my grandmother to inhabit Vieques are not recorded in 
history books.  Yet, she was my most marvelous, intimate and contradictory historical 
trace of the past I seek to capture.  It is traces, following Michel-Rolph Trouillot, that 
separate the socio-historical processes from the historical narratives that differ and 
overlap with the processes.  He argues that in particular contexts, often spurred by 
controversy, communities experience the need for a different kind of credibility that leads 
to the evaluation of historical facts from fictions.  The passing of these very context-
based tests is what separates, for Trouillot, historical narratives from fictional ones.  The 
separation, furthermore, depends on those traces that he argues socio-historical processes 
always leave behind, some of which are quite concrete and delimit the possibilities of 
future historical narratives.42  Abuela Paca is thus the inspiration of this historical 
                                                 
41 In the first line of Part One of Landscape for a Good Woman, Steedman wrote that the book was 
about “lives lived out in the borderlands.”  These were the lives of her English working-class mother and 
grandmother, and perhaps her own.  Steedman, Landscape.  5. 






narrative, for her narratives tuned my perception and her body bore the scars of the 
history that follows.  With those scars, I negotiate this history. 
The present narrative is spun through the histories of four generations of 
Viequenses, of which I am, for now, the last one.  I hope to convey to the reader the 
multiple forms of a long struggle of peoples to claim a place of their own.  The right to 
inhabit Vieques, after all, has been fought for on a daily basis over the past 500 years. 
The following text is divided into eight chapters.  The second chapter, titled 
“Myths of Origin and Foundation Figures, 1514,” provides a brief introduction to the 
geography of Vieques and to the aboriginal cultures that passed through and inhabited the 
Caribbean island.  The emphasis, however, is on the Carib group that clashed with the 
Spanish Empire in the early 16th century.  This group had a profound impact not only in 
shaping European fantasies of the region, but also in later negotiations surrounding 
Viequense identity.  The 1514 massacre of the indigenous people in the island, I argue, is 
alive in the collective memory of Viequenses who interpret it as a foundational 
conjuncture for their island-community.  Viequenses, in turn, credit the Caribs with the 
original imagining of the island-community of Bieke.  The imagining was carried out 
through daily rituals and, more importantly for Viequenses, through extraordinary acts 
like those of the tragic-heroic figures Cacimar and Yaureibo who died in the struggle 
against the Spanish conquistadors.  The introduction to the indigenous populations also 
facilitates the assessment of the role of archeology in the study of pre-Columbian 
Vieques and in the writing of the history of Puerto Rico. 
The third chapter “Claims to the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th Centuries” 






population, Spain did not exercise control over Vieques.  Even though the Spanish 
government identified Vieques as a deserted imperial possession, the island was the 
gathering place of people representing a synthesis of the fringes and enemies of the 
Spanish Empire.  Spain’s inability to populate and unwillingness to give up its claims to 
the small island, I argue, favored Vieques’ evolution into a contact zone of European 
empires.  Subjects of different empires coincided in Vieques for illicit dealings and for 
the extraction of the island’s natural resources.  The access of these subjects to the island 
encouraged a proliferation of non-Spanish geographical representations and colonization 
ventures.  These representations and ventures combined to propose alternate identities for 
the island that the Spanish Empire could not control.  In turn, some Spanish officials and 
chroniclers characterized Vieques as a savage island.  The writings portrayed how the 
Carib savagery Spain hoped to erase in 1514 could not be easily vanquished.  While 
Vieques’ status remained ambiguous, Puerto Rico was rapidly militarized and 
transformed into a sugar colony dependent on slavery.  These important changes in the 
main island affected the status of Vieques during the 16th to the 19th century.  In this 
chapter I analyze 16th-18th century maps, 18th century chronicles and diverse 19th century 
Spanish imperial documentation. 
Chapter four “The Founding of the Spanish Colony of Vieques” focuses on the 
gradual processes throughout the 19th century of establishing the Spanish colony of 
Vieques, and of annexing it to the nearby colony of Puerto Rico.  I argue that these 
processes, begun in 1811 and sealed by 1873, were full of contradictions and tensions 
that changed characterizations of the island from a void and untamable space into a 






represent for Viequenses a second and definite foundational conjuncture.  If the Caribs 
had imagined an island-community worth dying for, the Spanish Empire succeeded in 
establishing one that managed to survive.  In this chapter I examine 19th century British 
Foreign Office and French diplomatic records and varied documentation produced in 
Madrid, San Juan and Vieques. 
The fifth chapter “The Sugar Baptism of Isla Nena, Late 1800s-1930” addresses 
the 1898 change of Spanish to U.S. sovereignty over the Puerto Rican archipelago and 
the continuities and disruptions the change meant to the Viequense sugar world.  The 
cultivation of sugar dictated the demographic, socio-economic and land-tenure patterns 
prevalent on the island.  The prosperous sugar economy, I argue, made possible Luis 
Lloréns Torres’ poem “Isla Nena.”  The poem written by the Puerto Rican main islander 
both named an island already characterized as a female child and discursively sealed its 
subordinate relationship to Puerto Rico.  The island child, after all, was the daughter of 
the Puerto Rico main island.  The sugar world, in addition, made possible the gradual 
coming together of Viequenses, Caribbean immigrants and main islanders and the uneasy 
entrance of Puerto Rican nationalism into the small island.  The chapter, in this sense, is 
not about sugar, but about the people brought together by sugar.  In this chapter I employ 
diverse early 20th century U.S. government documentation, Vieques’ municipal records, 
newspapers, photographs, maps and interviews.  
The sixth chapter, titled “The Arrival of the U.S. Navy, 1930-1950,” discusses the 
entrance of the Navy into Vieques in relation to the changes it brought on the land-tenure 
patterns and the socio-economic and urban composition of the island.  The 1940s 






the island.  The expropriations, I argue, destroyed the island’s agricultural activities and 
broke people’s attachments to the land and barrios.  The entrance of the Navy redefined 
the relationship of Viequenses to the island and among themselves.  It marked the rise of 
Viequense regional pride and the acknowledgement of a Viequense transnational 
community.  In other words, the entrance of the U.S. Navy into the island made possible 
the imagining of a Viequense collective identity which was closely related to the 
experience of displacement.  The entrance, furthermore, altered the municipality’s 
relationship to the Puerto Rican main island and government.  Viequenses, after the 
1940s, were simultaneously more dependent upon and more suspicious of the Puerto 
Rican government.  In this chapter I use Navy and Puerto Rican government 
documentation, literary works, interviews, photographs and other cultural texts. 
The seventh chapter “Isla Nena, Island of Memories and the Dead, 1953-2003” 
delves into 50 years of tense Viequense-Navy coexistence by tracing the history of the 
1953 murder of a Viequense old man.  Viequenses, I argue, have infused the murder with 
a victimization-resistance motif and assigned its memory a central role in the negotiation 
of a late 20th century collective identity.  I trace the negotiation of such a collective 
identity, defined in relation to the U.S. Navy, from the 1953 murder to the 1999-2003 
civil disobedient movements.  I further argue that through these social movements people 
imagined Vieques as a polluted island and Isla Nena as a moribund child.  In this chapter 
I analyze Washington and San Juan-based documentation, municipal records, interviews, 
photographs, maps, newspapers, legal cases, Internet sites and other texts.  
The conclusion, functioning like an epilogue, focuses on the 2003 closing down 






Rican government and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.  Vieques in the 21st century, I 
argue, is being rapidly gentrified.  The gentrification process has resurrected the 19th 
century virginity debate constructing the island of Vieques as a pristine environment.  
While community activists denounce the inefficiencies of the post-2003 cleanup process, 
Isla Nena is being cosmetically revived by real estate agents and federal agencies 










Myths of Origin and Foundational Figures, 1514 
 
The worst of all was the memory and the feeling of being so insignificant, hungry and 
scarred in an island among so many that God must have made one of those nights when 
he argued with the Devil.  Angry would have been God that night, maybe angrier than 
ever at the evil stubbornness of Satan.  Listening to him while entertaining himself with 
that handful of mud he fondled; engaging him with his soft and sweet and bland words, 
without noticing that the exasperation he kept from his voice filtered through his fingers 
into the mud.  Without noticing that the sensed defeat before that stubborn and misled 
angel, took shape in that he molded…the small island that God did not wish to make. 
Pedro Juan Soto, Usmaíl (1959)1 
 
The novelist Pedro Juan Soto narrated in Usmaíl how a carelessly molded handful 
of mud fell from God’s hands and created an island.2  This island, Soto proposed, was not 
planned or even wanted.  Instead, it was a curse resulting from the clash between evil 
stubbornness and divine exasperation.  The somber origin Pedro Juan Soto imagined in 
the 1950s context contrasts with the island’s natural landscape.  Its diverse landscape, far 
from appearing carelessly designed, encompasses a bioluminescent bay, mangroves, 
green mountains and plains and an abundance of sunshine, tropical fruits and white sand 
                                                 
1 “Lo peor de todo era la memoria y el sentirse tan insignificante, hambriento y llagado en una isla 
de tantas que Dios debió de hacer una de esas noches en que discutía con el diablo.  Molesto estaría Dios 
esa noche, quizás más molesto que nunca ante la terquedad malévola de Satanás.  Escuchándolo mientras 
se entretenía con aquel puñado de barro que manoseaba; rebatiéndolo con sus palabras suaves y dulces y 
blandas, sin darse cuenta de que la desesperación que no permitía en su voz goteaba de sus dedos al barro.  
Sin percatarse de que el fracaso presentido ante aquel ángel testarudo y descarriado, tomaba forma en aquel 
pedrusco que moldeaba…la islita que Dios no deseó hacer.”  Pedro Juan Soto, Usmaíl (Río Piedras: 
Editorial Cultural, 1973) 15-16. 
2 In the novel Usmaíl Pedro Juan Soto tells the story of a Viequense young man named Usmaíl.  He 
is the illicit son of a black Viequense woman and a white American.  Usmaíl, once abandoned by the father 
and orphaned of the mother, must grow up in and eventually leave the Navy-occupied Vieques of the 






and crystal water beaches.3  This island, furthermore, rests in the middle of the West 
Indian island-arc as a steppingstone between the Greater and the Lesser Antilles.  Cradled 
by the Atlantic Ocean to the north and the Caribbean Sea to the south, it lies 6 miles from 
the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico’s main island.  There it reigns over the waters of the 
Vieques Sound that touch the eastern shores of Puerto Rico and the southwestern ones of 
the smaller island municipality of Culebra.4  The second largest island of the Puerto 
Rican archipelago, at approximately 18 miles in length and 3 ½ in width, received the 
name Bieke (Small Island) from the indigenous inhabitants around the arrival of 
Christopher Columbus.  The name was ignored by the Genoese explorer when he 
baptized the island as the Graciosa (Graceful).  Yet, it survived and by 1514, according 
to the Puerto Rican historian Salvador Brau, was already embraced by the Spanish.  The 
name, nonetheless, was gradually transformed and by the 18th century had been 
standardized to the present-day Vieques.5 
Long before Columbus’ November 14, 1493 arrival in Vieques multiple 
aboriginal cultures had already passed through the island then densely wooded and filled 
with bodies of water.  Since these pre-Columbian peoples left no written records 
archaeology has taken on the difficult challenge to dig out other historical traces left by 
these cultures.  In Puerto Rico the traces were initially gathered and displayed by José 
                                                 
3 A mountain range divides the island of Vieques in the middle.  The highest peak called Monte 
Pirata and located in the southwestern tip of the island reaches 301 meters above sea level.  United States, 
Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, Isla de Vieques Quadrangle, Puerto Rico, 7.5 Minute Series 
(Topographic), map, photorevised from 1951 ed. (Denver: U.S. Geological Survey, 1982). 
4 See Appendices 1, 2 and 4.  The present-day Puerto Rico is an archipelago encompassing 78 
municipalities.  The majority of the municipalities are located in the main island.  Yet, two of these, 
Vieques and Culebra, are separate smaller islands lying east of the main island. 
5 Salvador Brau stated the word “Bieque” can be found in Spanish archives dating back to 1514.  
Meanwhile, the pamphlet Vieques La Isla Nena maintains that the word “Vieques” (probably spelled 
differently) appeared in maps for the first time in 1527.  Also, the pamphlet points out that upon arrival 
Christopher Columbus might have named Vieques as the “Graciosa.”  Salvador Brau, La isla de Vieques: 






Julián Acosta and George Latimer in an 1854 San Juan exhibition allowing the public, 
probably for the first time, to fantasize about an indigenous past.  The exhibition closely 
followed Manuel Alonso’s 1849 publication of El Gíbaro.  The book has been identified 
by literary scholars as the earliest written text typifying a Puerto Rican national character 
that Alonso envisioned as embodied in the figure of the jíbaro (Puerto Rican peasant).6  
The 1854 exhibition and 1849 publication proposed to a wide audience the cultural past 
and present of a Puerto Rican nation beginning to be imagined in the mid 19th century.  
These coetaneous events were symptomatic of a burgeoning intellectual and political 
atmosphere. 
Archaeological studies about Puerto Rico, according to archaeologist and 
historian Sebastián Robiou Lamarche, timidly took off with Enrique Dumont’s 1876 
Investigación acerca de las antigüedades de la isla de Puerto Rico (Research about the 
antiquities of the island of Puerto Rico), Leopold Krug’s analysis of a petroglyph in 
Gurabo, Agustín Stahl’s 1889 Los indios borinqueños (The Borinquen Indians) and 
Cayetano Coll y Toste 1897s Prehistoria de Puerto Rico (Prehistory of Puerto Rico).  In a 
matter of 20 years, as evidenced in the above titles, studies shifted from understanding 
archeological artifacts as attached to a prehistoric space unconnected to 19th century 
people to suggesting a spatial and temporal continuum between the prehistoric and 
historic inhabitants of Puerto Rico.7  To the extent that Coll y Toste’s Prehistoria de 
Puerto Rico linked pre-Columbian populations to the island and to Puerto Ricans, it 
collapsed island and people in a historical relationship.  The shift by the doctor, historian 
and public servant to endow the island and people of Puerto Rico with a longer history 
                                                 
6 Manuel A. Alonso, El jíbaro (Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, Inc., 1983). 
7 For a reference to the Western privileging of the written word, as it applies to categorizations like 






must be contextualized within the emerging nationalist narratives and with Coll y Toste’s 
personal participation in the affairs of the colonial state which at the time was moving 
towards more autonomy.8   
Archaeologists Luis Chanlatte Baik and Yvonne Narganes Storde argue that, 
notwithstanding the earlier approaches, scientific interest for Antillean archaeology had 
to wait until the 20th century.  During the first half of the century the New York Science 
Academy sponsored the works of J. Alden Mason, Froelich G. Rainey and Irving Rouse 
who, among other North American anthropologists, presented the first cultural schemes 
and systematic studies encompassing the known totality of Antillean prehistory.  In terms 
of local production there is the work of José Montalvo Guenard, Pablo Morales Cabrera’s 
1932 Puerto Rico indígena (Indigenous Puerto Rico) and Adolfo de Hostos’ compilation 
of 35 years of ethnographical and archeological articles into his 1944 Anthropological 
Papers.  In the mid 20th century appeared the works of Ricardo E. Alegría, founder of the 
Institute of Puerto Rican Culture in 1955.  Alegría has been followed during the last 
couple of decades by others like Jalil Sued Badillo with his 1978 Los Caribes: Realidad o 
Fábula (The Caribs: Reality of Fable) and Labor Gómez and Manuel Ballesteros with 
their 1980 Vida y cultura precolombina de Puerto Rico (Pre-Columbian Life and Culture 
of Puerto Rico).9 
One hundred twenty years after the Acosta-Latimer exhibit, intellectuals 
contesting the archipelago’s colonial situation reformulated the role of indigenous 
                                                 
8 I define nationalism as the appropriation and the political and cultural use of national symbols in 
the creation of discourses, not necessarily related to the state, and the feeling that makes people respond to 
the uses of the symbols. 
9 Luis A. Chanlatte Baik and Yvonne M. Narganes Storde, La nueva arqueología de Puerto Rico (su 
proyección en las Antillas) (Santo Domingo: Editora Taller, C. por A., 1990) 10.  Sebastián Robiou 







artifacts and the discipline of archaeology in general.  Concerning the role of archaeology 
in Puerto Rico Diana López Sotomayor wrote in 1975 that the discipline had to: 
reach a historical reconstruction through the analysis of archaeological 
materials...[For] in Puerto Rico, to the extent that archaeology could 
explain a part of our history and make accessible these knowledges to any 
person then it will serve for something...It is, thus, part of a reappraisal 
and affirmation of our historical roots.  This that some can consider a 
remnant of anachronistic nationalist positions, is in Puerto Rico a pressing 
necessity due to the current political situation and to the deformation and 
mutilation of our history that it has provoked.  To exemplify, it is enough 
to point out what it means in our country to talk of economic formations in 
which there did not exist the private property of the means of production, 
or demand the protection of the national patrimony.  In this sense 
archaeology has, in Puerto Rico, many tasks to accomplish.10 
 
López Sotomayor, reacting to the repression of nationalism and communism in Puerto 
Rico, argued for an openly political archaeology that recuperated traces of the past in 
order to propose a national identity.11  Following López Sotomayor’s arguments, the 
historical knowledge produced by archaeologists had to respond to the needs for national 
definition of the Puerto Rican people.  In this sense, indigenous artifacts evolved into 
urgent traces of national origins that might uncover truly autochthonous nationals long 
                                                 
10 “Llegar a una reconstrucción histórica a través del análisis de materiales arqueológicos...en Puerto 
Rico, en la medida en que la arqueología pueda explicar una parte de nuestra historia y haga accesibles 
estos conocimientos para cualquier persona entonces servirá para algo...Es, pues, parte de una revaloración 
y afirmación de nuestras raíces históricas.  Esto que algunos pueden considerar como un residuo de 
posiciones nacionalistas anacrónicas, es en Puerto Rico una necesidad imperante debido a la situación 
política actual y a la deformación y mutilación de nuestra historia que ella ha provocado.  Para ejemplificar, 
baste señalar lo que significa en nuestro país hablar de formaciones económicas en las que no existía la 
propiedad privada de los medios de producción, o exigir la protección del patrimonio nacional.  En este 
sentido la arqueología tiene, en Puerto Rico, muchas tareas que cumplir.”  Diana López Sotomayor, 
Vieques: un momento de su historia, diss., Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1975, (México: 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma, 1975) 1-2. 
11 Throughout most of the 20th century expressions of Puerto Rican nationalism were violently 
repressed by the archipelago’s colonial government.  During the 1960s and 1970s places like the University 
of Puerto Rico became locus of resistance through political mobilization and intellectual production.  After 
the 1960s the political mobilization and intellectual production were greatly influenced by Marxism and 
Marxist analytical frameworks.  The influence, inside the Cold War context, was also frowned upon by the 
Puerto Rican government and more conservative sectors.  However, by the 1990s Puerto Rican nationalism 
lost the contestatory edge as it was appropriated by the archipelago’s three political parties, pro 
independence, commonwealth and statehood, as a central discourse in their agendas.  See “Chapter 7: Isla 






dead but uncorrupted by U.S. capitalist imperialism.  The favoring of an archaeology that 
geographically imagines the beginnings of the Puerto Rican nation and thus plays an 
important role in national myths of origin is prevalent in sectors of the Puerto Rican 
academia today.12  In his 1999 presentation to the Special Committee on Vieques about 
the need to safeguard the national archaeological patrimony, Miguel Rodríguez, then 
President of The International Association for Caribbean Archaeology, argued that 
archaeology must strive for a better knowledge of the Puerto Rican “collective being” in 
order to “permit a legitimate affirmation of nationality.”13  While López Sotomayor and 
Rodríguez do not represent an entire academic field spanning over at least a century, they 
do exemplify strands of an archaeological tradition in Puerto Rico engaging the 
archipelago’s long colonial history through academic narratives infused with a nationalist 
and anti-imperialist motif. 
Archaeologists studying Vieques, dating back to Irving Rouse’s 1938 work with 
four concheros, have undertaken the task to imagine the indigenous roots of the Puerto 
Rican and more broadly the Caribbean community.14  The island, archaeologists have 
theorized, was densely populated during parts of its pre-Columbian history and scarcely 
or selectively populated afterwards.  The demographic pattern has helped the preservation 
of very important archaeological sites for the study not only of the aboriginal cultures in 
                                                 
12 I, borrowing from Peter Novick’s definition, define the term myth not in relationship to truth or 
falsity, but rather as a narrative that contains certain unquestioned and defended statements.  Myths of 
origin, in turn, are narratives that hold an important or sacred place in discourses surrounding the creation 
and evolution of a community-nation.  Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and 
the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 1-17. 
13 Miguel Rodríguez, La Marina y el patrimonio arquelógico de Vieques (Ponencia presentada ante 
la Hon. Comisión Especial de Vieques 15 de junio de 1999 Vieques, Puerto Rico) (Caguas: Universidad del 
Turabo; San Juan: Centro de Estudios Avanzados de Puerto Rico y el Caribe, n.d.) 2. 
14 López Sotomayor, Vieques: un momento de su historia.  The term concheros refers to sites full of 
shells that could have served the indigenous populations as a place for waste disposal or that portray 
disposal patterns providing information like the nutritional habits of the populations.  Chanlatte Baik and 






Vieques and Puerto Rico, but also of their migratory patterns throughout the Caribbean.  
The archaeological richness of Vieques is evidenced in the 1984 survey performed by 
Ecology & Environment.  The survey, although controversial, identified 218 sites in the 
small island pertaining, according to Miguel Rodríguez, to all the indigenous cultures 
known in the Caribbean.15  Due to its archeological richness, Vieques has been given the 
title of the pre-Columbian “cultural and geographic bridge between the Lesser and the 
Greater Antilles.”16 
The discovery and study of well preserved sites like Puerto Ferro in 1990 and 
Luján in 1994 have provided archaeologists such as Luis Chanlatte Baik and Yvonne 
Narganes Storde, from the Center for Archaeological Investigation of the University of 
Puerto Rico, and Virginia Rivera and Sixto Pérez, from the Center of Archaeological 
Investigations Bieques, with material traces of the presence and practices of human 
                                                 
15 In 1981 the federal court ordered the U.S. Navy to care for the archaeological patrimony of 
Vieques.  Accordingly the Navy sponsored the 1984 “Ecology & Environment” study that located 218 (or 
226 according to Cecilia Enjuto Rangel) sites.  Of the 218 sites, they argued that only 33 held the 
characteristics to be considered for the National Register of Historic Places.  In the end only 20 (or 19 
according again to Enjuto Rangel) sites were included in the Register.  More than a decade later, a separate 
1996 study by “Goodwin & Associates, Inc.” denounced the 1984 study as a careless one that mainly 
adapted itself to the interest of the U.S. Navy.  These denunciations coincide with the opinion of many 
Puerto Rican archaeologists like Sixto Pérez deeming the 1984 study as deficient.  On the other hand, in 
1999 Miguel Rodríguez claimed that the 1984 “Ecology & Environment” survey identified sites pertaining 
to all the aboriginal periods and cultures known in the Caribbean.  It is highly improbable that traces from 
all aboriginal periods are found in Vieques because, among other things, some archeologists propose a first 
wave of human migration to the Caribbean 3,860 years before the first recorded human presence in the 
island.  However, models like Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde’s allow the possibility that all 
indigenous cultures might be represented in Vieques.  Cecilia Enjuto Rangel, “La Historia tras la verja,” El 
nuevo día (Revista Domingo) [San Juan] 1 August 1999: 8-10.  Rodríguez, La Marina y el patrimonio 
arqueológico de Vieques.  Robiou Lamarche, Taínos y Caribes.  Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde, La 
nueva arqueología.  See Appendices 6 and 7. 
16 See, for example, Enjuto Rangel, “La Historia tras la verja,” El nuevo día 8.  For detailed studies 
of the indigenous cultures in pre-Columbian Vieques see the late 20th century works of archaeologists 
Virginia Rivera, Sixto Pérez, Luis Chanlatte Baik, Yvonne Narganes Storde, Alfredo Figueroa, Miguel 
Rodríguez, Diana López Sotomayor, Jalil Sued Badillo, amongst others.  For post-1932 studies about the 
indigenous cultures in Puerto Rico see for example the works of Ricardo E. Alegría, Ovidio Dávila, Pablo 






cultures dating as far back as 2140 B.C.17  Archaeologists believe that these indigenous 
cultures in the Greater Antilles started migrating northward from South America around 
the year 4000 B.C.  The theory is sustained, for example, by the small carvings found in 
the southern Viequense coast of Andean condors holding human heads (Figure 2.1).18  
The representation of the South American bird, not native to the Caribbean islands, 
pinpoints to the movement of peoples from the southern continent to Vieques.  These 
peoples, predating the times of global leisure tourism, airplanes, motor boats and West 
Indian federations, were probably the first to island hop across the Antillean-arc in canoes 
that swiftly interweaved the Caribbean Sea.  Yet, although classified under the common 
category of pre-Columbian, these cultures were very different among themselves. 
 
Figure 2.1: Indigenous amulet of condor holding a human head, La Hueca, Vieques19 
 
Archeologists have broadly divided the Caribbean indigenous cultures into 
Archaic and Agro-ceramist.  There are two main differences that archeologists have 
                                                 
17 Archaeological studies formulate theories based on educated guesses and technologies like Carbon 
14 tests to establish chronologies.  While these methods might lead to close approximations, they do not 
provide exact answers and depend on the discovery and study of new archaeological traces.  For example, 
different sources offer different dates as to the first human presence in Vieques.  In the early 1970s Ovidio 
Dávila suggested the year 30 B.C.  The discovery and study of the “Man of Puerto Ferro” has, arguably, 
pushed back the date to 2140 B.C.  Ovidio Dávila, “La cultura igneri de Puerto Rico,” Antología de 
lecturas de historia de Puerto Rico (Siglos XV-XVIII), ed. Aida R. Caro Costas (San Juan: Editorial 
Corripio, C. por A., 1991) 71-85.  Enjuto Rangel, “La Historia tras la verja,” El nuevo día. 
18 The small carvings or amulets of a condor holding a human head are the most recognizable icon of 
the indigenous cultures exhibit in the Museum and Archive Fortín Conde de Mirasol.  See Appendix 6. 
19 “Pendant (Condor) jadeite,” Indigenous Cultures of Puerto Rico, 2008, Universia Puerto Rico, 26 






identified between the two groups.  On one hand, there is a 5500 years lapse between the 
first Archaic migration to the Antilles in 6000 B.C. and the Agro-ceramist one in 500 
B.C.  On the other hand, the Agro-ceramists employed agricultural and pottery-making 
techniques.  It has also been argued that the initial Agro-ceramists were more politically 
developed than the Archaic.20  Nonetheless, there is no consensus about this dichotomous 
division of the Antillean indigenous cultures or about the migratory patterns to and inside 
the Caribbean.21  There is also an ongoing debate about whether the Agro-ceramists 
replaced the Archaic population or they mixed together in a long process of 
transculturation. 
Since the 1980s Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde have been proposing that the 
Archaic assimilated culturally to the Agro-ceramists who arrived in two successive 
migrations: Huecoides (AGRO I) and Saladoides-Igneris (AGRO II).  The Huecoides, as 
evidenced in La Hueca’s 5 B.C. settlement in Vieques, established themselves along the 
coasts in small communities of 4 to 5 bohíos (familial dwellings usually made of 
stubble).  The bohíos were arranged in a semicircle surrounding a central plaza that faced 
a river.22  The Saladoides-Igneri established along the same coastal areas and provided, 
by their temporal and spatial proximity to the Huecoides, continuity to the early Agro-
                                                 
20 According to Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde the Archaic organized themselves in bands and 
the Agro-ceramists into tribes and cacicazgos.  While bands were usually nomad groups of 15 to 40 
persons, the tribes and cacicazgos were both sedentary groups.  Tribes were composed of 20 to 200 people 
and cacicazgos of several population nucleuses.  Tribes and cacicazgos were mostly dependent on 
agriculture and portrayed more stratified social and more centralized political systems.  Chanlatte Baik and 
Narganes Storde, La nueva arqueología 29-31. 
21 For an example of a study that argues for the coexistence of three great cultural groups (Archaic, 
Arawak and Carib) at the time of the Spanish arrival see Ricardo E. Alegría, “La población aborigen 
antillana y su relación con otras áreas de America,” Antología de lecturas de historia de Puerto Rico (Siglos 
XV-XVIII), ed. Aida R. Caro Costas (San Juan: Editorial Corripio, C. por A., 1991) 53-70. 
22 Luis Chanlatte Baik and Yvonne Narganes Storde, exhibit “Cultura La Hueca,” Museo de 
Historia, Antropología y Arte and Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 






ceramist communities.23  The interaction of these communities with previous Archaic 
ones bred the initial and late Taino culture (AGRO III and IV).  The Taino culture, in 
turn, is understood by Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde as a cultural moment instead 
of as a separate indigenous group.24  The Chanlatte-Narganes model is based on their 
excavations of the Sorcé farm in La Hueca for the Huecoides and Saladoides-Igneris 
theories, and on sites like Playa Chica and Yanuel for the arguments about the Tainos.25  
All these places are located in Vieques. 
Sebastián Robiou Lamarche provides a different synthesis of the Caribbean 
aboriginal cultures.  In his model, the 2140 B.C. “Man of Puerto Ferro” places the first 
human presence in Vieques inside the second Archaic period (4000 B.C. to 500 B.C.).  
The second Archaic people, mainly fishermen and gatherers from South America, were 
the first inhabitants of the Lesser Antilles and Puerto Rico.  Following their footsteps 
were the Agro-ceramists Saladoides of Arawak origin (500 B.C. to 600 A.D.) that 
evolved into the Ostionoides (600 A.D. to 1200 A.D.) and later into the Tainos (1200 
A.D. to 1500 A.D.).  The Caribs, for Robiou Lamarche, represent the last migratory wave 
(1000 A.D. to 1500 A.D.) northward.  They were Kalinagos or simply South American 
Caribs that, Robiou Lamarche argues, invaded the Lesser Antilles and halted just east of 
Puerto Rico.  In their path north they killed the Arawak men.  Yet, they kept the Arawak 
women along with their language and pottery-making skills.26  While Chanlatte-Narganes 
and Robiou Lamarche’s syntheses differ in essential elements like the existence of a 
                                                 
23 Luis A. Chanlatte Baik and Yvonne M. Narganes Storde, Vieques, Puerto Rico: Asiento de una 
Nueva Cultura Aborigen Antillana (Santo Domingo: Impresora Corporán, C. por A., 1983) 74. 
24 Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde, La nueva arqueología 23. 
25 See Appendix 7. 
26 Sebastián Robiou Lamarche agrees with the arguments of the ethnologist Douglas Taylor who 
proposed during the mid 20th century that the Carib language was fundamentally that of its captive Arawak 







Carib culture, both still coincide in the passing through and possibly coexistence in the 
Puerto Rican archipelago of different aboriginal cultural groups during the 3,633 years 
previous to the Indigenous-Spanish encounter in 1493 A.D. 
The most known about indigenous group, inside and outside the Puerto Rican 
academia, is the Tainos.  Their popularity is probably due to the fact that the Spanish 
recorded their encounter in the Greater Antilles and the Bahamas and thus the Tainos 
have survived, however distortedly, in the archives of their victimizers.  However, as 
suggested before, there is an ensuing debate among scholars about the aboriginal cultures 
and the differences, if any, between the Taino and the Carib groups.  Some scholars such 
as Juan Ignacio de Armas back in 1884 and Jalil Sued Badillo since 1978 have been 
proposing that there was actually no significant difference between Tainos and Caribs to 
justify their separation into two cultural groups.27  Sued Badillo, for example, proposes 
that the dualistic version of the indigenous Antillean culture resulted from the widespread 
European appropriation of Christopher Columbus’ fantastic stories of idolatrous Taino 
and Carib Indians.  These stories, Sued Badillo argues, were part of a publicity campaign 
designed to keep alive an economically disastrous first American journey.  The 
indigenous idolatry facilitated the religious justification for the colonization venture and 
the fierceness attributed to the Caribs created a potential slave pool that secured the labor 
force for the early colonial enterprise.  The debate surrounding Taino-Carib histories is 
even more complex taking into account David Henige’s reading of friar Bartolomé de las 
Casas’ (1474-1566) Diario de a bordo.  Henige, African studies and anthropology 
                                                 
27 Jalil Sued Badillo, Los Caribes: Realidad o Fábula (San Juan: Editorial Antillana, 1978).  
References to Juan Ignacio de Armas’ 1884 La fábula de los caribes can be found in Jalil Sued Badillo, The 
Caribs: A Proper Perspective (Puerto Rico: Fundación Arqueológica Antropológica e Historia de P.R., Inc., 






bibliographer, argues that the factual knowledge historians can extract from Casas’ 1520s 
or 1530s translation of the diary kept by Christopher Columbus of his first American 
voyage is minimal.  David Henige instead proposes that the transcription of the lost 
Columbus diary is a palimpsest detailing more Casas’ assumptions and agenda regarding 
Spanish imperial policies towards the indigenous populations.  The problem then lies on 
how to treat an unreliable source that has for centuries influenced academic and non-
academic imaginings, and writings, of the indigenous populations of the Caribbean.28 
Whether two different groups or just one, the Tainos have shared some of their 
popularity in the Puerto Rican collective imaginary with the Caribs.  The influential 
archaeologist and historian Ricardo E. Alegría has argued over the years for the 
separation of the Caribs from the Tainos.  He states that amidst plenty of contradictions 
different historical sources still agree on the following particular Carib characteristics: 
their late arrival to the Lesser Antilles from South America, their displacement and/or 
massacre of the previous indigenous populations in these islands, their sparing of captive 
women, their performance of anthropophagic rituals, and their belligerent culture that 
survived by raiding nearby Arawak settlements.29  Sebastián Robiou Lamarche, disciple 
of Alegría in the Center for the Advanced Studies of Puerto Rico and the Caribbean, 
                                                 
28 Following David Henige and Margarita Zamora, Christopher Columbus’ original log of his first 
American voyage was lost at some point after 1504.  The copy or copies made by Spanish authorities were 
also lost soon thereafter so that the only surviving version of Columbus’ log is Bartolomé de las Casas 
rather liberal transcription made sometime between 1520s and the 1530s.  The transcription made by Casas 
was also lost for many years and only found in 1790.  Scholars, however, are uncertain whether Casas 
transcribed his text from the original log or from later copies which in itself raises many other questions 
about the problems of copies made from copies.  David Henige, “In the Wake of ‘In the Wake of 
Columbus’: Why the Polemic over Columbus’ First Landfall is of Interest to Africanist Historians,” History 
in Africa 14 (1987): 349-357.  David Henige, In Search of Columbus: the Sources for the First Voyage 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991).  David Henige and Margarita Zamora, “Text, Context, 
Intertext: Columbus’ Diario de abordo as a Palimpsest,” The Americas 46:1 (July 1989): 17-40. 
29 Alegría, Antología de lecturas de historia de Puerto Rico 68.  Alegría sometimes used the terms 
historical or ethnohistorical sources to refer to early European written accounts about the indigenous 
populations in the Americas.  See, for example, Ricardo Alegría, H. B. Nicholson and Gordon R. Willey, 






further states that the debate surrounding the Caribs responds to various factors.30  If the 
Caribs were a fierce warfaring culture that massacred the men of conquered Arawak 
peoples and incorporated the captive women essentially as a coerced labor force, the 
archeological traces left behind by this hybrid union would resemble the Arawak culture 
and silence the presence of the Carib group.  This would be especially true in the case of 
pottery, central to Caribbean archeological studies, given that its making was an activity 
assigned to women.  Thus, Robiou Lamarche argues that the lack of clear archeological 
evidence of a distinct Carib culture should not lead to interpretations that construe the 
Caribs as Arawaks.  Instead, he exhorts archeologists to analyze other historical traces 
like the 1619 account of Martinique and Dominica’s flora, fauna and indigenous 
population attributed to the Anonymous of Carpentras.  This account, he continues, is the 
oldest known chronicle about the Caribs who as inhabitants of the non-Spanish Lesser 
Antilles were seldom mentioned in the Spanish imperial texts more preoccupied with the 
Tainos inhabiting the Greater Antilles.  The production of detailed European narratives 
about the indigenous populations of the Lesser Antilles, Robiou Lamarche concludes, had 
to wait for French chroniclers involved in their metropolis’ 17th century colonization 
ventures in the area.  This historical conjuncture of non-Spanish colonization ventures 
would have then heralded the Caribs’ narration, colonization and eventual disappearance 
in a process similar to what the Tainos had experienced a century earlier.  In other words, 
the European production of knowledge had dire consequences for the Caribbean 
indigenous populations. 
                                                 
30 Sebastián Robiou Lamarche both completed his master’s degree in Puerto Rican and Caribbean 
Studies and is currently working on his doctoral degree in the Center for the Avanced Studies of Puerto 






Sebastián Robiou Lamarche’s call to incorporate the analysis of European written 
texts to archaeological research in the Caribbean is not new.  In fact, such written 
accounts were an integral part of Alegría’s work, which must have influenced Robiou 
Lamarche’s own intellectual production heavily based on the analysis of written texts.31  
More so, written accounts have sustained by themselves, according to Chanlatte Baik and 
Narganes Storde, the traditional divide between Tainos and Caribs.  In this, Chanlatte 
Baik and Narganes Storde argue that there is no material evidence suggesting the divide.  
So that texts like Columbus-Casas’ Diario de a bordo, however problematic, have for 
decades played a central role in Caribbean archaeology and in the perpetuation of the 
Taino-Carib divide.  The debate, in turn, becomes centered on the privileging of material 
versus written sources, or maybe between privileging the analysis of material traces left 
behind by indigenous cultures or the written traces left behind by the European cultures 
of the indigenous cultures.32 
Ricardo Alegría, Sebastián Robiou Lamarche, Luis Chanlatte Baik and Yvonne 
Narganes Storde’s arguments represent only a few of the many academic and non-
academic versions circulating about the Tainos-Caribs.  It is unlikely, if not impossible, 
that a historically accurate version will surface any time soon to settle the debates about 
the Caribbean’s indigenous past.  In the following pages I will leave behind the debates 
within the archaeological discipline to focus instead on influential narratives circulating 
                                                 
31 Sebastián Robiou Lamarche’s Taínos y Caribes, in fact, is based on the analysis of European 
written accounts and of the published work of other archaeologists and scholars.  Robiou Lamarche’s call 
for the analysis of written texts has a very practical side to archaeological studies within the Caribbean.  
Archaeological digs are collective and expensive enterprises that usually depend on teamwork and on the 
financial support of institutions.  The analysis of written accounts allows, on the other hand, for an 
individual and more democratic research experience to the extent books are less expensive and difficult to 
obtain than archaeological artifacts and allow for a more private handling.   
32 The case of Jalil Sued Badillo is quite particular to the extent he analyzed European written 






inside and outside the academia that have been very influential in the imagining of 
Viequense myths of origin and foundational figures.  These narratives respond to 
archeological and historical studies as well as to European first impressions of the 
aboriginal populations and to romantic histories circulating thereafter. 
For starters, it has long been believed by many Viequenses and Puerto Ricans that 
Tainos and Caribs were indeed two different cultural groups at war with each other when 
the Spanish arrived in the Caribbean.  The belief, defended by numerous archeologists 
throughout the last couple of centuries, can be traced back to Christopher Columbus’ 
writings about his first American voyage.33  These were mostly texts he wrote for the 
Spanish monarchy, but that still circulated widely throughout Europe.  In the 1493 letter 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer Luis De Sant Angel, for example, the Genoese 
explorer detailed stories supposedly told by natives from La Hispaniola about the 
existence of, “a people considered in all the isles as most ferocious, who eat human 
flesh.”34  The question arises of how could Columbus and his European travel 
companions effectively communicate with the Caribbean populations during that first 
encounter, and how much of the observations concerning the indigenous populations and 
of the conversations about anthropophagic practices actually responded to European 
fantasies.35  Columbus, after all, considered the possibility of meeting with “dog-headed 
people that ate men” during his first voyage.  Yet, in the 1493 letter Columbus 
                                                 
33 For a critique of Christopher Columbus’ Diario de abordo see Henige, In Search of Columbus. 
34 Christopher Columbus, “The Letter of Columbus to Luis De Sant Angel Announcing his 
Discovery,” ushistory.org, 2006, Independence Hall Association in Philadelphia, 15 October 2006 
<http://ushistory.org/documents/columbus.htm>.  
35 During the first American voyage, Columbus and his crew spent approximately 5 months in the 
Caribbean, or from October 12, 1493 to January 16, 1493.  It is difficult to ascertain how effectively 
Columbus and the other European travelers could have communicated with the indigenous populations.  
The Europeans and the Americans, after all, did not share words or signs that might have served as 






confidently contrasted the “extremely cowardly” races he had met with this new 
“ferocious” people who would later be known as Caribs.36   
During the second American voyage, Spaniards literally translated the word tayno 
as good.37  The translation might have pushed forth the characterization of Tainos as 
natural men.  Following historian Anthony Pagden, the idea of natural men, living in an 
uncorrupted natural state outside civilization, was a central motif in European intellectual 
history brought to the forefront of European imaginaries by the early encounter with the 
American indigenous populations.38  The motif, in fact, was recurrent in Columbus’ 
writings and emphasized in Casas transcription of the Diario.39  The translation of tayno 
as good, in addition, might have further helped cement the idea that the Tainos were the 
peace-loving Indians defending the Puerto Rican main island from the Caribs who were 
voraciously making their way north from the Windward Islands.40  The intra-indigenous 
                                                 
36 The Casas-Columbus’ Diario is full of references to the divide between the peaceful Indians 
Columbus met and the savage ones that Columbus had not met but that these Indians supposedly described.  
Bartolomé de las Casas, Diario de a bordo de Cristóbal Colón (Barcelona: Editorial Arcadia, 1957) 60.  
Alegría, Antología de lecturas de historia de Puerto Rico 67-70.  Robiou Lamarche, Taínos y Caribes 153, 
167.  Sued Badillo, Los Caribes 33-40. 
37 For the literal translation of tayno as good see Diego Álvarez Chanca, Carta al Cabildo de Sevilla 
in Aurelio Tió, Dr. Diego Álvarez Chanca (Estudio Biográfico) (Barcelona: Instituto de Cultura 
Puertorriqueña and Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, 1966) 52. 
38 Anthony Pagden writes that the notion of the natural man was closely linked to Aristotelian 
notions of natural slaves.  These were people who could not uplift themselves alone, for which they needed 
the help of masters.  Pagden argues, however, that the concept of natural man was challenged early on in 
the 16th century for a more nuanced approach to indigenous cultures.  Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural 
Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). 
39 Bartolomé de las Casas, in his transcription of Columbus’ diary, narrated the following passage 
about the first European-indigenous encounter in the island of Guanahaní or San Salvador.  “The Christians 
also wondered at how the Indians came near and walked so freely among them, as fearless and 
unsuspicious as if they had been fathers and sons; at how they all went naked, just as their mothers bore 
them…so that they seemed not to have lost, or to have had restored, the state of innocence in which, for a 
tiny space of time, said not to have exceeded six hours, our father Adam lived.”  Bartolomé de Las Casas, 
Witness: Writings of Bartolomé de las Casas, trans. and ed. George Sanderlin (New York: Orbis Books, 
1992).  43.  For the Spanish unabridged text see Casas, Diario 27-33. 
40 The Caribs were usually referred to by the Spanish as barloventeños (from the Windward Islands).  
The terms Barlovento (Windward) and Sotavento (Leeward) given to the Lesser Antilles and part of the 
northern South American coast originally referred to navigational winds employed by Spanish sailors.  






conflict, appealing to noble savage versus savage dichotomies also central to European 
intellectual history, is thought to have been permanently interrupted by the coming of the 
Spanish.  The interruption, in turn, left Vieques as the last Carib conquest. 
Some scholars debate whether Vieques was the temporary hideout or permanent 
settlement of these indigenous warriors.41  Nonetheless, histories that have circulated for 
at least 500 years inside and outside the Puerto Rican archipelago tell of Carib raids on 
the Isla Grande (Big Island or the Puerto Rican main island) and of the booty of defeated 
men and women brought back to Vieques to be raped, enslaved and/or eaten.  The strong 
popular belief in these histories, neither proved or disproved by academic studies, and 
their centrality in Viequense myths of origin mandates that, at least for the purpose of this 
work, the Carib existence as a separate cultural group is not discarded.42  In addition, 
following Stuart Hall, identities always involve representations negotiated with others 
that recognize or not a given identity.  Identities, Hall emphasizes: 
actually come from the outside, they are the way in which we are 
recognized and then come to step into the place of the recognition which 
others give us.  Without the others there is no self, there is no self-
recognition.43 
                                                                                                                                                 
referred to the opposite of barlovento.  Navigating sotavento implied a swifter trip.  The Windward Islands 
are those found in the southern half of the Lesser Antilles, while those of the northern half are referred to as 
the Leeward Islands.  The classification of what islands belong to which island group depends on the 
sources consulted, but the islands of Guadeloupe and Dominica are generally acknowledged as border 
islands.  Guadeloupe would be the southernmost Leeward Island and Dominica the northernmost 
Windward Island.  For a definition of the Windward and Leeward Islands see Irving Rouse, The Tainos: 
Rise and Decline of the People Who Greeted Columbus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) 3-5. 
41 Irving Rouse argues that while Caribs only lived in the Windward Island, Vieques was still 
inhabited by “Eastern Tainos.”  Rouse creates the category “Eastern Tainos” to make a distinction in the 
degree of cultural evolution between the more advanced Tainos in Puerto Rico and La Hispaniola and the 
less advanced populations in Vieques and the Windward Islands.  Rouse, The Tainos. 
42 Many of the archaeologists against the existence of a Carib cultural group argue that there is a lack 
of material evidence, and not that there is evidence to rule out the Carib presence documented in early 
Spanish texts.  Thus, the possibility remains of finding Carib material traces, outside archives, in the future.  
See, for example, Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde, La nueva arqueología 28-29. 
43 According to Stuart Hall, “questions of identity are always questions about representation.  They 
are always questions about the invention, not simply the discovery of tradition.  They are always exercises 
in selective memory and they almost always involve the silencing of something in order to allow something 







Thus, real flesh and blood bodies outside academic debates endured the Carib identity 
whether embraced or violently imposed by the Spanish colonizers.  In other words, even 
if the Caribs had not been a separate culture before Columbus’ arrival, the group was 
bred into existence afterwards. 
Many of the stories about savage Caribs accustomed to anthropophagi can be 
traced back to Spanish sources like the writings of the medical doctor Diego Álvarez 
Chanca.  As a passenger in Christopher Columbus’ second voyage to the Americas in 
1493, Dr. Álvarez Chanca recorded his impressions on everything from the flora and 
fauna of the New World to the crew’s encounters with the Caribbean human populations.  
About their first exploration of the Leeward Islands and its inhabitants, he wrote to the 
Municipal Council of Seville that: 
After we arrived near [Guadalupe] the Admiral sent one light vessel that 
would keep close to the coast looking for a port, the one which went ahead 
and reaching land saw some houses, and with the bark jumped the Captain 
on land and reached the houses, inside which he found their people, and 
after they saw him they fled, and he entered in them, where he found the 
things they have, they had not carried anything, where he took two very 
big and very different from what had been seen macaws.  He found much 
cotton woven and for weaving, and things for their maintenance, and of 
everything he brought something; especially he brought four or five bones 
of arms and legs of men.  After we saw that we suspected that those 
islands [were] the Carib ones, that are inhabited by people that eat human 
flesh, because the Admiral, by the signs he had been given about the site 
of these islands, the other route, the Indians of the islands that had been 
previously discovered, had set the route to discover them.44 
                                                                                                                                                 
then come to step into the place of the recognition which others give us.  Without the others there is no self, 
there is no self-recognition.”  Stuart Hall, “Negotiating Caribbean Identities,” New Left Review 209 
(January-February 1995): 5, 8.  See also Stuart Hall, “Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity’?,” Questions of 
Cultural Identity, eds. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay (London: Sage Publications, 1996) 1-17. 
44 “Luego que llegamos cerca [de Guadalupe] mando el Almirante a una carabela ligera que fuese 
costeando a buscar puerto, la cual se adelanto y llegando a la tierra vido unas casas, e con la barca salto el 
Capitan en tierra e llego a las casas, en las cuales hallo su gente, y luego que los vieron fueron huyendo, e 
entro en ellas, donde hallo las cosas que ellos tienen, que no habian llevado nada, donde tomo dos 
papagayos muy grandes y muy diferenciados de cuantos se habian visto.  Hallo mucho algodón hilado e por 







The above passage narrates the Europeans’ initial encounter with the Canibe or Carib 
Indians.  Apparently, the Admiral had been so fascinated during the previous voyage with 
the stories about the human flesh-eating Indians that, Dr. Álvarez Chanca wrote, he had 
set the navigational route with the intention of finding them.  The idea of anthropophagic 
Indians in need of religious conversion was alluring.  Yet, it never replaced, but rather 
harmonized with, the central place of gold in the explorer’s fantasies.  According to Jalil 
Sued Badillo, the late 13th century writings of Marco Polo diffused throughout Europe the 
notion that the Cannibals from the courts of the Great Khan possessed plenty of gold.  
Columbus himself, fervent reader of Marco Polo, directly referenced the promising trade 
with the “great Khan” in his 1492-93 writings.45  In turn, Sued Badillo continues, the 
Spanish mistook the inhabitants of the Leeward Islands for these Canibes.46  Thus, 
Columbus probably set the course hoping to meet anthropophagus, but very wealthy 
Indians. 
The anthropophagi quickly multiplied.  Soon after the supposed discovery of 
human bones in the indigenous dwellings of the Leeward Island, the Caribs got the 
chance to throw back the man-eating description against the Tainos.  Further following 
the writings of Dr. Álvarez Chanca: 
to this one [Burenquen] come those of Carib to conquer, from which they 
took many people; these do not have any whips nor know travel by sea; 
but, according to what these Caribs that we took say, they use bows like 
                                                                                                                                                 
brazos e piernas de hombres.  Luego que aquello vimos sospechamos que aquellas islas [eran] las de 
Caribe, que son habitadas de gente que comen carne humana, porque el Almirante, por las señas que le 
habian dado del sitio destas islas, el otro camino, los indios de las islas que antes habian descubierto, habian 
enderezado el camino por descubrirlas.”  Álvarez Chanca, Carta al Cabildo de Sevilla, in Tió, Dr. Diego 
Álvarez Chanca 56. 
45 Casas, Diario 55.  “The Letter of Columbus to Luis De Sant Angel,” ushistory.org. 
46 Jalil Sued Badillo argues that the Spanish, in their anxious greed for gold, misinterpreted the 
symbolic references of the orient and the sun made by different indigenous populations.  Sued Badillo, Los 






them, and if by chance when [Caribs] come to raid they [from Burenquen] 
can take [Caribs] they [from Burenquen] also eat them as the Caribs eat 
them.47 
 
Thus, Dr. Álvarez Chanca was left wondering if the Tainos from Burenquen (Puerto 
Rican main island), apparently at war with the Caribs, also ate their captives.48  If the 
translations Columbus and Dr. Álvarez Chanca made of their indigenous encounters were 
more or less accurate, it would appear that the Tainos and the Caribs had engaged in a 
storytelling war with the newly arrived Spanish contingent as their audience-witness.  
The Tainos, having told their story first and with no hidden bones found in their closet, 
had the upper hand. 
The evidence of “four or five bones of arms and legs of men” combined to Taino 
stories might not be enough evidence to confirm the anthropophagic description.  In fact, 
soon thereafter Bartolomé de las Casas and much later Ricardo Alegría have interpreted 
the human bones supposedly found in the Carib dwellings as linked to the honorary rites 
for deceased ancestors that were common throughout the Antilles.49  Peter E. Siegel 
further argues that throughout the ceramist age, referred above with the term Agro-
ceramist and identified as spanning approximately from 500 B.C. to 1500 A.D., ancestral 
                                                 
47 “a esta [Burenquen] vienen los de Caribe a conquistar, de la cual llevaban mucha gente; estos no 
tienen fustas ningunas nin saben andar por mar; pero, segun dicen estos Caribes que tomamos, usan arcos 
como ellos, e si por caso cuando los vienen a saltear los pueden prender tambien se los comen como los 
Caribes a ellos.”  Álvarez Chanca, Carta al Cabildo de Sevilla, in Tió, Dr. Diego Álvarez Chanca 56.  
According to Robiou Lamarche Columbus originally thought that the Caribs were from the island of Carib 
east of La Hispaniola.  Robiou Lamarche, Taínos y Caribes 153. 
48 Burenquen was the indigenous name given to the Puerto Rican main island that later evolved into 
Borinquen.  Cayetano Coll y Toste, however, disagreed with the anthropophagic description of the 
Borinquen inhabitants stating that he could find no other source to confirm such description.  Diego 
Álvarez Chanca, “Carta del fisco Diego Álvarez Chanca al Cabildo de Sevilla dandole cuenta del segundo 
viaje de Cristóbal Colón, en el cual descubrió la isla de San Juan,” Antología de lecturas de historia de 
Puerto Rico (Siglos XV-XVIII), ed. Aida R. Caro Costas (San Juan: Editorial Corripio, C. por A., 1991) 
25-27. For the multiplying descriptions of different indigenous groups as the cannibals see Sued Badillo, 
Los Caribes 36-37. 
49 Ricardo E. Alegría does not question Carib anthropophagi, only the extent of the practice.  






remains or cemeteries were displaced from the village’s center to the individual bohíos as 
power shifted from the tribal collectivity to the caciques and the shamans.50  The 
displacement of bones to the bohío suggests that the ancestral cult had become a more 
private matter.  Yet, the linkage of the bones to ancestral cults did not and has not quelled 
the allure of the Carib cannibal myth. 
The writings of Columbus mentioning the existence of human eating Indians and 
Dr. Álvarez Chanca’s letter to the Municipal Council of Seville further fueling such 
suspicions worked to equate from early on Canibe/Carib to anthropophagic.  Such an 
equation had different effects.  First, the word Canibe evolved to cannibal and cannibal 
became synonymous of anthropophagi.  The basis for the dichotomy Taino=good vs. 
Carib=bad was, in turn, established and the term Carib became indiscriminately applied 
to rebellious Indians whether or not they belonged to the Carib cultural group.  The 
identification of Caribs as bad or rebellious served as justification for their pseudo 
enslavement in repartimientos or encomiendas.51  The Spanish Crown, after all, had the 
precedent of enslaving rebellious Muslims during the Reconquest.52  Finally, if an 
undisciplined Carib could be found anywhere in the new colonial scenario, then the also 
                                                 
50 Peter E. Siegel, “Contested Places and Places of Contest: The Evolution of Social Power and 
Ceremonial Space in Prehistoric Puerto Rico,” Latin American Antiquity 10:3 (September 1999): 209-238. 
51 As one of the measures resulting from the long debate about how to treat the newly encountered 
aboriginal populations of the Americas, the Spanish monarchy decided that, contrary to the Africans, the 
Indians were not to be taken as slaves.  Instead, Indians would be considered special subjects of the Crown.  
Nonetheless, they were forced to form part of repartimientos (later, or also, known as encomiendas) that 
allotted them to Spanish settlers.  Repartimientos and encomiendas facilitated the congregation of the 
indigenous populations in manageable spaces that allowed the Spanish to catechize, pacify and extract their 
labor more efficiently.  In theory, though not necessarily in practice, this was supposed to be a more benign 
treatment for the nonrebellious Indians (poor childish souls that had not been previously exposed to the 
Catholic religion).  Rebellious Indians lost the theoretical privileges.  For a further discussion of 
repartimientos and encomiendas see Francisco Scarano, Puerto Rico: Cinco siglos de historia (San Juan: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993).  And Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America: Empires and Sequels 1450-1930 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997). 






difficult to tame islands and waters were Caribe (Carib) territory.53  Thus, the archipelago 
and encompassed sea eventually named Caribe/Caraïbes/Caraïben/Caribien/Caribbean 
began to be geographically imagined as a savage space to be conquered.  The naming in 
dubious honor of the Caribs could almost attest that upon the Spanish arrival and first 
attempts of colonization the Caribs, whether a cultural group or rebellious Indians, 
dominated the region, or at least were eating their way north. 
The writings of Christopher Columbus and Diego Álvarez Chanca were not alone 
in supporting the Carib=cannibal equation.  The Anonymous of Carpentras’ 1619 
chronicle mentioned above contains a description of a Carib anthropophagic ceremony.  
A similar narrative was produced in 1578 by Jean De Léry detailing his experiences with 
the Tupinamba in Brazil.54  Such narratives incited European fantasies of the Americas 
and with the aid of the printing press the stories multiplied infinitely.  Such was the case 
with Michel de Montaigne’s 1580 “Des Cannibales.”55  Yet, one of the most known 
examples can be found in William Shakespeare’s The Tempest (1611).56  The story of the 
shipwrecked Prospero and his spirit Ariel and wretched slave Caliban has been passionate 
debated by Latin American intellectuals throughout the 20th century.  The Uruguayan 
scholar José Enrique Rodó appropriated the character of Ariel in 1900 as a symbol for the 
supposedly spiritual character of Latin America.  He, in turn, juxtaposed Ariel to Caliban 
which came to represent for Rodó the brutish materialism of the United States of 
America.  With the rise of indigenismo in the 1910s and 1920s, fostering the imagining 
                                                 
53 In the Spanish language, the word Caribe refers both to the disappeared indigenous population of 
the Lesser Antilles as well as to the Caribbean geographical region. 
54 Jean De Léry, History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil, Otherwise Called America, trans. Janet 
Whatley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
55 Michel de Montaigne, “Des cannibales,” Les Essais, ed. Pierre Villey, 2nd ed., vol. I (Paris: 
Quadrige, 1992) 202-214. 







of the indigenous populations in terms of natural men, Ariel was further collapsed with 
the disappeared Tainos.  Since the mid 20th century, however, Caribbean intellectuals 
have been rereading the story of Prospero and Caliban as an allegory of the colonial 
encounter between Europe and the Caribbean, or the Americas in general.  The allegory 
of the European conquest, they argue, constructs Prospero, the imperial agent, as 
civilization and Caliban, the indigenous cannibal, as a savage without language or 
remedy.57  For example, the sociologist and Africanist scholar Paget Henry argues that 
Caliban is the embodiment of the native construed as without language.  The linguistic 
lack implies the further lack of reason and humanity that justifies the native’s 
colonization and enslavement by those with the gift of civilization.  Others like the 
literary critic Roberto Fernández Retamar have responded to the allegory by choosing to 
embrace the mixed-race and oppressed Caliban as an anticolonial figure capable of 
pushing forth a local and above all non-Eurocentric understanding of the history and 
cultural identity of José Martí’s “nuestra America mestiza” (our mixed-race America).  In 
all, Columbus, Léry, Montaigne, Shakespeare’s and other such histories are in their own 
way surviving echoes of the now disappeared Antillean indigenous cultures.  Many of 
                                                 
57 William Shakespeare’s The Tempest has provoked intense debates amongst Caribbean and Latin 
American intellectuals.  José Enrique Rodó was the first to engage the play by using in a 1900 essay the 
character of Ariel as a symbol of the spiritual yet rational Latin American cultural identity.  Sixty nine 
years later Martinique’s Aimé Césaire posed questions of colonialism and racism through the play by 
making an “adaptation to the Black Theatre.”  In 1971 the Cuban Roberto Fernández Retamar challenged 
Rodó’s Ariel by appropriating the mixed-race and colonized but potentially revolutionary figure of Calibán.  
In recent years Consuelo López Springfield and others like Lizabeth Paravisini-Gebert have brought gender 
to the debate by identifying themselves as “Daughters of Caliban” and Paget Henry has pondered on how 
the representation of Caliban constructs colonized subjects as devoid of reason.  Roberto Fernández 
Retamar, “Calibán,” Casa de las Américas 68:XII (septiembre-octubre 1971) 124-151.  Aimé Césaire, Une 
Tempête: D’après “La tempête” de Shakespeare: Adaptation pour un théâtre nègre (Paris:  Éditions du 
Seuil, 1969).  Consuelo López Springfield, ed., Daughters of Caliban: Caribbean Women in the Twentieth 
Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).  Paget Henry, Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-






these echoes have become historical traces in the narratives historians weave and have 
woven about the Caribbean. 
Friar Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra (1745-1813), the precursor of historians of 
Puerto Rico, inherited such circulating historical traces produced by Columbus, Chanca 
and many other chroniclers and historians.  In the midst of Bourbon reformism he put 
forth his 1788 Historia de Puerto Rico in which he provided a detailed secondhand 
account of the indigenous dwellers of the Puerto Rican archipelago that had reportedly 
disappeared almost 244 to 274 years before.58  In the Chapter XVI, dedicated to the 
“Character, Practices and Customs of the Caribs,” he described these “principal 
devastators of the island of Puerto Rico” as of good stature and well-built.  He went on 
writing: 
Their eyes big, black, and so muddy-confused, that their gaze manifested 
their stupidity, their appearance would not be disagreeable, if they did not 
voluntarily make it ugly by disfiguring their heads, noses and other 
features for a pretended gallantry, that they made standout with the 
liveliest of colors, with which they painted their whole body, and this was 
the only clothing that covered them.59 
 
The Carib physique, according to Abbad y Lasierra, was disfigured but colorful.  The 
color, Robiou Lamarche suggests, could have been predominantly red due to daily baths 
with surúkuli (substance based on Annatto seeds).60  The colorfulness and, following 
                                                 
58 According to Sebastián Robiou Lamarche, in Puerto Rico there were 5,500 Tainos originally 
registered as encomendados (the entrustment of native workers to supposedly deserving Spanish settlers).  
The 1530 census recorded only 1,000 encomendados and finally the 1544 census identified 60.  Robiou 
Lamarche, Taínos y Caribes 244. 
59 “Sus ojos grandes, negros, y tan turbios, que en su mirar manifestaban su estupidez; su aspecto no 
sería desagradable, si voluntariamente no le afeasen desfigurando su cabeza, narices y demás facciones por 
una pretendida galantería, que hacían resaltar con los colores más vivos, con que pintaban todo su cuerpo, y 
era el único vestido que los cubría.”  Fray Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra, Historia geográfica, civil y 
natural de la isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico (San Juan: Ediciones de la Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, 1959) 79.  For Columbus physical description of Caribs based on the stories of La Hispaniola natives 
see “The Letter of Columbus to Luis De Sant Angel,” ushistory.org. 
60 Sebastián Robiou Lamarche’s argument about the Carib daily usage of surúkuli is based on the 






Diego Álvarez Chanca, the long hair wore by men and the cotton woven rings wore by 
women around their knees and ankles distinguished physically the Caribs from the 
Tainos.61  These distinctions, although refuted by Jalil Sued Badillo as common 
throughout the Antilles, are repeated in texts like Father Charles Plumier’s 1693 sketch of 
a Carib woman (Figure 2.2).62  Abbad y Lasierra’s assessment of these sources, however, 
remains unclear.  The absence of bibliographical reference in his Historia de Puerto Rico 
makes it difficult to identify exactly what historical traces Abbad y Lasierra appropriated.  
What is certain, however, is the strong influence his depiction of the disappeared 
indigenous subjects exerted in later historical narratives circulating in Puerto Rico. 
 
Figure 2.2: Charles Plumier’s 1693 sketch of a Carib woman63 
 
Friar Abbad y Lasierra complemented his contemptuous physical description of 
the Caribs by adding that these “barbarians” had almost no religion except for a belief in 
two beings: a good one and an evil one.  Neither did they, to Abbad y Lasierra’s 
amazement, appear to have any form of government although they still lived peacefully 
                                                 
61 Álvarez Chanca, Carta al Cabildo de Sevilla, in Tió, Dr. Diego Álvarez Chanca, 53, 55. 
62 Robiou Lamarche, Taínos y Caribes, 17, 169.  Sued Badillo, Los Caribes 52-57, 169. 






united in a manner resembling more the “irrationals” (beasts).  Equally surprising to him, 
they portrayed no class distinctions between men.  Women, on the other hand, were 
treated like slaves.  Their language, he wrote, was thought to be totally different to that of 
the men, which led to speculations alive today that these were actually the women of 
already conquered Arawak tribes.64 
The families composed by these men and women, according to Abbad y Lasierra, 
formed little republics separate from the rest of the Carib nation, or it could be inferred 
that the Carib nation was actually fragmented along family lines.  Abbad y Lasierra’s 
description of a fragmented but still centralized political arrangement coincides with 
archeological theories on the development of complex trans-tribal chiefdoms that allowed 
for caciques to exercise control over several population nucleuses.65  Each nucleus, 
further following Abbad y Lasierra, was a village composed of an extended family.  
These family villages, in turn, were named carbets.  In the center were the patriarchs’ 
houses inhabited by their wife and smaller children.  Around were the houses of their 
married descendents.  The houses were all made of sticks or canes covered with stubble 
and slightly elevated from the ground.  The interiors were described by Abbad y Lasierra 
as extremely simple consisting only of cotton hammocks and of drinking cups made with 
the skulls of devoured captives.  As such, the Caribs had no stored provisions and rather 
lived on a subsistence basis dependent on the activities of hunting, fishing, and raiding. 
Although Abbad y Lasierra made a distinction between the lifestyles of the forest 
dwellers versus those that inhabited open plains, the fact that there did not exist big game 
                                                 
64 Abbad y Lasierra, Historia 80. 
65 These theories on the development of transtribal chiefdoms or cacicazgos, however, were not 
devised in the case of Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde to describe Carib settlements but rather referred 






in Vieques must have oriented the Caribs towards the ocean either to fish or to cross for 
raids.66  The raids, which supposedly provided among the booty plenty of human flesh, 
were the only times when, according to Abbad y Lasierra, the Caribs showered 
themselves in abundance.  He described how the Caribs culminated raids as if a morbid 
Hollywood-like scene, “letting themselves be reigned by their bloodthirsty spirit, they 
killed and ate their captives and whatever else found; swallowing the meats dripping with 
blood, manifesting in everything their brutality and savagery.”  Then, in drunken stupor, 
they revived the fury against their enemy by swearing, “we will eat this nation.”67 
Friar Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra’s foundational Historia de Puerto Rico does 
not provide a sympathetic view of the Caribs he identified as simple bloodthirsty 
barbarians.  Robiou Lamarche, while defending the Carib anthropophagi thesis, refutes 
such bloodthirsty and above all simple characterizations.  Influenced by anthropological 
works on other supposedly anthropophagic cultures like the Tupinamba and Aztec, he 
argues that the Caribs only captured women and later Europeans and Africans to increase 
the coerced labor force.  Cannibalism, on the other hand, represented a transcendental 
social and religious ritual that simultaneously performed myths of origin, honored 
ancestors, avenged enemy insults and vindicated Caribs killed in battles.  Thus, the 
would-be sacrificed had to be worthy of the ceremony.  The sacrificed had to be a brave 
enemy warrior that could embody the affronts suffered by the Caribs.  Only then could 
revenge be obtained by the destruction and consumption of his body.68  Such a 
                                                 
66 Archaeologists like Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde agree that the indigenous populations in 
Vieques were oriented towards the ocean in terms of the building of villages and alimentary habits.  See for 
example Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde, La nueva arqueología.  Chanlatte Baik and Narganes Storde, 
Vieques, Puerto Rico. 
67 Abbad y Lasierra, Historia 81. 






meaningful anthropophagic ritual defies Abbad y Lasierra’s assumptions about the 
Caribs’ lack of religious and cultural complexity.  Instead, Robiou Lamarche borrows 
from the 17th century writings of French chroniclers like César de Rochefort to portray an 
animist Carib ideology populated by flora and fauna that either sheltered spirits like the 
Supreme Tree Spirit living in the silk-cotton trees or inspired them like the foundational 
conch-head serpent named Bakámo from whom the Caribs sprung.69  The mythical flora 
and fauna interacted with two main seasons defined through rain and constellations.  
Constellations, Robiou Lamarche further argues, divided the Carib year into nine months 
and dictated the proper activities to undertake at different times.  For example, the month 
of Mariru-bana that lasted from approximately the end of July to the beginning of August 
was reserved for the start of raiding expeditions and Iábura that coincided with most of 
August was for anthropophagi.  The month of Uráu concurring with November heralded 
the definite return of the warriors to their villages. 
The Carib villages described by Robiou Lamarche resemble Abbad y Lasierra’s 
carbets insofar as the two refer to an isolated small-scale community revolving around a 
central straw structure and spun together by familial relationships.  In the words of 
Robiou Lamarche: 
The Carib village – separated one from the other by approximately half a 
league – consisted of one carbet (tabui), the communal house of 
approximately 30 by 100 feet in length, whose only entrance was oriented 
                                                 
69 While Robiou Lamarche’s discussion of Carib culture is influenced by the writings of French 
chroniclers like Friar Jean-Baptiste Du Tertre, his discussion of Taino culture is influenced by Friar Ramón 
Pané’s writings.  Pané was commissioned by Christopher Columbus to gather information about the 
indigenous inhabitants of La Hispaniola.  Pané, in turn, lived among the indigenous populations for 
approximately 4 to 5 years.  During this time he learnt their language and recorded ethnographic 
observations that he finally compiled in his 1498 manuscript titled Relación acerca de las antigϋedades de 
los indios.  The manuscript, like Columbus’ diary, was lost at some point in the 16th century.  Therefore, 
Robiou Lamarche has access to traces of the manuscript through a translation of an incomplete Italian 
translation of the original text.  Pané’s Relación, in turn, is as problematic as Columbus’ Diario.  Robiou 






towards the east and whose straw roof descended almost to the ground.  
Around it were usually constructed “up to 50 straw houses” oval (muena) 
for the married couples, relatives of the family or houses “captain,” called 
Tiubutuli Hothe according to Rochefort.  Contrary to the Taino cacique, 
this Carib chief did not occupy any special dwelling and his authority, 
based on familial relationships, was limited to his village.70 
 
Robiou Lamarche suggests a somewhat larger village with a less powerful patriarch-
captain than those proposed in 1788 by Abbad y Lasierra.  His argument that the carbet 
was not the Carib village in itself but rather the central structure serving as a communal 
house reserved for men redefines local power relations.  Even if in both Abbad y Lasierra 
and Robiou Lamarche’s narratives the Caribs were fragmented politically along family-
community lines, Robiou Lamarche’s displacement of the patriarch-captain’s dwelling 
from the central structure to a surrounding one symbolically disperses unified power in 
favor of the village men who collectively occupied the centralized space. 
The identification of a Carib communal space could be understood within Peter E. 
Siegel’s theoretical framework for the Saladoid-Ostionoid-Taino evolution in the Puerto 
Rican archipelago.  According to Siegel the indigenous cultural evolution paralleled the 
shift from a communal plaza-central burial ground to a central ceremonial space 
epitomized in the ball court.  Based on the Destino excavations, he identifies the changes 
in Vieques as occurring during 1200 A.D. to 1500 A.D.71  Yet, Siegel argues that, “these 
                                                 
70 “La aldea caribe – separada una de otra alrededor de media legua – constaba de un carbet (tabui), 
la casa comunal de unos treinta por cien pies de largo, cuya única entrada estaba orientada hacia el este y 
cuyo techo de paja bajaba casi hasta la tierra.  A su alrededor se construían “hasta 50 casas de pajas” 
ovaladas (muena) para las parejas casadas, familiares del “capitán” de familia o de casas, llamado Tiubutuli 
Hothe de acuerdo a Rochefort.  Contrario al cacique Taino, este jefe caribe no ocupaba ninguna vivienda 
especial y su autoridad, basada en relaciones de parentesco, estaba limitada a su aldea.”  Robiou Lamarche, 
Taínos y Caribes 185. 
71 See Appendix 6.  Peter E. Siegel focuses on the Saladoid-Ostionoid-Taino evolution in the Puerto 
Rican archipelago which includes the island of Vieques.  He does not assertively state his position on the 
debate about the existence or nonexistence of the Carib cultural group in Vieques, but still places the small 
island inside the same indigenous evolutionary chronology as the Puerto Rican main island and refers to the 






architectural changes are physical manifestations or materializations of the consolidation 
of power into increasingly narrower social segments.”72  Thus, the ceremonial space 
responded to the centralization, and not the collectivization, of power in those few figures 
that controlled the central space through increasingly elaborate political and religious 
performances.  These newly empowered figures, as suggested above, were the caciques 
and the shamans.  In other words, if the village layout represented an organizing principle 
of the indigenous community, as Siegel argues, the chiefs and shamans’ consolidation of 
power over the religious and political realms had spatial consequences reflected in more 
elaborate and centralized communal spaces like ball courts and ceremonial plazas.  Yet, 
such a cacique-shaman consolidation of power could question Abbad y Lasierra and 
Robiou Lamarche’s assumptions about the strong familial ties knitting together the Carib 
community because for Siegel the members’ allegiances were ultimately due to politico-
religious figures.  Although, Jalil Sued Badillo argues that cacicazgos did harmonize with 
geographies of kinship that defied Greater versus Lesser Antilles’ imaginary borders.73 
In all, Friar Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra’s Historia de Puerto Rico represents an 
influential history that allows for a unique peek into Bourbon Spanish perceptions of the 
American enterprise and of its aboriginal settlers.  In addition, Abbad y Lasierra’s 
historical interpretations provides, on the one hand, some insight into a possible lax Carib 
lifestyle acted out in a decentralized politico-spatial arrangement that nonetheless 
revolved around the patriarchal familial unit and, on the other hand, evidence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
considers the late Viequense indigenous population as Taino.  Siegel, “Contested Places and Places of 
Contest,” Latin American Antiquity 215, 221. 
72 Siegel, “Contested Places and Places of Contest,” Latin American Antiquity 221. 
73 Jalil Sued Badillo argues that for the most part the caciques of southern Puerto Rico shared 
kinship and closer ties to those of the islands of Vieques and Saint Croix than to the caciques of northern 






indigenous rebelliousness and resistance against Spanish colonization.  His narration of 
Carib rebelliousness and resistance has been crucial in the establishment of Viequense 
myths of origin and foundational figures. 
In Historia de Puerto Rico Abbad y Lasierra provided a brief account of the tragic 
heroes Jaureyvo and Cazímes.  According to the history, since 1511 ‘the Caribs, that took 
war as a lifestyle and lived off cruelties and piracies,’ started responding to a call for help 
from the neighboring Tainos.  The response took the form of raids against Spanish 
settlements in the main island.  If the Tainos and the Caribs had been at war in pre-
Columbian times, the arrival of the Spanish served as a catalyst facilitating an indigenous 
union against the common European enemy.  Then, in 1514 the Viequense caciques 
Cazímes and his brother Jaureyvo made an incursion into the northeastern town of Loíza.  
During one of the raids Cazímes was killed.74  Infuriated, Jaureyvo returned a few days 
later to avenge his brother’s death.  This time the Caribs prevailed over the Spanish who 
even with the help of Becerillo, infamous dog instrumental in the disciplining of unruly 
indigenous subjects, could not prevent the capture of settlers.75  Once news of the event 
                                                 
74 Salvador Brau narrated that Cacimar, locked in combat with Pedro López de Angulo, was killed 
by Francisco de Quindós through a blow from behind, a “golpe que, entrando por la espalda del indio el 
hierro, llegó a asomar por la parte opuesta” (“blow that, the iron entering the Indian’s back, reached to 
show on the opposite side”).  In Vieques, as in other places, a blow from behind is interpreted as “un golpe 
a traición” (a treacherous blow), a cowardly act without honor.  Thus, Cacimar’s valiant death while locked 
in battle contrasts with Quindós cowardly act, perhaps suggesting that the Spanish violent victory over the 
Caribs lacked honor.  Salvador Brau, La colonización de Puerto Rico: Desde el descubrimiento de la Isla 
hasta la reversion a la corona española de los privilegios de Colón (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura 
Puertorriqueña, 1981) 236. 
75 Becerillo, following Salvador Brau, has been considered by many chroniclers as an “arma official 
de la conquista” (official weapon of the conquest) initially employed in La Hispaniola and then after 1511 
in Puerto Rico.  Becerillo, owned by Captain Sancho de Aragón, was one of the precursor tracker-killer 
dogs used by the Spanish in the American colonial enterprise.  In the Caribbean dogs like Becerillo were 
originally used against undisciplined indigenous subjects like the Caribs.  The dogs usually helped the 
colonizers in the conducting or in the fending off of attacks and in the tracking down of those Indians 
escaped from encomiendas.  Later when the indigenous populations died and African slaves were 
introduced to the Caribbean, these animals, also employed by creoles, served as fierce trackers of runaway 
and rebellious slaves.  For a representation of these tracker-killer dogs in action see the Cuban film La 






reached Governor Cristóbal de Mendoza, he pursued the Caribs to the island of Vieques.  
In the ensuing battle Jaureyvo along with many other Caribs were killed.  While Abbad y 
Lasierra did not provide numbers, according to Salvador Brau, Mendoza’s raid left a total 
of 120 Indians dead and approximately 80 captives.  The captives, following Brau, were 
taken to San Juan and sold as slaves to the Spanish settlers by royal officials.  Their sale, 
nonetheless, was eventually invalidated by the courts that allowed instead for the captives 
to be repartidos.76  In all, whether responding to deaths or virtual slavery, Abbad y 
Lasierra and Brau’s narratives coincided in marking 1514 as the year Vieques was left for 
deserted.77 
The massacre and the forced resettlement resulting from Governor Mendoza’s 
incursion in Vieques did not eliminate the Carib threat.  The Viequense Caribs, further 
following Salvador Brau, had long been allied with those of Ayay (indigenous name for 
Saint Croix).78  The Spanish thought that after the Viequense incursion these Caribs had 
also fled from Saint Croix to other Virgin Islands.  Thus, embarking in an anti-Carib 
crusade, the Spanish killed and enslaved the indigenous populations taking refuge in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cinematógrafos, 1978.  Reference to Becerrillo’s “particular help” in the taming or colonizing of Puerto 
Rico and in the defense against the 1514 Carib attack can be found in Juan Bautista Muñoz, “Libro 10.-
Capítulo 10.-Año de 1514,” Biblioteca histórica de Puerto Rico, ed. Alejandro Tapia y Rivera, 2nd ed. (San 
Juan: Instituto de Literatura Puertorriqueña, 1945) 118-119.  And in Brau, La colonización de Puerto Rico 
234-235. 
76 Salvador Brau wrote that in 1514 the provisional repartidor (distributor of encomiendas) Sancho 
Velázquez had to redistribute the encomiendas in the Puerto Rican main island.  The first repartimiento of 
5,500 Indians had been performed by Juan Ponce de León in 1511.  Three years later Velázquez dealt with 
a diminished number of approximately less than 4,000 Indians repartibles (able to be distributed in 
encomiendas), not including the Indians distributed to the Crown, Church and officials.  Brau listed that 
Sancho Velázquez distributed 50 Indians to each of the 70 settlers in San Juan and San Germán (3,500 
Indians), 200 to the two Councils, 200 for hospitals, 500 to the Crown, 150 to the Bishop, 600 to four Royal 
Officials; all for a total of 5,150 Indians repartidos.  Brau, La colonización de Puerto Rico 239-240. 
77 Abbad y Lasierra, Historia 58-60. 
78 Salvador Brau suggests that the Viequense Caribs were probably allied from the start with those of 
Saint Croix in the raids perpetrated against the Puerto Rican main island.  Brau, La isla de Vieques 4.  Peter 
E. Siegel also suggests there might have been some cultural Taino affinities, as evidenced in the 
construction of ball courts, between the late indigenous populations of the Puerto Rican archipelago and 






islands like Virgin Gorda.79  Yet, according to Brau, the neighboring island of Saint 
Croix along with others like Guadeloupe and Dominica in the Lesser Antilles provided 
temporary refuge to the fleeing Caribs who, faced with extermination, were forced to 
island hop and align themselves across the eastern Antilles. 
In the quest to exterminate the Carib threat, the Spanish colonizers made a 
distinction between the Caribs as a collective indigenous population that could not be 
successfully colonized and the Carib individual who could, once displaced from its 
cultural group and familiar geographical surroundings, be repartido and thus made part 
of a larger indigenous work force.  Perhaps the separation of the Carib individual from 
the Carib group could reintroduce him or her into the category of noble savage, or of 
natural man.  Going back to Anthony Pagden, Europeans believed the indigenous 
populations to be outside civilization and culture.  Such a natural state, ruled by passion 
as opposed to reason, resembled Aristotelian notions of natural slaves.  Natural slaves for 
Aristotle were individuals unable to uplift themselves from their lack of reason and 
civilization, for which they needed the guidance of masters.  Since the late 1ate 15th 
century, Europeans, according to Pagden, debated just how much guidance the 
indigenous populations of the Americas needed and whether they fitted better the 
category of natural slaves or of natural men.80  Both groups needed guidance, but natural 
men were thought to deserve a more benign treatment because they could potentially be 
civilized.  In the year 1500, the Spanish Crown leaned towards a natural men’s approach 
by prohibiting the enslavement of the indigenous populations in the Americas and the 
Iberian Peninsula.  Indians, who did not rebel, were to be treated as subjects of the 
                                                 
79 Brau, La colonización de Puerto Rico 239-257. 






Crown.  Those who rebelled, however, could be taken as slaves.  Still, the Caribs blurred 
the fine line between natural slaves and natural men for early 16th century Spaniards, or 
perhaps the Caribs made it evident that the two theoretical categories were not treated too 
differently in practice.  Queen Isabel, in fact, had allowed in 1503 for the specific 
enslavement of the Carib group due to their supposed anthropophagic practices.  The 
Caribs, in turn, might have just been considered fallen natural men by the queen.  Yet, 
these natural men could be legally enslaved until the 1530 complete prohibition of 
indigenous slavery passed by the Spanish monarch Carlos V.81  Whatever the practical or 
ideological reasons for sparing some Caribs during the incursion in Vieques, different 
sources coincide in that indeed some Caribs escaped and others were taken as prisoners.  
Thus, the Viequense Caribs were not all exterminated in 1514.  In other words, the 
indigenous community might have not survived, but individuals did. 
The islands of Guadeloupe and Dominica have been central to the perpetuation of 
Carib histories.  After the early 16th century, the hostilities between the Spanish and the 
Caribs resulted in an indigenous southward retracting movement.  The two islands, in 
turn, surfaced to prominence in what could be considered a myth of ends.  Guadeloupe 
and Dominica were identified as the remaining Carib strongholds.82  These strongholds, 
according to Jalil Sued Badillo, drew the attention of Spanish colonizers stationed in 
Puerto Rico.  Incited by random incidents like the 1553 assault of a Spanish boat in the 
coasts of Vieques, these colonizers persistently reminded the Crown as late as 1583 of the 
                                                 
81 Richard Konetzke argues that, although in practice rebellious and non-rebellious Indians were 
enslaved by Spanish colonizers, in theory only Indians who opposed Spanish just wars could be legally 
enslaved.  Just wars refered to righteous war waged by the Spanish Empire.  Konetzke, América Latina 
153-157. 
82 An example of the identification of Guadeloupe as a Carib stronghold can be found in the 1515 
failed raid of the island carried out, shortly after Governor Mendoza’s 1514 incursion in Vieques, by Juan 






Carib threat.  In the process, the Caribs became the barloventeños (from the Windward 
Islands) and Guadeloupe and Dominica, at least until the 1542 Royal decree against any 
form of indigenous slavery, evolved into preferred locus of Spanish slave raids.83  The 
term barloventeños, as employed by the Spanish inhabitants of the Greater Antilles, had a 
foreign quality.  The term implied the southern otherness of the Caribs that, eventually 
forced out of Guadeloupe, were cornered into settling in Dominica and Saint Vincent 
under the auspices of the 1660 Franco-Anglo-Carib Treaty.  The sedentary phase, 
according to Robiou Lamarche, lasted until 1797 when the English finally drove them off 
Saint Vincent and then until the early 20th century when they ethnically mixed themselves 
out of Dominica.  The process of miscegenation, however, had begun centuries earlier 
with their gradual intermarriage with other African fringe populations throughout the 
eastern Antilles.84  Thus, the 20th century witnessed for some the official end, heralded 
four centuries earlier, of the supposedly Carib Caribbean.  Although the Garifuñas in 
Central America claim the Carib heritage, and the indigenous populations in the 
Caribbean have a tendency to resuscitate unexpectedly.85 
The Puerto Rican aboriginal population, basically massacred in the record time of 
40 years, left no clear traces on the processes of racial and cultural mixing in the 
archipelago.  Perhaps the clearest traces are a few scattered words that have survived to 
name towns like Bayamón and Vieques.  Nonetheless, the ambivalent indigenous 
heritage has had a great impact on national myths of origin attempting to identify the 
                                                 
83 Sued Badillo, Los Caribes 138-140, 160-161. 
84 Robiou Lamarche states that while the French colonizers of the Lesser Antilles did not mix 
themselves with the local indigenous population like their Spanish counterpart, the cimarrones (runaway 
slaves) and captive Africans did.  The product of the exogamy was an increasingly hybrid society 
composed of Carib men, Arawak women and Blacks that Robiou Lamarche identifies as the Black-Carib 
culture.  Robiou Lamarche, Taínos y Caribes 246-249. 
85 The descendants of the Carib and African miscegenation are thought to have evolved into the 






autochthonous subjects of an archipelago mostly composed of an uprooted and mixed-
race population.  The appropriations of a Taino heritage, however, have differed between 
Puerto Rican populations in the archipelago and in the United States.  While few 
islanders would privilege a Taino identity that subordinates Puerto Rican-ness, during the 
1990s different groups surfaced in the United States claiming Taino ethno-racial 
identities.  Such is the case of the self-proclaimed descendant of the Puerto Rican cacique 
Agüeybaná, Juan Ramón Nadal Jr.  According to journalist Rosita Marrero of the 
newspaper Primera hora, Nadal Jr. sued the federal government during the summer of 
2007 for $515 thousand million for the U.S. usage of “the island of Borinquen.”86  As 
Arlene Dávila argues: 
in the United States, interest in the Taíno has not been limited to its use as 
a symbol of assertion but rather was concomitantly developed into an 
organized movement of ethnic revival intent on rescuing and restoring the 
Taíno language, culture and religion.  That is, while there are a variety of 
groups and individuals who identify themselves as Taíno on the island, it 
has nevertheless been in the United States, particularly in New York City, 
from which the revival of Taíno identity has been most boisterously 
assertive since the 1990s.87 
 
Taino revival in the United States, Dávila continues, must be contextualized within the 
discourses of multiculturalism in the mainland.  The U.S.-based Taino identity, 
furthermore, defies national boundaries to the extent it incorporates Tainos from different 
Caribbean islands.  Thus, Taino definitions in the United States ultimately have a pan-
Caribbean character not necessarily shared by Puerto Rican islanders. 
                                                 
86 Rosita Marrero, “Reclamo taíno de ‘Aguëybaná III,’” Primera hora [San Juan] 11 July 2007, 26 
January 2008 
<http://www.primerahora.com/noticia/otras_panorama/noticias/reclamo_taino__de_agueybana_iii/87347>.   
87 Arlene Dávila, “Local/Diasporic Taínos: Towards a Cultural Politics of Memory, Reality and 
Imagery,” Taíno Revival: Critical Perspectives on Puerto Rican Identity and Cultural Politics, ed. Gabriel 






The appropriation of a Taino heritage by Puerto Rican islanders cannot be 
separated from national myths of origin.  The fact that Puerto Rico changed imperial 
hands in 1898, when most of the Americas were divided into nation-states, has helped 
infuse myths of origin with a colonial motif.  The continuance of the colonial status has 
been for many Puerto Ricans, regardless of political affiliations, a source of 
embarrassment.88  The embarrassment has fostered the constructions of teleological 
histories attempting to identify the colonial problem of the Puerto Rican national 
character.  These histories, in tone with 19th century romantic narrations of the indigenous 
origins of the nation, trace back the roots of the problem of why Puerto Rico has not been 
able to cast off the imperial yoke to the Taino heritage.  In turn, the rebellious actions of 
figures like the famous cacique Agüeybaná have been characterized as exceptions and 
infused with a sense of futility.89  In all, the Taino heritage in general has been interpreted 
as non-heroically peaceful.  Thus, many Puerto Ricans, understanding that the problem 
indeed started with the submissive or impotent Tainos, summarize the history of their 
archipelago with the word colonial and define their national myths and foundational 
figures in terms of anticolonial struggles. 
Puerto Rican main islanders might read the Taino heritage with a nationalist pride 
infused with futility.  Yet, Viequenses in general have appropriated a quite different 
Carib past.  While there is a sense of embarrassment about Carib savageness, closely 
                                                 
88 The three major political parties in Puerto Rico today defined by their pro-independence, pro-
statehood and pro-commonwealth stance roughly coincide in their emphasis on Puerto Rican cultural 
nationalism and on the need to better define the archipelago’s political status. 
89 Agüeybaná is the most popular Taino cacique in Puerto Rican nationalist myths.  He has been the 
theme of numerous cultural productions narrating his courageous resistance against the Spanish 
conquistadores.  Yet, I argue that Taino narratives in Puerto Rico are simultaneously read with nationalist 
pride of the origins of the nation and with a sense of futility due to the Taino’s ultimate inability to resist or 
at least survive the Spanish invasion.  The continued colonial situation, openly denounced by at least two of 







linked to the anthropophagic accusations, Viequenses still boast of an anti-imperialist 
motif denied to other Puerto Ricans.  The motif is based on the uncompromising struggle 
the Caribs supposedly waged against the Spanish colonizers.  The Viequense caciques 
Cazímes and Jaureyvo, better known today as Cacimar and Yaureibo, have become the 
emblematic figures in such a “till the death” anticolonial struggle.  Their feats have been 
echoed in multiple texts with different undertones.90  The caciques, for example, have 
been acknowledged through the 1991 naming of the “The Prehispanic Cultures in 
Vieques” room as the “Sala Cacimar-Yaureibo.”  The caciques have also been paid 
homage through the 1967 naming of the Yaureibo Cultural Center after the avenging 
cacique brother.  The Center, honored in 1991 with a permanent space next to the archive 
and the Patronato del Fuerte in the newly restored Fortín Conde de Mirasol, is a local 
Viequense organization ascribed to the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture.  Its purpose is to 
promote educational cultural activities through different mediums of representation like 
the theater.  The organization, in turn, has undertaken the task to represent to the larger 
Viequense community an aboriginal heritage that, the members believe, should make the 
islanders particularly proud. 
The activities of the Yaureibo Cultural Center have helped push the naming rites 
even further.  Not only do tourism and car rental companies bear the names of the 
caciques, but Viequenses have conjured their indigenous foundational figures through the 
naming of their sons.  The fisherman and anti-Navy activist Carlos Zenón, for example, 
named his sons Cacimar and Yabureibo.  They both had an active role in the 1999-2003 
civil disobedient campaigns against the presence of the U.S. Navy in Vieques, and were 
                                                 
90 For different narrations of the Cacimar and Yaureibo history see, for example, Bautista Muñoz, 
“Libro 10.-Capítulo 10.-Año de 1514,” Biblioteca histórica de Puerto Rico 118-119.  And Brau, La 






imprisoned as a consequence of their participation.  In his allocution delivered on January 
15, 2002 before the federal court, Yabureibo stated: 
we are, Mr. Judge, the rebels of this Puerto Rican archipelago…who do 
not accept submissively the inferior role that the privileged of this society 
want to impose upon us in the name of their [U.S.] federal masters…There 
are Viequenses, Mr. Judge who have achieved our liberty in the struggle 
against military tyranny, and who prefer to welcome death before 
accepting being forced to wear the shameful chains of surrender.91 
 
As such, modern day Cacimars and Yaureibos, when interpellated, feel the burden of 
great anticolonial expectations because if Puerto Ricans from the Isla Grande suffered 
from weak blood, Viequenses could still infuse the national character with their Carib 
anti-imperialist heritage.92 
Perhaps the clearest narration of Cacimar and Yaureibo’s feats with an anti-
colonial motif was done not by a Viequense, but by a historian from Massachusetts that 
arrived in Vieques in 1980 searching to understand the effect of the military presence in 
Puerto Rican society.93  Approximately 20 years after his arrival in the island, the director 
of the Museum and Archive Fortín Conde de Mirasol, Robert Rabin has written that: 
The inhabitants of Vieques, brothers of the Tainos of the Puerto Rican Isla 
Grande, resisted the Spanish plans of colonization and enslavement.  In 
1514, under the leadership of the Viequense caciques Cacimar and his 
brother Yaureibo, the Viequense Tainos attacked the Spanish bases in the 
east coast of Puerto Rico, near the town of Loíza.  During one of these 
                                                 
91 “somos nosotros, señor juez, los rebeldes de este archipiélago puertorriqueño…que no aceptamos 
sumisamente el papel de inferioridad que los privilegiados de esta sociedad quieren imponernos a nombre 
de sus amos federales…Habemos viequenses, señor juez que hemos alcanzado nuestra libertad en la lucha 
en contra de la tiranía militar, y que mejor le daremos la bienvenida a la muerte antes que aceptar que se 
nos impongan las cadenas vergonzosas de la claudicación.”  Yabureibo Zenón, “Alocución de Yabureibo 
Zenón ante la corte federal,” Vieques Libre, 2003, Vieques Libre, 26 January 2008 
<http://www.viequeslibre.addr.com/espanol/articulos/alocucion_de_yabureibo.htm>. 
92 Following Louis Althusser’s formulation of the term, I understand the concept of interpellation as 
a calling or naming that defines and creates what is being called or named to the extent that what is being 
called upon or named responds and thus acknowledges the given name or identity.  The concept implies a 
negotiation for an identity cannot be solely imposed.  An identity must also be accepted and recognized.  
Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” Lenin and 
Philosophy, and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) 127-186. 






battles Cacimar died.  Later, Yaureibo leads an anticolonial expedition 
against the Spanish in the Vacia Talega zone, Piñones sector in Loíza.  
After defeating the Spanish they returned to Vieques with several 
prisoners.  A little later, a strong Spanish military expedition attacked the 
Viequense town destroying the settlement, enslaving the survivors and 
leaving the island basically uninhabited...[Still,] many elements of 
indigenous life and culture are present on Vieques today-names of places, 
foods, use of medicinal plants, in the faces of the people and in the spirit 
of struggle against foreign domination that has become an important part 
of the collective mentality of our population.94 
 
Robert Rabin, in the midst of anti-Navy protests in Vieques, revised the small island’s 
indigenous history through a bilingual Internet article devised to reach and inspire to 
action a wide national and international audience.  In the article he underlined, as if trying 
to call again into existence, the kinship bond between Puerto Rico and Vieques’ 
aboriginal inhabitants he identified as Tainos.  Such a kinship bond, after all, had once 
translated into a political allegiance against “the Spanish plans of colonization and 
enslavement.”95 
Robert Rabin coincides with Jalil Sued Badillo in reading Cacimar and 
Yaureibo’s 1514 raid of Loíza as part of a Taino punitive strike against Spanish 
enslavement schemes.  Yet, Sued Badillo identifies the cacica (female cacique) Doña 
                                                 
94 “Los habitantes de Vieques, hermanos de los Tainos de la Isla Grande de Puerto Rico, resistieron 
los planes de colonización e esclavitud de los españoles.  En 1514, bajo el liderato de los caciques 
viequenses Cacimar y su hermano Yaureibo, los Tainos viequenses atacaron las bases españolas en la costa 
este de Puerto Rico, cerca del pueblo de Loíza.  Durante una de estas batallas murió Cacimar.  Más tarde, 
Yaureibo dirige una expedición anti-colonial contra los españoles en la zona de Vacia Talega, sector 
Piñones en Loíza.  Después de derrotar a los españoles volvieron a Vieques con varios prisioneros.  Poco 
después, una fuerte expedición militar española atacó al pueblo viequense destrozando a la población, 
esclavizando a los sobrevivientes y dejando a la Isla básicamente despoblada.”  The rest of the quote is 
originally in English.  Robert Rabin, “Historia de Vieques: Cinco Siglos de Lucha de un Pueblo 
Puertorriqueño,” Historic Archives-Vieques Information, 2005, Fortín Conde de Mirasol, 10 July 2005 
<http://www.enchanted-isle.com/elfortin/history.htm>. 
95 The “Libro 10.-Capítulo 10.-Año de 1514” in Alejandro Tapia y Rivera’s Biblioteca histórica de 
Puerto Rico details how after the 1514 raid against Vieques the Spanish colonizers asked the Crown for 
permission to take the surviving Caribs as slaves, request the king supposedly denied partly due to the fear 
that potential but still unidentified Carib populations in the American mainland might strike back against 
the Spanish with vengeance.  Bautista Muñoz, “Libro 10.-Capítulo 10.-Año de 1514,” Biblioteca histórica 






Luisa, slain in combat, as the raiders’ main target.96  The cacica, whose indigenous name 
is currently unknown to scholars, was the widow of a cacique.  Once baptized as Luisa, 
she remarried to the mulatto Pedro Mexía.  The marriage to the outsider, however, did not 
seal her fate with the other Tainos.  According to Sued Badillo, Tainos branded Luisa as a 
traitor following her denunciations to the Spanish colonizers of the indigenous warriors 
hiding in her domains.  The characterization of cacica Luisa as assimilated and 
treacherous further allows Puerto Ricans to question the allegiance and resolution of 
Tainos, or maybe of Taino women.  Even Robert Rabin questions the main islanders’ 
resolution when he invokes the anticolonial spirit of Viequenses.  This is a spirit traceable 
from the 16th century Cacimar and Yaureibo to the late 20th century anti-Navy 
Viequenses.  Puerto Rican main islanders, in Rabin’s narrative, are ultimately the 
assenting witnesses of Viequenses long anticolonial struggle. 
If the Puerto Rican Tainos were indeed docile or compliant with the Spanish 
conquistadores, the history of Cacimar and Yaureibo has endowed Viequenses with two 
indigenous heroes that people, regardless of academic theories, identify as Carib.97  For 
many Viequenses Cacimar and Yaureibo are more than heroes.  They are considered 
revolutionary foundational figures.  After all, these are the first figures known by scholars 
and Viequenses, or provided by Spanish archives, to fight for their permanence in 
Vieques.  More so, historical interpretations like the one pushed forth by Rabin in the 
passage above have fostered the appropriation, by the mostly Catholic Viequense 
                                                 
96 Jalil Sued Badillo’s reinterpretation of Cacimar and Yaureibo’s 1514 incursions into the Puerto 
Rican main island as part of a collective Taino plan directed against the Loíza cacica Luisa are based on his 
reading of Salvador Brau’s La colonización de Puerto Rico.  Sued Badillo, Los Caribes 152.  
97 My argument about the general Viequense belief in their Carib past, as opposed to a Taino past, is 
based on numerous conversations with Viequenses and on my own personal Viequense-San Juanera 






audience, of the cacique brothers as Christ-like figures martyred by a foreign imperialist 
power.  Yet, their blood, potentially as redemptory as Christ’s, carries across time the 
Carib hereditary traits of fierceness and tenacity in the face of foreign colonizers and 
enslavers.  The belief in the power of these traits, considered unique in the Puerto Rican 
archipelago, has been for too long a part of the collective Viequense identity to be 
successfully displaced by rather recent academic theories.98  If indeed Carib histories will 
one day disappear from the islanders’ collective memory, the narratives will probably be 
substituted by the growing belief, supported by historians like Robert Rabin, in the 
exceptional unruliness of Viequense Tainos. 
Cacimar and Yaureibo’s feats, as safeguarded by the imperial archive and 
narrated by Rabin, have acquired the symbolic significance of conjuring into existence a 
small island community worth fighting for.  Paradoxically, the imperial archive has been 
a very guilty accomplice of historians throughout the conjuring process.  Working inside 
the metropolis, archives like the Real y General Archivo de Simancas e Indias have 
protected the surviving historical traces of Cacimar and Yaureibo’s history.99  These 
traces were once part of the bureaucratic writings interweaving the Spanish empire, and 
were gathered by bureaucrats and preserved by archivist to document perhaps the end of 
                                                 
98 The appropriation of a Carib past in Vieques began in the early 18th century with the writings of 
the colony’s founder Teophile Le Guillou.  See “Chapter 3: Claims to the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th 
Centuries” and “Chapter 4: The Spanish Colony of Vieques, 19th Century.” 
99 The now called Archivo General de Simancas holds documents dating from the late 15th century to 
1800.  According to the Spanish Subdirección General de Archivos Estatales, this archive, started by Carlos 
V and created by Felipe II, was the first one ever constructed as well as the first one with an archival guide.  
The Archivo General de Indias located in Seville was not founded until 1785.  Archivo General de 







rebellious Indians.100  Still, these traces have been read and narrated by historians like 
Friar Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra and his contemporary Juan Bautista Muñoz (1745-1799).101  
Bautista Muñoz, appointed “Cosmográfo Mayor de las Indias” (Main Cosmographer of 
the Indies) in 1770 by Charles III, was authorized through a 1781 Real Cédula (Royal 
Decree) to visit and thus employ the archival memories of Simancas, Cádiz, Seville and 
other cities.  These archives informed his History of the New World published in 1794.102  
In this History, focused on the vast Spanish American empire, Cacimar and Yaureibo 
were only secondary characters in a chapter dedicated to the Spanish Empire’s effort to 
discipline the Caribs.  Later, in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries, Cacimar and Yaureibo 
would be brought to the forefront of local histories with the help of historians like 
Salvador Brau, Jalil Sued Badillo and especially Robert Rabin.  These scholars have 
rescued, revised and further imagined for future Viequense generations the drama of 
anticolonial foundational figures embedded in indigenous myth of origins.103 
 
  
                                                 
100 While archives may sometimes seem to have a life of their own, it is mostly archivists who pass 
judgement on the historical value of documents, and who are the people that physically preserve the 
documentation. 
101 For an analysis of the centrality of writing, especially bureaucratic writing, in the imagining of the 
Spanish American Empire see Ángel Rama, The Lettered City, trans. and ed. John Charles Chasteen 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1996). 
102 Juan Bautista Muñoz was able to publish only the first volume of his History of the New World.  
He died in 1799 leaving behind him 166 volumes of annotated manuscripts gathered from different 
archives throughout Spain.  The volumes, of which some are missing, are currently known as the “Muñoz 
Collection.”  Vicente Murga Sanz, ed., “Introducción,” Biblioteca histórica de Puerto Rico: Puerto Rico en 
los Manuscritos de Don Juan Bautista Muñoz (Río Piedras: Ediciones de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
1960) IX-XVII. 
103 Spanish archives may have been more willing accomplices, as exemplified in the offering of 
research grants to Latin American history scholars, in the imagining of Viequense foundational figures and 
myths of origin during the 20th and 21st centuries because these institutions are no longer part of the 
imperial power being contended.  Alejandro Tapia y Rivera, however, worked with the “Muñoz Collection” 







Contrary to Cacimar and Yaureibo’s histories and to tales about the Taino cacica 
Luisa, there were no Carib cacicas recorded in the Spanish archives for Viequense 
women to emulate.  There were no heroic or even tragic tales staring Carib women.  Yet, 
living flesh and blood traces of Carib women survived the Spanish empire, however few 
and scattered, for I had my own private model.  Born in 1886, before local history books, 
archives and museums detailing with nationalist nostalgia the disappearance of the 
Viequense Caribs, my great-grandmother had made the Carib heritage her own.  It could 
have also been the other way around for she inherited the tragic-heroic island, the tragic-
heroic carbet, the tragic-heroic destiny, and the fierceness and tenacity to meet them 
face-to-face even when she lost her eyesight and even when life got hard, very hard.  
Nonetheless, scholars assert, perhaps as part of a myth of ends, that the Caribs were 
massacred and Vieques was surely deserted by 1582 with only sheep left to roam the 
island.104  Still, my great-grandmother, living outside books, dusty primary documents 
and written communication in general, claimed proudly that she was a pureblood Carib 
woman.  Her strong auburn features, even when weathered and wrinkled, silently stood as 
assenting witnesses to her indigenous claims.  Having grown up in a time marked by low 
literacy and scholastic rates, some sort of oral tradition must have helped my great-
grandmother appropriate her Carib identity.105  Some oral tradition or network outside the 
                                                 
104 López Sotomayor, Vieques: un momento de su historia. 
105 Cayetano Coll y Toste wrote that there were 6 schools in Vieques by 1898 with a total of 288 
students and 6 teachers.  The schools were located in the town of Isabel II and in the districts of Puerto Real 
and Mosquitos.  Each place had two schools since they were divided by gender.  Girls outnumbered boys in 
all three localities.  According to Juan Bonnet Benítez, by the year 1899 Vieques had 5,938 inhabitants.  
Thus, combining Coll y Toste with Bonnet Benítez numbers it can be stated that by the end of the 19th 
century approximately 5% of the population was attending school.  Cayetano Coll y Toste, Historia de la 






disciplining reach of the few letrados (primarily those that mastered written 
communication) in Vieques, so invested in narrating how they disinfested the island of 
savages and brought civilization, must have fostered Carib imaginings.106  These 
collective imaginings could have been passed down through generations that, after 1514, 
traveled around the Lesser Antilles for a while before returning, or establishing 
themselves for the first time, to Vieques.  Yet, even if Abuela’s family was the only one 
openly claiming a Carib identity in the late 18th century Vieques, I do not think she was 
the only one.  I do not think she was the last one left of a now officially disappeared 
indigenous race, even when history books deny such claims. 
My great-grandmother is now to me but a vague old memory of a diminished 
blind old lady that died when she was 98 years old.  I was only eight at the time.  Still, I 
remember her, Abuela Cocoroco, nicknamed by my immediate family after the 
affectionate rooster callings she made to lure to her bedside the small grandson she could 
not see.  To others she was known by Doña Basilia, a more appropriate Spanish name for 
public spaces.  Yet, the Spanish honorary title Doña, backed in my great-grandmother not 
by wealth but rather by dignity and pride, could not successfully silence her 
onomatopoeic name or conquer her indigenous claims.  Both continued to be performed 
in the more private domestic sphere of her apartment in the caserío.  The Carib presence, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Juan A. Bonnet Benítez, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico (San Juan: F. Ortiz Nieves, 1976) 118.  See 
Appendix 18. 
106 As proposed by Ángel Rama, the letrados in Latin America were originally those that mastered 
written communication.  During the colonial period the letrados wielded the almost sacred power that 
writing had acquired to perform and legitimize themselves in their roles as bureaucrats and ideologues of 
the Spanish empire.  Concentrated in urban centers, the letrados had an important role in the imagining of 
Latin American cities, ideal cities that many times diverged from the “real cities” inhabited primarily by 
non-letrados.  Thus, Rama identified the letrado collectivity as an urban elite he named “The Lettered 
City.”  The “Lettered City,” according to Rama, commanded over the “order of signs,” a more spiritual-
cultural realm that differed and many times contrasted with the materiality of the “real city.”   Rama, The 






as the Spanish soon found out with Vieques after 1514, could be hidden but was very 










Claims to the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th Centuries 
 
The island of Puerto Rico, attacked the most by the Caribs, could not fend them off, 
neither by the number of its inhabitants, nor with the advantage of firearms; until in 1625 
the English, by orders of Warnes, and the French, by those of Danambuc, disembarked at 
the same time in San Cristóbal, not with the intention of cultivating the land, but with that 
of enriching themselves, through theft and piracy, which from this island [San Cristóbal] 
they planned to perpetrate over the Spanish ones...The French, English and Dutch that 
replaced the Caribs in their islands, adopted their ferocity and savagery; spreading terror 
and fright to all the Spanish colonies, carrying everything in blood and fire. 
Friar Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra, Historia de Puerto Rico (1788)1 
 
The island of Puerto Rico, as Friar Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra suggested in 
his Historia de Puerto Rico, was a frontier colony to the Spanish Empire.  The island was 
located in a privileged geographical position to provide harbor to vessels arriving from 
Europe.  Puerto Rico, in addition, was the easternmost colony of the Spanish Empire in 
the Greater Antilles.  As such, the settlers of the island had to deal with the non-Spanish 
populations of the Lesser Antilles.  The linkages established between Puerto Rico and the 
Lesser Antilles were very complex.  Abbad y Lasierra, in the midst of Bourbon 
reformism, stressed the porosity of the Spanish imperial boundary and the violent nature 
                                                 
1 “La isla de Puerto Rico, que fué en todos tiempos la más combatida de los Caribes, no pudo 
contenerles, ni por la multitud de sus habitantes, ni con la ventaja de las armas de fuego; hasta que en 1625 
los ingleses, a las órdenes de Warnes y los franceses, a las de Danambuc, desembarcaron a un mismo 
tiempo en San Cristóbal, no con el objeto de cultivar sus tierras, sino con el de enriquecerse, mediante los 
robos y las piraterías, que desde esta isla [San Cristóbal] pensaban hacer sobre las españolas...Los 
franceses, ingleses y holandeses que sucedieron a los caribes en sus islas, adoptaron su ferocidad y 
barbarie; esparcieron el terror y espanto por todas las colonias españolas, llevándolo todo a sangre y 
fuego.”  Fray Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra, Historia geográfica, civil y natural de la isla de San Juan 






of the relationship.  The southern neighbors, he argued, waged a continuous war against 
Puerto Rico.  Out of these neighbors, he singled out the Caribs.  Their savagery, it seems, 
could not be erased from the islands the European sought to claim. 
For some time after the 1514 massacre of the indigenous population in Vieques, 
the Spanish colonizers in Puerto Rico rejoiced with the cleansing of the bothersome Carib 
presence from the small island.2  The survival of anything Carib, then equaled to 
savagery and rebelliousness, had become a threat to the Spanish plans for the 
northeastern sector of the Caribbean archipelago.  Spanish colonizers, in fact, did not 
assign to the Caribs the value given early on to the Tainos and later on to the Africans.  
On the contrary, the colonizers pushed the Crown to recognize the Caribs as a warfaring 
group and to therefore favor their disbandment through massacre and forced 
resettlement.3  The Caribs, after all, represented to the colonizers a surplus indigenous 
population from whom collective labor could not be easily extracted and who openly 
challenged Spanish control over the area.  Thus, the Governor of Puerto Rico, Cristóbal 
de Mendoza, must have hoped in 1514 to end the Carib threat in Vieques and its 
surrounding waters.  Almost 500 years later, most scholars coincide that Mendoza’s party 
was quite successful in driving out the Caribs from Vieques.  Diana López Sotomayor, 
for example, states that by 1522 Vieques was deserted, while Elizabeth Langhorne writes 
                                                 
2 As stated in Chapter 2, back in 1514 the Spanish colonizers embarked throughout different Virgin 
Islands in an anti-Carib crusade.  The indigenous populations found in these islands were either killed or 
taken as slaves, which made the Spanish colonizers from the Puerto Rican main island momentarily think 
the problem with the Caribs in the nearby islands was over.  Salvador Brau, La colonización de Puerto 
Rico: Desde el descubrimiento de la Isla hasta la reversion a la corona española de los privilegios de Colón 
(San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1981) 239-257. 







that 1582 is the last year in which there is any report of indigenous presence in Vieques.4  
Leaving aside the 60-year difference, both scholars coincide that by the close of the 16th 
century the Caribs in Vieques were history.  Still, following Friar Agustín Iñigo Abbad y 
Lasierra’s 1788 brief description of the long reign of “savagery” that surrounded the 
Puerto Rican archipelago, the Spanish colonizers might have celebrated too soon for 
more than the name Carib survived in the region to haunt the Crown’s imperial designs. 
The Spanish Crown’s struggle to claim Vieques was a long and complicated one 
expanding over four centuries.  The Caribs might have been officially driven out of 
Vieques during the early 16th century, but even at the height of Spain’s overseas 
dominion the small island could not be successfully conquered, deserted or managed.  
According to Abbad y Lasierra, Spain was unable to control the Caribs in the Lesser 
Antilles, and the 1622-23 arrival in San Cristóbal (later named St. Kitts) of Pierre Bélain 
d’Esnambuc for France and of Thomas Warner for England only heralded the continued 
reign of “ferocity and savagery” over the islands where the French, English and Dutch 
succeeded the Caribs.  By the 1788 publication of Abbad’s Historia de Puerto Rico, 
Vieques was part of the islands frequented and sometimes inhabited by these non-Iberian 
Europeans that supposedly continued to spread “terror and fright” to nearby Spanish 
colonies.5  Thus, long after the 1514 massacre of the indigenous population, Spain still 
considered the island of Vieques as a savage territory. 
                                                 
4 Diana López Sotomayor, Vieques: un momento de su historia, diss., Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 1975, (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma, 1975).  Elizabeth Langhorne, 
Vieques: History of a Small Island (Vieques: The Vieques Conservation and Historical Trust, 1987) 1. 
5 Vieques, by the year 1788 when Friar Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra published his Historia de Puerto 
Rico, was still not assertively claimed by Spain.  For this and for other reasons I explain further on in the 
chapter, Vieques must have been on Abbad y Lasierra’s mind when he mentioned the existence of islands 
that even after the expulsion of the Caribs had remained the locus of “ferocity and savagery.”  For an 
example of such a description explicitly referring to Vieques see Teophile Le Guillou’s descriptions of pre-






The establishment of Pierre D’Esnambuc and Thomas Warner in San Cristóbal 
represented the first permanent settlement of European competitors to the Spanish 
Empire in the Caribbean.6  San Cristóbal and the nearby islands had not been inhabited 
by Spain.  By 1655, however, the English had taken over Jamaica.  By 1697 the French 
had official possession of Saint-Domingue, and by 1733 the Danes had purchased and 
occupied part of the Virgin Islands.  All these post-1650s acquisitions gave control to 
other European empires over territories that had been either populated by Spain or that 
were close to established Spanish colonies.  Thus, like the succession of biblical plagues 
suffered by the ancient Egyptians, the Spanish colonizers endured the Caribs who were 
followed by the French, the English, the Dutch and the Danes.  In this procession of New 
World plagues, Abbad y Lasierra’s categories employed to understand the American 
reality were easily transferable.  To the Benedictine monk from Aragón, the challenge to 
Spanish colonial possessions, in this case Puerto Rico, transmuted these other Europeans 
into savages.  As such, the Caribs were transfigured into the French, the Dutch, the 
English and, although not explicitly mentioned, into the Danes and the Brandenburguers.  
The transfigured shared, according to Abbad y Lasierra, the category of ferocious 
savages.  The category, previously employed on the African Moors during the 
Reconquest, continued to be recycled after its usage on the Caribs to designate both 
Catholic and Protestant populations threatening Spanish dominion overseas.7 
                                                 
6 Sebastián Robiou Lamarche, Taínos y Caribes: Las culturas aborigínes antillanas (San Juan: 
Editorial Punto y Coma, 2005) 246. 
7 The Spanish usage of categories like savages to identify the American indigenous populations can 
be traced back to the Reconquest (711-1492) and the long struggle with African Moors for the control of 
the Iberian Peninsula.  See, for example, Richard Konetzke, América Latina, vol. II (México, D.F.: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, 1997).  And Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the 






The 17th century marked the full onset of a representational warfare between 
European empires competing for American dominion and accusing each other of brutal 
savagery.8  The representation warfare, nonetheless, had firm roots in the 16th century 
with, for example, the 1578 Dutch and the 1583 English translations of Bartolomé de las 
Casas’ 1552 Brevisima relación de la destrucción de las Indias (Brief Account of the 
Destruction of the Indies).  The text was written by the Dominican priest as a critique of 
the Spanish treatment of the indigenous populations in the Americas.  The appropriation 
of the text by Protestant empires, in turn, helped the creation of the Black Legend 
characterizing the Catholic Spanish Empire as exceptionally cruel and savage.  Thus, the 
same characterizations the Spanish had used on the Caribs were being returned to them 
by other Europeans.  These characterizations also responded to geopolitical tensions, but 
between Spain and other European empires.  The Dutch, after all, waged between the 
years 1568 and 1648 a war of independence with Spain, and had founded the Dutch West 
India Company in 1621 to establish trade monopolies with the Americas.  Meanwhile, the 
English defeated the Spanish Invincible Armada in 1588 and was challenging the Spanish 
navy at sea.9 
Abbad y Lasierra’s Historia de Puerto Rico was very much part of the 
representational warfare waged between European empires since the 16th century.  Yet, 
the Brandenburguers and the Danes did not feature prominently in Abbad y Lasierra’s 
                                                 
8 The representation warfare between European empires had definitely begun in the 16th century 
with, for example, the 1578 Dutch and the 1583 English translations of Bartolomé de las Casas’ 1552 
Brevisima relación de la destrucción de las Indias (Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies).  The 
text was written by the Domincan priest as a critique of the treatment of the indigenous populations in the 
Americas.  The appropriation of the text by Protestant European empires, in turn, helped give rise to the 
Black Legend characterizing the Catholic Spanish Empire as exceptionally cruel and savage.  Benjamin 
Keen, “The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 49:4 (November 1969): 703-719. 
9 The Dutch declared their independence from Spain in 1581, but Spain did not recognize it 






narration.  In the case of Brandenburguers, I have found their presence in the Caribbean 
mentioned only once.  In the Documentación sobre Vieques transcriptions from the 
Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección de Ultramar, in Madrid, Brandenburg is briefly 
alluded to as having unsuccessfully attempted to establish in Vieques during the year 
1692.10  Given the short one-time stay in Vieques, it is unlikely that Spanish officials or 
Abbad y Lasierra regarded Brandenburg as a serious threat to Spanish interests in the 
northeastern Caribbean.  The Danes, on the other hand, had settled the neighboring 
islands of St. Thomas, St. John and St. Croix between 1672 and 1734.  The Danes had 
also been supposedly responsible, through the protests of Captain Hanjen from St. 
Thomas, of driving out the Brandenburguers from Vieques.  Captain Hanjen’s protests 
suggest that Denmark did not want its European neighbor as its American neighbor.  The 
protests also suggest that as early as 1692, 26 years before settling St. John and 41 years 
before acquiring St. Croix, Danish officials considered Vieques to be a territory of 
Denmark.  Even if Spain ignored Denmark’s pretensions over Vieques, by 1765 St. 
Thomas and St. Croix were contraband havens for Puerto Rico’s surplus food staples and 
coffee.11  There were also diplomatic tensions between Danish West Indies and Puerto 
Rico’s officials over runaway slaves from the Danish territories who were given refuge in 
                                                 
10 For the 1692 colonization attempt by Brandenburg, now Germany, in Vieques see, for example, 
José de la Higuera y Lara, “Yndice de los documentos que se encuentran en este Real Archivo General de 
Yndias que tienen relación con la isla de Vieque, inmediata a Puerto Rico,” Documentación sobre Vieques: 
Transcripciones de documentos procedentes del AHN/U Madrid, CIH, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río 
Piedras, 322-330.  The Documentación sobre Vieques transcriptions in the Centro de Investigaciones 
Históricas of the University of Puerto Rico were brought from the Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección de 
Ultramar, in Madrid.  These are transcriptions of 19th century imperial documents, like correspondence 
between the Governor of Vieques and the Governor of Puerto Rico, related to the exercise of Spanish 
authority in Vieques. 
11 Alexandro O’Reylly, “Memoria de D. Alexandro O’Reylly sobre la isla de Puerto Rico,” 
Antología de lecturas de historia de Puerto Rico (Siglos XV-XVIII), ed. Aida R. Caro Costas (San Juan: 






Puerto Rico.12  Notwithstanding Denmark’s nearby presence, pretensions over Vieques, 
fostering of contraband and demands for the return of slaves, Friar Iñigo Abbad y 
Lasierra in his Historia de Puerto Rico still made reference to the Dutch presence in the 
Caribbean while completely ignoring the Danes. 
Friar Abbad y Lasierra was not alone in his disregard of Denmark.  The Spanish 
monarch Fernando VI, for example, passed the September 24, 1750 Real Cédula only 16 
years after the Danish purchase of St. Croix.  The Cédula guaranteed the freedom of 
runaway slaves from English and Dutch colonies that reached Spanish domains and 
wished to embrace the Catholic faith.  Yet, the Spanish Crown ignored the Danish 
colonies, at least until Carlos IV passed the April 14, 1789 Real Cédula stipulating that 
all runaway slaves that reached Spanish territories would be free.13  The omission of 
Denmark in texts like the 1750 Real Cédula and the 1788 Historia de Puerto Rico could 
have responded to Denmark’s rather late entrance into the Caribbean colonial scenario, to 
its limited territorial extension, to its neutrality during many of the European conflicts of 
the time, and to the fact that, contrary to France, England and the Netherlands, Denmark 
did not employ corsairs to attack Puerto Rico.  Yet, my analysis of a wide range of 
Spanish documentation dealing with the subject of European nations settling in and 
around Vieques has led me to conclude that some of the authors of these documents 
could have confused the daneses with the holandeses (the Danes with the Dutch).  The 
                                                 
12 Girjanauth Boodraj writes that early on the Danish West Indies had a problem with runaway 
slaves.  In St. Croix, for example, the slaves would hide in the island’s forests.  However, after the cutting 
down of woods to make way for sugar plantations, slaves sailed to Vieques and Puerto Rico.  Amidst 
protest from Danish officials, Puerto Rico, scarcely populated, gave refuge to these runaway slaves.  
G[irjanauth] Boodraj, Slave Society in the Danish West Indies: St. Thomas, St. John and St. Croix (Mona: 
University Press of the West Indies, 2000) 130.  
13 “1750,” Biblioteca histórica de Puerto Rico, ed. Alejandro Tapia y Rivera, 2nd ed. (San Juan: 







confusion of the Danes with the Dutch can help explain why the nearby Danish presence 
appears to have not attracted as much attention from Spanish letrados stationed in Puerto 
Rico as the Dutch did, even though the Netherlands, contrary to Denmark, England, 
France and Brandenburg, did not attempt to colonize Vieques.14  Friar Iñigo Abbad y 
Lasierra, particularly, could have simply inherited some of this documentation 
safeguarded by imperial archives and thus been inclined to interpret Denmark’s presence 
as unthreatening to Spanish affairs.  Such silences concerning the Danes, however, 
quickly changed during the early 19th century when both Denmark and Spain’s 
pretensions over Vieques became clearer.  In the early 1800s Denmark became the focus 
of bureaucratic concern and of letrados’ correspondence in Puerto Rico and Madrid. 
Even though non-Iberian empires established themselves in the Caribbean after 
1622, they had taken an interest in the wealth-producing Americas by the late 15th 
century.15  Names like Puerto Rico (Rich Port) given to the capital of San Juan Bautista 
(St. John the Baptist, and name given to the Puerto Rican main island) helped feed greedy 
European imaginations.16  The naming of Puerto Rico was an obvious allusion to the 
conquistadores’ expectations of finding plenty of gold.  The capital’s pretentious name 
painted a more concrete picture of the colonial enterprise that overshadowed the 
                                                 
14 Spanish colonial officials like Field Marshall Alexandro O’Reylly did notice the Danish 
possessions dangerously close to the Puerto Rican archipelago.  During his 1765 visit to Puerto Rico he 
noted that St. Croix and St. Thomas had become contraband havens where most of Puerto Rico’s surplus 
food supplies and coffee ended but that this illicit activity had helped survive Puerto Rican towns like 
Fajardo in the island’s eastern tip.  O’Reylly, “Memoria,” Antología de lecturas de historia de Puerto Rico 
458-462.  
15 During the late 15th century non-Iberian European interest in the lands explored by Christopher 
Columbus went farther than simple fascination with the circulating stories.  England’s King Henry VII, for 
example, sponsored in 1497 the exploration of the northeastern coasts of North America performed by the 
Genovese Henry Cabot. 
16 The name Puerto Rico was originally given to the capital of the Puerto Rican archipelago’s main 
island.  The main island itself was named San Juan Bautista by Christopher Columbus during his 1493 
American voyage.  However, as early as the 16th century the names were confused and as centuries passed 
the identification of the island through its capital reversed the original names so that the colony of San Juan 






evangelizing aspirations Christopher Columbus had made reference to when he named 
the island after St. John the Baptist.  Indeed, during the first 30 years of occupation, the 
Spanish settlers dedicated themselves and their encomendados (allotted Indians) to the 
extraction of gold from the island’s rivers.  Yet, the great expectations led to equally 
great disillusionments as the gold quickly dried out and the encomendados died out.  
Apparently Puerto Rico was not so rich after all, or at least not so rich in gold. 
The decrease of Puerto Rico’s indigenous population led to the shortage of a 
cheap work force.  The problem was addressed in 1519 with the introduction of African 
slaves.  The Emperor Carlos V (1517-1556) authorized in 1518 the establishment of a 
direct and stable slave commerce between the African coasts and the Americas.  For such 
a purpose, the Emperor granted slave-trading licenses to distinguished figures of the 
nobility.17  While Christian and European-cultured slaves known as ladinos had 
accompanied the conquistadores to Puerto Rico as early as 1509, it took until the 1518 
commercial impulse for the number of Africans to exponentially increase.18  According 
to historian Aida Caro Costas, between 1519 and 1530 the African slaves brought to 
Puerto Rico exceeded by far the 500-figure the Crown had authorized the Fleming 
Lorenzo de Garrevood to introduce to the island.  Instead, Caro Costas estimates that a 
total of 1,047 were actually introduced which was more than twice the authorized figure.  
The importation of slaves, the decrease of the indigenous population and the emigration 
                                                 
17 The Portuguese, having first explored the African coasts, would later come to dominate the slave 
trade in the Americas.  They would continue to run the profitable Atlantic human traffic until the 19th 
century international bans on the trade and the later abolitions of slavery.  Brazil, in turn, was the last 
country to abolish slavery in 1888. 
18 Between 1509 and 1518 the introduction of slaves to Puerto Rico initially paid 2 ducados (Spanish 
monetary unit) per slave and later an almojarifazgo (import tax) of 7% of the slave’s total estimated price.  
Estados Unidos, Departamento de la Guerra, Dirección del Censo de Puerto Rico, Informe sobre el Censo 
de Puerto Rico 1899 (Colombia: Ediciones Puerto, 2003) 30.  Aida R. Caro Costas, “Esclavos y esclavistas 
en Puerto Rico en el primer tercio del siglo XVI (1531),” Revista del Museo de Antropología, Historia y 






of Spanish settlers to other newly conquered territories changed dramatically the racial 
configuration of the Puerto Rican main island.  So drastic was the change that the 1530-
1531 census performed by Governor Francisco Manuel de Lando portrayed demographic 
figures where the 2,284 African slaves outnumbered the 332 Spanish settlers by almost 
six to one.19  For the next 21 years, following Abbad y Lasierra, a total of 1,300 more 
slaves were introduced, although the number did not include slaves brought through 
contraband.20  Thus, during the mid 16th century, slaves filled the demographic void and 
need of working hands left in Puerto Rico by the decreasing indigenous population and 
Spanish colonizers. 
The African slaves were initially brought to work in the extraction of gold.  The 
enterprise was short-lived because by 1540 there was no more gold left to harvest from 
the rivers.  The island’s main economic activity had to rapidly shift gears if the colony 
was to survive.  Farming, in turn, replaced the harvest of gold.  During the next four 
centuries farming, following Francisco Scarano, shaped Puerto Rico’s landscape with 
estancias, hatos and ingenios azucareros.  The estancias (roughly translated as farms), 
established in the main island since the early 16th century, were a midway compromise 
between gold mining and subsistence and export agriculture.  Estancias were farms 
                                                 
19 Of the 2,264 slaves in Puerto Rico for the year 1531, 1,931 resided under the jurisdiction of the 
city of San Juan and 333 in the town of San Germán.  Of these 2,264 slaves, 406 were women and 1,803 
were men.  Caro Costas, “Esclavos,” Revista 17.  There is a discrepancy of 20 slaves in the total slaves 
figures provided by Aida Caro Costas and by Francisco Moscoso.  Francisco Moscoso writes that there 
were a total of 2,284 slaves accounted for in the 1530-1531 Lando census, along with 510 Indians 
encomendados, 1,043 Indian slaves and 332 Spanish settlers for a total population of 4,169.  However, 
Moscoso states that the Lando census was performed only in the two Spanish settlements of San Juan and 
San Germán and that children were not accounted for in the census.  Thus, an unknown number of children 
and non-village settlers were not included in the official census figures.  Francisco Moscoso, 
“Presentación,” Cuaderno de Investigación Histórica 1 (1994) V.  For a list of the total slave population in 
Puerto Rico from the years 1531 to 1873 see Appendix 9.   
20 Fray Agustín Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra, as cited in the 1899 Puerto Rican Census, estimated that in 
the year 1530 200 slaves were introduced to the island, in 1536 200, in 1540 300, in 1550 250, in 1551 150 
and in 1553 400 for a total of 1,500 slaves in a period of 23 years.  Dirección del Censo de Puerto Rico.  






located near riverbanks for the cultivation of crops like cassava and sweet potatoes while 
simultaneously serving as mining facilities.  After the 1540s the mining activities were 
discarded and agriculture became more diversified.  The hatos (cattle ranches) were 
circular land tenures literally centered on the raising of livestock.  Hatos comprised great 
extensions of grass lands that circumscribed stables.   In the beginning, hatos could easily 
encompass a two miles radius in all directions, but the gradual increase of settlers 
restricted such expansive land distributions.  Although cattle raising and leather tanning 
were profitable enterprises for Puerto Rican settlers from the 16th to the mid 20th century, 
the ingenios azucareros (sugar mills) represented the spark that initially brought the 
biggest revenues to the island’s economy and that jumpstarted the slave traffic after the 
1520s.21 
The first attempt to establish a sugar mill in the island was made in the western 
town of Añasco during the early 1520s by Tomás de Castellón and his son-in-law Blas de 
Villasante, the Royal Treasurer.  The enterprise had the economic support of Carlos V, 
but the Crown’s support was not enough.  By 1529, when the monarch made a decree 
protecting mills from being embargoed for debts, the Añasco initiative was already dead.  
The risky sugar enterprise was capital, technology, land and labor intensive.  Yet, the first 
failure did not deter other settlers from taking an interest in the crop that was revitalizing 
the economy of the neighboring La Hispaniola.  With the support of the Dominican 
clergy, crown approved loans and a massive influx of slaves, the sugar industry in Puerto 
                                                 
21 The owners of cattle did not necessarily own the land to raise their animals.  If this was the case, 
the cattle were usually left free to roam nearby wild or unclaimed areas until needed by their owners.  Thus, 
cattle raising represented a more democratic economic activity than the production of sugar that demanded 
the ownership of great extensions of land.  Francisco Scarano, Puerto Rico: Cinco siglos de historia (San 
Juan: McGraw-Hill, 1993) 201-210.  Fernando Picó, Historia general de Puerto Rico (Río Piedras: 






Rico got the needed impulse.  In the case of Rodrigo Franquez and his son, the support of 
a Dominican friar’s technical assistance, a municipal loan and the intensive labor of 19 
slaves, one of which was a “maestro de azúcar”  (“master of sugar”) probably from the 
Portuguese colony of Sâo Tome, allowed them to finish establishing a mill near the Loíza 
riverbanks in 1540.22  The Franquez’s sugar mill, in turn, was a hybrid mixture that 
incorporated such diverse elements as Taino utensils and diet, African labor, Portuguese 
technology and Spanish capital and management.  This Atlantic World yet local sugar 
enterprise, adapting different variables to the particular Puerto Rican situation, 
subsequently served as an example to other settlers and paved the way for the sugar mills 
that arose near the northern Toa, Bayamón and Loíza rivers and later spread throughout 
the Puerto Rican archipelago. 
For the next 300 years after the establishment of the first sugar mills in the island, 
the sugar cane flowered all over the Puerto Rican coastal plains and valleys.  Indeed, 
during 1550 to 1650 sugar was the most profitable commodity exchanged through official 
commerce with the metropolitan port city of Seville.  For example, in the year 1568 alone 
Puerto Rico exported 277.5 tons of sugar to the metropolis.  Yet, sugar production did not 
monopolize Puerto Rico’s early colonial economy as in other Caribbean colonies like 
Barbados.23  The initial impulse was rather tumbling by 1589 when Puerto Rico shipped 
to Seville only 14.625 tons of sugar, a 262.875 tons or 95% decrease compared to 21 
years earlier, and had definitely subsided by 1670 when only 1.65 tons were exported to 
                                                 
22 Scarano, Puerto Rico 207. 
23 The British island-colony of Barbados, before evolving into a sugar producer, briefly exported 






Spain.24  So by the late 18th century, as recorded by Field Marshall Alexandro O’Reylly, 
the production hardly sufficed to fulfill the local demand.25 
Since the early 16th century the sugar cane shared the island’s cultivated soil with 
subsistence agriculture and with exportable crops like ginger, tobacco and coffee.  One 
century later, these exportable crops along with lumber and livestock were increasingly 
exchanged through contraband with non-Iberian Europeans from islands like Curaçao and 
St. Thomas.26  In return, Puerto Rico’s settlers received handkerchiefs, hats, silk 
stockings, machetes, gunpowder, flour, wine and rum, among other things.27  This 
commercial exchange was emphatically proscribed by the closed mercantilist policies of 
the Spanish Empire.  Yet, in 1546 Spain established a fleet system to conduct the 
maritime transportation between its metropolitan shores and the Caribbean.  The fleet 
system eventually left Puerto Rico, and other colonies like La Hispaniola, outside the 
lucrative imperial trade routes because few ships dared to wander outside the protective 
range of the imperial escorts that anchored in specific Caribbean ports.  Given the 
difficulty to engage in legal trade, Puerto Rican colonists in general turned to contraband.  
This proscribed activity, as identified by O’Reylly in 1765, benefited Puerto Rico to the 
extent it fostered economic activity in a colony otherwise lacking legitimate commercial 
opportunities inside the Spanish empire, an efficient circulating monetary currency, and 
local commerce in general.  Such combination of imperial neglect and lack of 
                                                 
24 See Appendix 12. 
25 Alexandro O’Reylly, also spelled O’Reilly, wrote in 1765 that Puerto Rico’s mills provided 
enough sugar and molasses to satisfy local consumption, but that most of the rum, alcoholic beverage 
derived from sugar, was brought through contraband from neighboring islands that produced the beverage 
cheaper.  O’Reylly, “Memoria,” Antología de lecturas de historia de Puerto Rico 474-475. 
26 For a chart of the commercial traffic between Puerto Rico and Seville between the years 1512 and 
1699 see Appendix 11. 
27 For a list of articles introduced and extracted by foreigners through illicit commerce in Puerto 






commercial infrastructure prevented the sugar cane from monopolizing the island’s 
landscape during the early colonial enterprise. 
Spanish maritime commerce with the Americas decreased during the span of the 
Thirty Years War (1618-1648).  The reduction worsened Puerto Rico’s status as a 
neglected Spanish imperial possession.28  The island, according to Francisco Scarano, 
evolved into a colony of independent and mixed-raced peasants living off subsistence 
agriculture and contraband.29  Each peasant cultivated the same bananas, corn, rice, sweet 
potatoes and yams as its neighbor did, and for which there was no local demand.  With 
commercial ties to the metropolitan markets severed, only foreign Caribbean colonies 
like St. Croix and Barbados absorbed Puerto Rican surplus produces.  These small islands 
with an intense sugar industry suffered from deforestation and from the lack of resources 
for subsistence agriculture and the raising of cattle.  Thus, despite Spain’s pretensions of 
closed imperial borders and markets, contraband united Puerto Rico with other non-
Spanish Caribbean colonies in mutually profitable ties of dependency.  Still, Puerto 
Rico’s export economy did not take off until international events coincided with imperial 
reforms to foster an early 19th century sugar boom.30  The boom that turned Puerto Rico 
into a world producer of sugar came almost 300 years after the pioneering Franquez sugar 
                                                 
28 Francisco Scarano states that the Puerto Rico-Seville commerce markedly decreased after the 
1610s and collapsed after 1625.  Meanwhile, Fernando Picó provides a chart of yearly commerce marking 
1625 as the beginning of the commercial decrease.  Yet, Picó identifies the period 1630-1650 as one of 
lessened commerce, period that starts only two years after the Dutch captured most of the Spanish fleet 
returning to the peninsula.  Scarano, Puerto Rico 215, 244.  Picó, Historia general 79, 92.  See Appendix 11 
and 12. 
29 The situation of the capital city of San Juan differed from that of the rest of the island.  San Juan, 
as will be discussed below, remained an important military bastion of the Spanish empire that after 1583 
received the Mexican situado and after 1646 harbored naval organs like the Armada de Barlovento. 
30 Francisco Scarano roughly outlines Puerto Rico’s economic stages from the 16th to the 19th 
century as follows: early 16th century to the 1540s mining of gold; approximately 1550s to 1610s 
commercial production of sugar, ginger and leather; 1650s to early 19th century subsistence agriculture and 
contraband performed by an independent peasant society; and approximately 1820s to 1870s sugar boom.  
Francisco Scarano, Haciendas y barracones: azúcar y esclavitud en Ponce, Puerto Rico, 1800-1850, trans.  






mill.  Even if the 19th century eventually overshadowed earlier enterprises, Francisco 
Scarano states that during the 1540-1550 sugar fever Puerto Rico’s economic outlook 
appeared favorable to the colony’s emerging dominant sectors that thought they had 
found the replacement of gold.31 
The promise of land and wealth was not the only New World allure.  As the 
colonizers of the western Puerto Rican town of San Germán found out in 1528 and again 
in 1538, the tensions and hostilities amongst European monarchs were sometimes played 
out in the American scenario.  In the particular case of San Germán, the quarrel between 
France’s François I and Spain’s Carlos V translated into the pillaging and burning of the 
town by French corsairs.  The 1528 assault was the first corsair attack against Puerto 
Rico.  It was a presage of things to come.  The 1588 English defeat of the Spanish 
Armada broke Spain’s hegemonic pretensions over the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean 
Sea.  In turn, European empires began challenging more openly Spain’s dominions in the 
Americas.  For example, in 1595 and 1598 respectively the English corsairs Sir Francis 
Drake and George Clifford, Count of Cumberland, attacked the city of San Juan.  Such 
employment of corsairs represented, before the proliferation of non-Iberian colonies in 
the region, the main challenge to Spanish settlements and constant flow of people, 
information and commodities in the Caribbean.  These mercenaries shared profits with 
the different European monarchs that endorsed the pillaging of adversaries overseas.  
Spain, however, was not simply the victim of the piracy warfare between European 
empires.  The Spanish Crown, for example, employed in 1718 the services of the Puerto 
Rican corsair Miguel Henríquez for the expulsion of an English settlement from Vieques.  
                                                 
31 Scarano, Puerto Rico 206-210.  See Appendix 12.  For a further discussion of the sugar economy 






The spoils gained by the mulatto corsair included 71 African slaves worth 9,775 pesos 
(Spanish monetary unit) along with ‘one big Black woman missing the fingers in her left 
hand’ worth 40 pesos.32  Even if forced to share the spoils with Henríquez and the rest of 
the expulsion party, Spain still gained some extra royal revenue and a deserted Vieques.  
Yet, the engagement of piracy through piracy between European empires did not translate 
into an open war.  Instead, what ensued in the Caribbean after the defeat of the Spanish 
Armada and arguably until the 1898 Spanish-Cuban-American War was a permanent 
state of cold war interweaved by periods of open warfare.33 
The Caribbean was undoubtedly the center of the American world.  The region 
lost much of its economic appeal to the Spanish Crown after the mid-1500s discovery of 
gold and silver deposits in the American mainland.  Yet, the convergence in the area of 
the trading routes between Spain and the viceroyalties of New Spain (Mexico) and of 
Peru (most of Spanish South America) facilitated its evolution into an imperial 
superhighway.34  The region further evolved into an important geopolitical unit with the 
post-1622 establishments of European colonies in the area.35  These settlements gradually 
transformed the Caribbean into a microcosm of global empires.  The presence of rival 
                                                 
32 Documentación sobre Vieques 771, 893-900.  Salvador Brau, La isla de Vieques: Bosquejos 
históricos (San Juan: Gráfico, 1912) 7-8. 
33 The long cold war was interweaved by numerous periods of open war like the Thirty Years’ War 
(1618-1648), the Second and the Third Dutch Wars (1665-1667 and 1672-1678), the War of the League of 
Augsburg (1689-1697), the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-
1713) and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815). 
34 The Viceroyalty of Peru, founded in 1542, was later divided and the present-day Columbia, 
Ecuador, Panamá and Venezuela came to roughly form part after 1717 of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. 
35 While Spain might have been more attracted with the American mainland, other European empires 
concentrated their efforts in making their Caribbean colonies highly profitable.  An example of an 
extremely profitable Caribbean colony can be found in the pre-1791 St. Domingue.  This French sugar 
colony was a world producer of sugar that helped France during much of the 17th century to dominate the 
European sugar trade, and during the 19th century fiercely compete for the control with England.  Another 
example can be found in the Danish colony of St. Croix that according to Alexandro O’Reylly was 
profitable to its metropolis after only 30 years of being settled.  Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and Power: 
The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin Books, 1986) 188.  O’Reylly, “Memoria,” 






colonies, corsairs, contraband and unconquered indigenous populations gave vivid 
testimony to the frailty of Spanish hegemonic pretensions over a space that had become 
critical for its imperial communication system.  Such regional fragmentation threatened 
the stability of the Spanish overseas empire.  Spain, in turn, assigned a strategic-military 
importance to the Caribbean while other European empires strove to make their West 
Indian colonies into profitable trading posts and producers of tropical commodities.  To 
the extent that these other European empires transformed islands into profitable colonies, 
their position inside the Caribbean was strengthened and contraband in the region 
flourished. 
The shift in the role of the Caribbean inside the Spanish empire was suggested as 
early as 1545 with the establishment of a circular transportation system between Spain 
and America called the Carrera de Indias (Indies Run).  The Carreras were ostentatious 
biannual convoys designed to escort valued commodities across the Atlantic.  These 
Spanish galleons and fleets linked Seville and later Cadiz with New Spain, Peru and 
Cuba.  To ease the traverse through Caribbean waters, military strategists argued for the 
defense of the region’s main ports and commercial routes.  Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 
for example, proposed to King Felipe II (1556-1598) that strategically important 
Caribbean ports needed to be fortified and that corsairs had to be actively pursued in open 
sea.36  The city of San Juan held such a critical port to the proper functioning of the 
empire’s transportation system.  The Crown, in turn, allotted funds for the 1530 to 1570 
fortification of La Fortaleza (The Fortress) and later for the 1630 to 1780 walling of the 
                                                 
36 José F. Cruz de Arrigoitia, El Situado Mexicano: Origen y Desarollo en Puerto Rico durante los 
años de 1582 a 1599, diss. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1984, (Río Piedras: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 






city-islet.37  As evidenced in these fortification works spanning over three centuries, the 
organization of Spanish trade through the Carreras assigned strategic importance to 
Puerto Rico.  The importance was based on the island’s location as the easternmost 
Spanish colony in the Caribbean.  From the port of San Juan, for example, vessels could 
take advantage of the North Equatorial current for a swift travel west to the Gulf of 
Mexico.  Yet, the strategic role also relegated the colony to a secondary plane to the 
extent it made Puerto Rico a guardian of the Carreras but not an integral part of the 
imperial trading route.  The circuit, instead, officially included the ports of Cuba, Mexico 
and Colombia.  Commercial vessels traveling to Puerto Rico had to be chartered.  
Without imperial protection these risky voyages paid high insurance fees to cover cargo 
lost to corsairs.  These fees raised the price of commodities and made legal trade even 
less desirable for Puerto Rican settlers.  Thus, Spain’s attempt to limit foreign 
interference in the flow of commodities through the articulation of a fleet system had just 
the opposite effect in Puerto Rico where contraband flourished. 
One century after the establishment of the Carrera de Indias the Spanish Crown 
further pushed forth the principle of the Caribbean as Spain’s mare clausum (closed 
sea).38  Through the Real Cédula of May 4, 1635 the Crown ordered the creation of a 
local naval organ to be named the Armada de Barlovento (Windward Armada).  The 
Cédula, written 13 years after the French and English settlement of San Cristóbal, 
ordered the viceroy of New Spain to secure funds for the construction of a naval organ 
                                                 
37 The capital city of San Juan, now the Old San Juan, was built in an islet just off the northern coast 
of Puerto Rico.  La Fortaleza is one of the oldest structures in the city that once housed the local 
government and held the royal revenues.  During the 17th and 18th centuries the city was fortified through a 
wall that circumscribed the islet.  This wall had only four doors as access to the outside.  These doors were 
closed during the night.  Picó, Historia general 83, 91. 
38 The Latin term mare clausum refers here to the strategic imagining of the Caribbean as a closed 







that would safeguard the American heart of the imperial navigational routes.39  Once the 
funding had been secured the Crown issued the “Royal Decree and Instruction 
concerning the creation of the Armada de Barlovento, given on May 2, 1646 to General 
Juan de Urbina.”  According to the document: 
The principal purpose had [by the Crown] to form this Armada has been to 
want to have in her a Portable Garrison for the aid, defend and shelter of 
all the coasts of the Windward Islands and Seno Mexicano, their Presidios 
and Ports and avoid with this the harms that the Pirates and enemies cause 
to the commerce and contracting of the Indies so that my Vassals can 
freely navigate those seas, since with the warnings that you will have from 
the Governors you will easily be able to clean those coasts when the 
enemy tries to infest them.40 
 
The Armada, although coined with the term Windward, had as its space of movement the 
Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.  Its purpose was to accompany the Carreras while in 
the Caribbean.  In addition, the Armada had to proactively “clean” this space prone to 
enemy ‘infestation’ so that the Crown’s vassals could move freely in its midst and, more 
importantly, the plata (both silver and money) could flow.41  In other words, the Armada 
was responsible for protecting the Carreras while in the Caribbean and the Spanish 
colonies in general from pirates and enemies. 
The Armada de Barlovento was initially stationed in Puerto Rico.  The posting 
further confirmed the island’s strategic role inside the Spanish Empire.  Puerto Rico, as 
                                                 
39  “Real Cédula del 4 de mayo de 1635 sobre la fundación de la Armada,” in Manuel Alvarado 
Morales, La ciudad de México ante la fundación de la Armada de Barlovento: historia de una encrucijada, 
1635-1643 (México: El Colegio de México and Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1983) 247-249. 
40 “El intento principal que se ha tendido para formar esta Armada ha sido querer tener en ella un 
Presidio Portátil para socorro, defensa y abrigo de todas las costas de las Islas de Barlovento y Seno 
Mexicano, Presidios y Puertos dellos y escusar con esto los daños que los Piratas y enemigos causan al 
comercio y contratación de las Indias para que libremente mis Vasallos puedan navegar aquellos mares, 
pues con los avisos que tendreis de los Gobernadores facilmente podreis limpiar aquellas costas cuando el 
enemigo intentare infestarlas.”  “Orden e instrucción real para el funcionamiento de la Armada de 
Barlovento, dada el 2 de mayo de 1646 al general Juan de Urbina,” in Alvarado, La ciudad de México 255. 
41 The Spanish word plata means silver but is also used to refer to money in general.  In fact, 







the easternmost colony, had indeed become the “key to the Indies.”42  Yet, the strategic-
based identity pushed forth by the island settlers since 1529 was not understood in the 
same terms by the Spanish Crown.  Colonist had employed epithets like “another Rhodes 
of Christianity” for Puerto Rico in order to justify concrete economic and military 
demands to the Crown.43  Baltasar de Castro, for example, described Puerto Rico as the 
“key to the Indies” in a 1529 letter to Carlos V in order to request the monarch’s 
endorsement for the construction of La Fortaleza and for the local sugar industry.  Still, 
the Crown privileged the rapid militarization of the strategic bulwark while assigning 
economic development a secondary place.   
The militarization of Puerto Rico had royal approval at least since 1564 when 
military men such as Francisco de Bahamonde were appointed as Governors of the 
colony.  The position of Governor was further militarized when in 1580 it was collapsed 
with that of Captain General, and the colony became a capitanía general (captaincy-
                                                 
42 Puerto Rico was first described as “the key to the Indies” by Baltazar de Castro and others in a 
1529 letter to Carlos V seeking, among other things, that the Emperor would endorse the fortification of the 
island.  The description was picked up and echoed by different local letrados so that, for example, in 1647 
Diego de Torres Vargas described “la isla de Puerto Rico como primera de las pobladas y principal 
custodia y llave de todas” (the island of Puerto Rico as the first of those settled and principal custodian and 
key to all) in referral to the 1643 Reales Cédulas identifying Puerto Rico as “Siendo frente y vanguardia de 
todas mis Indias Occidentales y respecto de sus consecuencias la más importante de ellas y codiciada de los 
enemigos” (Being the front and vanguard of all my West Indies and in regards to its consequences the most 
important of them and coveted by the enemies).  “Al Emperador: Licenciado Gama, Ramírez de Vargas, 
Baltasar de Castro, García Troche.  Puerto-Rico 15 de Junio de 1529,” Biblioteca histórica de Puerto Rico 
300.  Diego de Torres Vargas, “Descripción de la Isla y Ciudad de Puerto Rico, y de su vecindad y 
poblaciones, presidio, gobernadores y obispos; frutos y minerales,” Antología de lecturas de historia de 
Puerto Rico (Siglos XV-XVIII), ed. Aida R. Caro Costas (San Juan: Editorial Corripio, C. por A., 1991) 
322-323. 
43 In 1542 Alonso de Molina wrote to Carlos V that “esta isla [Puerto Rico] en estas partes del 
Oceano es otra Rodas de la cristianidad” (this island [Puerto Rico] in these parts of the Ocean is another 
Rhodes of Christianity).  The comparison to Rhodes made by Alonso de Molina was meant to suggest that 
Puerto Rico was at the strategic forefront of Christianity in the Caribbean and for this reason should be 
zealously guarded and cared for by the Spanish Crown.  “Al Emperador: Alonso de Molina.  Procurador de 






general).44  The transformation of Puerto Rico into a strategic-military colony was 
expedited, both administratively and financially, in the year 1583 through the creation of 
the Junta de Puerto Rico in Madrid and through the establishment of the Mexican 
situado.45  These measures were designed to fortify and secure Puerto Rico.  In return, the 
colony was responsible for protecting the constant flow of people, information and 
commodities through its waters.  Puerto Rico, initially imagined by Spain as a rich port, 
evolved into the easternmost part of the offensive-defensive system of fortified Caribbean 
ports that included Santo Domingo, Santiago de Cuba, La Havana, Cartagena de Indias 
(Colombia) and others.  In the process, the easternmost Caribbean colony became an 
imperial frontier valuable to the metropolis as long as it remained Spanish and helped 
station naval organs like the Armada de Barlovento. 
The Armada’s presence in Puerto Rico facilitated its deployment to Vieques.  In 
the year 1693, for example, the Armada was ordered to eject English, French and Danish 
settlers from the island and to frequently patrol its coasts thereafter.  These settlers, 
having the unofficial endorsement of their respective governments, had been gradually 
establishing themselves in Vieques since 1685.  The English arrived first, then the French 
                                                 
44 In 1514 Juan Ponce de León was appointed by the king Fernando Captain General of San Juan 
Bautista.  Yet, a capitanía general (captaincy-general) to be occupied by the Governor was not created in 
Puerto Rico until 1580 with the designation of Juan de Céspedes as Captain General one week after having 
been appointed Governor.  Cruz, El Situado Mexicano 3, 13.  There was a brief interlude to the 
appointment of military men as Governors during the early 1820s.  Picó, Historia general 56. 
45 The situado, established in 1583 after the 1582 stationing of a permanent garrison in San Juan, 
consisted of a yearly subsidy sent from Mexico meant to cover military expenses incurred in Puerto Rico.  
Eventually the situado covered military and administrative expenses because, as suggested above with the 
1564 joining of the positions of Governor and Captain General, military and administrative functions in 
Puerto Rico were intertwined.  For an analysis of the situado in Puerto Rico see Alvarado, La ciudad de 
México.  For a brief analysis of the relationship between Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Armada de Barlovento 
and the Spanish imperial schemes for the Caribbean region see the paper by Manuel Alvarado Morales, 







and the Danes by 1689, and later the Brandenburgers in 1692.46  Sharing a small 
Caribbean island was not a new practice to, for example, English and French colonizers 
who co-inhabited at the time islands like Saint Kitts.  Thus, by 1693 Vieques had a 
diverse European population that worried Spanish officials.  These reconnaissance trips 
were then meant to discourage further enemy presence and settlements in the small 
island.  The trips, however, were seldom carried out.  Meanwhile enemy presence and 
settlements became common occurrences in Vieques after 1685.  Thus, the Armada’s 
trips, besides helping brand Vieques as a Spanish-claimed area, were unsuccessful in 
curing the frequently ‘infested’ imperial limb.  As the Governor of Vieques Teophile Le 
Guillou wrote in 1839: 
From the year 1493 when discovered by the Admiral Columbus to 1828, 
that island [Vieques] was inhabited by the Carib Indians, filibusters, 
pirates, deserters, evildoers, thieves, corsairs and contraband dealers.  
Sometimes these have played their part together.  This enchanting island 
has been witness to scenes capable of being exalted by a great poet, above 
all if some episodes of the good neighbors from Tortola and St. Thomas 
were added, then it would be a complete work that would cause fury in 
Paris…Of all these qualities of individuals, the Indians were the less 
savages; and surely the Caribs were not the most barbarous.  The Excy, 
Mr. Governor of Puerto Rico, Don Salvador Meléndez, tired of the 
depredations these vandals committed sent a company of granaderos 
commanded by Don Luis Lart in pursuit.  But this troop could do nothing; 
the filibusters and the pirates knew all the escape routes from the woods, 
these were labyrinths to Don Luis.  Some filibusters and others hid in 
Culebra, St. Croix and St. Thomas.47 
                                                 
46 The dates above are those provided by José de la Higuera y Lara’s 1685-1735 “Yndice.”  Yet, the 
exact dates of the first settlement attempts in Vieques could be debatable for Salvador Brau wrote that in 
1647 an English expedition led by John Pinard invaded the island.  The expedition was supposedly 
massacred by the Spanish.  Brau placed another colonization attempt in 1672 by a combined English and 
French force of approximately 300 persons under the English Governor of Antigua.  These were 
supposedly driven out on January 1673.  While Brau stated nobody was killed, 100 slaves were still 
captured for the Royal Treasury.  de la Higuera y Lara, “Yndice,” Documentación sobre Vieques 322-330.  
Brau, La isla de Vieques 5-6. 
47 “Desde el año 1493 que fué descubierta por el Almirante Colón hasta 1828, aquella Isla fue 
habitada por los Indios Caribes, filibusteros, piratas, desertores, malhechores, ladrones, corsarios y 
contrabandistas.  Estos han representado su papel algunas veces juntos...De todas estas calidades de 
individuos, los indios eran los menos salvajes, y seguramente no eran los Caribes los más bárbaros.  El 







Vieques, as Le Guillou wrote, was for centuries an unconquerable labyrinth for Spanish 
officials who could not rival the knowledge of the landscape possessed by “Carib Indians, 
filibusters, pirates, deserters, evildoers, thieves, corsairs and contraband dealers.”  These 
individuals were the unwanted others of the Spanish empire that frequented and dwelled 
in the small island since 1493.  They were, following Michel de Certeau, the users of the 
island that through everyday practices like walking creatively spun the space otherwise 
claimed by the Spanish Empire.48  Their escape routes, as identified by Le Guillou, led 
not only through the woods but also to islands like St. Croix.  In turn, these unwanted 
others retraced the paths trodden by the Caribs in 1514, perhaps suggesting a historical 
continuity in the knowledge of the land and nearby waters that Spanish officials such as 
Luis Lart did not possess. 
The control of Vieques and of the Caribbean region in general depended on more 
than random incursions and a display of big boats.  To possess the Caribbean all the 
aspiring empires struggled to know and decode the region while simultaneously 
imagining it in their own terms.  Identities, following Stuart Hall, are negotiated through 
representations.  Representations, in turn, produce knowledges that must be recognized 
into existence by others that did not necessarily partake in their productions.49  European 
empires, then, were in a race to know and authoritatively represent the Caribbean region 
                                                                                                                                                 
vándalos cometían en envió una compañía de granaderos en su persecución al mando de Don Luis Lart.  
Pero esta tropa no pudo hacer nada; los filibusteros y los piratas conocían todas las salidas de los bosques, 
que eran laberintos para Don Luis.  Algunos filibusteros y otros se ocultaron en la Culebra, Santa Cruz y 
San Tomas.”  Teophile Jacques Josephe Marie Le Guillou, “Compendio topográfico, estadístico e histórico 
de la Isla Española de Vieques,” Documentación sobre Vieques 747-748. 
48 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988). 
49 Stuart Hall, “Negotiating Caribbean Identities,” New Left Review 209 (January-February 1995): 
3-15.  For a discussion about the close relationship between knowledge and representation see “Chapter 2: 






to, in the extent, possible fix and control its identity.  A stable Caribbean identity dictated 
in particular European terms and known to particular European communities could be 
more easily wielded to harmonize with particular European imperial schemes.  Spain, for 
example, strove through the Armada de Barlovento and officials like Luis Lart to 
simultaneously know Vieques and dictate for the island a Spanish identity.  If such an 
identity would have been recognized by other empires, Spain would have exercised better 
control over the Puerto Rican archipelago.  The problem for the Spanish Empire with 
fixing Vieques’ identity was, as evidenced in the Lart incident, that while its officials 
attempted to sporadically represent a Spanish Vieques from Madrid and San Juan, 
unwanted others were getting to know Vieques from within the small island.  Their 
knowledge, in turn, rivaled not only Spanish representations but also Spanish control over 
Vieques. 
In the European imperial race to appropriate the Caribbean, different forms of 
geographical imaginings surfaced.  Monarchs like Felipe II commissioned cartographers 
like Abraham Ortelius to generate and compile detailed geographical representations of 
the region.50  As exemplified in Ortelius’ “Hispaniolae, Cubae, Aliarumque Insularum 
Circumiacientium, Delinetio.  [on sheet with]  Culicanae, Americae Regionis, 
Descriptio.” (“Sketch of La Hispaniola, Cuba, Antilles [on sheet with] Sketch of 
Culiacan, America”) included in the 1588 Spanish edition of his Theatrum Orbis 
Terrarum (Theater of the Earth’s Globe), cartographers created and gathered maps that 
                                                 
50 During the 16th and, especially in, the 17th centuries Dutch cartographers dominated the map 
making practice in Europe.  Considering that by 1543 the Netherlands were under Carlos V, king of Spain 
and Holy Roman Emperor, and then under the kings of Spain until 1648, some Spanish monarchs 
commissioned Dutch cartographers like Gerardus Mercator and Abraham Ortelius to portray their empire.  







were in themselves beautiful pieces of art (Figure 3.1).51  Yet, the artistry should not hide 
the fact that these maps were imperial instruments meant to decode and simplify the 
geographical region to monarchs, bureaucrats, settlers, merchants and corsairs alike.  
Like Frank H. Netter’s detailed drawings of the human body, cartographers such as 
Gerardus Mercator with his 1538 global map for Carlos V were illustrating and in the 
process revealing the increasingly complex imperial bodies.52  These were extensive 
bodies that monarchs ruled, but were unlikely to travel to or ever see for themselves.  
Thus, cartographers were visualizing empires.  More so, cartographers were actually 
making the empires come to life by delineating frontiers and by helping establish vital 
organs and arteries like Mexico and the trade winds.  The envisioning of organs, arteries 
and frontiers made possible the formulation of large-scale imperial policies over areas 
where the reach of monarchs extended, or hoped to extend.  The frontiers, in particular, 
divided imperial territories in administrative units and negotiated territorial borders with 
foreign neighbors. 
                                                 
51 While the word “atlas” to refer to a systematic collection of maps was first used by Gerardus 
Mercator in 1585-95, Abraham Ortelius’ 1570 Theatrum Orbis Terrarum represents the first modern atlas 
produced.  Antiquariat Reinhold Berg. 
52 For an example of Frank Netter’s detailed drawing of the human body see Frank H. Netter, Atlas 
of Human Anatomy, 3rd ed. (New Jersey: Icon Learning Systems, 2003).  MapHist.com: Open Information 








Figure 3.1: Abraham Ortelius’ 1588 “Hispaniolae, Cubae, Aliarumque Insularum Circumiacientium, 
Delinetio.  [on sheet with]  Culicanae, Americae Regionis, Descriptio.” 53 
 
European imperial cartography, indeed, helped imagine the Caribbean as a 
geopolitical region.54  Those “others” that according to Hall validate identities were, in 
this case, those who proceeded to adopt certain cartographic representations of the 
Caribbean as valid.  These “others” consisted of monarchs and bureaucrats who favored 
certain names instead of others when creating policies for certain regions, of diplomats 
and Armadas who defended their countries’ claims over certain territories, of trading 
companies that sponsored certain cartographers, and even of corsairs who used certain 
maps to carry out their pillaging and trace their escape routes.  Nonetheless, the 
imaginative process that brought to life the Caribbean as a geopolitical region was a long 
                                                 
53 The map was included in later editions of the Theatrum Orbis Terrarum.  The map in Figure 3.1 is 
from the 1612 Italian edition.  Abraham Ortelius, “Hispaniolae, Cubae, Aliarumque Insularum 
Circumiacientium, Delinetio.  [on sheet with]  Culicanae, Americae Regionis, Descriptio.,” Theatro del 
Mondo di Abrahamo Ortelio (Antwerpen: Plantin Press, J.&B. Moretus, 1612) n.p., Sanderus Antiquariat, 
2008, Sanderusmaps.com, 26 January 2008 <http://www.sanderusmaps.com/antique-
maps/america/culiacan--mexico--antilles_12868.cfm>. 







and gradual one.  As evidenced in the Archivo Algemeen Rijksarchief, Sección 
Cartográfica of the Center for Historical Investigations of the University of Puerto Rico, 
representations nowadays taken for granted had to be negotiated.55  For example, in the 
Dutch authored Map 15 produced around the 17th century, Puerto Rico’s horizontal 
elongation was inversed so that Europe laid west of the island instead of east.56  While 
the inversion of cardinal points was not common in Caribbean cartographic 
representations, Map 15 suggests that as late as the 17th century basic geographical 
conventions were still not settled, and the colonial space was very much open for 
interpretation.   
Not only were north-south orientations debatable in cartographic representations, 
but also what the region per se could encompass and how should monarchical gazes 
apprehend it.  Similarly to the 1569 Mercator versus the 1855/1967 James Gall-Arno 
Peters’ global projections, the scales of representations frequently shifted, as did the lands 
and waters portrayed.57  As a result of these shifts some areas were emphasized while 
                                                 
55 The Dutch words Algemeen Rijksarchief can be roughly translated as national or imperial archives.  
The Algemeen Rijksarchief Collection in the Center for Historical Investigations of the University of Puerto 
Rico was named Algemeen Rijksarchief because the documents were brought from the Dutch Algemeen 
Rijksarchief. 
56 The Algemeen Rijksarchief Collection does not include any Caribbean map dated prior to the 19th 
century.  Yet, I argue that Map 15 was produced in the late 17th century like other Dutch maps in the 
Collection.  The usage of the name San Juan de Puerto Rico suggests a pre-19th century making because by 
the 1800s San Juan had for the most part been dropped out of the island’s name.  The omission of San Juan 
is evidenced in other 19th century dated maps of the Collection.  In addition, there are other 17th century 
Dutch maps inside, like Map 8, and outside the Collection with the cardinal points similarly inverted.  For 
example, the inversion of the cardinal points was a relatively common practice in Johannes Van Keulen’s 
Caribbean maps published in Amsterdam in 1684.  In addition, Van Keulen authored Map 2 and 14 of the 
Algemeen Rijksarchief Collection and there is the possibility that Map 15 could even be one his firm’s 
maps.  Map 15, Archivo Algemeen Rijksarchief, Sección Cartográfica, CIH, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Río Piedras.  For another collection of early maps of Vieques see the map exhibit in the Museum and 
Archive Fortín Conde de Mirasol in Vieques.  For a collection of 16th to 19th century maps of the 
Caribbean, including maps by Johannes Van Keulen, see Antiquariat Reinhold Berg. 
57 Both the Mercator and the Gall-Peters’ global projections offer distorted representations of the 
world characteristic of portraying a circular object through a flat squared grid.  The Mercator projection 
distorts the size of the lands and waters portrayed in favor of shape, while the Gall-Peters projection 






others were rendered invisible.  For example, in the most likely 17th century Map 6 of 
Dutch origin the emphasis lies on the Puerto Rican archipelago and the Lesser Antilles.  
Yet, the Virgin Islands marking the transition between the two island groups were pushed 
northeast, distorted in size and shape, and gathered together in a cluster of island-specks 
collectively labeled as “Virgines.”58  Considering that by the 17th century Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands and the Lesser Antilles in general were being divided by European 
empires and receding indigenous populations, the non-Spanish author of Map 6 might not 
have conceived or wanted to portray the islands as one organic whole. 
Each map represented a new perspective that, similar to microhistory, 
experimented with the different realities revealed by different scales.  The surfacing of 
these different realities had important consequences for cartographers were producing 
texts that resembled radiographies insofar as they could not only illustrate organs and 
arteries but also pinpoint the ails of the imperial bodies.  In this sense, the Dutch 
cartographer Johannes Van Keulen’s 17th century look at the “Eyland S. Iuan de Porto 
Rico met d Eylanden daar Beoosten” (“Island of San Juan of Puerto Rico with the Islands 
there Eastward”) revealed what Ortelius’ representation of the Caribbean did not.  Van 
Keulen revealed through Map 2 an array of smaller islands situated very close to the 
Spanish colony of Puerto Rico.59  One of them, labeled by Van Keulen as Borequem and 
known in Puerto Rico as Vieques, was extremely close.  In fact, Vieques was 
conveniently close to Puerto Rico for the possible non-Hispanic readers of Van Keulen’s 
map and uncomfortably so for the Spanish empire that handled similar representations 
                                                 
58 Map 6, Archivo Algemeen Rijksarchief. 
59 In 1680 Johannes Van Keulen founded the Van Keulen Cartography firm in Amsterdam.  The 
firm, in business until 1885, became a main supplier of navigational instruments and manuals for the Dutch 
East-India Company, and even Van Keulen’s grandson and great-grandson became the Company’s official 






like Don Francisco Fernandez Valdelomar’s “Carta Geografyca de la Ysla de San Juan de 
Puerto Rico con las mas procsymas de Barlovento” (“Geographic Chart of the Island of 
San Juan of Puerto Rico with the nearest Windward ones”).60  The legend of 
Valdelomar’s 18th century Map 11 stating that “The three islands in the yellow color are 
settled by the Danes” decodes a map that through the use of yellow color emphasized on 
the existence of three Danish Virgin Islands in the uncomfortable vicinity of Puerto 
Rico.61  As if leading a blind man or more precisely a blind monarch through a journey of 
corporal recognition, cartographers had the power to bring out to the monarch those small 
anomalous masses that stood out in their geographical radiographies.  Vieques, following 
Pedro Juan Soto’s handful of mud narrative, was such an anomalous mass stuck in the 
heart of the Spanish empire.  It was almost invisible but for cartographers’ conjuring 
fantasies. 
The small masses could appear to be nothing more than insignificant peripheries, 
but peripheral Vieques posed problems that were emblematic of both the colonial 
enterprise and imperial cartography.  In terms of the early colonial enterprise, Spain 
would or could not settle Vieques even though the 1514 incursion led by Governor 
Mendoza left the island officially deserted.  During the mid 16th century, Caribbean and 
Puerto Rico’s demographics were changing.  The indigenous populations were 
                                                 
60 For Don Francisco Fernandez Valdelomar map of Puerto Rico and its nearby islands see Map 11, 
Archivo Algemeen Rijksarchief. 
61 “Las tres Yslas con el color Amarillo estan pobladas por los Dinamarqueses.”  The islands in 
question are St. Croix, St. Thomas and St. John.  While the exact date of the map is not known, it can be 
inferred that it must have been produced in the 18th century.  Following Salvador Brau, the use in the map 
of the word “Vieque” indicates that the artifact must have been produced no earlier than the 18th century.  
Also, the Danes settled St. Thomas in 1672, St. John in 1718 and officially acquired St. Croix from France 
in 1733-34.  As such, a map representing the three Danish islands could not predate the mid-1730s.  The 
usage of the name San Juan de Puerto Rico, instead of simply Puerto Rico, suggests that the map predates 
the 19th century when San Juan was employed only to refer to the colony’s capital.  Map 11, Archivo 






dramatically decreasing to the point of extinction, African slaves were beginning to come 
in and the European settlers searching for the easy gold were immigrating to the 
American mainland.  Puerto Rico, Vieques’ closest Spanish colony, was so scarcely 
populated that at the end of the 16th century it did not even have 2,500 settlers.62  If Spain 
did not readily possess the manpower to boost Puerto Rico’s crashing demography, much 
less did it have the human resources to colonize Vieques.  As such, Spain could not own 
Vieques through the everyday practices of a stable colony that inhabited, manipulated 
and defended the island.  Instead, as described by Teophile Le Guillou and implied by 
Friar Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra, for the next three centuries Vieques was inhabited by the 
remnants of the Caribs, the French, the Dutch, the English, the Danes, corsairs, thieves, 
contraband dealers, runaway slaves, deserted soldiers and many other groups and 
individuals that together nicely synthesized both the fringes and the enemies of the 
Spanish Empire.  This synthesis had no reserved place inside the ordered city, the ordered 
colony, envisioned by letrados for America.63  If anything, these peoples were the 
antitheses of the imperial designs for what the colonial society should be: Spanish, 
Catholic, loyal, law-abiding and productive.  These peoples, not the island as Pedro Juan 
Soto suggested in Usmaíl, were the cells that together made up one of the small 
anomalous masses shown in Spain’s Caribbean radiographies.  More precisely, they were 
                                                 
62 The Puerto Rican’s main island population began to increase during the later 17th century but 
really took off after 1765.  José L. Vázquez Calzada, La población de Puerto Rico y su trayectoria histórica 
(San Juan: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1988).  For more information about Puerto Rico’s population 
during the 16th to the 20th centuries see Appendices 8-10. 
63 Ángel Rama’s proposed that the letrados’ ordered city was an ideal city rationally planned to 
embody a desired order in terms of administrations, commerce, religion, defense and colonization.  Yet, the 
ordered city many times contrasted with the real city.  Ángel Rama, The Lettered City, trans. and ed. John 
Charles Chasteen (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996) 1.  For a reference to Rama’s work see “Chapter 






the sick cells that made the mass a malignant one.64  Their presence was considered by 
Spanish imperial bureaucrats as corrupting to the organic functioning of the colonial 
enterprise.  Yet, the unwanted others could not be efficiently extirpated from the Spanish 
imperial body. 
The Spanish Crown, embodied after 1646 as far as Vieques was concerned 
through the Armada of Barlovento, possessed sophisticated maps of the region and island.  
Still, as Teophile Le Guillou recounted, the Crown could not rival the users’ knowledge 
of the landscape and their improvised escape routes.  Nor could the Armada, as an 
ostentatious displacement of Spanish imperial power, cope with the mobility and 
inconspicuous practices of these unwanted users.65  If something united corsairs, thieves, 
contraband dealers, runaway slaves and deserted soldiers, for example, it was their 
uprootedness and desire to evade imperial attention.  This might explain why Spain had 
more success dealing with settlements from rival empires than with other users.  Settlers 
from rival empires, for starters, placed an emphasis on the claiming of space.  Nor were 
they uprooted in the same way a runaway slave was.  These settlers had a place they 
could return.  If Spain’s success against European settlements was moderate, its handling 
of the other unwanted users was negligible.  Spain could neither colonize Vieques nor 
assertively claim it armed only with the knowledge produced by Spanish imperial 
cartography.  Vieques was, following Le Guillou, a labyrinth that even sophisticated 
imperial maps could not decipher. 
                                                 
64 Another such small malignant mass was the island of Tortuga, just north of Port-de-Paix in the 
Haitian northern coast, from where during the early 17th century the French settlers schemed and carried out 
the take over of the western third of La Hispaniola, takeover finally recognized by Spain in 1697 through 
the Treaty of Ryswick. 






In terms of the problems Vieques posed to imperial cartography, Spain’s inability 
to populate or physically claim the island went hand in hand with its inability to control 
authoritatively its geographical representations.  As stated above, the Spanish Crown 
possessed sophisticated maps of the northeastern section of the Antillean arc.  The Crown 
also performed reconnaissance trips every certain number of years to maintain the status 
of Vieques as officially deserted.  Nonetheless, as evidenced in the French, Dutch and 
English authored maps of the Algemeen Rijksarchief Collection, different European 
nations also produced their own maps of the area.  These maps were concrete 
contestations to Spanish hegemony.  On the one hand, maps worked like keys to the area 
for they facilitated entrance to their readers.  On the other hand, maps could establish a 
representational ownership of the lands and water portrayed.  For example, the French 
authored Map 25 measured the distance to “Porto Rico et des Iles Voisines” (“Puerto 
Rico and the Neighboring Islands”) from Paris.  The measurement established a 
representational ownership to the extent that the islands were an extension of the imperial 
capital.66  Whether deciphering or establishing claims to that represented, the 
proliferation of maps defied Spain’s exclusivist claims to the region and closed 
mercantilist policies. 
The geographical representations produced by different European nations 
sometimes even named the lands and waters portrayed with new non-Spanish names.  For 
example, by the 16th century the English and the Danes had named Vieques Crab Island 
or Krabben Eyland, while the Dutch had labeled it Borequem.67  These namings were 
either equally or more dangerous to Spain than the uncontrolled proliferation of maps 
                                                 
66 Map 25, Archivo Algemeen Rijksarchief. 






because the action represented an outright refusal to recognize Spanish sovereignty over 
Vieques.  Spain had, in fact, engaged in a similar practice when in November 14, 1493 
Christopher Columbus named Bieke as La Graciosa.  As he had done during his first 
American voyage, Columbus named the island in order to claim it.68  Thus, through the 
name “Graciosa” he established the precedent of ignoring indigenous rights to the island.  
Understanding the act of naming as refusals to acknowledged Spanish sovereignty over 
Vieques can help explain why England, later joined by Denmark, France and 
Brandenburg, was the first European empire to seriously attempt to colonize Vieques 
during the years 1685 to 1693.  The refusal can also explain why Spain’s 1693 eviction of 
English, Danish and French colonists from Vieques, and the subsequent Armada de 
Barlovento’s reconnaissance trips to the island, did not discourage England from future 
colonization attempts.69  From the year 1685 to mid 19th century, England and Denmark 
simply continued to use and claim sovereignty over Vieques.  Thus, in the specific case 
of Vieques, European empires were not attempting to usurp a Spanish colony as when the 
English took Jamaica in 1655.  They, on the contrary, were attempting to settle a 
supposedly uninhabited island without an internationally recognized colonial identity.  In 
other words, European empires did not recognize the existence of a Spanish colony of 
Vieques.  Their acts rather stressed on the existence of a non-Spanish colony of Vieques. 
                                                 
68 “I discovered a great many islands, inhabited by numberless people; and of all I have taken 
possession for their Highnesses by proclamation and display of the Royal Standard without opposition. To 
the first island I discovered I gave the name of San Salvador, in commemoration of His Divine Majesty, 
who has wonderfully granted all this. The Indians call it Guanaham. The second I named the Island of 
Santa Maria de Concepcion; the third, Fernandina; the fourth, Isabella; the fifth, Juana; and thus to each 
one I gave a new name.”  Christopher Columbus, “The Letter of Columbus to Luis De Sant Angel 
Announcing his Discovery,” ushistory.org, 2006, Independence Hall Association in Philadelphia, 15 
October 2006 <http://ushistory.org/documents/columbus.htm>. 
69 The Brandenburguer colonists are not included in the list of those evicted by Spain in 1693 






The acts of naming ultimately implied the proposition of a new identity.  
European monarchs through their cartographers were trying to name and thus dictate the 
island’s identity in order to have it recognized by the other empires.  Spain, unable to 
colonize or otherwise assertively claim the island, could not impose a Spanish name.  La 
Graciosa, even though endowed by Columbus as early as 1493, could not erase a couple 
thousand years of indigenous presence because others inside as well as outside the 
Spanish Empire would not validated the identity.  On the contrary, these others pushed 
forth their own names for the island.  Spain, in turn, negotiated the name Vieques.  This 
name recognized, to the extent it recalled an indigenous past, that the island was not a 
typical Spanish colony imagined by letrados.  Still, this version of Bieke opened space 
for the inscription of Spanish meaning.  Accordingly, Vieques, from 1514 to the early 
19th century, evolved into a Spanish claimed island-común where transnational activities 
were unofficially tolerated.  Comunes, following the pervading agrarian philosophy in 
Castile, were the scarce natural resources like water or grassing lands that belonged to 
community members.  Thus, the Vieques Spain pushed forth was an officially deserted 
island reserved for the exploitation of resources like lumber.70  To rival Spain’s Vieques 
the Dutch proposed an up for grabs Borequem.  Meanwhile the English and the Danes 
proposed the inhabited colony, supported by slave labor, of Crab Island or Krabben 
Eyland.  The Dutch’s Borequem was probably a mix up between the indigenous names of 
the main and the smaller Puerto Rican islands, or between Borinquen and Bieke.  If so, 
the Dutch joined the Spanish in appropriating the island through its indigenous name and 
in, coincidentally, not attempting to settle in the island during the early colonial 
enterprise.  The fact that the two empires that appropriated an indigenous name were the 
                                                 






only two that did not attempt to settle Vieques suggests a possible link between the acts 
of naming and of colonizing.  Maybe, those who named strove to symbolically erase the 
island’s past in order to possess it, while those who appropriated Bieke acknowledged the 
Caribs’ power over the labyrinthine island.  One way or the other, the Caribs were still 
engaged. 
For approximately three centuries Spain’s imaginings had to contend with 
alternate proposals for the small island’s identity.  Spain claimed sovereignty over but did 
not readily possess the resources or commitment to colonize Vieques.  The Spanish 
Crown, instead, limited itself to random policing actions designed to maintain the island 
uninhabited.  In the meantime, Vieques’ ambiguous deserted status facilitated its 
conversion into a común for the extraction of lumber.  The Spanish, however, were not 
the only ones to use and frequent the island-común.  From the year 1514 to the early 19th 
century, the official Vieques was deserted but the unofficial small island was periodically 
and permanently inhabited and used by all kinds of unwanted others of the Spanish 
Empire.  These others exploited the small island’s natural resources and established illicit 
commercial relationships with the settlers of Puerto Rico.  As such, Vieques remained for 
at least three centuries a small malignant mass in the global map of the Spanish Empire, 
almost invisible but still threatening to spread its cancer to the nearby colony of Puerto 
Rico. 
The creation of a stable settlement that could translate into physical reality the 
delusions of Spain’s cartographers and bureaucrats about the existence of a Spanish 
Vieques had to wait until a change in demographics occurred in Puerto Rico and until the 






and the metropolitan scenario.  The independence movements begun around 1810 in far 
apart regions like Buenos Aires and Querétaro-Dolores had, in a period of 15 years, 
thrown off the Spanish empire from most of the Americas.  Only Cuba and Puerto Rico 
remained as Spanish possessions.71  In those 15 years the feats of Simón Bolívar, José de 
San Martin, Bernardo O’Higgins, José María Morelos y Pavón and other less known and 
anonymous figures created, for example, the Greater Colombia and Mexico.  These 
newly independent republics, in turn, further fragmented into smaller nation-states like 
those of Central America and Ecuador.  As the nation-states multiplied, the maps of the 
Americas and the Caribbean became compartmentalized, or maybe scarred, by national 
and colonial lines.  Many of the new national frontiers were traced over late 
administrative colonial lines that had divided the American territory into viceroyalties, 
intendancies, provinces and others.  In other words, in the independence process 
intendancies like that of León became the republic of Nicaragua and captaincies-general 
like that of Venezuela became the republic of Venezuela.72  Thus, the imperial 
boundaries drawn early on by cartographers to delineate and subdivide the empire have 
been a long lasting colonial legacy that the independence movements inherited and 
naturalized as national frontiers.73 
                                                 
71 Peter Bakewell roughly outlines Latin American independence in the following chronology: Rio 
de la Plata (later Argentina) on May 1810, Paraguay on May 1811, Chile on February 1818, Colombia 
(colonial New Granada) on August 1819, Venezuela on June 1821, Mexico on August 1821, Central 
America (originally part of Mexico) on August 1821, Ecuador (colonial Quito) on May 1822, Peru on 
December 1824, Bolivia on January 1825.  Brazil also gained its independence from Portugal in the year 
1822.  Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America: Empires and Sequels 1450-1930 (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997) 360-384.  For further discussions of the 1810-1825 Latin American independence 
movements see Edwin Williamson, The Penguin History of Latin America (London: Penguin Books, 
1992). 
72 The national frontiers did not necessarily follow the exact administrative borders of colonial times 
as evidenced in the annexation of the region of Guanacaste, southwestern tip of the Intendency of León, to 
Costa Rica during the late 19th century. 
73 I take the idea of European empires drawing the future national frontiers of former colonies from 









The standardization of imperial, and later national, cartographic representations 
has been guided by the obsession to demarcate impermeable borders.  These lines traced 
over papers are powerful inventions that can render invisible the population flows and 
cultural and economic intermingling that have been characteristic of the Caribbean since 
pre-Columbian times.74  Yet, Caribbean boundaries, notwithstanding how rigid lines 
appear in maps, have been quite porous.  In this, Vieques represents a perfect example.  
For at least three centuries the island that was claimed by many users, but it was 
permanently occupied by none.  Instead, all sorts of people from different nationalities, 
races and occupations came and went because Vieques, if anything, was movement.  The 
small island had no settlements, only escape routes.  The labyrinthine island that Teophile 
Le Guillou once described did not invite to permanence.  So people in Vieques moved.  
Among these people in movement were my Abuela Cocoroco and, most probably, her 
ancestors. 
Very early in her long life Abuela Cocoroco challenged the boundaries of her 
tragic-heroic island, and maybe destiny, through a journey that took her as far as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Siam, later Thailand.  Siam’s case, however, is different from that of Latin America because it was never a 
European colony.  Nonetheless, to the extent that Siam’s colonized neighbors were charted by their 
respective imperial cartographic bodies, Siam was also charted.  In addition to cartography, Winichakul 
identifies other mechanisms of establishing national borders, like census.  Thongchai Winichakul, Siam 
Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
74 By standardization I refer to the long process through which rivaling bodies of cartography and 
their patron nations struggled to legitimize their representations of the Caribbean over other such 
cartographic representations.  For example, I refer to the process through which an international community 
gradually acknowledged the existence of a non-Spanish Caribbean, and later of colonies lying next to 






Venezuela, La Hispaniola and Cuba.  Through the journey she symbolically retraced the 
Caribbean journey of her Carib ancestors and claimed islands they had been unable to.  
Yet, her travels did not respond to some nostalgic identity quest or to the more modern 
trends of leisure tourism.  She was not preoccupied with discovering the Caribbean’s 
indigenous soul that worried nationalist intellectuals.  Nor did any Royal cruise line 
offered to unravel for her the exotic Caribbean in seven days.  My abuela could not be 
pampered by the locals because she briefly formed part of an itinerant labor force that 
united the fragmented Caribbean through population flows searching for ways of 
sustenance.  In many ways, Abuela herself was the typical Caribbean local when she 
boldly crisscrossed old imperial and newer national borders compartmentalizing the 
Caribbean.  Her incursion as a racialized, or simply non-white, itinerant worker made her 
share a pan-Caribbean identity centered on displaced colonial subjects.  These subjects in 
the early colonization period could have been summed up by indigenous and African 
populations but later included their descendants and many others that could not be 










The Spanish Colony of Vieques, 19th Century 
 
[Vieques] by itself it would not be very desirable if it were situated farther from Puerto 
Rico, but the position that it occupies, so close, separated only by a canal that even the 
smallest coastal boats cross in half an hour, would allow foreigners to bring ruin to the 
agriculture and commerce of this one [Puerto Rico]; they could furtively introduce all the 
manufactures of their factories; and triggering a slave revolt they would find so near and 
with very little risk the site where they find freedom leaving for the same thing Puerto 
Rico destitute of arms for the cultivation and elaboration of the articles that it has formed 
without agricultural riches, and lost the immense capital invested in this object. 
Governor Miguel López de Baños, Documentación sobre Vieques (1840)1 
 
A geopolitical map of the 21st century Caribbean can present the viewer quite an 
array of colors, as if tempting the adventurous traveler to island hop as the Caribs once 
did across a rainbow of nations, territories, commonwealths, departments and colonies.  
Yet the establishment of the Caribbean as a geopolitical region was the result of a fiercely 
negotiated process between rivaling monarchs, bodies of cartography, legions of 
bureaucrats and diplomats, Armadas, armies of settlers and many other interested 
communities.  After the 16th century, diverging geographical imaginations gradually 
converged to acknowledge the existence of a non-Spanish and more complex Caribbean.  
                                                 
1 “[Vieques] que si bien por sí misma sería poco apetecible si estuviese situada en una mayor 
distancia de Puerto Rico, la posición que ocupa tan inmediata y separada sólo por un canal que atraviesan 
en media hora hasta los botes más pequeños de cabotaje, sería bastante en manos de extranjeros para 
arruinar en poco tiempo la agricultura y comercio de esta [Puerto Rico]; introduciendo furtivamente todas 
las manufacturas de sus fábricas; y sublevando la esclavitud que encontrarían tan cerca y con poquísimo 
riesgo el punto donde consiguen la libertad quedando por lo mismo Puerto Rico destituido de brazos para el 
cultivo y elaboración de los artículos que han formado sin riqueza agrícola, y perdidos los inmensos 
capitales invertidos en este objeto.”  Documentación sobre Vieques: Transcripciones de documentos 






Spain never represented a hegemonic power that could unify the fragmented region.  On 
the contrary, heterogeneous and undisciplined populations thrived throughout diverse 
imperial margins where non-Iberian European empires made their presence in the 
Caribbean recognized.  It was not until the 18th and 19th centuries, however, that Spain 
faced the Caribbean as the microcosm of global empires it had become and accordingly 
revised its policies for frontier colonies like Puerto Rico.  One such imperial stance the 
Governor of Puerto Rico Miguel López de Baños (1837-1840) wanted revised was the 
ambiguous colonization of Vieques.  With the strengthening of British-led abolitionism, a 
fragmented Caribbean threatened the survival of Puerto Rico’s burgeoning sugar 
economy that depended on slave labor.2  Vieques, with its geographical proximity, could 
either help to protect or open to ruin the larger colony of Puerto Rico. 
Almost since the establishment of the colony in 1508, Spain had neglected the 
economy of Puerto Rico while still pretending to impose closed mercantilist policies 
throughout the Empire.  The neglect coupled with the restrictive economic policies 
fostered the rise in Puerto Rico of illegal activities like contraband.  In fact, contraband 
helped the island survive when years passed and Spanish merchant ships from the 
Carreras did not dock in San Juan.3  The precarious situation prevailed until Bourbon 
reformism proposed in the second half of the 18th century that with proper attention 
Puerto Rico could be a prosperous colony.  The reigns of Fernando VI (1746-1759) and 
Carlos III (1759-1788) aimed quite successfully to transform the island into a producer of 
                                                 
2 Great Britain had outlawed the slave trade within the British Empire with the passing of the Slave 
Trade Act in 1807, and completely abolished slavery within the Empire with the Slavery Abolition Act of 
1833.  Yet, the British government pressured countries like Portugal, Spain, Brazil and the United States 
into also abolishing the slave trade during the early 19th century.  For a study of the effects of the British 
abolitionist push and the end of the slave trade in Cuba see David R. Murray, Odious Commerce: Britain, 
Spain, and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 







tropical commodities, specifically into a sugar colony.  The purpose behind the reforms 
was to foster a stable and if possible prosperous Spanish colony that would not only be 
strategically important but also profitable to the metropolis.  To such ends the Crown 
ordered the visitas generales (general visits) of high-ranking Spanish officials like 
Alexandro O’Reylly (1765) and issued pieces of legislation like the Reales Cédulas of 
1778 and 1789.  The visit of Field Marshal O’Reylly to Puerto Rico, recorded in his 
Memorias, resulted in the restructuring of the army, militias and fortifications.4  He also 
argued for better land distribution to harmonize with a slave-run sugar society as well as 
criticized the rampant contraband pervading throughout the island.  The Real Cédula of 
1778, designed to boost agricultural production, conceded lands to the dispossessed and 
to those who could exploit them.  To stimulate the sugar industry, the Cédula authorized 
hacendados to import sugar-related technology.  The document also allowed for the 
immigration of skilled Catholic workers who came to the archipelago mostly from 
neighboring French colonies.5  The decree also created the towns of Arecibo, Aguada and 
Coamo to accompany the already established San Juan and San Germán.  The Real 
Cédula of 1789, on the other hand, completely liberalized slave trade in the Spanish 
Caribbean and Caracas by authorizing the entrance of any merchant ship importing slaves 
and exempting them from taxes related to the human commerce.6  These Bourbon 
                                                 
4 Alexandro O’Reylly, “Memoria de D. Alexandro O’Reylly sobre la isla de Puerto Rico,” 
Antología de lecturas de historia de Puerto Rico (Siglos XV-XVIII), ed. Aida R. Caro Costas (San Juan: 
Editorial Corripio, C. por A., 1991) 453-484. 
5 Scholars like Jorge Chinea argue that the Real Cédula of 1778 did not represent a significant 
turning point in non-Hispanic immigration to Puerto Rico, since the trend was already established earlier in 
the 18th century, and that the Cédula was aimed at attracting white immigrants with knowledge in the sugar 
industry and capital to invest in the archipelago.  See, for example, Jorge Chinea, Race and Labor in the 
Hispanic Caribbean: The West Indian Immigrant Worker Experience in Puerto Rico, 1800-1850 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005). 
6 The Real Cédula of 1780, a preamble to the Real Cédula of 1789, allowed Puerto Ricans to buy 






reforms, embodied in O’Reylly’s visita and in the 1778 and 1789 Real Cédulas, remained 
unsuccessful in the fight against contraband but succeeded in boosting Puerto Rico’s 
economy and demography at the turn of the 19th century.  Such a boost, however modest, 
helped Puerto Rico survive when Latin American independence movements ended the 
Mexican situado that had sustained the colony since 1583.7 
In the early 19th century various historical processes converged to push Spain 
towards the formal colonization of Vieques.  For starters, revolutionary movements and 
ideas were spreading throughout Europe, North and South America and the Caribbean.  
The Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) and the onset of the Latin American independence 
movements (1810-1825), in fact, directly threatened the control of Spain over its 
territories in the Americas.8  Spanish officials, in turn, attempted to establish a firmer grip 
on its colonies, particularly on those that risked being engulfed by old and new rival 
nations like Puerto Rico.  In terms of Puerto Rico, the colony was experiencing a 
demographic growth and a boom of its sugar economy that helped push imperial 
bureaucrats to affirm the strategic importance of Vieques to the Empire.  Colonizing 
Vieques after three centuries of neglect, however, would not be an easy task.  Spain had 
never been able to colonize, control geographical representations or even formulate non-
ambiguous policies concerning Vieques prior to the 19th century.  The island-común that 
evolved into an island-boundary had long been an unofficial neutral zone of international 
activity.  If Spain had never attempted to colonize Vieques, it did forcefully terminate 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 8 and Francisco Scarano, Puerto Rico: Cinco siglos de historia (San Juan: McGraw-
Hill, 1993) 315-322. 
8 Some of the revolutions haunting Spanish imperial bureaucrats were the French Revolution (1789-
1799), the independence wars of the United States of America (1775-1783) and of Latin America (1810-
1825) and the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804).  The Haitian Revolution probably provoked the most fear 
among Spanish officials and Puerto Rican hacendados.  Asides from having sprung from inside the 







colonization ventures on the part of England, Denmark and France.  Thus, while Spain 
had defended ever since the 15th century its self-proclaimed rights as “la primera 
inventora y descubridora” (the first inventor and discoverer), both England and Denmark 
credited themselves with more and longer-lasting settlements across the 17th and 18th 
centuries.9  In turn, at the beginning of the 19th century three European empires regarded 
themselves as Vieques’ rightful owners.  Even as it disputed ownership of the island with 
England and Denmark, Spain approved a first colonization plan on July 31, 1811. 
The Spanish colonization plan, devised by the Governor of Puerto Rico Salvador 
Meléndez, included a military detachment under Juan Roselló with orders to tame 
Vieques.  Establishing authority over unwanted locals, while fostering the foundations of 
a modest but stable colony, turned out to be more than Roselló could handle.  By 1811 
there were strongmen well established in the island like the mulatto Guebardo, otherwise 
known as the “King of Vieques.”  The mock title revealed the power he might have 
wielded in the island, and the little relevance the men from the House of Bourbon and 
Joseph Bonaparte had in the life of locals in Vieques.  The exercise of authority in the 
island, according to the first Governor of Vieques Teophile Le Guillou, depended on the 
rule of the strong, and in the particular case of Guebardo not much was recorded about 
him except that he was a, “feared man and very skilled in the handling of the machete and 
the dagger.”10  Apparently the island had changed in 300 years from a haven of rebellious 
Caribs, to one of strong willed mulattos.  That a mulatto man had risen to, notorious, 
                                                 
9 According to Spanish documents Christopher Columbus reached Vieques on November 14, 1493 
during his second American voyage.  Thus, Spanish diplomats based their claims over the Vieques on 
Columbus’ “discovery” of the island.  See Documentación sobre Vieques 590. 
10 “hombre temible y sumamente diestro en el manejo del machete y puñal.”  Teophile Jacques 
Josephe Marie Le Guillou, “Compendio topográfico, estadístico e histórico de la Isla Española de 






prominence in the island is testimony to the importance of runaway slaves and of mixed-
raced populations in Vieques.  The mixed-raced population, I would argue, most likely 
incorporated remnants of indigenous populations displaced during the last three centuries 
throughout the northeastern Caribbean.  There are, however, little archival historical 
traces about these peoples inhabiting Vieques just before the 19th century Spanish 
colonization.  Yet, this mixed-raced people were precisely the unwanted locals that had 
established themselves in the island and that Roselló had to bring into the realm of the 
Spanish Empire.  Yet, there rumors circulated that the first Military Commander of 
Vieques was not successful in facing Spain’s unwanted others.  In fact, it was apparently 
common knowledge throughout the island that whenever pirates or smugglers appeared 
Roselló would hide in the forests for as long as the visits lasted.11 
If the stories about the cowardice of Juan Roselló were true, then the Military 
Commander must have been well hidden during the brief 1816 visit made by the 
Libertador de América (Liberator of America) Simón Bolívar.12  News of the event, 
however, did reach Governor Meléndez who ordered in 1817 the construction of a small 
fort on the southern Viequense key of Puerto Real.13  Bolívar’s visit, later imagined as a 
quasi-mystical baptism with anticolonial pan-Latin Americanism, fueled Spanish fears of 
                                                 
11 Le Guillou, “Compendio,” Documentación sobre Vieques 745-755. 
12 Simón Bolívar, according to Juan A. Bonnet Benítez, decided to gather fresh supplies in Vieques 
during an 1817 trip through the Caribbean.  Reaching Vieques during a storm, the two ships traveling 
together, the Mariño and the Brión, were briefly separated.  The Mariño, where Bolívar was traveling, got 
stuck on a reef.  A Spanish ship sighted the Mariño.  Against all odds, Bolívar’s crew supposedly forced the 
Spanish party to help the Mariño off the reef.  When the crew finally reached the Viequense shore, they 
engaged in a bloody crossfire with the men of the Brión before both parties recognized each other.  Juan A. 
Bonnet Benítez, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico (San Juan: F. Ortiz Nieves, 1976) 30-31.  Juan 
Augusto and Salvador Perea wrote that Vieques’ military commander indeed did not confront Simón 
Bolívar.  Juan Augusto and Salvador Perea, Bolívar en Vieques (Puerto Rico: Ateneo Puertorriqueño and 
Sociedad Bolivariana de Puerto Rico, 1970). 






rebellious subjects.14  Vieques, the imperial limb prone to infection, had come into 
contact with the embodiment of the dangerous virus of independence, Simón Bolívar.  
Roselló, as the embodiment of Spanish law in Vieques, had not stepped up to the 
challenge.  He was probably hidden in the woods.  Juan Roselló, even if unsuccessful in 
establishing Spanish authority in the island, at least could be credited with learning the 
island’s landscape, which was until then an unaccomplished feat by Spanish officials. 
Even though Juan Roselló’s did not succeed during his 17 years (1811-1828) as 
Military Commander to impose Spanish authority in Vieques, the Spanish settlement in 
the island grew and mildly prospered.15  According to the March 14, 1824 census 
performed by Roselló, there were 103 vecinos (residents) in the island, 30 women and 73 
men.  These were divided between 34 heads of households, 33 family members, 18 
alquilados, 17 agregados and 1 steward.16  Alquilados and agregados, according to 
historian Fernando Picó, were generally landless people who lived under another 
household that hired them or let them use the land.17  As such, in 1824 there were 34 
landowning households composed of 67 family members with 36 landless people.  The 
majority of the population, however, was either classified as pardo (brown) or moreno 
                                                 
14 Following Viequense interpretations in the 20th century, Bolívar’s anticolonial pan-Latin 
Americanism, vigilant of the northern neighbor, was denied to the rest of the Puerto Rican archipelago, 
which the “Libertador” never visited. 
15 According to Juan Roselló, during the years 1812-1821 he unofficially shared the position of 
Military Commander with his brother Antonio Roselló.  There were, however, many intrigues in the island 
with different people briefly taking over at different times.  Vieques 1825 Naufragio, Capitanía General, 
Vieques, 602, AGPR, San Juan.  By the term Spanish settlement I refer to the settlement encouraged by the 
Spanish Empire and not necessarily to the settlement of Spanish subjects. 
16 For the March 14, 1824 Census see Vieques 1824, Capitanía General, Vieques, 602, AGPR. 
17 Fernando Picó points out that the definitions of agregado diverged depending on the context to 
which they were employed.  César Ayala and Viviana Carro define agregados as, “rural workers who lived 
on the plantations and exchanged labor services for usufruct rights over the land.”  Fernando Picó, Libertad 
y servidumbre en el Puerto Rico del siglo XIX (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1983) 45-82.  César J. 
Ayala and Viviana Carro-Figueroa, “Expropriation and Displacement of Civilians in Vieques, 1940-1950,” 
Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights, eds. Ramón 






(black).  These two groups representing 68% of the total population comprised 56% of 
the landowners.18  Although there is not enough archival evidence to confirm the 
assertion, this relatively high percentage of mixed-raced persons owning land could 
suggest that at least part of these pardos and morenos had been locals inhabiting the 
island prior to 1811, and that Roselló included in the census as heads of household.  Such 
an inclusion in the census might not have meant a compliance with Spanish authority 
since, as Roselló wrote on July 2, 1820, most of the vecinos in Vieques lived scattered 
around the island, living off subsistence agriculture, and some of them just refusing to be 
governed.19  This was a situation that hardly changed in the four years leading to the 1824 
census. 
The Vieques that Juan Roselló’s brother and successor, Francisco Roselló, 
inherited (1828-1832) had, according to the September 14, 1828 census ordered by 
Colonel Ramón Aboy, 25 heads of households, 27 women family members, 32 sons, 73 
peons and 38 slaves for a total of 195 inhabitants.20  Of the 25 heads of households 
surveyed in 1828, two were women and possibly eight were non-Hispanic in origin.  
Such numbers suggest that the multicultural population of Vieques could have been 
composed of 32% foreigners.21  This would represent an increase from the 7 French and 
English foreigners identified in the 1824 census and comprising then only 7% of the total 
                                                 
18 According to the 1824 census, there were 2 morenos, 17 pardos, 11 white persons, 4 French 
foreigners and 3 English foreigners settled in Vieques as heads of households.  Vieques 1824, Capitanía 
General, Vieques, 602, AGPR. 
19 Juan Roselló wrote that some 6 or 8 vecinos refused to be governed.  These vecinos preferred to 
aid the pirates by telling them, for example, the location of other vecinos in the island.  Vieques 1820, 
Capitanía General, Vieques, 602, AGPR. 
20 Among the 25 heads of households were two women, María Hernández and Madam Bequer.  
Documentación sobre Vieques 462-463.  For the 1828 Census see Appendix 13. 
21 Except for Madam Bequer and Don José Ma Guillot, all the other six non-Hispanic names started 
with the title Mr.  The 32% foreigner figure depends on many factors like the nationality of the 73 field 






population.  The wealthiest settlers in 1828 were the pardo Guillermo Opio with 35 
people/225 animals and the French foreigner Teophile Le Guillou with 43 people/219 
animals under their households.  These two settlers hired 40% of the peons, owned 71% 
of the slaves and 60% of the island’s cultivated land.  This land totaled 75 cuerdas 
destined for bananas, sugar cane and grass.22  In addition, three of the eight boats in the 
island’s port were recorded under the names of Opio and of Le Guillou.  On the other 
hand, the poorest settlers were Mr. Mofret and Madam Bequer who did not have persons 
or possessions under their names.  Perhaps they both were, along with Teophile Le 
Guillou, refugees from the 1822 Haitian invasion of Spanish Haiti.23  Mofret and Bequer, 
however, must have arrived in a dispossessed state in Vieques after the 1824 census.  
While the resources were unequally distributed, at least most of the 25 heads of 
households had chickens and/or bananas which suggest that the basic Viequense diet 
could have consisted of combining the two with other abundant fruits scattered 
throughout the island.24 
While only four years elapsed between the 1824 and 1828 censuses, there are 
identifiable trends altering population totals and landholding patterns. During the four 
                                                 
22 A cuerda is a measurement unit in Puerto Rico equaled approximately to .97 acres and to 3,929 
square meters.  Thus, 70 cuerdas are about 67.9 acres or 275,030 square meters.  Opio and Le Guillou, in 
turn, cultivated only 75 cuerdas or 0.2 percent of the total 36,032 cuerdas in the island.  I take the number 
of the island’s total cuerdas from César Ayala and Viviana Carro.  Ayala and Carro, “Expropriation and 
Displacement,” Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule 176. 
23 Through the 1795 Treaty of Basel, Spain ceded the eastern part of La Hispaniola, today the 
Dominican Republic, to France.  French citizens, therefore, settled themselves under the auspices of the 
treaty in the Spanish Santo Domingo.  France, nonethess, lost the colony back to Spain in 1809.  The 
change in sovereignty still allowed French citizens to remain in the colony and to keep their properties.  
The 1822 Haitian invasion of Spanish Haiti, however, threatened the social and economic order of the 
eastern part of La Hispaniola.  The occupation brought about the abolition of slavery and the disruption of 
racial hierarchies along with the seizing of private property.  Thus, the year 1822 sparked the migration of, 
for example, white French citizens like Teophile Le Guillou.  Franklin Franco Pichardo, Historia del pueblo 
dominicano (Dominican Republic: Editora Universitaria – UASD, 2005) 141-162, 176-182. 
24 The centrality of bananas in the Viequense diet is evidenced as early as 1834 when, following a 
lack caused by unknown reasons, bananas had to be imported from Puerto Rico in order to fulfill the 






years in question, 92 more settlers seem to have arrived or been born in the island.  These 
newcomers comprised an 89% population increase.  Yet, there was a marked 26% 
decrease in the number of landowning households.  This percentage is even more 
significant when comparing the 35% landless population of 1824 to the 57% one of 1828.  
In four years there were 22% more people without land in Vieques.  This rise of the 
dispossessed and the population in general follows the appearance of slaves and the 
growth of the peon population.  These two ranks, I would argue, grew as a result of the 
emerging farm and sugar economy fostered by landowners like Le Guillou.  Le Guillou’s 
household, for example, augmented from one agregado, two alquilados and one steward 
to 17 peons and 26 slaves in four years.  In addition, by himself he owned 68% of the 
slaves and 57% of the island’s cultivated land.  Such a change in household and land 
tenure patterns indicates the inception of the slave-peon run sugar economy, which 
became firmly established by 1839, and that perhaps began displacing the pre-1811 locals 
of Vieques and pulling them into wage labor.25 
The January 1, 1824 and September 14, 1828 censuses were the first population 
surveys conducted in Vieques.  These censuses provided for the first time a detailed 
profile of the island’s settlers to the Spanish government.  The profile identified what 
Thongchai Winichakul might call an early Viequense geo-body.  The concept of geo-
body, as formulated by Winichakul, refers to a nation or community defined and brought 
into existence through geographical technologies like mapping.  These technologies of 
territoriality, based on the tracing of boundaries through practices like the imposition of 
                                                 






custom duties, create communities spatially and help equate a people to a map.26  
Winichakul, taking the example of Siam where people coexisted and then came to 
harmonize under a national map, proposes that mapping can define the geo-body.27  Yet, 
in the case of Vieques, the map of the island existed to the Spanish Empire centuries 
before the people that came to populate it in the 1820s.  Thus, these censuses in the 1820s 
represent the first official imaginings that filled the map of Vieques with an identifiable 
people. 
The people emerging in the 1820s as the Viequense community were racially 
diverse.  Although slavery had been present in the island at least since the 1685 English 
colonization attempt, the 1824 census did not identify a slave population.  The census, 
however, did separate the settlers into the categories of white, foreign, pardo and moreno.  
As stated above, these last two groups comprised 68% of the population.  Four years later 
slaves, totaling in number 38, would comprise 19%.  This percentage remained constant 
until 1845 when the presence of 369 slaves increased it to 36%.28  These changes in the 
slave population can be traced back to the 1778, 1789 and 1815 Real Cédulas that 
fostered the legal importation of slaves and the slave traffic increase to the Puerto Rican 
islands during the years 1815 to 1845.29  The Haitian Revolution, in addition, had left a 
void in the global production of sugar.  Unfulfilled demand raised prices and opened a 
promising market for producers in both Cuba and Puerto Rico.  The new sugar 
                                                 
26 Although in the case of Vieques, a community was traced through the suppression of custom 
duties imposed on the rest Puerto Rican main island. 
27 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
28 The figures above do not include the population categorized as “free blacks.”  The category was 
not included in the 1828 census, suggesting that there were either no “free blacks” or they were included 
under the 73 “peons.”  The 1845 census identified eight “free blacks.”  For the 1828 to 1845 censuses 
conducted in Vieques see Appendices 13-16. 
29 For a discussion of slave traffic in Puerto Rico and Vieques see “Chapter 3: Claims to the 






commerce, increasingly carried out with the U.S., facilitated the replacement of coffee in 
1828 by the more labor-intensive sugar as the colony’s main crop.30  In turn, a vital 
relationship between slavery and the booming sugar economy evolved.  While Spain 
signed in 1817 an agreement with England to cease after 1820 the slave traffic to the 
Americas, the accord was never enforced by Spanish officials.31  Instead, bureaucrats like 
the Governor of Puerto Rico Miguel de la Torre ignored the rising slave contraband.  The 
contraband was further increased after England’s 1833 abolition of slavery because some 
owners, in the hope of making last-minute profits, sold their captives in Spanish 
territories like Vieques.  Such contraband fueled during the 1830s the diplomatic tensions 
between Spain and Great Britain over the control of Vieques and its slave and runaway 
population.32  The 1835 and 1840 treaties with England and the 1840s decrease in world 
sugar prices, as places like Cuba rose to meet the international demand, slowed down the 
human traffic.33  Yet, between 1815 and 1845 the traffic multiplied tenfold the enslaved 
population in Vieques.34 
The rise of the slave population in Vieques was accompanied by the immigration 
of a refugee population displaced by the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution and Latin 
American wars of independence.  Both trends, as suggested by the 1828 census, fostered 
                                                 
30 See Appendix 13. 
31 For a study of the effects and contradictions of British abolitionist pressure, the end of the slave 
trade, contraband and the sugar economy in Cuba see Murray, Odious Commerce. 
32 The debate between Spain and England about sold, captive or runaway slaves driven to Vieques 
can be traced back to the 1811 accusations against the Governor of Puerto Rico Salvador Meléndez for 
supposedly promoting such prejudicial practices to the British subjects in the Leeward Islands.  For a 
discussion of the post-1833 diplomatic problem with Great Britain over slaves in Vieques see the June 5, 
1840 “Instructions” by the Council of Ministers.  Documentación sobre Vieques 426-428, 614. 
33 For a study of the rise of Cuba to a world producer of sugar during the 19th century see Manuel 
Moreno Fraginals, The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba, 1760-1860, trans. 
Cedric Belfrage (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976). 
34 Francisco Scarano suggests that approximately 60,000 to 80,000 African slaves were brought to 
Puerto Rico during the years 1815 to 1845.  Scarano, Puerto Rico 405.  Slavery was abolished in Puerto 






Vieques’ demographic growth and ensured the diversity of the population.  The 1822 
Haitian invasion of Spanish Haiti, for example, most likely encouraged the immigration 
of the would-be first Governor of Vieques, Teophile Le Guillou, and of dispossessed 
people like Madam Bequer, Mr. Mofret and Mr. Duple.35  The island was, as suggested 
before, an unofficial neutral zone of international activity.  Some of these immigrants, as 
the Governor of Puerto Rico Santiago Méndez Vigo confirmed in an official 1841 visit to 
Vieques, took advantage of the 1815 Cédula while others remained in the island without 
the government’s authorization.36 
The 1815 Real Cédula de Gracias continued the late 18th century trend of 
liberalizing Spain’s economic and migration policies.37  The Cédula opened for 15 years 
all the island’s ports to international commerce with friendly nations willing to pay the 
high taxes imposed on the traded merchandise.  The Cédula substituted the alcabala 
taxes on merchandise and ecclesiastical tithe for the new subsidio that equaled or 
surpassed the abolished contributions.  In terms of importation the text allowed the free 
entrance of farming machinery, utensils and tools, as well as slaves from neighboring 
foreign colonies.  As for immigration the Cédula authorized the entrance of Catholic 
                                                 
35 Earlier events, like the 1795 Spanish cession of the Dominican Republic to France through the 
Treaty of Basel, combined in the creation of migratory waves to the Puerto Rican archipelago. 
36 Documentación sobre Vieques 127-145. 
37 The formulation of the 1815 Real Cédula was the result of power shifts in Madrid, and in 
America, leaning at times the political balance to the more radical left.  Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1808 
invasion of Spain and subsequent usurpation of the Spanish Crown from Fernando VII (1808, 1814-1833) 
led to a rebellion in the name of the exiled King.  The rebellion created alternative political structures like 
Seville’s Junta Suprema (Supreme Council) and the Cortes (Parliament) of Cádiz.  These structures 
culminated in a constitutionalist government under the liberal Constitution of 1812.  The legitimacy crisis 
in the heart of the Spanish Empire facilitated the start of the Latin American independence movements in 
1810.  In 1814, once Napoleon was defeated, King Fernando VII returned.  The reversion to absolutism, 
however, had to be negotiated with sectors demanding more democratic and liberal reforms and 
independence.  In Puerto Rico, the 1812 Constitution limited the Governor’s power through the creation of 
a Provincial Deputation.  This organ included the Governor, an Intendente, seven elected citizens and 
constitutional municipal governments.  Scarano, Puerto Rico 366-386.  Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin 






foreigners from friendly nations.  To further promote the settlement of white immigrants 
with the capital and knowledge to invest in the island’s economy, the document promised 
them unoccupied and/or uncultivated lands. 
One such white Catholic foreigner with capital and knowledge to invest in 
Vieques was Teophile Jacques Josephe Marie Le Guillou.  The man, controversial to this 
day, is identified in British Foreign Office records as a member of the French Navy once 
suspected of committing piratical acts, who hid himself among the criminals in Vieques.  
Yet, Spanish government records, many of which Le Guillou produced or directly 
influenced, painted a different picture.  Following the Documentación sobre Vieques 
transcription, Le Guillou was indeed a French refugee from the 1822 Haitian invasion of 
the Spanish Santo Domingo.38  According to his own 1839 “Compendio topográfico, 
estadístico e histórico de la Isla Española de Vieques,” Captain Le Guillou of the 
Brigantine Cadelán arrived in Vieques on May 1, 1823 with the intention of buying 
lumber.39  Once in the island, the “Compendio” continues, Le Guillou invited Juan 
Roselló aboard who proceeded to seduce his host with tales of pirates, thieves, murderers 
and rampant contraband.  In all, Roselló told Le Guillou his experiences of life in 
Vieques. 
                                                 
38 There is plenty of archival documentation preserved, for example, in Puerto Rico and England, 
which was written both by Teophile Le Guillou and about his stay in Vieques.  However, there is not much 
documentation available about Le Guillou’s life prior to his 1823 arrival in Vieques.  Since, according to 
historian Antonio Rivera, Le Guillou was never naturalized as a Spanish citizen, it is even difficult to know 
exactly where he was born.  The life of Teophile Le Guillou berfor his arrival in Vieques has therefore been 
surrounded by speculations.  Antonio Rivera Martínez, Así empezó Vieques (San Juan: Universidad de 
Puerto Rico, 1963) 49-50. 
39 The “Compendio topográfico, estadístico e histórico de la Isla Española de Vieques” recorded in 
Documentación sobre Vieques does not directly credit the author of the text.  Antonio Rivera Martínez 
proposes that the document is Teophile Le Guillou’s autobiography.  The text, nonetheless, refers to the 
figure of Le Guillou in third person.  Le Guillou, “Compendio,” Documentación sobre Vieques 745-755.  






The Commander [Roselló] gave him news of the thieves of beasts from 
Puerto Rico, the smugglers, the suspects of all sorts of robberies, above all 
those that were made in St. Thomas, among others, of the little black and 
mulatto female slaves that they took under pretext of transporting them to 
Santo Domingo, and later they deposited in Vieques to bring them from 
there to Puerto Rico; about the pirates from Vieques among which one of 
the Captains was a pretty little negress called María la Mota.40 
 
Right then, as if already envisioning himself to be the hero of the story, Teophile Le 
Guillou supposedly decided to establish himself in Vieques and “make war against these 
pirates, purging the island from all the evildoers that infest it.”41  Thus, right then he 
appropriated the taming of the island as his own personal quest.  Whatever the reasons 
might have been for Le Guillou’s establishment in Vieques, the English and Spanish 
archives coincide that he gradually “established a sort of irregular authority over the 
lawless horde by which he was surrounded.”42  Such a feat made him the island’s first 
appointed political and military governor (1832-1843) and later earned him the title of 
“Founder of Vieques.” 
Teophile Le Guillou was quite a literary man given to the production of written 
texts while in an island described as, “governed without written precepts that give the one 
in charge and the one obeying the norms of their respective conduct.”43  He could have 
been the typical letrado except for the fact that he was French, and Vieques could have 
been the typical Spanish colony with rampant illiteracy except for the fact that it was 
                                                 
40 “El Comandante [Roselló] le dió conocimiento de los ladrones de bestias de Puerto Rico, los 
contrabandistas, los receladores de toda suerte de robos, sobre los que se hacían en San Thomas, entre 
otros, los de esclavas negritas y mulatitas que se llevaban bajo pretexto de transportarlas a Santo Domingo, 
y luego las depositaban en Vieques para de allí traerlas a Puerto Rico; sobre los piratas de Vieques de los 
cuales uno de los Capitanes era una linda negrita llamada María la Mota.”  Documentación sobre Vieques 
751-752. 
41 “hacer la guerra a estos piratas, purgando la isla de todos los malhechores que la infestaban.”  
Documentación sobre Vieques 752. 
42 President of the Virgin Islands Isidore Dyett, letter to Governor in Chief of the Leeward Island B. 
Hamilton, 14 March 1862, Sovereignty over Vieque or Crab Island and Culebra or Pasaje Island, vol. 1 
1846-1862, FO 72/1119, National Archives, London, 216. 
43 “gobernada a discreción sin preceptos escritos que den al que manda y al que obedece la pauta de 






being colonized in the 19th century.  Writing was not a central part of the everyday life of 
19th century Viequenses.  In turn, Teophile Le Guillou’s written voice stands out as a 
historical trace of this oral culture.44  He wrote down his thoughts, actions and histories in 
trilingual records that have been guarded by imperial archives like the Archivo Público 
General del Reino, later the Archivo Histórico Nacional, in Madrid.45  These texts coded 
in Spanish, French and English have been able to travel across time with more clarity and 
urgency than those of his predecessors, contemporaries and close successors.  The 
trilingual character of the records, a necessity for commanding a multicultural island, 
widened the audience.46  In turn, time travelers, mostly historians like Antonio Rivera 
Martínez playing their part in the imagining of Vieques, have been better inclined to 
apprehend Le Guillou’s historical interpretations over those of historical actors like 
Francisco Roselló who could not read or write well and depended on Le Guillou’s 
services as judge and translator.  The “Memoria del Gobernador de Vieques sobre el 
fomento de Ila. Ysla,” for example, the most important document produced in Vieques 
until then, was signed by the French man on December 10, 1828.47 
Teophile Le Guillou’s historical interpretations of the early foundation years of 
Vieques are synthesized in his “Compendio.”  The text could be an abridged antecedent 
                                                 
44 My use of historical traces follows Michel Trouillot’s arguments about the traces left by socio-
historical processes.  See “Chapter 1: Introduction.” 
45 For information about the Archivo Histórico Nacional, in Madrid, visit Archivo Histórico 
Nacional.  Archivos Estatales, 2007, Ministerio de Cultura, Spain, 27 January 2008 
<http://www.mcu.es/archivos/MC/AHN/index.html>. 
46 While some official correspondence and documents authored by Teophile Le Guillou like the 
“Compendio” and “Plan para la organización de la Colonia” are recorded in Documentación sobre Vieques, 
other writings pertaining to his position as Political and Military Governor of Vieques are kept under 
Gobierno de la Isla Española de Vieques, Correspondencia: 1 agosto de 1838 a septiembre 1845, CPR, 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río Piedras.  And Manuscritos. Registros. vol II, CPR, Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, Río Piedras.  For the “Plan para la organización de la Colonia” see Documentación sobre Vieques 
475. 
47 Vieques 1828, Capitanía General, Vieques, 602, AGPR.  Records written by Juan, Antonio and 
Francisco Roselló can be found in the Archivo General de Puerto Rico.  See, for example, the box 






of Rómulo Gallego’s Doña Bárbara where the cultured white man single-handedly 
succeeds in taming the savage wildness of, in this case, Vieques.48  Just like the 
feminized yet terrible Venezuelan plains encountered by Santos Luzardo, Vieques was 
also accustomed to devouring men like Juan Roselló.  This sad figure was described by 
Le Guillou as “not energetic enough to tame those men so ferocious that they committed 
all sorts of cruelties.”49  The remark was, as if to quell any doubts, illustrated through the 
story of a civil war between settler families over “four dulcineas.”  These women were 
brought from the eastern Puerto Rican town of Fajardo to accompany three old women 
residing in Vieques.  The “dulcineas,” however, were dishonored by corsairs.50  As 
Roselló was incapable of facing the enemy, he was also incapable of protecting the 
women under his territory.  The message of this history might have been that Vieques 
was a no man’s island under an emasculated man.  The Juan Roselló that Le Guillou 
recorded for posterity was naturally good but cowardly.  He was, in addition, prone to 
gossip and to corruption.  Indeed, Juan Roselló had all the expected qualities of a woman.  
Furthermore, he was but the specter of a man who having arrived to conquer Vieques 
during his 45th year of life, already an old man for the time, died poor, an alcoholic and 
                                                 
48 According to Doris Sommer Doña Bárbara is a perfect example of a Latin American foundational 
fiction where the romantic triangle of Doña Bárbara, Santos Luzardo and Marisela embody Venezuelan 
national qualities and geographies.  These characters, when confronted, violently purge and incorporate 
qualities in themselves and others in an attempt to synthesize a harmonious national balance that, following 
Julie Skurski, emphasizes on the national struggle between civilization and barbarism.  Doris Sommer, 
Foundational Fictions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).  Rómulo Gallegos, Doña Bárbara 
(Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, S.A., 1997).  For a further discussion of Doña Bárbara see also Julie Skurski, 
“The Ambiguities of Authenticity in Latin America,” Becoming National: A Reader, eds.  Geoff Eley and 
Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 371-402. 
49 “no sería lo suficientemente enérgico para domar aquellos hombres tan feroces que cometían toda 
suerte de crueldades”  Documentación sobre Vieques 749. 
50 The usage of “dulcineas” by Teophile Le Guillou made a reference to Miguel de Cervantes’ Don 
Quixote.  Dulcinea was Don Quixote’s object of desire.  She was, furthermore, his idyllic love of 
supposedly irreproachable virtue and for whose honor he undertook his foolish knightly quests.  Yet, 
Dulcinea was but a villager of questionable reputation.  Thus, through the reference Le Guillou might have 
been making fun of Vieques’ settlers as well as criticizing them by suggesting that the honor of the Fajardo 






defeated.  So emasculated was Juan Roselló that he even suffered from weak blood.  His 
own brother Francisco Roselló was unable to redeem the tarnished family name through 
an inconsequential four-year passage through Vieques as Military Commander.  The 
Rosellós, in what has become a Viequense myth of origin, have functioned as the 
antithesis to the “Founder” hero.  Inside this foundational narrative Teophile Le Guillou, 
would-be richest man in the island, arrived and against all odds, “order started to be 
established.”51 
Teophile Le Guillou proposes a particular periodization of Vieques’ history in the 
“Compendio.”  He juxtaposed an untamable 1493-1828 era to a more civilized post-1828 
Vieques.52  The chronological break, adopted by numerous historians like Antonio Rivera 
Martínez, marked 1828 as the foundational conjuncture when the Spanish colony of 
Vieques started to take shape.53  While Le Guillou had been involved in the colonization 
drama since his 1823 arrival, in the year 1828 his role as a prominent actor evolved.  
Further following the “Compendio,” he devoted the 1823-1828 period to purging Vieques 
from all evildoers.  These were supposedly dealt a final blow during Le Guillou’s brief 
1827-1828 interval as Acting Commanding Officer.  Once the island’s most violent 
unwanted others had been disciplined, Le Guillou shifted his attention to more 
administrative concerns.  The year 1828, in turn, marked the more official entrance of Le 
Guillou and Vieques to the Spanish Empire. 
                                                 
51 “El orden principiaba a establecerse”  Le Guillou, “Compendio,” Documentación sobre Vieques 
752. 
52 For Le Guillou’s quote see pages 92-93 of “Chapter 3: Claims to the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th 
Centuries.” 
53 Antonio Rivera Martínez understanding of the early 19th century as a foundational context is 
evidenced throughout his book devoted to the 19th century Vieques and titled Así empezó Vieques, roughly 






In the year 1828 Teophile Le Guillou performed as Acting Commanding Officer, 
Francisco Roselló’s judge and translator, and as a wealthy hacendado.54  That year he 
also formally asked Governor de la Torre “au nom de toute la petite population de 
Bieques” for the titles to the cultivated lands.55  The title request, grounded on the land 
promises encompassed in the 1815 Real Cédula, portrayed his and other settlers’ intent to 
tie their capital, knowledge and future to the island’s soil.56  The request was part of the 
December “Memoria” mentioned above pushing forth a plan for the administrative, 
religious and military organization of the colony.  The plan proposed the creation of a 
self-sufficient government organized through a Colonial Council and financed through 
taxes imposed on merchant ships.57  The administrative plan and land petition validated 
Le Guillou’s position inside the emerging colony.  More importantly, the text combined 
with the September 14, 1828 census sent a clear message to San Juan and Madrid-based 
bureaucrats urging them to seriously engage the colonization of Vieques, especially 
considering sugar’s replacement of coffee as Puerto Rico’s main crop. 
By the late 1820s different imperial officials agreed with Le Guillou’s stance that 
the Spanish Empire should move towards a more serious colonization of Vieques.  The 
end in 1825 of the Latin American independence wars had left Puerto Rico and Cuba as 
                                                 
54 Having previously appointed him as Acting Commanding Officer, Colonel Ramón Aboy made 
Teophile Le Guillou Captain of the Urban Militias during Francisco Roselló’s administration.  Le Guillou’s 
important administrative and military role in the young colony can also be evidenced in his exchanged 
correspondence with both the Governor of Puerto Rico and Fajardo’s War Lieutenant commenting on 
Vieques’ welfare. 
55 “In the name of all the small population of Vieques.”  Vieques 1828, Capitanía General, Vieques, 
602, AGPR. 
56 As discussed earlier in the chapter the 1815 Real Cédula de Gracias promised unoccupied and/or 
uncultivated lands to wealthy and knowledgeable immigrants willing to exploit them. 
57 The Colonial Council proposed was presided by a First Commander followed by a priest as Vice-
President, a Second Commander as Counselor and seven reputable settlers as Captain, First Lieutenant of 
the Militias and juries.  For the “Memoria” see “Plan para la organización de la Colonia,” Documentación 






the last Spanish colonies in the Americas.58  The diminished situation of the Spanish 
Empire rekindled metropolitan interest in Puerto Rico.  The island remained identified as 
the key to the Caribbean to the extent that it could serve as an outpost securing the 
commercial lines with Cuba.  Yet, after 1825 and with its transformation into a sugar 
colony, Puerto Rico lost some of its relational identity and gained value to the metropolis 
as a profitable colony in its own right.  The value assigned to Puerto Rico, in turn, 
changed the role of Vieques inside the empire, for if Puerto Rico had been the key to the 
Caribbean, Vieques was the key to Puerto Rico.  Or, in the words of Teophile Le Guillou 
in 1839, “Vieques must be considered the key to Puerto Rico, from whom it is 
inseparable.”59 
In a matter of 10 years Vieques evolved into a focal point of discussion among 
certain circles of the diminished Spanish Empire.  George Dawson Flinter, an Irishman 
enrolled in the Spanish army under the Knight Commander of the Royal Order of Isabel 
the Catholic, published in 1834 An Account of the Present State of the Island of Puerto 
Rico.  In the book the Colonel proposed that: 
The importance of this island [Vieques] must be obvious to whoever 
considers its position relative to Puerto Rico.  It lies to windward of the 
coast: consequently it must always form a part of the government of 
Puerto Rico…I would pronounce decidedly, that the island of Bieques in 
the hands of any other nation would be a source of incalculable injury to 
Puerto Rico.  In time of peace it would be a refuge of malefactors, and a 
nest for contraband traffic, which, from its position, could be carried on 
with impunity: boats during the nights could run down on the coasts, and, 
in the numerous creeks by which it is indented, find a safe place of deposit 
for their goods.  I make these observations, because I am convinced that 
the occupation of Bieques by a foreign power would be incompatible with 
                                                 
58 By 1825 Spain had already ceded the territory of Louisiana to France through the San Idelfonso 
Treaty of 1800 and sold the territory of Florida to the United States through the Adams-Onís Treaty of 
1819.  Alan Brinkley,  Historia de Estados Unidos, trans. Pilar Mascaró Sacristán (México: McGraw Hill, 
1996) 151, 173-175. 






the security and prosperity of this island, and that the nation that governs 
Puerto Rico must also waive its flag over its natural and inalienable 
dependencies.  I trust that this question may terminate soon, as it ought in 
regard to justice, in favour of Spain, and that its colonization may not 
suffer any further interruption from the delay of diplomatic forms.60 
 
Colonel Flinter’s account comprised, according to Isabel Gutiérrez del Arroyo, an 
instructional manual on the policies the Spanish metropolis should follow to maintain 
sovereignty over Puerto Rico.61  This manual, based on his 1829-1832 stay in the island 
and influenced by his prior expulsion from Venezuela, recognized that in the making of 
the Caribbean mosaic of nation-states, colonies and other political entities, Puerto Rico 
was left surrounded by old and new rival nations to the Spanish Empire.  In the years 
after the Latin American independence wars, marked by British commercial expansion 
over the region and the growth of U.S. hemispheric pretensions, Flinter argued that the 
security and prosperity of Puerto Rico depended on the stability of Vieques under the 
Spanish flag.62  The short distance dividing the two islands made impossible the 
establishment of a clear imperial border.  If taken, bureaucrats like Governor López de 
Baños concurred, Vieques could be turned into a nest of “foreigners” facilitating 
contraband, slave desertion and the spread into Puerto Rico of revolutionary doctrines.63  
The urgency assigned by people like Flinter and López de Baños to the maintenance of 
the imperial line east of Vieques redefined the island’s role inside the Spanish Empire.  It 
                                                 
60 George Dawson Flinter, An Account of the Present State of the Island of Puerto Rico (San Juan: 
Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia, 2002) 37-38. 
61 Flinter, An Account X-XI. 
62 Colonel George Dawson Flinter originally published his Account in 1834.  This was only 11 years 
after the proclamation in 1823 of the Monroe Doctrine by the President of the United States.  The 
proclamation, in retrospect, established U.S. pretensions over the Western Hemisphere.  For President 
James Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823, encompassing the Monroe 
Doctrine see Dexter Perkins, Hands off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1941) 390-392. 






was not a small malignant mass stuck in the heart of the Spanish Empire anymore.64  
Neither was it simply an island-común for the extraction of raw materials.65  As a result 
of revolutionary times, and opportunistic rivals, Vieques evolved into an island-
boundary.  This island-boundary had to separate the last vestiges of Spanish America 
from a proliferating array of rival nations. 
Seven years after the end of the Latin American wars of independence and four 
years the collective petition for land titles to Governor de la Torre, Teophile Le Guillou 
became Vieques’ first appointed Political and Military Governor (1832-1843).  During 
his 11 years as Governor he excelled as a diplomat, established intricate networks of 
intelligence gathering across the neighboring islands, made decrees against contraband, 
oversaw the distribution of land for cultivation, looked out for the security of the island, 
and embodied the law when there were still no clear judicial texts or organized 
government structures to follow.66  Le Guillou, for example, responding to local 
denunciations of contraband and to intelligence reports about the illegal traffic of persons 
and objects carried out by schooners crisscrossing between islands like Antigua, St. 
Thomas and Vieques, decreed that all dockings should be done in the Puerto Mulas.67  He 
additionally proscribed settlers from providing lumber or trading with a ship without 
proper permits.  In terms of land issues, Le Guillou arranged the division of inheritances, 
functioned as witness and transcriber of property transfers, conceded cultivable land to 
petitioners deemed worthy, donated 100 cuerdas for the establishment of the town and 
                                                 
64 For a discussion of the representation of Vieques as a malignant mass see “Chapter 3: Claims to 
the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th Centuries.” 
65 For a discussion of Vieques as an island-común see “Chapter 3: Claims to the Labyrinthine Island, 
16th-19th Centuries.” 
66 For Teophile Le Guillou’s administrative records see Gobierno de la Isla Española de Vieques, 
Correspondencia: 1 agosto de 1838 a septiembre 1845.  And Gobierno de la Isla Española de Vieques, 
Manuscritos. Registros. vol II. 






cemetery of Isabel II, owned the most prosperous sugar hacienda named La Patience and 
worked with investors in the establishment of sugar haciendas.68  In all he helped 
stimulate and reinforce the rising sugar industry in the island.  These measures helped 
establish the land distribution patterns and administrative basis for the colony of Vieques.  
In turn, Viequenses have come to appropriate, with the aid of historians, the figure of 
Teophile Le Guillou and the years 1832 to 1843 as a foundational figure and context.  If 
the Caribs had consecrated the earth, and Simón Bolívar had added a little anticolonial 
spice to the mixture, this second foundational conjuncture established the basis for the 
future Vieques.  Although as fate would have it, the colony was only officially founded in 
1844, one year after the “Founder’s” death. 
Leaving aside the histories detailing the Rosellós’ lack of gumption or Le 
Guillou’s foundational heroics, Spain still spent the first 50 years of the colony’s life 
assuming ambiguous imperial stances that would not attract either England or Denmark’s 
complaints.  Acting upon a May 5, 1831 Royal Order, Governor de la Torre instructed 
Military Commander Francisco Roselló to refrain from exercising any kind of authority 
over English and Danish citizens in Vieques.  This included the charging of taxes for 
docking and commerce conducted in the island.  The measure placed the Military 
Commanders of Vieques in a difficult position for the next 33 to 38 years with respect to 
exercising authority over the less subordonée (subdued) groups in the island.  The 
                                                 
68 Juan Bonnet Benítez states that Teophile Le Guillou reportedly had 2,650 cuerdas under his name 
in the year 1839.  However, in Correspondencia: 1 agosto de 1838 a septiembre 1845 is recorded that on 
April 2, 1839 La Patience encompassed a total of 1, 200 cuerdas (800 of forests, 180 for sugar, 70 for food 
supplies, and 150 of savannah).  Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico 46.  Gobierno de la Isla 
Española de Vieques, Correspondencia: 1 agosto de 1838 a septiembre 1845.  For a discussion of Le 
Guillou’s donation of 100 cuerdas for the establishment of the town and cemetery of Isabel II see Justo 






measure also proved the original 1811 colonization plan to be but a vague mandate.69  
The colonization enterprise was, instead, ruled by the following imperial maxim: 
questionable properties, the ones litigated between the Nations, are 
affirmed and consolidated either by repeated and continued acts of 
possession that lose or considerably remove the origin of the issue, or by 
acquiring the security of the dominion through compensations or other 
onerous titles common in the treaties.70 
 
The Crown, treating the case of Vieques like one of a rapto (elopement) to be decided 
through the act of possession, chose option number one.71 
The imperial maxim facilitated cycles of proposals for the colony’s administrative 
organization followed by counterproposals to reduce the colonization impulse to the 
minimum.  While the proposals originated mainly from Vieques and sometimes from San 
Juan, the counterproposals usually arrived from Madrid with the professed intent to make 
the Spanish hold on the island appear more the consequence rather than the cause of the 
colony’s natural development and prosperity.  The policy was aptly synthesized in a 
September 17, 1847 correspondence from the Royal Palace to the Minister of the 
Kingdom’s Governance. 
                                                 
69 Teophile Le Guillou denounced in June of 1840 that the English settlers were the less respectful to 
Spanish authority and that they treated “Crab Island” as an English territory.  See the June 11, 1840 entry of 
Gobierno de la Isla Española de Vieques, Manuscritos. Registros. vol II. 
70 “Las propiedades dudosas, las que se litigan entre las Naciones se afirman y consolidan o bien por 
repetidos y continuos actos posesorios hasta perder o alejar considerablemente el orijen de la cuestión, o 
bien adquiriendo la seguridad del dominio por compensaciones u otros títulos onerosos que son comunes en 
los tratados.”  Documentación sobre Vieques 31-32. 
71 The raptos were a fairly popular practice in colonial Latin America.  These were usually a 
measure last resort employed by young couples whose families, particularly the woman’s family, did not 
allowed them to marry.  In a rapto the man usually took the woman away from her father’s house for a few 
days.  Once the couple returned the father was basically forced to accept the union since the daughter could 
no longer lay claims to virginity.  The practice of raptos sought the a posteriori recognition of an act of 
possession.  In the case of Vieques, Spain could not run away with the island, but it sought to gradually 
possess it until other empires could not lay claims to the island.  For a study of the practice of elopement in 
19th century Cuba see, for example, Verena Martínez-Alier, Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth 
Century Cuba: A Study of Racial Attitudes and Sexual Values in a Slave Society (Ann Arbor: The 






About the convenience of activating the colonization and development of 
the island of Vieques; and notified H.M. has warned me manifest to Y.E. 
that in these last times the English government has protested against the 
fortifications that were being built in Vieques and the rise in the island’s 
garrisoned force: that in the last days the Minister of England has 
reproduced this protest: and that if currently adopted ostensible measures 
to formally formulate in the island a complete administrative systems it 
would probably provoke a conflict that is advisable to avoid, because no 
matter how much for the government of H.M. is not doubtful the right of 
Spain to the property of Vieques, this issue is still not definitely finished 
with the English government.  It is thus the will of H.M. that as soon as 
possible efficient measures be adopted for the development of the 
agriculture and industry in the island, authorizing to the effect the Captain 
General of Puerto Rico; but that these measures be of such nature that can 
be justified with the natural advancement of the colony’s interests; without 
awaking the suspicion that its object is to secure in her Spanish dominion: 
abstaining for the same from establishing Courts of Justice or authorities 
of any kind outside from military Chiefs that command the detachments 
garrisoned in the island, and which force is not inconvenient to be 
somewhat incremented, as a guarantee to the settlers.72 
 
Faced with England’s protests the Spanish Crown ordered the fostering of an organic 
development of the island characterized by undefined administrative structures and an 
increased military presence.  Such undefined political structures led to general confusion 
and serious public debates.  For example, on December 1837 questions revolved around 
the specific role of different imperial ministries like Hacienda, Instrucción Pública, and 
                                                 
72 “acerca de la conveniencia de activar la colonización y fomento de la isla de Vieques; y enterada 
S.M. se ha servido prevenirme manifieste a V.E. que en estos últimos tiempos ha reclamado el Gobo inglés 
contra las fortificaciones que se construían en Vieques y el aumento de la fuerza que guarnece en la isla: 
que en los últimos días ha reproducido al Ministro de Inglaterra esta reclamación: y que si se adoptasen 
actualmente medidas ostensibles para plantear formalmente en la isla un sistema completo de 
administración se provocaría probablemente un conflicto que conviene evitar, pues por mas que para el 
Gobierno de S.M. no sea dudoso el derecho de la España a la propiedad de Vieques, esta cuestión no se 
halla aún terminada con el Gobierno inglés.  Es por tanto la voluntad de S.M. que se adopten en cuanto sea 
posible medidas eficaces para el desarollo de la agricultura y la industria en la isla, autorizando al efecto al 
Capitán General de Puerto Rico; pero que en dichas medidas sean de tal naturaleza que puedan justificarse 
con el natural adelanto de los intereses de la Colonia; sin que despierten sospecha de que su objeto sea 
asegurar en ella la dominación de la España: absteniéndose por lo mismo de establecer Tribunales ni 
autoridades de ninguna especie fuera de los Gefes militares que manden los destacamentos que guarnezcan 
la isla, y cuya fuerza no hay inconveniente en que tenga algún aumento, como garantía de los moradores.”  






the Ministry of Overseas Governance.73  Although a detailed list of the range and 
function of these ministries was shortly produced, only time and the “repeated and 
continued acts of possession” resolved the debate over the sovereignty of Vieques.74  
Meanwhile Spain, not risking an openly hostile confrontation or willing to assume 
“onerous titles” entailing obligations that outweighed advantages, continued to act under 
the only consistent imperial policy: inconspicuously populating and militarizing Vieques. 
While fostering the demographic growth and militarization of Vieques, Spain 
engaged the challenging suitors in a diplomatic warfare over what had previously been an 
island-fringe.  Through the consular and government correspondence exchanged during 
the 1810s to the 1860s a new Vieques was imagined.  Such geographical imaginings 
depended on prolific pens like Teophile Le Guillou’s as well as on the wittiness and 
feistiness of the battling interlocutors.  Once the battle started, England proved to be the 
main contender, while Denmark remained a present but distant second.  On January 16, 
1816 England’s Lord Castlereagh insisted that, notwithstanding void titles like “first 
discoverer,” Vieques was a Virgin Island.75  Lord Castlereagh, honoring a Shakespearean 
tradition of playing with puns, established the basis of an enduring virginity debate.  At 
stake here was not honor, but the very concrete drawing of imperial demarcating lines to 
the west or east of Vieques.  If the small island was indeed part of the neighboring Virgin 
Islands, as Lord Castlereagh argued, it had to be either a Danish or English possession.76  
                                                 
73 The Spanish institution of Hacienda dealt with the handling of government finances or with the 
recollection and distribution of taxes.  Instrucción Pública, on the other hand, dealt with public education.  
Both institutions, at least in names, have been inherited by many postcolonial Latin American countries. 
74 Documentación sobre Vieques 127. 
75 Documentación sobre Vieques 8. 
76 The Virgin Islands are located to the east of Vieques.  The Danish Virgin Islands, after 1917 the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, were composed by the islands of St. John, St. Croix and St. Thomas and other 
numerous islets.  The British Virgin Islands, east of the Danish-U.S. ones, are composed of 86 keys and 






Yet, eleven days after the British diplomat’s remarks Conde de Fernán Núnez 
emphatically denied such Virgin allegations.  He responded that, “the island of Vieques 
was not included in the number of the Virgins” since Spain was in, “indisputable 
possession of her.”77  Spain’s ownership, Núnez further argued, was evidenced in the 
repeated dismissals of would-be possessors and in ancient maps, like the 17th century 
Map 6 of the Algemeen Rijksarchief Collection, separating Vieques from the Virgin 
Islands.78  Whether Vieques was or was not a Virgin Island, Spain was definitely a 
jealous lover. 
The virginity debate was a very ingenious and less confrontational way of 
discussing the island’s status.  The discussion climaxed in an encounter between the 
Governor of Vieques Teophile Le Guillou and the President of Tortola and Governor of 
the Virgin Islands Isaac Hay.  Le Guillou recounted the event in a June 26, 1840 letter to 
the Governor López de Baños. 
the conversation fell on the richness of Vieques’ soil, and on the poverty 
of the Virgin Islands.  Mr. President Hay, only one who spoke French told 
me that those Virgins were very decrepit young ladies and full of 
sicknesses, that Goat Island (Vieques), was the most beautiful, youngest 
and richest of the virgins.  I told him that Vieques was not a virgin after 
her marriage with Spain.79 
 
                                                 
77 “la isla de Vieques no estaba comprendida en el número de las Vírgenes…indisputable posesión 
de ella.”  Documentación sobre Vieques 9. 
78 Map 6 of the Algemeen Rijksarchief Collection portrays the Virgin Islands as a group of small 
islands labeled by “Virgines.”  Yet, the islands of Bieke and St. Croix were portrayed separately and 
labeled.  Map 6, Archivo Algemeen Rijksarchief, Sección Cartográfica, CIH, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Río Piedras.  Documentación sobre Vieques 9.  For a discussion of Map 6 and other maps from the Archivo 
Algemeen Rijkarschief also see “Chapter 3: Claims to the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th Centuries.” 
79 “recayó la conversación sobre las riquezas de los terrenos de Vieques, y sobre la pobreza de las 
Islas Vírgenes.  El Sr. Presidente Hay, único que habló francés me dijo que esas Vírgenes eran señoritas 
muy decrépitas y llenas de enfermedades, que la Isla de Cabra (Vieques), era la más bella, más joven y más 
rica de las vírgenes.  Yo le conté que Vieques no era virgen después de su matrimonio con la España.”  
Documentación sobre Vieques 641-642.  According to the Compendio” some foreigners identified Vieques 
as “Isla de Cabra” (Goat Island) given the abundance of such animals, along with pigs, chickens, rabbits 






Both officials assumed sexual metaphors to assign gendered qualities to the island-
colonies.  According to President Hay, the Virgin Islands were hardly virginal.  Already 
possessed for a couple of centuries by the English and Danish empires, not to mention 
previous indigenous presences, they were worn down and decrepit.  Vieques, on the other 
hand, smelled like new with its 34,585 cuerdas of unexploited territory after a promising 
1830s decade of sugar bloom.80  Yet, Le Guillou argued that Vieques’ lushness and 
fertility already had an owner.  The small island was married to Spain.  In the process the 
young bride’s body became a private domesticated sphere accessible only to the 
polygamous husband, or so the husband would try to establish.  Whether Vieques was a 
luscious virgin or a married lady could not be decided.  However, conversations like the 
Hay-Le Guillou’s one fostered a new and more feminized way of imagining Vieques.  If 
the post-1514 island had remained an unconquerable and savage space, a more 
manageable post-1828 Spanish Vieques was emerging.81 
The geographical imaginings of a Spanish Vieques responded to diplomatic 
arguments, to coming from savageness to civilization histories, and to other narratives.  
Yet, all these imaginings depended for substance and legitimation on the memory of 
imperial archives like the Real y General Archivo de Simancas e Indias.82  In fact, as 
soon as the possession controversy started, after the 1811 colonization plan, Spain armed 
                                                 
80 The island’s space devoted to the growth of sugar went from Teophile Le Guillou’s 10 cuerdas in 
1828 to a total of 196 cuerdas in 1839.  The difference represents an almost 1860% increase in 11 years.  
The 34,585 figure above is based on the subtraction of the 1,447 cuerdas of cultivated land identified by 
Government Statistics in 1839 to the 36,032 cuerdas in the island provided by César Ayala and Viviana 
Carro.  Ayala and Carro, “Expropriation and Displacement,” Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule 176.  See 
Appendices 13-15. 
81 For Teophile Le Guillou and Fray Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra’s comments about post-1514 Vieques 
see “Chapter 3: Claims to the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th Centuries.” 
82 For a reference to the Real y General Archivo de Simancas e Indias see “Chapter 2: Myths of 






itself with as many geographical and historical facts as the archivists could muster.83  The 
purpose was to create an arsenal of dusty documental references to Vieques that could 
prove beyond any doubt that Spain was indeed the first inventor and possessor of the 
island.  After all, to know and to represent convincingly was to own.84  In the midst of 
this archival battle, one of the most powerful weapons produced in the metropolis was a 
history of Vieques written in September 1829 by José de la Higuera y Lara.  The history 
was a 1685-1735 chronology weaved through the colonization attempts on the part of 
England, Denmark, Brandenburg and France, and their subsequent expulsions by Spain.85  
This historical instrument wielded by the Spanish Empire against Denmark and England 
could have been the first Viequense chronology and archival history ever written.  The 
historical narratives produced by de la Higuera and Le Guillou coincided in their concern 
with the presence of unwanted others in Vieques.  Yet, it was de la Higuera y Lara’s 
history that established the precedent of narrating Vieques’ history in order to articulate 
ownership claims over the island.  Yet, even with Spain’s archival arsenal the dispute was 
not settled for another 35 years.  In the meantime, Vieques gravitated towards Spanish 
dominion. 
                                                 
83 Documentación sobre Vieques 8-10. 
84 For a discussion about the close relationship between knowledge and representation see “Chapter 
2: Myths of Origin and Foundational Figures, 1514.” 
85 José de la Higuera y Lara’s sometimes used the name “Bekia,” another Caribbean island, to refer 
to Vieques.  Apparently some early Spanish documents confused Vieques’ name with Bekia.  It can be 
inferred that the use of Bekia in Documentación sobre Vieques referred to Vieques through the outright 
acknowledgement of the confusion like in page 319 and through the physical placing of Bekia between 
Puerto Rico and Saint Croix in page 334.  De la Higuera y Lara’s referral to Vieques can also be evidenced 
in the document’s heading “Yndice de los documentos que se encuentran en este Real Archivo General de 
Yndias que tienen relación con la isla de Vieque, inmediata a Puerto Rico” (“Index of the documents found 
in this Real Archivo General de Indias that are related to the island of Vieque, next to Puerto Rico”).  José 
de la Higuera y Lara, “Yndice de los documentos que se encuentran en este Real Archivo General de 
Yndias que tienen relación con la isla de Vieque, inmediata a Puerto Rico,” Documentación sobre Vieques 






The Spanish colony of Vieques, dependent on but not integrated into Puerto Rico, 
was officially founded in 1844.  The event, however, expressed more a project than a 
reality.  The small island, composed of a 40% non-Puerto Rican population, was a 
disparate mosaic of languages, religions, races and cultures.86  Spain’s dilemma was to 
subtly impose a design.  Spain had to establish a disciplined identity that could harmonize 
a colony of foreigners dispersed throughout the island with the aim of a secured and, if 
possible, profitable Spanish dependency.  To such an end, the Governor of Puerto Rico 
Santiago Méndez de Vigo, acting on the Crown’s orders, formed a commission in 1841 
responsible for suggesting appropriate measures to further develop Vieques without 
attracting international attention.  Out of the numerous recommendations came the 1844 
establishment of the parish-capital of Isabel II in the northern coast of Vieques.  This took 
place in the 100 cuerdas Teophile Le Guillou had previously donated for such a purpose.  
In accordance with Spanish urban traditions, the town’s plaza was gradually surrounded 
by the most important religious, governmental and social structures.  These structures 
included the Casa del Rey, Church and cemetery.  The building of these three, although 
ordered since 1843, took years of planning, fund-raising and construction.  Nonetheless, 
their eventual gathering together near the Port Mulas led settlers into the island’s capital 
and made Isabel II the center of urban life. 87 
One of the most controversial measures in the transformation of Vieques into a 
stable Spanish dependency actually started as an 1831 solution to Spain’s inability to 
properly claim the island.  The May 5, 1831 Royal Order discussed above, originally 
devised to avoid confrontations with the British and Danish governments, set the 
                                                 
86 See Appendix 16. 






precedent for subsequent fiscal policies favoring less governmental intervention and 
fewer economic impositions.  The 1841 Commission supported the Order by proposing 
that for a period of 15 years Vieques would not be charged the territorial and commercial 
taxes imposed in Puerto Rico.  The entrance of foreign merchandise without the added 
6% tax officially gave Vieques the free port status that had been its de facto status since 
1831.  Even if originally designed to appease Danish and English complaints, the free 
port status and other fiscal privileges allowed local commerce to flourish and spurred the 
young colony’s economic growth.  The most assertive step taken by the Spanish empire 
in Vieques, however, was the 1845-1855 construction of the Fortín Conde de Mirasol. 
The fort, named Conde de Mirasol after the Governor of Puerto Rico Rafael de 
Aristegui y Vélez, embodied many things at once.  Even though the diplomatic war over 
Vieques had not ended, the military building evidenced Spain’s pretensions to physically 
possess the island through exclusivist claims over the use of violence.  Spain, aiming for 
imposition of Spanish authority, had begun to flex its muscles.  The investment in the 
fort, the last one constructed by Spain in the Americas, also evidenced the strategic 
intentions behind the island’s colonization.  These intentions, so defended by Colonel 
Flinter, made Vieques’ identity relational to Puerto Rico insofar as the first colony was 
truly intended as an outpost to the second.  Vieques, as discussed above, needed to be 
secured in order for Spain to secure Puerto Rico.  The fort came to form part of the 
defense system of both the Puerto Rican archipelago and the weakened Spanish Empire 
in the Americas.  Still, the Fortín was never finished.  Nor did its now rusted cannons 
ever fire a single shot to defend Vieques from an enemy attack, not even when the U.S. 






important part in disciplining the heterogeneous local population.  The violence that was 
not directed towards foreign aggressors was nonetheless focused on the enemies within.  
According to Robert Rabin, the military structure became early on a prison frequented by 
marginal sectors.  Among the list of prisoners were peons, vagos (unemployed or person 
without a steady labor contract) from Vieques and Puerto Rico and even political 
prisoners from the Dominican Republic.88  The Fortín, however, played one more and 
very important role in the consolidation of the Spanish colony of Vieques.   During the 
years 1862-1863 British diplomats in London and the Caribbean discussed intelligence 
reports gathered by Virgin Island officials that revealed the growth of the Spanish colony 
and the establishment of the garrison fort (Figure 4.1).89  These discussions and the 
ineffective diplomatic negotiations with Spanish officials led to the formal renunciation 
of the British Empire’s claims over Vieques in the year 1864.90  Thus, the Fortín was 
indeed instrumental in establishing Spanish dominion in Vieques. 
                                                 
88 Among the prisoners taken to the Fortín were field hands, descendants of Teophile Le Guillou, 
vagos (unemployed or person without a steady labor contract) from Vieques and Puerto Rico, and even 
political prisoner from the Dominican Republic.  Ignacio Olazagasti and Robert Rabin, Notas para la 
historia del Fortín Conde de Mirasol y la isla de Vieques, 2nd ed. (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura 
Puertorriqueña, 1991) 15-42. 
89 Among the intelligence information gathered by British officials was a sketch of Isabel II.  The 
sketch portrayed buildings already established, like the Fortín and the Governor’s house, and indications of 
military barracks to be established.  These barracks were never established.  This sketch, however, is likely 
to be the first sketch of Isabel II ever made.  Perhaps the British Empire acknowledged the existence of 
Isabel II before the Spanish Empire did.  “Bird’s Eye View of Crab Island and Town,” Sovereignty over 
Vieque, vol. 1, FO 72/1119, 23. 
90 See, for example, Sovereignty over Vieque or Crab Island and Culebra or Pasaje Island, vol. 2 







Figure 4.1: British mid 19th century sketch of Isabel II, Vieques91 
 
                                                 






The year 1864 was a crucial one for Vieques.  After Denmark’s pretension over 
Vieques had died away and England had formally renounced Crab Island, the Spanish 
colony of Vieques was officially incorporated as the 8th Military Department of Puerto 
Rico.92  As could be suggested by the indigenous naming of the second largest island east 
of Puerto Rico as “Small Island,” Vieques’ identity had for centuries been conceived as 
relational to Puerto Rico.  In fact, most Spanish officials in the archipelago, especially 
throughout the early 19th century, considered it only a matter of time before the smaller 
island became integrated into the neighboring colony.  In the 1850s, the population of 
Vieques reached the 2,000 mark and was further subject to the migratory influx of 
itinerant workers from neighboring colonies.  In addition, the island’s annual exportation 
total exceeded 60,000 pesos.  Thus, many thought that the progress of Vieques was such 
that it should be assimilated politically and economically as it already was judicially.93  
The inhabitants of Vieques probably had the same expectations.  Yet, the incorporation 
process undertaken after 1864, typical of a colonial relationship, was far from democratic 
and both the Madrid and the San Juan based governments dictated what the Viequense 
ruling sector considered adverse policies.  These measures, about which the local 
population was not consulted, ultimately brought new responsibilities that still sparked 
passionate debates in the late 19th century. 
Vieques’ fiscal privileges and free port status caused heated controversy and the 
passionate taking of sides from their very inception.  As exemplified in the 1840s clash 
between the Governors of Puerto Rico and the Intendente de Hacienda Manuel José 
Cerero over the restriction versus the fostering of Vieques’ commerce, opinions diverged 
                                                 
92 Puerto Rico’s other Military Departments were Bayamón, Arecibo, Aguadilla, Mayaguez, Ponce, 
Guayama and Humacao. 






on whether the defense of Puerto Rico should be ensured through the implementation of 
exceptional fiscal policies.94  Aguadilla’s Customs Administrator Antonio Calderón 
argued to the central government against such exceptions in July 25, 1846 by stating that, 
“the wanting to encourage Vieques at such great expenses to Puerto Rico and the Nation 
is the wanting to kill a mother in the midst of delivery to save the life of a fetus that still 
has not been seen.” 95  The problem, as identified by people like Calderón, was that the 
exceptional fiscal policies endowed to Vieques burdened the main island with the 
younger colony’s administrative costs and facilitated both contraband and competition to 
local and Spanish produces by allowing the introduction of tax-exempt foreign 
commodities through Vieques.  Yet, Antonio Calderon’s words are more than simply 
representative of those opposed to Vieques’ privileges for his quote might actually be the 
first metaphorical construction of the Puerto Rico-Vieques relationship as that of mother 
and child.  Still, the child, as acknowledged by both Calderón and the Crown that 
endorsed the fiscal privileges, was not fully born in 1846.  What Vieques would become 
was yet to be seen, but the delivery, according to some in Puerto Rico, was already taking 
a heavy toll on the mother. 
Twenty-four years after the foundation of the Spanish colony of Vieques and with 
at least nine sugar haciendas and two estancias established in the island, opinions or, 
                                                 
94 The Intendencia, established in much of Hispanic America during the 1780s, was an 
administrative organ in charge of the orderly functioning of fiscal institutions and the fostering of the 
colonial economies.  In Puerto Rico, the Intendencia was officially created in 1803 but came to be 
occupied, as an independent administrative entity from that of the Governor, in 1811-1812.  Fernando Picó, 
Historia general de Puerto Rico (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1988) 130-131.  During the 1840s the 
Intendente Cerero opposed the expenditure plans proposed by the Governors of Puerto Rico from Santiago 
Méndez de Vigo to Juan Prim y Prats designed to foster and defend Vieques.  Bonnet, Vieques en la 
historia de Puerto Rico. 
95 “el querer que se fomente Vieques a tan grandes expensas de Puerto Rico y la Nación es querer 
matar a una madre que se halla de parto por salvar la vida de un feto que aún no se ha visto.”  






more specifically, the Crown’s opinions shifted.  Spain ordered the people of Vieques 
through the May 13, 1868 Royal Decree to start paying subsidiary contributions to the 
Royal Treasury which amounted to the 6% of the island’s registered wealth, or to 3,701 
escudos in 1868-69.96  As an October 14, 1873 Hacienda report argued, the tributary 
exceptions had become an unjustified privilege favoring a portion of Puerto Rican 
inhabitants to the detriment of the others.97  The report detailed the characteristic posture 
of Hacienda since the 1840s of supporting a “no privileges” policy.  The stance, 
however, had more ample support in San Juan by the 1870s.  By 1873 the Diputación 
Provincial, acting under the 1870 Ley de Ayuntamientos, incorporated Vieques to Puerto 
Rico as another municipality.  In turn, the island’s last privilege, its free port status, was 
taken away seven years later.98  Vieques, by 1880, had been integrated to the colony of 
Puerto Rico. 
Vieques’ wealthiest residents or “major contributors,” well represented in the 
Municipal Council, were in dismay at the prospect of such a tax burden.99  While the 
island had been dependent on Puerto Rico throughout the 19th century, the imposed 
integration process commenced after 1864 made very clear the residents’ subordinated 
bargaining position with respect to Madrid and San Juan.  Probably sensing that a new 
language had to be used in order to appeal to their two metropolises, the Governor of 
                                                 
96 “21 de junio de 1868,” 6, Documentos Municipales, Vieques, 1, AGPR, San Juan. 
97 Documentación sobre Vieques 847. 
98 Antonio Rivera Martínez argued in Así empezó Vieques that Vieques lost its free port status in 
1868.  The date is unlikely given the July 21, 1871 petition signed by the Governor of Vieques Tomás Font 
and other Vieques residents in defense of the continuation, as opposed to reinstallation, of the free port 
status.  For this reason, Justo Pastor Ruiz’s proposal of 1880 as the year when Vieques lost its free port 
status is more feasible.  Pastor Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno.  Rivera, Así empezó Vieques. 
99 The Junta Municipal or Municipal Council was not a democratic body.  Instead, it was presided 
by a Governor or, after 1873, a Mayor appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico.  The rest of the board 
was composed of members of Vieques’ “mayores contribuyentes” (major contributors) or wealthiest 






Vieques Tomás Font and a group of merchants, hacendados and other land owners signed 
a collective petition in July 21, 1871 stating that: 
To save itself Vieques needs a paternal and economic government that 
instead of imposing new burdens, sets it free if possible of the ones that 
today oppress it; it needs its port to remain frankly open to foreigners, 
because from abroad, it receives the elements of its sustenance…Puerto 
Rico is a virile nation that counts with centuries of existence, Vieques, Sir, 
that hardly counts with some years, cannot be compared with Puerto Rico 
in the political or in the administrative.  No country in the world, Sir, has 
been able to produce benefits to its Metropolitan Government at its 28th 
year of being settled.  Vieques is a fragile child from whom cannot be 
expected the work of an adult; its strengths would be exhausted and it 
would die by consumption.100 
 
The petitioners, arguing against Vieques’ further incorporation to Puerto Rico and in 
favor of repealing the recently established subsidy contributions and maintaining the free 
port status, employed the child-parent metaphor previously articulated by Antonio 
Calderón.  Yet, in 1871 the metaphor was designed to appeal to the sense of paternal 
responsibility over a frail offspring.  If Puerto Rico had indeed conceived Vieques, it 
could not leave the fragile infant to die.  Instead, the virile father had to make sacrifices 
for the newborn if it ever hoped to reap the rewards of successful child rearing in the 
future.  The irony was that to save the child the parent had to intrude as little as possible 
while assenting to foreign intervention.  Apparently, the parent could not provide all the 
nourishing its newborn needed.  One thing is evident though.  By the 1870s the child had 
definitely been born. 
                                                 
100 “Vieques necesita para salvarse un gobierno paternal y económico que en vez de imponerle nuevas 
cargas, lo libre si es posible de las que hoy le oprimen; necesita que su puerto continúe francamente abierto 
al extranjero, porque del extranjero, recibe los elementos que lo sostienen…Puerto Rico es un pueblo viril 
que cuenta siglos de existencia, Vieques, Señor, que apenas cuenta algunos años, no puede ser comparado 
con Puerto Rico ni en lo político ni en lo administrativo.  Ningún país en el mundo, Señor, ha podido 
producir beneficios al Gobierno de su Metrópolis a los 28 años de ser poblado.  Vieques es un débil niño 
del que no puede exigirse el trabajo de un adulto; sus fuerzas se agotarían y moriría por consunción.”  






After England’s formal renunciation, the argument that Vieques, as a young 
island-community, was an exceptional case in need of special attention fell on deaf ears 
among colonial officials.  Subsequently, for many Viequenses the years 1864-1880 
evolved into a historical turning point for the worst.  If by the mid 19th century Vieques 
had been a prospering sugar colony, the post-1868 policies imposed from Madrid and San 
Juan bred an air of pessimism among the Viequense society.  The island’s upper sectors 
faced the mounting municipal deficit, the heavier tax burden and the more expensive 
imports.  Meanwhile the lower strata faced unemployment and, if non-Spanish citizens, 
deportation and the forfeiture of work contracts.101  In the words of the member of the 
Municipal Council José García Marín, “It is also said that Vieques heads to its ruin, that it 
is decaying especially since it was assimilated to the other towns of this Province [Puerto 
Rico], imposing the payment of the subsidy that had not satisfied before.”102  For García 
Marín as for many of his colleagues the May 1868 Royal Decree had been collapsed with 
the 1873 incorporation of Vieques to Puerto Rico.  The collapse made both equally 
suspicious and detrimental to the welfare of Vieques.  The belief led to support of the 
separation from Puerto Rico in order to continue under a more direct Spanish colonial 
                                                 
101 Slavery, first recorded as existing in Vieques during the 1685-1693 non-Hispanic colonization 
ventures, was abolished in Puerto Rico on March 22, 1873.  Although Vieques was a haven for both 
fugitive slaves from the British colonies and slave traffickers heading to the Puerto Rican main island, the 
abolition of slavery had little impact in Vieques for the island’s economy depended more on a free and 
immigrant labor force than on the work of slaves numbered at 33 in 1873.  The immigrant labor force was 
contacted in and subsequently attracted from the neighboring non-Spanish colonies through the offering of 
generous work contracts.  Although the contract stipulations were not always followed, during the mid 19th 
century workers in Vieques enjoyed comparatively higher wages than in islands like Tortola.  Robert 
Rabin-Siegel, “Esclavitud africana en Vieques,” Historias vivas: Historiografía puertorriqueña 
contemporánea, eds. Antonio Gaztambide Géigel and Silvia Álvarez Curbelo (San Juan: Editorial Postdata, 
1996) 60-64.  “18 de junio de 1873,” Actas celebradas por la Junta Municipal y Ayuntamiento de esta Ysla 
desde el 18 de junio al 28 de Diciembre de 1873, 6-B, Documentos Municipales, Vieques, 1, AGPR.  See 
“Chapter 5: The Sugar Baptism of Isla Nena, Late 1800s-1930.” 
102 “Dícese también que Vieques camina a su ruina, que va decayendo sobre todo desde que se le 
asimiló a los demás pueblos de esta Provincia [Puerto Rico], imponiéndole el pago del subsidio que antes 






regime.  The late 19th century separatist sentiment in Vieques arose from the island’s 
Municipal Council, which was in turn composed of hacendados, merchants and appointed 
officials from Puerto Rico hardly representative of Vieques’ population.  The diversity of 
the local population combined with the limited communication venues with Puerto Rico 
had not provided fertile ground in Vieques for the sense of Puerto Rican-ness developing 
across parts of the main island.103  Thus, the incorporation to the colony of Puerto Rico 
was hardly a celebrated event in Vieques.  The debate about the Puerto Rico-Vieques 
relationship, however, was about to be redefined by a new historical conjuncture that 




The life story of Abuela Cocoroco represents in itself a foundational fiction that 
parallels Vieques’ romanticized history.  Foundational fictions, following Doris 
Sommer’s formulation of the term, are historical narratives based on allegorical love 
stories.  These narratives allude to national histories through the many times romantic 
interaction of characters representing broad sectors of society.  Through the outcome of 
these interactions, authors make proposals about the future of nations.104  As such, 
foundational fictions can be spaces of representation from where to negotiate national 
identities.  While the concept was formulated by Sommer to describe a Latin American 
literary tradition, the non-written life story of my great-grandmother still travels through 
                                                 
103 In the Puerto Rican main island there were large sectors of the population, especially Caribbean 
migrants settled in the south and blacks in the northeast of the island who did not identify with the cultural 
nationalist discourses being fashioned by San Juan based intellectuals in the late 19th century. 






time as if it was written by the famous pen of Rómulo Gallegos.  My Carib great-
grandmother, as if to allegorically amend the blood spilled almost four centuries earlier, 
romantically conjoined in her 15th year of life with the blond and blue-eyed Spaniard 
Manuel Santiago, known as Manuel Felicidad or simply as Filá since there was probably 
a Félix somewhere in the name.  It is not clear to me who conquered and tamed whom, if 
this is indeed what happened, but if this foundational fiction is to follow the romanticized 
plot of Vieques’ history, my great-grandfather Manuel succeeded in taming the savage 
Carib Vieques my great-grandmother Basilia embodied.  On the other hand, Abuela 
Cocoroco ingeniously kept my Spanish great-grandfather by her side as her life partner 
and made him adopt along with the island the remnants of Carib lifestyle well alive in 
19th and early 20th century Vieques. 
Spain’s long ambiguous relationship with Vieques, made official only at the end 
of the romantic liaison, resembles my great-grandparents’ foundational fiction.  My 
great-grandfather Manuel married my great-grandmother Basilia on his deathbed on 
January 11, 1955.  The marital ceremony sealed approximately fifty-five years of living 
together.  The outcome of the long interaction between my two real-life but still 
allegorical great-grandparents resulted in the engendering of 12 children with Carib and 
Spanish ancestry, that I also claim as my own.  These children were living symbols of a 
fusion where the foreign imperial power became intimate with the evanescent Carib race.  










The Sugar Baptism of Isla Nena, Late 1800s-1930 
 
They came here from the island [of Puerto Rico] looking for work.  The [central] hired 
them because of the sugar cane.  They came every year and worked here and sent 
sustenance to their homes over there.  You could earn money…[and the] day lasted from 
6 till 6.  A terrible thing.  You had to work.  Yes…I worked carving wood, because we 
had to make carts to carry the cane, one had to do wagons and I did all that work [in the 
workshop].  That was in the still time, in the harvest I worked in the central.  Then I 
would cut five llaves in the tachos during the nights.  The night shift was complete 
because I got home, after a half a mile walk, by midnight. 
Gabriel Carambot, Personal interview (2003)1 
 
During the 1800s the sugar cane had reigned over the Puerto Rican archipelago, 
but had been in decline during the last two decades of that century.  According to 
historian Andrés Ramos Mattei, the economic system based on the hacienda collapsed in 
Puerto Rico after 1873.  He argued that the hacienda, relatively small socio-economic 
unit usually managed by plantation owner, was a precapitalist enterprise dependent on the 
coerced labour of slaves and free workers.  The free workers were forced into plantations 
by the 1849 law known as the Reglamento de jornaleros (Regulation of day labourers).  
The law decreed by Governor Juan de la Pezuela stipulated that persons without the 
                                                 
1 “Venían de la isla aquí en busca de trabajo.  Los cogían [la central] porque estaba la caña.  Ellos 
venían todos los años y trabajaban aquí y mandaban el sustento para las casas allá.  Con [mana-inteligible] 
se ganaba dinero…día pues era de 6 a 6.  Una cosa terrible.  Había que trabajar.  Sí…Yo trabajaba labrando 
madera, acerando porque había que hacer los carros para cargar la caña, había que hacer vagones y todo eso 
pues yo trabajaba allí [en el taller]…Eso era en la bruja, en el cosecho trabajaba en la central.  Entonces yo 
mapuleaba cinco llaves en los tachos y ahí pues trabajaba ahí por la noche.  La noche era completa porque 







means to sustain themselves, even if they were landowners, had to hire themselves out or 
become jornaleros (day labourers).2  Although jornaleros received modest wages for 
their work, Ramos Mattei argued that the relationship between jornaleros and hacendados 
was not based on the exchange of labour for money.  Instead, he proposed that feudal 
relationships, ruled by allegiances and responsibilities, defined the hacienda economic 
system.3  The abolition of slavery and overturn of the Reglamento de jornaleros in 1873 
helped, for Ramos Mattei, precipitate the downfall of the haciendas in Puerto Rico by 
putting an end to the two important sources of coerced labor.4 
The feudal character Andres Ramos Mattei assigned to haciendas is a debated 
point among scholars.  In fact, late 19th century sugar haciendas in Vieques were hardly 
feudal.  These haciendas depended less on slavery and more on salaried free and 
immigrant workers.  At the time of the March 22, 1873 abolition only 33 slaves were 
                                                 
2 The 1849 law that brought about the Régimen de la libreta (notebook regime) was a vagrancy law.  
Similar types of vagrancy laws designed to create a cheap labor force were implemented during the 19th 
and early 20th centuries throughout Latin America.  Governor Pezuela’s 1849 law stipulated that any 
person between 16 and 60 years of age without a known occupation was considered a jornalero.  
Jornaleros, then, had the obligation to be employed at all times and to prove their employment through a 
notebook bearing the markings of their boss.  Jornaleros, furthermore, were required to move to towns so 
that officials could watch over them better.  The 1849 law also dictated the end of agregados.  Francisco 
Scarano, Puerto Rico: Cinco siglos de historia (San Juan: McGraw-Hill, 1993) 417-418.  See also Fernando 
Picó’s discussion of the 19th century rural workforce in Puerto Rico in Fernando Picó, Libertad y 
servidumbre en el Puerto Rico del siglo XIX (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1983) 45-82.  For a 
definition of agregados see “Chapter 4: The Spanish Colony of Vieques, 19th Century.” 
3 Andrés Ramos Mattei defines feudal relationships in the hacienda context as a socio-economic 
regime sustained through servile extra-economic ties between the owners of the means of production and 
the direct producers.  I, therefore, understand the concept to mean relationships of production based more 
on allegiances and responsibilities than on wages and salaries.  Andrés A. Ramos Mattei, La sociedad del 
azúcar en Puerto Rico: 1870-1910 (Río Piedras: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1988) 13-16. 
4 Andrés Ramos Mattei also identified the lack of capital to invest in modern technology and 
infrastructure as a problem in the transition from haciendas to a capitalist and more competitive system of 
sugar mills in 19th century Puerto Rico.  Technology and infrastructure were central to meet the demands of 
global market for refined sugar.  Andrés Ramos Mattei, La hacienda azucarera: Su crecimiento y crisis en 






emancipated in the island.5  The President of the Virgin Islands Isidore Dyett, in addition, 
visited Vieques in 1862 to assess the status of British citizens and had then written to the 
Governor in Chief of the Leeward Islands B. Hamilton that a few slaves worked in most, 
if not all, of the haciendas, but that most of the laborers were free immigrants from the 
British colonies.6  Four years later the Municipal Council declared that slaves comprised 
only 2% of the population and that these 80 persons in bondage were devoted to domestic 
service.7  By June 1868 the Council complained that the labor force in Vieques was 
essentially free and in shortage.8  Therefore, Vieques’ sugar industry was run at least 
since the early 1860s by the hands of immigrant workers.9  This immigrant labor force 
was enticed with generous work contracts from neighboring non-Spanish colonies.  
Although contract stipulations were not always enforced, during the 1850s and 1860s 
workers in Vieques did enjoy comparatively higher wages than in islands like Tortola.  If 
hacendados broke contracts stipulations, immigrant workers had the option to leave.10  
                                                 
5 “18 de junio de 1873,” Actas celebradas por la Junta Municipal y Ayuntamiento de esta Ysla 
desde el 18 de junio al 28 de Diciembre de 1873, 6-B, Documentos Municipales, Vieques, 1, AGPR, San 
Juan. 
6 The President of the Virgin Islands Isidore Dyett wrote on March 14, 1862 to the Governor in 
Chief of the Leeward Islands B. Hamilton about the status of British subjects in Vieques.  His letter 
included a detailed account of the political, economic and social situation of Vieques as Dyett witnessed it 
during an 1862 visit.  Isidore Dyett, letter to B. Hamilton, 14 March 1862, Sovereignty over Vieque or Crab 
Island and Culebra or Pasaje Island, vol. 1 1846-1862, FO 72/1119, National Archives, London, 225. 
7 Even though slavery in Vieques declined during the 1850s and 1860s, slaves represented 19% of 
the population in 1839 and 36% in 1845.  According to the Municipal Council, by 1866 there were only 80 
slaves in the island of approximate 4,300 residents.  In other words, slaves comprised only 2% of the 
population in 1866.  “29 de enero de 1866,” 5, Documentos Municipales, Vieques, 1, AGPR.  See 
Appendices 13, 15 and 16 and “Chapter 4: The Spanish Colony of Vieques, 19th Century.” 
8 “22 de junio de 1868,” Isla de Vieques año de 1868 Junta Municipal, 6, Documentos Municipales, 
Vieques, 1, AGPR. 
9 The number of British subjects working in Vieques by January 1864 was so significant that by 
themselves they were able to put up an uprising to which the Spanish authorities had to call on troops from 
the Puerto Rican main island.  Captain of HMS Inmortalité Hancock, letter, 23 January 1864, Sovereignty 
over Vieque or Crab Island and Culebra or Pasaje Island, vol. 2 1863-1865, FO 72/1120, National 
Archives, London, 147.  Ignacio Olazagasti and Robert Rabin, Notas para la historia del Fortín Conde de 
Mirasol y la isla de Vieques, 2nd ed. (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1991) 41. 
10 The British Government received complaints over the years from their subjects stating that, “much 






Thus, the relationship between hacendados and the immigrant workers depended on the 
actual exchange of labor for money, or at least on the expectation of the exchange. 
The labor force in Vieques, however, was still coerced to the extent immigrant 
and local workers had been submitted until 1873 to the Reglamento de jornaleros.  The 
immigrant jornaleros, furthermore, were not allowed to leave the island if the hacendados 
accused them of a breach of contract (Figure 5.1).11  With the overturn of the 
Reglamento, the Municipal Council passed in October of 1873 an ordinance regulating 
the movement of these immigrant workers around the island.  The intention behind such 
an ordinance was to discourage workers who “wander without a contract” and to 
“extirpate the idleness, demoralization and excess to which these foreign workers 
succumb.”12  The ordinance, therefore, was basically a reinstatement of the vagrancy law 
overturned four months earlier ultimately making such an overturn irrelevant in the 
island.  The Council’s insistence on controlling the immigrant workers further suggests 
the importance of such workers to the island’s economy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
there against their will in essentially a state of Slavery.”  Isidore Dyett, letter to B. Hamilton, 7 October 
1861, Sovereignty over Vieque, vol. 1, FO 72/1119, 174-175. 
11 The Governor, and later Mayor, of Vieques was the only official in the island authorized to 
process passports.  During the later 19th century, the Governor usually required the approval of employers 
before processing passport to jornaleros.  If employers did not approve, jornaleros could make a direct 
appeal to the Governor to leave the island.  The fact that the direct appeal was a recourse undertaken by 
different jornaleros throughout the late 19th century suggests that employers’ authorization was not always 
easy to get were.  Yet, the Governors usually sided with the hacendados.  In this sense, when hacendados 
claimed in the early 1870s that they could no longer employ their jornaleros because of a widespread 
economic crisis, the Mayor allowed the one-sided termination of the contracts and the deportation of 
immigrant jornaleros.  See, for example, 59, Documentos Municipales, Vieques, 8, AGPR. 
12 “vagan sin contrato…extirpar la vagancia, desmoralización y exceso a que se va entregando el 
peonaje extranjero.”  “1 de octubre 1873,” Actas celebradas por la Junta Municipal y Ayuntamiento de esta 







Figure 5.1: Passport belonging to Luis Charles, dated April 14, 1888, authorizing passage to 
Guadeloupe13 
 
                                                 






The haciendas in Vieques were dependent on salaried immigrant laborers.  Yet, 
the island experienced, along with the rest of the Puerto Rican archipelago, the decline of 
the haciendas during the late 19th century.  Vieques’ sugar industry, in fact, was already 
facing problems by the late 1860s, and sugar was the cash crop that moved the island’s 
economy and government.  The link between the sugar industry and the municipality was 
so strong that by 1871, when hacendados were having marked cycles of financial 
instability, the Municipal Council was operating its budget on a deficit.14  The Council, 
after all, depended on the income received from its “major contributors” like the brothers 
Eugenio and Manuel Benítez from the respective Haciendas of Resolución and of Santa 
Elena respectively who were declaring themselves unable to pay the salary of to their 
immigrant workers.15  Eventually, the Municipality assumed responsibility for the breach 
of contracts.16   
Most of the council members, like the Benítez family, were personally invested in 
the sugar industry or in the related commercial sector.17  According to these members of 
the Viequense elite, the economic downfall of the island had less to do with the 
manageability of cheap labor, technology, the yield of the soil and the global fluctuations 
of sugar prices than with the forced incorporation into the Puerto Rican main island.  In 
the late 19th century Puerto Rican nationalist sentiment was not widespread among the 
Viequense upper sector, and much less so with the lower classes and the immigrant 
population. 
                                                 
14 Due to its fiscal deficit, in January of 1873 the Municipality could not even pay its own 
employees.  “25 de abril de 1873,” Año de 1873 Ysla de Vieques Actas, 6-A, Documentos Municipales, 
Vieques, 1, AGPR. 
15 Vieques 1870, Capitanía General, Vieques, 605, AGPR, San Juan. 
16 98, Documentos Municipales, Vieques, 9, AGPR. 






The world that sugar created in the 19th century Vieques was marked by contrasts.  
The President of the Virgin Islands Isidore Dyett keenly observed during his visit in 1862 
that: 
The population is heterogeneous in the extreme, consisting of whites of 
almost all the European Nations, of Americans, of slaves of African 
descent, and of free black and colored immigrants from the other West 
Indian Colonies, of whom about 300 are reported to be from the British 
Virgin Islands, and of “Gibaros”, a peculiar class of people of mixed 
blood, the descendants of the early inhabitants of Puerto Rico, chiefly by 
Spanish Convicts, sent to that Island before its colonization, who 
intermarried or cohabited with Caribs and Africans.  These people the 
“Jibaros” are reported to be a mild and orderly, but exceedingly indolent 
race, they live in small palm built huts or ranchos and maintain themselves 
by grazing stock and by small cultivations of fruits and vegetables, and 
latterly of tobacco.18 
 
Two decades after the Spanish colony of Vieques was officially founded, the population 
of the island was still “heterogeneous in the extreme.”  The 19th century sugar industry 
had attracted to Vieques clusters of people that did not see themselves as an island-
community.  Yet, it was the sugar industry and European imperialism that made possible 
their encounter in Vieques. 
Caribbean immigrants were among the clusters of people sharing 19th century 
Vieques.  The 1899 Census, in fact, identified Vieques as the Puerto Rican town with the 
fourth largest concentration of immigrants.19  This group of people, so central to the 
Viequense economy, were considered foreign to the island by local officials.  The group, 
nonetheless, had achieved a certain social standing by 1870 when the Spanish Crown 
authorized the opening of a Protestant school in Vieques where the children of 
                                                 
18 Isidore Dyett, letter to B. Hamilton, 14 March 1862, Sovereignty over Vieque, vol. 1, FO 72/1119, 
223-224. 
19 The 1899 Census identified 656 foreigners established in Vieques in 1899.  The number 
represented 10% of the population.  San Juan and Ponce, the two largest Puerto Rican cities, had 1,645 and 
973 immigrants respectively.  Yet, the immigrant population in San Juan, for example, represented only 5% 
of the city’s population.  Estados Unidos, Departamento de la Guerra, Dirección del Censo de Puerto Rico, 






immigrants could learn in their language and about their faith.  The school, according to 
Reverend Justo Pastor Ruiz, represented the first instance of Spanish religious tolerance 
in the Puerto Rican archipelago.  Twelve years later an Anglican Church was established 
in Vieques.20   
In the late 19th century, Caribbean immigrants might have achieved a similar 
status in Vieques to, for example, that of non-rebellious indigenous populations under the 
Spanish Empire in the early 16th century.  These immigrants had certain rights and 
obligations before the state that assured and reinforced their difference as a group.  
Immigrant jornaleros had, for example, the “Reglamento Especial para el Peonaje 
Extranjero” (“Special Regulation for the Foreign Laborers”) approved in 1871 that, 
among other measures, forced foreign jornaleros to live in the haciendas that employed 
them.21  The Caribbean immigrants had, in addition, a defined space within the larger 
society.  Such a space had very concrete physical manifestations like the Anglican 
Church located in the corner of San José and Luis Muñoz Rivera streets in Isabel II.  The 
Church reflected the existence as well as the peripheral status of the Caribbean immigrant 
population.  Although situated in the capital town, the building was located three blocks 
west of the Municipal Plaza and its Catholic Church.  In Isabel II, right until the mid 20th 
century, three blocks could mean the difference between social respectability and 
marginality.  Thus, the rights and space of the Caribbean immigrant community did not 
imply the outright integration into the broader Viequense society. 
                                                 
20 Justo Pastor Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno: 1493-1946 (Santurce: JAY-CE Printing, 1987) 41, 
89. 
21 To the extent that it forced immigrant jornaleros to obey their employers and live in the haciendas, 






The “Jibaros” that President Dyett identified as a separate ethnic group would 
later be described as the native Viequense population.22  This people of mixed ancestry 
who shared a certain history with the island were as much a part as much excluded from 
the Vieques that sugar was weaving.  They were subsistence farmers spread throughout 
the island, as Dyett affirmed, but they were also jornaleros in haciendas.  Dyett’s 
characterization of the “jíbaros” could attest to the local population’s dislike of the 
jornalero life and preference for a more independent lifestyle through subsistence 
agriculture.  After all, this people, if indeed the descendants of Caribs, runaway slaves 
and other fringe populations of the Caribbean, had a long tradition of living outside the 
grasp of states and empires.23  The small plots of land cultivated by these subsistence 
farmers claimed the landscape not taken over by sugar.  The potential inaccessibility of 
the plots, however, isolated their dwellers.  The roads, with the possible exception of the 
one connecting Isabel II to Punta Arenas, were not easy to traverse.24  Nor were there 
reasons for a subsistence farmer or a jornalero to continuously travel through them.  The 
difficulties in transportation forced barrios and haciendas to form self-sufficient units.  
Thus, people from different haciendas and barrios all over the island did not encounter 
each other on a regular basis.  Nor did they read or handle other texts that might have led 
them to imagine a collective Viequense identity, much less a Puerto Rican one. 
In the late 19th century the category of Viequense as it is understood today did not 
exist.  European imperialism and the sugar industry had thrown and attracted peoples into 
                                                 
22 For a discussion of the centrality of “jíbaros” in Puerto Rican nationalist imaginary see “Chapter 
6: The Arrival of the U.S. Navy, 1930-1950.” 
23 See “Chapter 3: Claims to the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th Centuries” 
24 The state of the roads in the island was a constant source of concern for the Municipal Council.  
The road connecting Isabel II to the district of Punta Arenas usually received more attention since it 
connected the capital town to the sugar producing region.  The coasts of Punta Arenas were also the nearest 
to the Puerto Rican main island.  See, for example, “12 de abril de 1878,” 5, Documentos Municipales, 






the island, but these peoples did not engage in activities that fostered the imagining of a 
Viequense community.  According to Cayetano Coll y Toste, there were only six schools 
in Vieques by 1898 servicing a total of 288 students.25  If the population of Vieques was 
5,938 in 1899, public education was reaching approximately 5% of the population at the 
end of the 19th century.26  Therefore, public education did not play a decisive role in 
shaping the Viequense population.  The people in Vieques, however, did engage from 
time to time in ceremonies ultimately designed to swear allegiance to Spain and reinforce 
a disciplined work ethic.  In the 1860s, for example, it was customary for Spanish 
officials to award money to the two best-behaved jornaleros, one native and one foreign-
born, during the commemorations of Queen Isabel II’s day.  Yet, even in these public 
ceremonies the groups of people in Vieques were kept in separate spaces.  Such was the 
case during the 1866 celebrations when the municipality offered one dance for native 
jornaleros and another one for the foreign jornaleros.27  Native and foreign-born were 
also separated in death.  At least since 1874 there were two cemeteries in Isabel II, one 
for Catholics and one for Protestants.  The Protestant Cemetery, adjacent to the larger 
Catholic cemetery, held the dead of the Caribbean immigrant population (Figure 5.2).28  
In death, as in life, the native and foreign born were kept separate but somewhat equal. 
                                                 
25 The schools Cayetano Coll y Toste identified were located in the town of Isabel II and in the 
districts of Puerto Real and Mosquitos.  Each place had two schools since they were divided by gender.  
Girls outnumbered boys in all three localities.  Cayetano Coll y Toste, Historia de la instrucción pública en 
Puerto Rico hasta el año 1898 (Bilbao: Editorial Vasco Americana, S.A., 1970) 196. 
26 The 1899 census conducted by the U.S. War Department placed the number of people attending 
school in Vieques at 312.  The percentage of the population reached by public education remained at 5%.  
This figure, however, included the island of Culebra incorporated to the municipality of Vieques from 1902 
to 1917.  Dirección del Censo de Puerto Rico, Informe sobre el Censo de Puerto Rico 1899 159, 248. 
27 “29 de octubre de 1866,” 5, Documentos Municipales, Vieques, 1, AGPR.  “7 de noviembre de 
1866,” 5, Documentos Municipales, Vieques, 1, AGPR.  “10 de noviembre de 1864,” 4, Documentos 
Municipales, Vieques, 1, AGPR. 
28 At least since May 1866 there were discussions in the Municipal Council about a Protestant 
Cemetery in Isabel II.  “26 de septiembre de 1874,” Actas del Ayuntamiento de 1874, 6-C, Documentos 







Figure 5.2: Catholic and Protestant cemeteries in the outskirts of Isabel II, Vieques29 
 
The different dances and cemeteries that the Municipal Council sponsored 
evidenced that the administrative organ conceived the population of Vieques as 
distinctive groups of people who were far from comprising a harmonious community.  
Furthermore, the financing of separate spheres indicates that the Council was not invested 
in unifying the Viequense society.  The currency that term Viequense had then, in fact, is 
unknown since the word itself is difficult to find in 19th century documentation.  The 
absence of the precise word or any other word representing the collectivity suggests that 
people in 19th century Vieques were indeed not imagining themselves in terms of a 
Viequense collective identity.  More precisely, given that the majority of the late 19th 
century documentation available was produced by the Municipal Council, the upper 
social sectors were not envisioning themselves as Viequenses.  Since such identity 
projects related to the convergence of a community with political units are usually 
constructed from above, it is doubtful that that the term Viequense had much currency in 
                                                 
29 “26 de septiembre de 1874,” Actas del Ayuntamiento de 1874, 6-C, Documentos Municipales, 






19th century Vieques.30  The lack of investment in imagining a Viequense identity 
however changed in the early years of the 20th century with the arrival of the U.S. in 
Vieques. 
During the months of May to September 1898 the U.S. Navy encircled the Puerto 
Rican archipelago and more specifically the island of Vieques as part of the Spanish-
Cuban-American War.  These were months, according to Justo Pastor Ruiz, of great 
uncertainty and distress for the Viequense population, which was isolated both from the 
world and from the Puerto Rican main island. 
The opinion held of the American soldiers (then called Yankees) was so 
bad that very few people dared to be near when they landed. They were 
characterized as bloodthirsty, criminals, murderers and cannibals…[The] 
blockade made things very critical in Vieques. There was hunger, 
suffering and need. In Playa Grande plantains were cut and spread in the 
sugar mill’s plaza for the people to use…Vieques suffered a psychological 
warfare as it is called now, during the Hispanic-American war. These were 
hours of breakdown and suffering.  The Register Book of the Anglican 
Church states that “the rumour spread that the soldiers were going to burn 
the town”. There was generalized fear and [according to the Register 
Book,] “the commander had ordered to kill the population without 
consideration for women and children”.31 
 
People believed, according to Pastor Ruiz, that the American soldiers were, “bloodthirsty, 
criminals, murderers and cannibals…ordered to kill the population without consideration 
for women and children.”  Such was the fear prevalent among the local population that 
                                                 
30 I could not find the word Viequense in the 19th century documentation safeguarded by the Archivo 
General de Puerto Rico.  The type of documentation held in the Archivo General, with the predominance of 
municipal records, portrays voices from the upper class of the Viequense society.  It, thus, remains 
uncertain how other sectors used, if at all, the word Viequense. 
31 “La opinión que había de los soldados americanos (entonces yanquis) era tan mala que muy pocas 
personas se atrevieron a estar cerca cuando la entrada.  Se les anunciaba como sanguinarios, criminales, 
asesinos y caníbales…[El] bloqueo puso las cosas muy serias en Vieques.  Había hambre, angustia y 
necesidad.  En Playa Grande se cortaban los plátanos y se derramaban en la plaza de la Central para que el 
pueblo se sirviese…Vieques sufrió una guerra de nervios como se dice ahora, durante la guerra Hispano-
americana.  Fueron horas de quebranto y angustia.  El libro de Registro de la Iglesia Anglicana consigna 
que “se corría el rumor de que los soldados iban a quemar el pueblo.”  Había el temor general y [siguiendo 
el libro de Registro,] “el comandante había ordenado matar la población sin perdonar mujeres y niños.”  






when U.S. troops finally entered the island on September 10, 1898, the people hid.32  The 
“Yankees,” however, had brought a music band that played waltzes and pasodobles, and 
possibly the national anthem, for the surrendering parties.  The music, Pastor Ruiz wrote, 
lured people out of their hiding places and made them begin to shed their fears.  Thus, 
music worked in 1898 as a universal language capable of breaking the ice between the 
colonized and the new colonizers. 
The first encounter of the Viequenses with the U.S. Empire, according to Justo 
Pastor Ruiz, was ruled by fear and mistrust.  Categories like bloodthirsty cannibals, used 
to justify imperial endeavours and to distinguish the colonizer from the colonized, were 
inverted.  In Pastor Ruiz’s account, the American soldiers were the ones perceived as 
savages.  Yet, Justo Pastor Ruiz narrated the entrance of U.S. troops into Vieques almost 
50 years after the actual event.  He, in fact, wrote his Vieques antiguo y moderno in the 
1940s context of great distrust towards the actions of the U.S. Navy’s in Vieques.33  The 
context influenced his narrative and those of the people he interviewed who, Pastor Ruiz 
acknowledged, had different memories of the encounter.  Vieques antiguo y moderno is 
then a good source to approach not only the 1898 entrance of the U.S. into Vieques, but 
people’s memories of the events 50 years later.  While the presence of the 1940s cannot 
be extricated from Pastor Ruiz’s narrative, the text offers a unique glimpse of some of the 
contradictions of this first Viequenses-U.S. Empire encounter.  For example, while Pastor 
Ruiz insisted that the encounter was initially ruled by fear and suspicion, he nonetheless 
wrote that Viequenses quickly turned on the Spanish authorities.  The characterization of 
                                                 
32 Justo Pastor Ruiz’s account of the entrance of U.S. troops into Vieques is contradictory.  He wrote 
that the U.S. flag was first raised in Vieques on September 10, 1898.  Yet, one page later he situated the 
event on September 21, 1898.  Pasto Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno 78-79. 






the U.S. soldier as a bloodthirsty cannibal, Pastor Ruiz clarified, did not discourage 
Viequenses from openly expressing their disdain for the retreating Spanish soldiers and, 
especially, the Civil Guard.34  Such public expressions of hostility were only possible 
because, Pastor Ruiz argued, people thought the U.S. soldiers would protect them from 
retaliation.35  The expectation of protection evidences an early sign of trust. 
On December 10, 1898, three months after the first Viequense-U.S. Empire 
encounter, the Treaty of Paris officially ended the Spanish-Cuban-American War.  While 
Article 16 of the treaty specified that the United States’ occupation of Cuba was 
temporary, Article 2 of the treaty sealed the fate of Puerto Rico with the line, “Spain 
cedes to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and the others that are now under its 
sovereignty in the West Indies.”36  In other words, the treaty ensured Cuba’s 
independence, but assured U.S. sovereignty over the Puerto Rican archipelago.  The 
United States, as Spain had previously done, coveted the islands for military and strategic 
reasons.37  Both the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations were influenced by the 
writings of historian and naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan.  In his famous 1890 book The 
                                                 
34 Nor did the characterization of the U.S. soldiers as bloodthirsty cannibals discourage Viequenses 
from later consuming the U.S. nationalist and imperialist discourse of progress, modernity and democracy.  
The Civil Guard, group equivalent to the police, had been in charge of disciplining the Viequense 
population, especially the lower classes and immigrants.  Their use, or rather abuse, of violence and 
authority did not make them a popular group among the marginal sectors of Viequense society.  People 
were therefore glad to see the Civil Guard leave and to have an occasion to publicly vent their discontent 
without the fear of reprisal. 
35 Pastor Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno 77-81. 
36 “España cede a los Estados Unidos la Isla de Puerto Rico y las demás que están ahora bajo su 
soberanía en las Indias Occidentales.”  “Tratado de París,” Puerto Rico: Leyes Fundamentales (Río Piedras: 
Editorial Edil, Inc., 1973) 113-119. 
37 For a study of late 19th century U.S. military interests in Puerto Rico see María Eugenia Estades 
Font, La presencia militar de Estados Unidos en Puerto Rico 1898-1918: Intereses estratégicos y 
dominación colonial (San Juan: Ediciones Huracán, 1988) 23-58.  For a study of more recent U.S. military 
interests in Vieques and Puerto Rico see the collection of essays in Humberto García Muñiz and Jorge 
Rodríguez Beruff, coords., Fronteras en conflicto: Guerra contra las drogas, militarización y democracia en 
el Caribe, Puerto Rico y Vieques (San Juan: Red Caribeña de Geopolítica, Seguridad Regional y 






Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Captain Mahan argued for the need to 
control the sea through strong navies.38  The control of the sea would then allow the U.S. 
to shape history.  The ability to shape history was a euphemism for becoming a naval 
empire.  Such an empire depended on battleships, coal stations and open waterways.  
These were things that President William McKinley and President Theodore Roosevelt 
assured for the U.S. with the 1898 Spanish-Cuban-American War and the 1904-1914 
construction of the Panama Canal.  The Canal ensured Puerto Rico’s strategic 
importance.  The empires might have changed in 1898 for Puerto Rico, but the 
archipelago still remained the key to the Caribbean.  Only this time the island of Culebra, 
located just north of Vieques, was considered the key to Puerto Rico.39   
On December 19, 1901 President Roosevelt issued an executive order stating that, 
“Such public lands as may exist on Culebra Island between the parallels of 18°15' and 
18°23' north latitude, and between the meridians of 65° 10' and 65° 25' west longitude, 
are hereby placed under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department.”40  Two years later he 
created the Culebra Naval Reservation.  In the process of establishing the naval base in 
Culebra, the local people from the town of San Idelfonso and other expropriated areas 
were resettled in a town the U.S. founded.41  The new town was named Dewey by U.S. 
                                                 
38 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1890). 
39 See “Chapter 4: The Spanish Colony of Vieques, 19th Century.” 
40 The Culebra Naval Reservation was conceived primarily as a coaling station for U.S. ships.  The 
onset of World War II marked the start of gunnery and bombing practices in Culebra.  The naval base 
continued operating until 1975 when civilians’ protests forced its close down.  The activities were then 
relocated to Vieques.  Theodore Roosevelt, “Executive Order: December 19th, 1901,” The American 
Presidency Project, 2007, American Presidency Project, 15 June 2007 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69696>. 
41 The total population of Culebra in 1899, according to the November 10, 1899 census carried out 
by the U.S. War Department, was 704.  The total population residing in “Culebra village,” probably the 
town of San Idelfonso, was 206.  “Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910 – V 3 Population,” U.S. 







authorities in honor of Admiral George Dewey.  The Admiral was famous at the time for 
taking the Manila Bay in the Philippines on May 1, 1898 without the loss of one U.S. 
soldier.  He was also the president of the newly created General Board of the Navy from 
March 1900 until his death in January 1917.  This was an influential organ in the shaping 
of early 20th century U.S. foreign policies.  The Board, in fact, recommended to President 
Roosevelt in September 1901 the establishment of the naval base in Culebra.42  
Therefore, Admiral Dewey was directly responsible for the creation of the town that bore 
his name.  The name Dewey, in turn, linked U.S. imperial endeavors in the Pacific and 
the Caribbean. 
While Culebra with its coal station appeared in the foreground of U.S. military 
and strategic considerations, Vieques slipped temporarily into the background of the new 
imperial drama.  Vieques did not come close to experiencing the burden imposed on 
Culebra and other Puerto Rican municipalities like San Juan that underwent significant 
territorial expropriations and an increased military presence.  During the early years of 
the 20th century the U.S. government only expropriated the Fortín Conde de Mirasol in 
1903 for the establishment of the first Caribbean Magnetic and Seismologic 
Observatory.43  The expropriation, in turn, was not related to military concerns or even 
too disruptive to the local population.  On the contrary, the first 30 years of U.S. 
sovereignty in the island were characterized by more continuities than breaks with the 
previous Spanish rule. 
                                                 
42 For a study of U.S. military interests and entrance into Puerto Rico and Culebra see Estades, La 
presencia militar  23-58. 
43 The Caribbean Magnetic and Seismologic Observatory was situated in the Fortín Conde de 
Mirasol from 1903 to 1907.  In 1907 it was moved to the Barrio Cofi less than one mile west of the Fortín.  
The Observatory was finally transferred to the Puerto Rican main island in 1926.  Juan A. Bonnet Benítez, 






After a brief period of adjustment following the Spanish-Cuban-American War, 
Vieques and Puerto Rico in general were able and very much encouraged by U.S. capital 
to revive the stagnant sugar industry.44  The Foraker Act of 1900 established a quota of 
Puerto Rican sugar that could enter the United States.45  The sugar, increasingly backed 
by capitalists from northeastern states like New York and Massachusetts, had an added 
15% tax creditable to the Puerto Rican treasury.46  Thus, Puerto Rico gained not only 
privileged access to the U.S. market, but an added 15% of revenues through the 
exportation of sugar.  Meanwhile, the U.S. corporations took advantage of the access to 
fertile land at very low prices, the promise of a stable colonial government assured by the 
Foraker Act, the free entrance of Puerto Rican products to the U.S. after 1902 and the 
cheap labor force.  U.S. capital, in turn, quickly took over the sugar industry in Puerto 
Rico, replacing hacendados with corporations like United Puerto Rico Sugar Company.  
Sugar, in fact, attracted most of the $120 million of U.S. investment in Puerto Rico 
during 1900 to 1930.  The sum is comparable to U.S. investments during the same 30 
years in the oil producing nations of Venezuela and Peru and was greater than the U.S. 
                                                 
44 According to César Ayala, the United States transformed the economies of the Spanish Caribbean 
in the early 20th century by giving rise to the corporate plantation.  He stresses that U.S. imperialism 
brought ruptures and a path of capitalist development that ultimately bred underdevelopment.  Yet, even if, 
as Ayala argues, the economic integration of the area to the U.S. brought ruptures in the economy, these 
ruptures perpetuated poverty in the region.  Thus, the ruptures translated into continuities for the people 
directly affected with the rise of the “corporate-owned plantation” in the Spanish Caribbean.  César Ayala, 
American Sugar Kingdom: The Economy of the Spanish Caribbean, 1898-1934 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
45 The 1900 Foraker Act established the basis of the Puerto Rican colonial government under the 
U.S. Empire.  The Act defined the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Puerto Rican 
government.  The Governor, the members of the Executive Council and the Supreme Court were appointed 
by the U.S. President.  The Executive Council was an organ roughly equivalent to the Senate.  The Foraker 
Act also created the ambiguous juridical category of “Puerto Rican citizenship.”  This was a citizenship 
without clear rights or obligations assigned to it except for “the right to be protected by the U.S.”  The Act 
is an epitome of U.S. imperialism to the extent it articulated the mechanisms of U.S. Presidential and 
Congressional control over a territory deemed as non-incorporable.  In other words, it established control 
over a territory that was not intended to become a state in the union.  Scarano, Puerto Rico 571-574. 






investments in many larger Latin American countries.47  Comparing the size of the Puerto 
Rican archipelago to the level of U.S. investment suggests that Puerto Rico became a 
very attractive colony to the U.S. investors during the early 20th century. 
Puerto Rico became more than a strategic colony to the U.S.  It also evolved into 
a sugar enclave ruled by absentee corporations that established sugar mills and fields 
around the archipelago, provided low-paid jobs to the Puerto Rican population and never 
reinvested in the local economy.  One difference between U.S. intervention in Puerto 
Rico and in other Latin American countries during the early 20th century was that U.S. 
actions in Puerto Rico were outright colonial in the most traditional sense of the word.  
U.S. dominion over the archipelago was imposed through economic, political and 
military presence.  The U.S. assumed control over the Puerto Rican colonial state, 
economy and people while claiming the exclusive use of violence. 
The heavy U.S. investment assured the return of sugar as the primary Puerto 
Rican export by the year 1910.48  Indeed, Andrés Ramos Mattei argued that the year 1910 
marked the triumph of agrarian capitalism in Puerto Rico.  The infusion of U.S. capital 
allowed the Puerto Rican sugar industry to fulfill a portion of the global demand for 
refined sugar dependent on modern technology.49  The change entailed the final move 
from haciendas to centralized sugar mills.  In Vieques, the nine haciendas established in 
the island by 1866 were consolidated by 1910 into four centrales (sugar mill grinding 
cane from multiple suppliers) named Arcadia, Santa María, Puerto Real and Playa 
                                                 
47 Scarano, Puerto Rico 584-585. 
48 Following the crisis of the sugar haciendas in the late 19th century, coffee replaced sugar as the 
primary Puerto Rican export.  Coffee, however, never replaced sugar in Vieques. 






Grande.50  While Arcadia had ceased operations by 1912, the other three centrales 
reached their peak during the early 1920s.51  Playa Grande, Puerto Real and Santa María 
produced a total of 17,276 tons of sugar in 1920 and a total of 15,531 tons in 1922.  Playa 
Grande, however, reached its maximum production of 13,088 tons of sugar in 1928.52  
Sugar cane, then, claimed the Viequense landscape in a way it had not done during the 
19th century.  The increased efficiency of the sugar mills fostered the cultivation of more 
expansive plots of land so that by 1910 sugar fields occupied 7,005 acres or 19% of the 
island.53  The western coasts of Vieques came to be enveloped by the sugar cane almost 
all the way from Santa María to Bahía de la Chiva (Figure 5.3). 
                                                 
50 The Municipal Council identified nine sugar haciendas in 1866.  Three haciendas were operated 
by steam and another three by “fuerza de sangre” (strength of blood).  The term “fuerza de sangre” must 
have referred to haciendas run through the sweat and toil of animals and slaves.  Juan Bonnet Benítez wrote 
110 year later that the nine haciendas La Patience, La Sucrerie Marquisat de St. Jacques, Pistolet, 
Resolución, Santa Elena, Arcadia, Campaña, Esperanza and Playa Grande became the sugar mills Puerto 
Real, Arcadia, Playa Grande and Santa María.  “29 de enero de 1866,” 5, Documentos Municipales, 
Vieques, 1, AGPR.  Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico 125-127. 
51 César J. Ayala and Viviana Carro-Figueroa, “Expropriation and Displacement of Civilians in 
Vieques, 1940-1950,” Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human 
Rights, eds. Ramón Bosque-Pérez and José Javier Colón Morera (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2006) 175. 
52 Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico 125-129.  See Appendix 20. 
53 “Report of the Committee for the Investigation of Conditions in the Island of Vieques,” Folder 
Vieques C40-20—Vi-5 #337 Roosevelt Roads Puerto Rico 40PR, Box 1109, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 







Figure 5.3: Map of Vieques produced in 1943 by the Committee for the Investigation of the 
Conditions in the Island of Vieques54 
 
The economic prosperity Vieques experienced during the early decades of the 20th 
century earned the island the title of tacita de oro (gold cup).55  The tacita de oro 
captured people’s imaginations.  Just as in the 19th century Caribbean immigrants had 
arrived in Vieques searching for a better life, during the early 1900s Puerto Rican main 
                                                 
54 “Report of the Committee for the Investigation of Conditions in the Island of Vieques,” Folder 
Vieques C40-20—Vi-5 #337 Roosevelt Roads Puerto Rico 40PR, Box 1109, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 
Naval Property Case Files, 1941-1958, RG 71, NARA. 
55 Juan Bonnet Benítez identified the Central Arcadia as one of the four major sugar mills in 20th 
century Vieques.  Yet, he did not provide detailed information about the workings of the Central.  It is, 
thus, difficult to compare Central Arcadia’s production with the other three centrales Bonnet discussed.  






islanders flocked to Vieques to try out their fortunes.56  The population of the island 
subsequently swelled from 5,938 in 1899 to 11,651 in 1920.57  This was a 49% increase 
or the doubling of the island’s population in a 20-year period.  The island was thus filled 
with dreamers.  There were also dreamers who remained in the main island.  Sometime in 
the midst of this sugar world a Puerto Rican named Luis Lloréns Torres from the 
municipality of Jayuya on the main island dreamt of Vieques.  His dream, however, took 
the shape of a poem he titled “La Isla Nena” (“The Girl Island”). 
Vieques: don Pepe Benítez, 
Cayita, (cane and song); 
lowlands of sun and of sugar 
beaches of coconuts and of sun!... 
The mother island, the pregnant island, 
broke into the sea her pain; 
the mother island opened her entrails 
and the daughter island was born: 
Vieques, Isabel Segunda, 
Cayita, cane and song. 
The cane sings in the plain, 
and in the mountain the nightingale… 
The mother island opened her entrails 
and the daughter island was born: 
of the heraldic lamb 
escaped to the sea a tuft of wool: 
chick that from beneath 
the wings escaped; 
little calf, little calf, 
little running calf, 
that the milk all foam 
of the sea lost… 
The daughter island belongs to the mother 
that painfully gave birth to her; 
to the mother that in giving her birth 
lost her heart.58 
                                                 
56 According to Gabriel Carambot, Puerto Rican main islanders were mostly seasonal immigrants in 
Vieques.  They came to work the sugar fields during the times of harvest when the demand for labor was 
great.  During the still times between the harvests, however, these workers returned to the main island.  
Carambot, personal interview. 
57 See Appendix 21. 
58 “!Vieques: don Pepe Benítez,/Cayita, (caña y canción),/vegas del sol y de azúcar,/playas de coco y 







Through a stroke of the pen Luis Lloréns Torres baptized the child conceived back in the 
16th century and born in 1868.59  She was a girl and her name was Isla Nena.  The name, 
roughly translatable to Girl Child or Daughter Island, would be a constant reminder of the 
familial bond shared between daughter and mother.  While the daughter was “a tuft of 
wool,” the mother was “the heraldic lamb.”  The mother of Isla Nena was therefore the 
island of Puerto Rico that had been granted in the year 1511 a coat of arms by the 
Spanish Crown with the Agnus Dei (Lamb of God) in its center.60  Yet, Isla Nena, 
according to Lloréns Torres, was no longer the fragile child of 1871 whose future seemed 
uncertain.61  Her identity was better defined by the early 20th century.  She was sunshine, 
coconuts, and songs, but above all she was sugar.  Not only were her lowlands and plains 
inscribed with sugar cane, but her name could be collapsed with that of the hacendado 
Don Pepe Benítez whose family by 1940 owned almost half of the island. 
In Vieques the influx of U.S. capital did not necessarily displace the island’s 
landowning elite.  It could, on the contrary, back their sugar enterprises.  The Benítez 
family provides a perfect example through which to trace the continuities of the late 19th 
                                                                                                                                                 
nena nació:/Vieques, Isabel Segunda,/Cayita, caña y canción./La caña canta en el llano,/y en el monte el 
ruiseñor…/La isla madre abrió su entraña/y la isla nena nació:/del heráldico cordero/se fue a la mar un 
vellón;/polluelo que de debajo/de las alas se salió;/becerrito, becerrito,/becerrito corredor,/que la leche toda 
espuma/de la mar desgaritó…/La isla nena es de la madre/que la parió con dolor;/de la madre que al 
parirla/se salió del corazón.”  Luis Lloréns Torres, “La Isla Nena,” Obras Completas, vol. I (Barcelona: 
Editorial Cordillera, 1967) 488-489.  Lloréns Torres published his poem “La Isla Nena” in his 1940 Alturas 
de América.  He must have written the poem much earlier since the book was a selection of his life’s work. 
59 For the May 13, 1868 Royal Decree see “Chapter 4: The Spanish Colony of Vieques, 19th 
Century.” 
60 Puerto Rico’s coat of arms has a lamb sitting on top of a book.  The lamb and book represent the 
Agnus Dei, St. John the Baptist and the Book of Revelations.  Symbols of St. John the Baptist had a central 
place in the coat of arms since the colony of Puerto Rico was first named San Juan Bautista.  Luis Lloréns 
Torres’ use of the term “of heraldic lamb” implied belonging to San Juan Bautista.  He furthermore played 
with the word “heraldic” that could refer both to St. John the Baptist through the word herald and to the 
coat of arms through the word heraldry.  “Escudo de Puerto Rico,” Secretaría Auxiliar de Protocolo, 2007, 
Departamento de Estado del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 24 June 2007 
<http://www.estado.gobierno.pr/escudopr.htm>. 
61 For the July 21, 1871 petition signed by the Governor of Vieques Tomás Font and the frail 






and early 20th century sugar elite in Vieques.  The history of this family also provides an 
insight into the transition from haciendas to centrales in Vieques.  In the late 19th century 
two Danish citizens unified the three haciendas Marquisat de St. Jacques, Pistolet and 
Resolución under the name Resolución.  José Benítez Guzmán then bought the 
consolidated Hacienda Resolución from these two Danish citizens.  In 1889 Benítez 
Guzmán further bought Playa Grande from another Danish citizen named Matías 
Hjardemal.  He also acquired from his brother Regalado Benítez the Hacienda Santa 
Elena adjacent to Resolución.62  Benítez then strove to modernize the machinery and 
increase the yield of his central.  His efforts brought the initial 4,000 sacks of sugar per 
year to the 12,000 sacks figure.  The economic and social standing of José Benítez, or 
Don Pepe Benítez as Lloréns Torres called him, was such that the reorganization of the 
municipal government right after the U.S. invasion was carried out in Resolución.  By 
1898 José Benítez had formed his own sugar empire within Vieques.  That the 
reconstitution of government authority took place in his hacienda suggests that incoming 
imperial officials knew that he was a force to be reckoned with in Vieques. 
The death of José Benítez also symbolized the death of the last great hacendado 
and of the hacienda system in Vieques.  He had, after all, integrated the major haciendas 
in the island.  In turn, his heirs, in order to maintain the integrity of the property, formed 
the Benítez Sugar Company with the second Don Pepe in command.  The family-owned 
company still gave rise to a corporate-owned style of plantation with shares divided 
among the Benítez family.  José J. Benítez Diaz advanced the modernization efforts 
commenced by his predecessor.  By 1920 the Central Playa Grande produced 80,000 
                                                 
62 Juan Bonnet Benítez, descendant of the Benítez family, first identified the Hacienda Santa Elena 
as belonging to Eugenio Benítez and later to Regalado Benítez.  It is unclear whether Eugenio and 






sacks of processed sugar.  If in 1889 34 carts and 127 oxen moved the Benítez sugar, by 
the 1920s there were 17 miles of narrow gauge track, 7 locomotives and cars running the 
Central Playa Grande.  By 1936 the Central Playa Grande boasted a total of 15,943 acres 
of land with more than 6,000 acres cultivated in sugar cane.63  The Benítez family, 
indeed, came to own 44% of Vieques. 
The problem of land concentration was one of the many results of the sugar 
prosperity.  As Rafael Picó, Chairman of the Junta de Planificación de Puerto Rico 
(Puerto Rico Planning Board or JPPR), noted in 1950: 
 Twelve years ago, out of a total number of 73 farms, two large sugar cane 
enterprises, the Benítez Sugar Co. -owner of the Playa Grande Central- 
and the Eastern Sugar Associates, controlled about 75 per cent of the total 
and cultivated area of the Island.  Thus, the evils of land concentration and 
absentee-ownership, prevailing in most sugar cane lands in Puerto Rico, 
were deeply intensified in Vieques.  The bulk of the population was 
landless, a part of the “peon” class.64 
 
In the late 1930s the Benítez Sugar Company owned 15,943 acres and the Eastern Sugar 
Associates owned 10,343 acres for a total of 26,286 acres.65  The fact that in the 1930s 
two landowners possessed 73% of the island’s 36,032 acres placed Vieques as the third 
most extreme case of land concentration in Puerto Rico.  Vieques was only surpassed by 
the municipalities of Santa Isabel and Guánica respectively controlled by the Aguirre 
                                                 
63 While Elizabeth Langhorne wrote that the Central Playa Grande encompassed 15,943 acres of land 
in 1936, César Ayala and Viviana Carro have written that the Benítez family owned 15,735 acres in 1940.  
Ayala and Carro, “Expropriation and Displacement,” Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule 176.  Elizabeth 
Langhorne, Vieques: History of a Small Island (Vieques: The Vieques Conservation and Historical Trust, 
1987) 53. 
64 Rafael Picó, The Geographic Regions of Puerto Rico (Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico 
Press, 1950) 209. 






Sugar Company and the South Porto Rico Sugar Company.66  Both of these companies 
were U.S. corporations established shortly after 1898.67 
The majority of the land in Vieques, given that it was mostly owned by the 
Benítez family, was in Viequense hands.  Yet, the land in Vieques was not just owned by 
Viequenses.  In the year 1915 a long and violent strike took place in Vieques and, most 
specifically, in the Central Puerto Real.  The owner Gustavo Mouraille, scared by the 
events, sold the Central to the successors of Enrique Bird Arias who later lost it in a 
lawsuit filed against them in 1921 by L.W.G.P. Armstrong for the unpaid mortgage of 
$1,730,000.  The Central Puerto Real, temporarily managed by a judicial receivership, 
was sold to the United Puerto Rico Sugar Company.  This company, founded in 1926, 
subsequently reorganized itself into the Eastern Sugar Associates.68  The Eastern Sugar 
Associates, a U.S. trust established in Baltimore, then owned 29% of Vieques.69  In turn, 
the history of the Central Puerto Real evidences that U.S. capital, if not directly owning 
the centrales in Vieques, was backing up their activities and, when possible, taking them 
over.  Such was also the case with the Central Playa Grande when in 1936 the Bank of 
Nova Scotia took over the bankrupted central.  Three years later, and even though the 
                                                 
66 Ayala and Carro, “Expropriation and Displacement,” Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule 176. 
67 César Ayala and Laird Bergad, “Rural Puerto Rico in the Early Twentieth Century Reconsidered: 
Land and Society, 1899-1915,” Latin American Research Review 37:2 (2002): 71. 
68 Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico 126.  Ayala and Laird, “Rural Puerto Rico,” Latin 
American Research Review 71. 
69 In 1941 the Puerto Rican government, aware of the problem of land concentration and absentee 
corporations, created the Puerto Rico Land Authority to carry out an agrarian reform.  The Land Authority 
was charged with seizing land from “non-natural persons” holding more than 500 acres.  In 1944 the Land 
Authority was further instructed to acquire lands from Eastern Sugar Associates in Vieques for the 
development of sugar and liquor industries in the island.  These industries, however, were never 
established.  “Eminent Domain.  For What Purposes Property May Be Taken.  Condemnation of Corporate 
Land Holdings for Redistribution in Puerto Rican Agrarian Reform Program Upheld,” Harvard Law 
Review 59:7 (September 1946): 1162-1165.  Folder Vieques X40-20-Vi Permit from Eastern Sugar Assoc. 
to Navy Dept. to occupy certain land 125 ac. Puerto Rico 40 PR, Box 1110, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 






Benítez family was still litigating in courts, the Central Playa Grande was sold to Juan 
Ángel Tió.70 
The displacement of hacendados by U.S. companies gave rise to a pessimist 
sentiment among the Puerto Rican elite.  During the early 20th century, in fact, the Puerto 
Rican elite was for the most part economically displaced and politically ignored.  Sugar 
hacendados were replaced by U.S. companies, coffee growers were run out of business 
by a diminished market and the Puerto Rican elite in general was not taken into account 
by the new imperial officials.71  The situation resulted in the fashioning of a nostalgic 
discourse about the good old days of the Spanish Empire.72  The situation, furthermore, 
gave rise to a militant nationalist movement on the main island.  Since hacendados in 
Vieques were not initially displaced by U.S. capital, the island did not provide a fertile 
ground for such nostalgic discourses.  The Viequense upper class, moreover, had 
remained vocally loyal to Spain during the late 19th century.73  The relative isolation of 
Vieques from the main island hindered the spread of nationalist ideals.  Puerto Rican 
nationalism, however, did make its entrance to Vieques during the early decades of the 
20th century.  It made such an entrance that in November 1930 Pedro Albizu Campos and 
                                                 
70 Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico 127. 
71 The decline during the late 19th century of the hacienda system in Puerto Rico led to the rise of 
coffee and tobacco as the main island’s primary exports.  These commodities were shipped mainly to Spain 
and Cuba which were the last vestiges of the Spanish Empire in the Atlantic.  Puerto Rican exports, 
therefore, had privileged access to these markets in terms of tariffs.  With the coming of the U.S., Puerto 
Rico lost these trading privileges.  While the U.S. established a sugar quota under the Foraker Act for the 
entrance of Puerto Rican sugar to the U.S. market, coffee did not enjoy the same protection.  Puerto Rican 
coffee planters, in turn, saw their markets shrink during the early years of the 20th century.  See Scarano, 
Puerto Rico 459-508, 547-617. 
72 For a critique of U.S. imperialism and praise of the supposed Spanish heritage of Puerto Rico see, 
for example, Luis Lloréns Torres, “El patito feo,” Obras completas 309-313. 
73 After the 1868  Grito de Lares, for example, the members of the Municipal Council denounced the 
insurgents as a few “evildoers” in one of the Puerto Rican towns.  The statement portrayed an ignorance of 
the Puerto Rican main island’s geography.  “2 de octubre de 1868,” Isla de Vieques año de 1868 Junta 






Juan Antonio Corretjer visited the Local Committee of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party 
and were then able to establish the first Section of nationalist women in Puerto Rico.74 
The rise of Puerto Rican nationalism in Vieques is not easy to trace.  One thing is 
for certain, it was definitely the product of the entrance of the U.S. Empire in the 
archipelago and the subsequent growth of the sugar industry.  The growth of the sugar 
industry, for starters, attracted immigrants who had to abide to U.S. immigration laws.  
The situation favored the arrival in Vieques of Puerto Rican main islanders, who after 
1917 were U.S. citizens, as opposed to the arrival of other Caribbean immigrants.75  The 
influx of main islanders facilitated the establishment in 1919 of the first commercial 
transport service between Vieques and the municipality of Fajardo.  Before this service, 
Viequenses who wished to travel to the main island had to arrange the trip with a local 
fisherman.76  Thus, after 1919 the main island became more accessible to Viequenses.  
The physical accessibility and influx of main islanders resulted in an increased exposure 
to the Puerto Rican main island.  The exposure, in turn, transformed the labor relations in 
Vieques.  While in the 19th century immigrant jornaleros had on repeated occasions 
rebelled against their employers, the 20th century witnessed the birth of organized labor 
movements both in Vieques and in the Puerto Rican archipelago.77   
During the late 19th century a day’s work in Vieques’ sugar fields lasted from 
dawn till sunset.  Justo Pastor Ruiz described the life of the sugar workers as a hard one 
                                                 
74 Olazagasti and Rabin, Notas 42. 
75 The Foraker Act of 1900 was replaced in 1917 by the Jones Act which made the colonial 
government somewhat more democratic to the extent that the legislative branch became elective.  Yet, the 
Governor of Puerto Rico and other key officials were still appointed by the U.S. President.  The Jones Act, 
in addition, made Puerto Ricans into U.S. citizens.  This U.S. citizenship has been, however, an ambiguous 
category endowed to the local population of a colonial and non-incorporable territory.  Scarano, Puerto 
Rico 616, 645-649. 
76 “Vieques: Isla Nena,” unpublished essay. 
77 In the years 1864 and 1874, for example, English workers rebelled against their employers and the 






with scarce rewards.  He wrote that British West Indian jornaleros, called negradas 
(black hordes), worked at times from 2am till 8pm.78  These men and women, regarded 
by the locals as “muy fuertes al trabajo” (good workers), made and transported bundles 
of cane.  Their diet consisted of bread, fried fish and coffee.  It was a simple diet for a 
hard day’s work.  Their pay, if not confiscated by their employers, was minimal.79  Yet, 
Pastor Ruiz wrote, “That is how the worker lived.  There was not any labor movement 
and nobody knew they could aspire to better their bleak situation.”80  The Spanish word 
Pastor Ruiz used for bleak was “negra” (black).  His word choice is important because, 
indeed, the conditions in Vieques, especially those of the “negradas,” resembled those of 
slavery.  In this sense, a day in Vieques’ sugar fields must not have differed much from a 
day spent in the sugar field of any other Caribbean island.  The descendants of slaves 
could not shake off the shackles even when working for wages.  In the 20th century the 
situation changed.  The changes, however, would take some time. 
Gabriel Carambot was born in December 23, 1902 in the southern coast of 
Vieques.  In 2003 the 101 years old Carambot reminisced about his life as a jornalero in 
the Central Puerto Real.  He remembered living in a small hut, probably similar to the 
indigenous bohíos, made of wood and hay stubble.81  The work day lasted from 6am till 
                                                 
78 Most of the Caribbean immigrants that arrived in Vieques during the 19th century were British 
citizens from neighboring islands like Tortola.  Thus, Viequenses and Justo Pastor Ruiz refer to these 
immigrants as “English” even though they might have not been English in origin.  Pastor Ruiz, Vieques 
antiguo y moderno 172. 
79 Justo Pastor Ruiz recounted, for example, that the hacendados Gustavo Mouraille used to take the 
law into his own hands.  He would punish his workers either by suspending them from work or confiscating 
their wages.  He would furthermore bring the judge and policemen to his estate whenever he wanted.  
Pastor Ruiz thus suggested that Mouraille could wield the law however he wanted to in Vieques.  Pastor 
Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno 174-175. 
80 “Así vivía el obrero.  No había movimiento obrero ninguno y nadie sabía que podía aspirar a 
mejorar su negra situación.”  Pastor Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno 173. 
81 For a discussion of the construction of indigenous dwellings in Vieques see “Chapter 2: Myths of 






6pm.  “It was a terrible thing,” he said.  Yet, “you had to work.”82  So he worked as a 
carpenter in the Central during the “bruja” (still time).  He made the carts that transported 
the sugar cane.  Yet, during the time of harvest he worked the night shifts in the fields.  
During the time of harvest, he emphasized, the work never stopped.  The intense working 
hours and demand for laborers continued even with the influx of Puerto Rican main 
islanders that seasonally migrated to Vieques in search of work.  Thus, in the harvest 
Carambot would leave for home at midnight.  It was a tough life, he admitted.  People 
were never free because even in their own time they thought about work.  Their lives 
revolved around sugar.83  The life the sugar jornalero Gabriel Carambot narrated 
resembled, more than differed, Justo Pastor Ruiz’s account of the 19th century.  These 
continuities question, as Andrés Ramos Mattei argued, the relevance of chronologies that 
pinpoint 1898 as a definite turning point in Puerto Rican history.84  The coming of the 
U.S. Empire, however, did eventually affect the situation of workers in Puerto Rico’s 
sugar industry. 
The coming of the U.S. Empire opened the door to U.S. capital, but also to the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL).  As early as 1905 Santiago Iglesias, the labor 
organizer for the Federación Libre de Trabajadores (Free Federation of Labor or FLT) 
and the AFL, visited Vieques.85  After his visit two unions formed in Isabel II and the 
                                                 
82 “una cosa terrible.  Había que trabajar.”  Carambot, personal interview. 
83 Carambot, personal interview.  For the life of a sugar worker in the Puerto Rican main island see 
Sidney W. Mintz, Taso: Trabajador de la caña (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1988). 
84 Andrés Ramos Mattei argued that the sugar industry in Puerto Rico underwent a period of 
transition from 1873 to 1910.  The U.S. Empire was then one of the actors, but not the determinant agent in 
the transformation from the hacienda to the central economic system in Puerto Rico.  Ramos Mattei, La 
sociedad de azúcar 18-19. 
85 In 1899 Santiago Iglesias helped found the Federación Libre de Trabajadores in Puerto Rico.  In 
1901 the FLT was afiliated to the AFL.  Santiago Iglesias then became the general organizer for the AFL in 
Puerto Rico and Cuba.  It is said he maintained a close relationship with the President of the AFL Samuel 






Central Puerto Real.  According to Pastor Ruiz, these two unions had 1,000 members 
registered in a relatively short time.  If the hacendados in Puerto Rico resented the 
entrance of the U.S. and reminisced about the bygone days of the Spanish Empire, the 
Puerto Rican workers embraced the new spaces available for labor organization under the 
U.S.  Sugar workers quickly mobilized to demand higher wages and fewer hours of work 
for in the 20th century people still worked 12-hour shifts in the fields.  Higher wages and 
fewer hours of work were, in fact, their demands during the 1915 strike that took hold of 
Vieques and the Puerto Rican archipelago.  In Vieques the clash between the striking 
workers and the police turned violent.  Policemen and four strikers were killed when the 
workers attempted to march through the fields of the Central Puerto Real.  Once news of 
the incident reached Isabel II, a riot ensued in front of the police headquarters.86  The riot 
confirmed that some people in Isabel II were sympathetic to the workers’ demands.  The 
town was, after all, also a union’s headquarters.  The police in Isabel II, however, did not 
open fire on the people and the 1915 strike stopped then and there.  Some of the strikers, 
however, were prosecuted.  According to Pastor Ruiz, the situation for workers in 
Vieques improved after the 1915 strike.  Their salary was augmented and their hours of 
work shortened.  Regardless of the outcome, the relationship forged through working 
class solidarity between main islanders and Viequenses helped imagine, maybe for the 
first time, a community that crossed the Vieques Sound.  The 1915 strike, after all, was 
backed by workers and labor leaders from the main island like Santiago Iglesias and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Documentación Obrera Santiago Iglesias Pantín,” Biblioteca de la Universidad de Puerto Rico en 
Humacao, 2007, Universidad de Puerto Rico en Humacao, 26 June 2007 
<http://biblioteca.uprh.edu/articulos_fondo.asp?ID=55>. 






Luisa Capetillo as well as by the FLT and the AFL.87  In the antagonism not against the 
U.S. but against the hacendados, Vieques’ workers might have started to envision 
themselves as a people within a larger group of people.  In other words, the experience of 
labor mobilization made possible the imagining of Viequense and Puerto Rican identities 
in Vieques. 
The strength of the labor movement in Vieques must have unsettled the 
hacendados like Gustavo Mouraille who could no longer rely on vagrancy laws to coerce 
the labor force.  The solidarity of main islanders and people in Vieques with the sugar 
workers during the 1915 strike must have made the hacendados’ discomfort worst.  Yet, 
it might have been the open manifestation of the underlying violence of the sugar world 
that made Gustavo Mouraille sell in haste his Central Playa Grande.88  Apparently, by 
1915 workers in Vieques started to believe their “negra” situation could improve.  The 
threat of such a belief must have scared hacendados and thus played a part in their 
appropriation of Puerto Rican nationalist discourses.  The Viequense upper class, 
traditionally opposed to the annexation to Puerto Rico, had in Puerto Rican nationalism a 
discourse that could unify the people of Vieques under their leadership.  Puerto Rican 
nationalism could replace the cohesion that the term subjects of the Spanish Empire 
might have given to the people of Vieques during the 19th century.  The networks of 
solidarity, in turn, could be reworked under a collective Puerto Rican identity to which 
both the upper and lower sectors of Viequense society belonged.  The fostering of such 
                                                 
87 Santiago Iglesias, later the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico in Washington, was actually 
born in Galicia, Spain.  Luisa Capetillo, the famous feminist, anarchist and labor organizer, came to 
Vieques during the 1915 strike as a member of the American Federation of Labor.  Olazagasti and Rabin, 
Notas 42. 
88 If, as Justo Pastor argued, Gustavo Mouraille used to take the law into his own hands, he might 
have been uncomfortable with the attention the 1915 strike brought upon his central.  Pastor Ruiz, Vieques 






an identity was less threatening than one based on working class experiences.  Puerto 
Rican nationalism, moreover, afforded the Viequense elite a position of leadership.  For 
starters, the Viequense elite was the only sector with the means to engage in such an 
identity project.  The imagining of communities is, after all, an expensive enterprise 
dependent, for example, on the control of spaces of representation like newspapers.89  
Their control of the Municipal Council, moreover, facilitated claims to represent the 
people of Vieques.90  If there was indeed a people, the Municipal Council was the 
organism charged with their welfare.  The role played by the Municipal Council could 
compensate for the more distanced relationship between hacendados and jornaleros 
within the central system of production.91  Thus, even though unlikely, Puerto Rican 
nationalism legitimized the already privileged position of the Viequense upper class. 
With the rise of the sugar industry the people governed by the Municipal Council 
increased in numbers.  The population increase, in turn, augmented the demand on 
municipal services and exerted pressure on the island’s infrastructure.  Since the 
economic prosperity swelled the municipal revenues, the Municipal Council relied on a 
more generous budget to engage in the modernization efforts that had preoccupied the 
Council since the 1860s.  The Municipality undertook, for example, the building of the 
                                                 
89 Identity projects are expensive enterprises.  In the forging of a working class identity, the workers 
in Vieques had the support of the labor movement in the main island and of the American Federation of 
Labor.  The main islanders and the AFL, for example, helped the workers prosecuted during the 1915 strike 
with their legal counsels and fees.  Pastor Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno 178-179. 
90 Under the U.S. Empire, the Mayor of Vieques and the Municipal Council became elective 
positions.  The change, although democratic, ultimately legitimized the power of the Viequense elite over 
the people of Vieques.  The “major contributors” and their descendants still controlled the island’s political 
sphere.  This oligarchy was, as in the late 19th century, personally invested in the sugar industry.  Various 
members of the Benítez family, for example, occupied the position of Mayor of Vieques during the first 
three decades of the 20th century.  See Appendix 19. 
91 The sugar central could distance hacendados and jornaleros to a different degree than in 
haciendas.  Compared to the hacienda, the central was a complex and extensive production unit involving 
more land and workers.  The hacendado, then, could become a more distant authority figure to the average 






City Hall in 1903, of the butcher shop and slaughterhouse in 1904, and of the Municipal 
Hospital in 1912.92  These buildings represented the very concrete concerns of the 
Municipal Council with problems of hygiene, health, poverty and urban renewal, 
amongst others.  The concerns marked a shift in the conceptions about the government’s 
role in the island.  At the turn of the 20th century the Municipal Council was evolving 
from a group of “major contributors” who acted on behalf of the Spanish Empire to a 
group of public administrators who responded, at least theoretically, to the people.93  The 
change, therefore, entailed a closer look at the people being governed so as to decipher 
their needs.  The imagining of a people, and their needs, required resources.  In this 
sense, the Municipality invested $22,000 in 1912 to build a two-story hospital with a 40-
person capacity (Figure 5.4).  These 40 imaginary patients the Council envisioned would 
have belonged to the humble sectors of Viequense society since the upper class took care 
of their sick in the privacy of their homes. 
 
Figure 5.4: Municipal Hospital José Benítez Guzmán built in 1912 in the outskirts of Isabel II, 
Vieques94 
 
                                                 
92 “23 de agosto de 1919,” 72, Obras Públicas, Obras Municipales, 355, AGPR, San Juan. 
93 For a discussion of the “major contributors” see “Chapter 4: The Spanish Colony of Vieques, 19th 
Century.” 






The appropriation of Puerto Rican nationalist discourses went hand in hand with 
the imagining of a Viequense identity.  The Municipal Council might have envisioned a 
people in Vieques through public administration.  Yet, the people being administered 
imagined a collective identity in a different way.  These people forged a community 
through politics of survival.  The entrance into a labor movement might have been one of 
its manifestations, but on a daily level the people relied on each other to survive.  Gabriel 
Carambot remembered that people back then led a simple but tough life that afforded 
them no luxuries.  However, when somebody in the community had something it was 
shared.  In this sense, when a community member killed a pig, everybody ate meat.  In 
the meantime, nobody did.95  Such everyday rites of sharing food, and poverty, created 
the community.  Yet, the sense of community developed among the most humble sectors 
of Viequense society did not involve an island-community.  Except for instances like the 
1915 strike, conceptions of community in Vieques were more fragmentary among the 
lower strata of the population.  The island was divided into seven districts: Punta Arenas, 
Mosquito, Florida, Puerto Diablo, Puerto Ferro and Puerto Real.96  Each district had its 
own characteristics and could even have its own schools, cemeteries and patron saint 
festivities.  These institutions, sites and festivities involved public rituals where people 
could physically coincide and learn to imagine themselves as members of a separate 
community.  The schools, however, connected students to the broader Viequense and 
Puerto Rican community through history lessons about Puerto Rico and its indigenous 
cultural heritage.97  Yet, the attendance levels at these schools, as well as the literacy rate 
among the general population, were low.  For these reasons, the Municipal Council might 
                                                 
95 Carambot, personal interview. 
96 See Appendix 1. 






have been more invested in Puerto Rican and Viequense nationalist discourses than 
members of the lower sectors of Viequense society. 
The Viequense elite had important allies in the imagining of a Viequense identity 
that was compatible with a Puerto Rican one.  Main island politicians and intellectuals 
like Luis Lloréns Torres and Pedro Albizu Campos were imagining through poems, 
speeches and others representations a Puerto Rican national community that did not 
renounce the tacita de oro.98  If Vieques had been annexed to Puerto Rico during the 19th 
century for its strategic value, in the 20th century the island had achieved an economic 
significance within the Puerto Rican archipelago.  The sugar boom not only attracted 
seasonal workers from the main island, but the nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos.  
While Albizu Campos visited Vieques to organize the Nationalist Party, Lloréns Torres 
wrote the poem “La Isla Nena” about the inalienable relationship between the islands of 
Vieques and Puerto Rico.  Pedro Albizu Campos gave inflamed speeches in the 
Municipal Plaza about Puerto Rico’s right to independence and Luis Lloréns Torres 
praised from the comfort of his desk Vieques’ sugar world.99  The message of both men, 
however, was the same: Vieques belonged to Puerto Rico. 
The sugar baptism Luis Lloréns Torres gave to Vieques could not conjure a sweet 
future for the island.  Vieques’ sugar economy had rapidly decelerated after the mid 
1920s when sugar prices globally plummeted.  The deceleration created an economic 
vacuum for the 1930s in an island with resources already unequally distributed.  The 
                                                 
98 Both Luis Llórens Torres and Pedro Albizu Campos believed in the independence of Puerto Rico 
from the United States.  They differed, however, on the means to achieve independence.  Luis Llórens 
Torres was a politician, lawyer and literary man invested in party politics and negotiating for independence 
while Pedro Albizu Campos, trained as a lawyer at Harvard University, believed in the Puerto Ricans’ right 
to an armed struggle. 






Central Santa María, in turn, had its last grinding in 1922 and Puerto Real followed in 
1927.  The Central Playa Grande, outlasting all the other centrales in Vieques, closed 
down in 1942 when it was expropriated by the U.S. Navy.  From the year 1946 until 1967 
the Puerto Rico Agricultural Corporation (PRACO) handled Puerto Real and Playa 
Grande’s sugar cane plantations.  Since all the centrales in the island had closed, PRACO 
shipped the sugar canes harvested in Vieques to mills in Humacao and after 1950 in 
Fajardo.  The government agency, however, could not revive Vieques’ sugar economy.100  
Still, Isla Nena’s misfortunes would not end any time soon.  If anything, during the 1940s 




The rise of the sugar industry and the efforts for urban renewal in Vieques during 
the early 20th century suggest a growth in urban living and perhaps even an increase in 
commerce and consumption within the island.  Yet, there were people in Vieques who 
managed to maintain a life outside the sugar industry.  Even though by the year 1910 
sugar fields occupied 20% of the Viequense landscape, these people still lived off 
subsistence agriculture.  This was particularly the case in the eastern half of the island.  
According to stories I have heard over the years my great-grandparents, grandmother and 
her eleven older siblings were part of the people living on the margins of the sugar world.  
They lived in the southeastern coast of Vieques in the district of Puerto Ferro.  In their 
                                                 
100 For the workings of PRACO in Vieques during the 1940s see Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de 
Puerto Rico 130-135.  And César Ayala and José Bolívar Fresneda, “The Cold War and the Second 






modest plot of land right in front of the Caribbean Sea they cultivated cassava, sweet 
potatoes and other subsistence crops.  These crops did not require so much labor to sow 
or cook and, it was said, my great-grandmother usually found ways to prepare them so as 
to feed all the hungry mouths.  Nonetheless, there were days when the food was not 
enough and everyone went to sleep hungry.  My grandmother’s family also raised 
domesticated animals that they washed in the ocean and grazed on a nearby key.  These 
activities defined their everyday lives.  My grandmother, in fact, did not attend school.  
Neither did she work in a sugar field.  Her social life during her early years revolved 
around her immediate family.  The memories that seemed to define her youth, those she 
repeated over and over, usually involved her siblings, their household animals and the 
open Viequense fields.  In that time neither hacendados nor even the government had a 
place in her life. 
My great-grandfather Manuel was a subsistence farmer and a curandero (healer).  
He worked hard, but did not abide to the strict work hours of the sugar plantations.  He 
rather worked on his own time without a schedule or wages.  His economic activities with 
the larger Viequense community depended on the bartering of goods and services.  He, in 
fact, received lots of plantains and mangos in exchange for his healing services.  These 
services depended on concoctions made with plants grown in my great-grandfather’s 
backyard.  Thus, he depended doubly on the soil for sustenance.  The land provided him 
both with food and with the instruments to perform his craft.  Such dependence fostered a 
special bond between the man and land he labored.  More so, it is said that he took great 
pride in what he grew.  The bond between the man and the land proved long-lasting so 

















The Arrival of the U.S. Navy, 1930-1950 
 
He turned the handle and felt the overturn of memory.  He suddenly remembered, as in a 
silent film, the arrival of the Nephilim. 
Carmelo Rodríguez Torres, Veinte siglos después del homicidio (1971)1 
 
In some versions of The Bible the Nephilim are identified as a race of giants 
inhabiting Canaan at the time of the Israelites’ arrival.2  Translatable from the Hebrew as 
“Fallen Ones,” the Nephilim are further characterized as crossbreeds between fallen 
angels and the daughters of men.3  It is to these crossbreeds, thought to be wicked and 
violent, that the Viequense writer Carmelo Rodríguez Torres compared the U.S. Navy in 
1971.  While in the biblical account the Israelites physically arrived in Canaan, in the 
novel Veinte siglos después del homicidio the Nephilim were the ones making an 
entrance into an inhabited territory.  Despite the difference in the group doing the 
arriving, the metaphor worked for Rodríguez Torres because both the Nephilim and the 
Navy tried to possess a land that was not promised to them.  They were both, in this 
                                                 
1 “Giró la manivela y sintió el vuelco en la memoria.  De momento recordó, como en una película 
muda, la llegada de los nefilim.”  Carmelo Rodríguez Torres, Veinte siglos después del homicidio (Río 
Piedras: Editorial Antillano, 1980) 31. 
2 The Nephilim are translated as “giants” in the King James’ version of the Bible.  
BibleGateway.com, 2007, Gospel Communications, 19 January 2007 <http://www.biblegateway.com>. 
3 According to Bernard Bamberger, the word Nephilim comes from the Hebrew words ְנִפיִלים and 
 meaning “fallen.”  Bamberger also states that some biblical interpretations propose that God was so לפנ
displeased with the Nephilim’s sins that he sent the great flood to kill them and later condemned the 
survivors to murder each other.  Bernard Bamberger, “Nephilim,” Encyclopaedia Judaica, eds. Michael 






sense, invaders of great prowess but no moral right.  The metaphor, in addition, allowed 
Rodríguez Torres to frame the Navy’s entrance to Vieques in biblical terms and the 
Navy-Viequense relationship as the struggle of unequal contenders.  The invaders, in 
turn, were great in size and power, but evil.  The framing would carry into the 21st 
century. 
The arrival of the U.S. Navy in Vieques predates its official establishment in the 
island.  According to Carlos Ventura, Viequense fisherman and community activist, in 
the beginning: 
they [the U.S. Navy] came to Vieques to do their exercises and then they 
left.  There were not any established camps as such and what they did then 
was to place the persons in corrals.  They did their exercises and later 
those people returned to their houses.  But later when the type of practices 
in the island grew, they made themselves space.4 
 
Following Ventura, the Navy sporadically performed exercises in Vieques before the 
establishment of formal bases in the island.  During these exercises, the local people were 
confined to restricted spaces Ventura compares to “corrals.”  As the exercises grew in 
intensity and length, Ventura continues, the Navy took for itself a permanent space in the 
island. 
The Navy carefully surveyed the space it planned to make for itself.  As the 
Spanish Empire through its imperial cartographers had previously tried to know and 
represent the island, the U.S. Empire, with more advanced technology, produced a variety 
of texts about the late 1930s and early 1940s Vieques.  In 1941, for example, the Navy 
commissioned C.F. Castro and Pfc. Bradt to take aerial photographs as part of the 
                                                 
4 “ellos [la Marina de los Estados Unidos] venían a Vieques a hacer sus maniobras y luego se iban.  
No habían campamentos establecidos como tal y lo que hacían eran pues que a las personas las recogían en 
unos corralones.  Hacían las maniobras y luego regresaban por las tardes a las casas esas personas.  Pero 
luego cuando se siguió incrementado el tipo de práctica en la isla se fueron “haciendo” espacio.”  Carlos 






documentation gathered for the acquisition of approximately 10,130 acres belonging to 
Juan Ángel Tió (Figure 6.1).5  Tió was the owner since 1939 of the Playa Grande sugar 
mill located in the western part of Vieques.  The photographs of his property and 
surrounding areas depicted a landscape compartmentalized by sugar cane fields and 
spotted with sugar mills and communities.  The communities appeared scattered and 
insignificant from the air.  The Navy spectator, if indeed concerned about the colonized 
subjects about to be evicted, could delude itself into thinking that the land was 
uninhabited.  The view from above could facilitate the imperial bureaucrats’ imagining of 
an island void of local communal meaning and ready for the taking.  From the air 
Vieques was, as it had been during the 16th to the 18th centuries for the Spanish Empire, 
the map of a space to be taken. 
 
Figure 6.1: Navy aerial photograph of western Vieques taken in March 18, 1941, framing photograph 
of the Arkadia Colony6 
 
                                                 
5 The exhibition “Vieques, A Long Way Home” opened in March 18, 2006 in the Museum and 
Archive Fortín Conde de Mirasol.  The exhibition contained documentary photographs of Vieques’ 
western part taken after 2001 by the Professor of Photography at the School of the Museum of Boston 
Bonnie Donohue.  These photographs of dense woods and military bunkers were contrasted in the 
exhibition with the March 18, 1941 aerial photographs taken by C.F. Castro and Pfc. Bradt.  The aerial 
photographs portrayed the same western section of the island compartmentalized by sugar plantations and 
the Playa Grande sugar mill working at full capacity.  The 1941 photographs were found by the sociologist 
César Ayala during the summer of 2005 in the Seabees Archive in Port Hueneme, California.  Bonnie 
Donohue, César Ayala and Lauren Weinger, exhibit “Vieques, A Long Way Home,” Museum and Archive 
Fortín Conde de Mirasol, Fortín Conde de Mirasol, Vieques, 18 March 2006.  For some of the photographs 
see Vieques: A Long Way Home, eds. César Ayala and Bonnie Donohue, 2006, Casa de la Cultura/Center 
for Latino Arts, 21 January 2007 
<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/ayala/vieques/bdonohue/index.htm>. 






The map of Vieques could not be voided of local meaning because to control the 
space the Navy needed to decipher its minute intricacies.  Just like the Spanish Empire 
needed to map out the “escape routes” that doomed Luis Lart’s expedition in the early 
19th century, the Navy needed to take a closer look at local inscriptions on the landscape.7  
That look was provided by the local hacendado and engineer Aurelio Tió.  In a 1979 
interview with sociologist Viviana Carro, Aurelio Tió reminisced that: 
Commander Johnson, chief of the base came to talk with Tió [me].  He 
already had in place several study brigades to measure the island of 
Vieques.  He asked Tió [me] to draw for him a landholding map, as best as 
he [I] could, and to have it ready in 30 days.  The only way to accomplish 
this task was to take some measurements, and by putting into a bigger map 
all of the already existing maps of the island.  Tió [I] replied to Johnson 
that, how was he going to do this if they were going to use this map to 
expropriate him [me]?  The Commander told him [me] that if he [I] didn’t 
do it he was going to recruit him [me], make him [me] lieutenant and then 
order him [me] to do it.  This was said half jokingly and half seriously, but 
more seriously than jokingly.  This was a few days before Pearl Harbor 
and when the attack occurred, he [I] went to the federal court, settled the 
case and finished with everything.  He [I] did the map, as best as he [I] 
could, exactly enough.8 
 
Tió translated the Viequense map for the understanding of the U.S. Navy, as embodied 
by Commander Johnson, through the inscriptions titled private property left on the 
landscape.  Titled private property provided a common language between the hacendado 
and naval officials.  The agregado relationship, so central to the everyday life and 
economy in the island, was made invisible by the emphasis on inscribing the map through 
the boundaries of titled private property.9  The agrego was an inscription, or maybe a 
                                                 
7 For Teophile Le Guillou’s 1839 text about the colonization of Vieques see “Chapter 3: Claims to 
the Labyrinthine Island, 16th-19th Centuries.” 
8 The interview and translation from Spanish to English were performed by Viviana Carro.  César J. 
Ayala and Viviana Carro-Figueroa, “Expropriation and Displacement of Civilians in Vieques, 1940-1950,” 
Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights, eds. Ramón 
Bosque-Pérez and José Javier Colón Morera (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) 181. 
9 I employ the term titled private property, as opposed to private property, because although an 






population, on the Viequense map that the Navy was unwilling to recognize as it made 
space for itself in the island. 
Carlos Ventura inherited the memory of naval exercises and Viequenses locked 
up in corrals from stories made by previous generations.  These stories pinpoint a shift in 
the Navy’s interests in Vieques, and in the Puerto Rican politicians’ fostering of such 
interests.  The Navy had shown interest in Vieques since at least 1898.  Yet, back in 1934 
the President of Puerto Rico’s Chamber of Commerce Filipo L. de Hostos offered 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt lands in the Puerto Rican southeastern municipality of 
Ceiba for the establishment of a military base.10  Militarization, however much a Faustian 
deal, appeared to Puerto Rican politicians at the time as an alternative for regional 
development.11  It was also a way to address political tensions between the colony and the 
metropolis.  As the Retired Navy Lieutenant Commander Virgil Baker noted in an 
August 21, 1933 letter to the Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson: 
The Governor is being actively opposed by native politicians who are 
unfriendly to our Government and to American interests in Puerto Rico, 
and he expressed the opinion, with which I agree, that the establishment 
and operation of such a base in Puerto Rico would add greatly to our 
prestige here and in other Latin-American countries, and would assist in 
                                                                                                                                                 
exclusive use of the land an agregado lived and worked.  In other words, the land of an agregado, however 
modest, was for private use.  It was not communal, nor controlled or surveilled on a daily basis by the legal 
owner.  In this sense, as I argue later on, the agregado relationship could lead to feelings of ownership over 
land that agregados did not legally own. 
10 Jorge Rodríguez Beruff identifies Adolfo de Hostos as the President of the Chamber of Commerce 
that offered Puerto Rican lands in 1934 to the U.S. military.  Yet, Filipo L. de Hostos is identified in 
documentation of the U.S. National Archives and Administration Records as the President of Puerto Rico’s 
Chamber of Commerce offering the land.  Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, “Luis Muñoz Marín y el problema de 
Vieques: fuentes para su investigación en el Archivo Luis Muñoz Marín,” Luis Muñoz Marín: Una ventana 
para el estudio de la historia de Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico: Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín, 2000) 81.  Folder 
NB/EG55 TO END OFEG, Box 3109, Office of the Secretary, General Correspondence, 1926-1940, RG 
80, NARA, Washington, D.C. 
11 The Mayor of Ponce José Tormos Diego, for example, wrote to the U.S. Senate in March 2, 1939 
asking for Ponce to be considered for development in the national defense plans.  Acting Secretary of the 
Navy William Leahy responded that besides San Juan, no other place in Puerto Rico was being considered 
for the establishment of bases.  Folder EG55/N1-13 TO 381281, Box 126, Forrestal Papers 1940-47, RG 






Americanizing the population of the Island, and would tend to discourage 
the unfriendly political influences who oppose and obstruct and spread 
seditious propaganda against every American governor appointed to 
Puerto Rico.12 
 
The imperial rule of the U.S. in Puerto Rico, according to Baker, was being actively 
challenged by the natives.  The proposed base, in turn, could perform a similar function 
in the Puerto Rican archipelago as the Fortín Conde de Mirasol had performed in 
Vieques a century earlier.  The military facility could assert the authority of the newly 
established Empire.  More so, Baker added, the base could influence U.S. public relations 
with Latin America in an advantageous way for the U.S.   
Virgil Baker and Filipo L. de Hostos had exchanged ideas about the mutual 
benefits of establishing a naval base in Puerto Rico.  In fact, in the 1930s the project was 
openly discussed and endorsed by upper sectors of the Puerto Rican political sphere.  
Such discussions led the Puerto Rican legislature to approve in 1938 a resolution insisting 
on the construction of the naval base in the east of Puerto Rico.13  The resolution offered 
Ceiba and Vieques.  Since in 1898 President Theodore Roosevelt expropriated lands in 
the island municipality of Culebra, the establishment of naval facilities in Ceiba and 
Vieques would create a triangle around the Vieques Sound.14  This was an area that the 
Navy had already shown interest in earlier that year.  It was, indeed, during the early 
months of 1938 when the Nephilim arrived in Vieques.  The naval exercises in 1938 did 
not include air-to-land or sea-to-land target practice.  Yet, these must have left Navy 
                                                 
12 NB/EG55 (330821), Folder NB/EG55 TO END OFEG, Box 3109, Office of the Secretary, 
General Correspondence, 1926-1940, RG 80, NARA, Washington, D.C. 
13 To make the offer more appealing to the United States government, the Puerto Rican Senate, in the 
“P. del S. 724” of March, 25, 1938, authorized the Governor of Puerto Rico to, “acquire and transfer to the 
United States, without cost, title to and jurisdiction over all such land and water areas and necessary rithst-
of-way thereto.”  “P. del S. 724,” NB/EG55 (330821), Folder NB/EG55 TO END OFEG, Box 3109, Office 
of the Secretary, General Correspondence, 1926-1940, RG 80, NARA, Washington, D.C. 







officials with a favorable impression of the area because one year later they were back.  
During January and February of 1939 the Navy participated in the Fleet Problem XX 
exercises in the Vieques Sound.  As in the 1938 exercises, Admiral William D. Leahy 
performed the role of Chief of Naval Operations while President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
watched from Culebra.15 
In Sept 11, 1939, only 10 days after Germany invaded Poland, President 
Roosevelt appointed Admiral Leahy as Governor of Puerto Rico.  The Admiral was then 
instructed to anticipate the U.S. entrance to war.  In accordance with the December 1938 
recommendations of the Hepburn Board to Congress, the construction of the Roosevelt 
Roads naval base started in Ceiba in 1940.16  Two years later construction started in 
Vieques.  The formal establishment of the Navy in Vieques gave rise to two 
expropriation waves.   The first wave hit Viequense shores when Congress approved 
“Public Law” #13 in March 17, 1941.  The law assigned $35,000,000 for a military base 
in Vieques.  It was followed by the “Public Law” #22 of March 23, 1941 defining the 
base in Vieques as a facility for the U.S. Naval fleet.  The Puerto Rican legislature 
backed the Congress initiatives through their signing of Law #54 of April 26, 1941 
ceding part of the desired territory in eastern Puerto Rico.  The Congress then responded 
with the “Public Law” #247 of August 25, 1941 authorizing the immediate entrance of 
the U.S. Navy into Vieques.  The law further specified that the base in Vieques was to be 
                                                 
15 While Jorge Rodríguez Beruff dates Navy exercises in the Vieques Sound in the year 1939, Arturo 
Meléndez López, César Ayala and José Bolívar Fresneda date such exercises in the early months of 1938 
and 1939.  Meléndez López, in addition, emphasizes on the Navy’s interests in Vieques well before the late 
1930s exercises.  Rodríguez Beruff, “Luis Muñoz Marín,” Luis Muñoz Marín 79-81.  Arturo Meléndez 
López, La batalla de Vieques (México: COPEC-CECOPE) 25.  César Ayala and José Bolívar Fresneda, 
“The Cold War and the Second Expropriations of the Navy in Vieques,” CENTRO Journal XVIII:I (Spring 
2006) 31. 
16 In December 27, 1938 the Hepburn Board headed by Admiral Hepburn recommended to Congress 
the establishment and improvement of naval installations in the Puerto Rican archipelago and the Virgin 






part of Roosevelt Roads.17  The Navy expropriated 21,013 of the 33,649 acres of land in 
Vieques.18  The expropriation entailed the closing down of the Playa Grande sugar mill, 
largest employer in the island, and the forced relocation of 700 families from the west of 
Vieques to what became the civilian middle section.19 
The U.S. government undertook the building of Roosevelt Roads with earnest.  
The naval facility, U.S. military strategist thought, could provide shelter to the British 
Fleet in case Great Britain fell to the Axis Powers.  Thus, in 1942 construction started in 
Vieques creating 2,950 jobs out of which 1,700 went to the local population.20  The war 
scenario, however, moved towards northern Africa and southern Europe.  D-Day later 
secured Allied control over the U.K. and the war shifted towards the Pacific.  The 
importance of Roosevelt Roads, in turn, subsided and construction in Vieques halted 
during the summer of 1943.  The end of the construction boom combined with the closing 
down of Playa Grande to create an economic void in Vieques.  Viequenses took to the 
streets to protest the island’s dire socio-economic situation and demand the return of the 
sugar mill.  Puerto Rican politicians then came face to face with the consequences of their 
Faustian deal.  The Navy, aware of the island’s situation, made it clear early on that it 
was not about to assume responsibility for the social and economic well-being of 
                                                 
17 Meléndez López, La batalla de Vieques 40-42. 
18  I take the number of acres expropriated by the Navy from Ayala and Carro, “Expropriation and 
Displacement,” Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule 180.  I take the total number of acres in Vieques by 
converting the 32,640 cuerdas figure in Rodríguez Beruff, “Luis Muñoz Marín,” Luis Muñoz Marín 81. 
19 See Appendices 1-3.  The actual number of families displaced by the 1941-1942 diverges.  César 
Ayala and José Bolívar offer a 700 figure.  Yet, in an August 12, 1943 letter to the Secretary of the Navy 
Frank Knox, the Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes identified 825 families displaced.  Ickes’ letter 
described in some detail the “serious socio-economic problems exist[ing] in the Island of Vieques, due in 
part to the fact that the Navy purchased large portions of the Island.”  César Ayala and José Bolívar, “Entre 
dos aguas: economía, sociedad, e intervención estatal en Vieques, 1942-1948,” Revista de Ciencias 
Sociales 13 (invierno 2004): 57.  Folder Vieques C40-20-VI-5, #337 Roosevelt Roads Puerto Rico 40 PR, 
Box 1109, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Naval Property Case Files, 1941-1958, RG 71, NARA, College 
Park, MD. 






Viequenses.  With the local economy destroyed, Viequenses would come to rely on 
subsidies from the Puerto Rican government.  The dependency on government subsidies 
represents a trend that has continued well into the 21st century. 
The Puerto Rican government, following political scientist Jorge Rodríguez 
Beruff, spent the years 1943-1947 devising alternate economic activities for Vieques.  Its 
most important initiative was the creation in April of 1945 of PRACO assigned to the 
economic rehabilitation of Vieques.  The corporation, described by sociologist César 
Ayala and José Bolívar as a New Deal organ, undertook the island’s socio-economic 
rehabilitation through heavy government subvention.  The General Manager of PRACO 
Thomas A. Fennell wrote in February 1948 that from 1945 to 1948 the corporation 
invested $1,887,795.14 in Vieques.  The money went primarily towards the acquisition of 
cattle and of grazing lands, edifications and agricultural research.  The activities of 
PRACO in the island helped change land tenure and usage patterns.  The government 
agency became the island’s largest landowner and employer.  By 1947 it employed 1,113 
workers, or 40% of the island’s labor force, and administered 16,680 acres, or 50% of the 
land.  According to Fennell by 1947 PRACO had 1,734 acres of sugar cane, 100 acres of 
pineapple, 100 acres of corn, 200 acres of grain sorghum, 30 acres of mango and avocado 
orchards and 10 acres of vegetables.21  While sugar cane was still the island’s main crop, 
PRACO’s programs diversified the agricultural production.  Yet, the 2,174 total acres of 
cultivated land took the island’s agricultural production back to early 19th century 
standards. 
                                                 
21 2, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares, Cartapacio 55, 1962-1958, Sección V, 






Most of the PRACO land was devoted to cattle-raising.  This was an activity 
better suited to Vieques’ land tenure patterns as it did not demand heavy investments or 
long term attachments to lands leased from the Navy.  The activity also fostered as well 
as responded to the emergence of an important cattle rancher interest group in Vieques.  
This was a trend begun with the decline of the sugar industry in the early 1940s.  So in a 
way, the sugar hacendados were replaced by the cattle ranchers.  The founding father and 
sugar hacendado Theophile Le Guillou, for example, was replaced by Leoncio T. Davis, 
Mayor of Vieques during the 1940s and Spokesperson and President of the Minor Cattle 
Owners’ Association of Vieques during the 1940s-1950s.  PRACO, however, subleased 
13,000 out of its 16,680 acres in Vieques from the Navy.22  Between 1946 and 1947 the 
Navy fenced off only 8,000 of its 21,013 acres in the island.  The land it kept from 
civilian use incidentally coincided with the western part of Vieques, the sugar land.  Yet, 
PRACO was not able to secure title to the land it leased in the eastern part of the island.  
Thus, there was little the corporation could do, or the Minor Cattle Owner’s Association 
in Vieques for that matter, when the Navy announced in 1947 that it was going to take 
back its leased lands and further expropriate Viequense lands. 
The second expropriation wave hit Vieques in 1947-1948.  The wave coincided 
with the onset of the Cold War.  Under a discourse of the sacrifices to be made in the 
fight against communism, the Navy took back the 13,000 acres from PRACO and 
expropriated 4,340 acres more.  Added to the 8,000 acres it already controlled, the Navy 
came to possess in 1948 25,353 acres of the total 33,649 acres in Vieques, or 75% of the 
                                                 
22 The Navy, through the Department of Interior, subleased 13,000 acres of Vieques’ land to the 
government of Puerto Rico.  These lands, although employed by PRACO, remained the property of the 






land.23  Viequenses, in turn, were squeezed into the civilian middle stretch representing 
25% of the island that recalled the times of the corrals, but on a larger scale.  The west 
became the Naval Ammunition Support Detachment (NASD) and the east the Inner 
Range of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility (AFWTA).24  The AFWTA, later 
known as Camp García, was divided into the Eastern Maneuver Area and the Live Impact 
Area.25  As their names suggest, NASD was designed to store ammunition and AFWTA 
to practice with it.  AFWTA, in fact, operated as a target range since January 16, 1948 
when, according to Arturo Meléndez López, 60 ships, 350 airplanes and thousands of 
sailors, pilots and soldiers from the four branches of the armed forces met on the island.26  
The storage and training facilities in Vieques were conceived as an integral part of the 
Roosevelt Roads Naval Base.27  More so, the facilities in Vieques were considered a 
valuable piece of real estate the Navy rented to ally countries willing to pay a substantial 
amount to practice their troops outside their national soil.28 
                                                 
23 There are 13 acres missing from the 8,000 acres and/or 13,000 acres figures. 
24 Some maps produced by and for the Navy portray the Inner Range of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
Training Facility as divided between the Eastern Maneuver Area and the AFWTA in the eastern half of the 
base.  See, for example, United States, Department of the Navy, Final Work Plan for Community Relations 
Plan: Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility and Eastern Maneuver Area Vieques, Puerto Rico, by 
CH2MHILL (March 2002) 1-2, 1-3. 
25  The AFWTA was renamed in February 1959 Camp García in honor of the Private First Class 
Fernando Luis García, USMC.  Fernando Luis García was the first Puerto Rican to win the Medal of 
Honor.  United States, Department of the Navy, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1947-
1964, by Ralph W. Donnelly, Gabrielle M. Neufeld and Carolyn A. Tyson, vol. III (Washington, DC: 
Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1971) 40. 
26 Meléndez López, La batalla de Vieques 78.  César Ayala and José Bolívar identify February 1948 
as the date when the U.S. Navy’s bombing of Vieques officially begun.  These target practices consisted of 
sea-to-land and/or air-to-land maneuvers.  Ayala and Bolívar, “The Cold War,” CENTRO Journal 29-31. 
27  United States, Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques, Report to the Secretary of 
Defense of the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques (N.p.: n.p., October 1999). 
28  The second expropriation wave in Vieques coincided with the early years of Cold War 
panamericanism.  In this context, U.S. military strategist like Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, supported by 
Puerto Rican politicians, imagined the island of Vieques as a conciliatory space where the American 
hemisphere came together for naval practices.  In turn, ally countries like Canada started practising their 
armed forces on Viequense soil as early as March 2, 1949.  Of this exercise Ralph Donnelly, Gabrielle 
Neufeld and Carolyn Tyson of the Historical Division of the U.S. Marine Corps wrote that, “U.S. Marines, 






Some sectors of the Viequense population and Puerto Rican politicians welcomed 
the second wave of expropriations with pro-American Cold War discourses and renewed 
arguments that increased military activity would bring economic benefits to Vieques.  A 
part of Puerto Rican politicians and society even argued that if sacrifices had to be made 
for the American nation, Vieques was expendable.  Other sectors disagreed.  This time 
around the Navy encountered resistance, however short-lived, from the Puerto Rican 
government and the Viequense population.  Puerto Rican politicians under Governor 
Jesús T. Piñero, first Puerto Rican appointed to the office, protested the Navy plans to 
deal another fatal blow to the island’s economic activity and to displace another 150 
families.  Between June and November 1947, César Ayala and José Bolívar write, 
Piñero’s arguments were overcome.  Ayala and Bolívar argue that the Navy stressed its 
influence on federal policies and thus pressured the Governor on the issue of Puerto 
Rico’s sugar quotas to the U.S.  Arturo Meléndez López, on the other hand, argues that 
Puerto Rican politicians in general and the President of the Senate Luis Muñoz Marín in 
particular secretly traded Vieques in return for the Elective Governor Law.  The project 
made the position of Governor of Puerto Rico an elective one, position Luis Muñoz 
Marín was elected for in 1948.29  Whatever the reasons, Puerto Rican politicians finally 
assented to the new expropriations and to losing most of PRACO’s $1.9 million 
investment in Vieques. 
                                                                                                                                                 
largest postwar amphibious exercise.”  Other ally countries willing to pay the U.S. Navy to practice their 
troops in Vieques were the Netherlands and the neighboring Venezuela and the Dominican Republic.  
Department of the Navy, A Chronology 9.  Meléndez López, La batalla de Vieques 80-99. 







The second wave of expropriations were publicly announced and carried out 
within the months of December 1947 and January 1948.30  It was difficult for the local 
population to oppose in any organized manner the expropriations.  As César Ayala and 
Viviana Carro state, the majority of the people expropriated were agregados with no 
legal rights binding them to the land they occupied.  Secondly, translators were 
supposedly present when the agregados were ordered to vacate their dwellings.  Yet, the 
expropriated were unable to engage the Navy personnel in a common language or in 
person for that matter.  There was only the translator, a marine and the eviction letter 
mediating between the Navy and the expropriated Spanish-speaking and illiterate 
population.  Perhaps the most important factor that prevented an organized resistance was 
fear.  People were scared of what could happen if they opposed the Navy and the federal 
government.31  Vieques’ cattle ranchers, however, faced both the Navy and PRACO with 
some degree of success.  The Navy still expropriated within less than two months the 
13,000 acres administered by PRACO, forcing cattle ranchers to hastily sell cattle below 
market prices.  Yet, the cattle ranchers, organized under the Minor Cattle Owner’s 
Association in Vieques, openly criticized PRACO for what they considered monopolistic 
practices.  Coaxed by Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey on January 1948, they further 
defied the corporation’s liquidating terms and proceeded to negotiate grazing stipulations 
directly with the Navy.  PRACO lost $70,000 in the process.32  The corporation 
                                                 
30 Some expropriations were actually carried out as late as 1950.  The majority of the expropriations, 
however, were carried out between 1947 and 1948.  See Ayala and Carro, “Expropriation and 
Displacement,” Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule 173-205. 
31 Ayala and Carro, “Expropriation and Displacement,” Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule 186-187. 
32 “Barbey Promete Ayudar a Ganaderos si Abandonan La Compañía agrícola,” El Imparcial [San 
Juan] 6 January 1948: 16.  Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares, Cartapacio 57, 1948, 
Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM.  2, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades 






continued operating in Vieques, but after 1948 its role was greatly diminished.  The Navy 
dealt with the cattle ranchers and their cattle roaming through Navy-land, but in their own 
terms and without the intervention of Puerto Rican government agencies like PRACO.  
To the extent the cattle ranchers’ livelihood depended on Navy policies, naval officials 
like Barbey gained power over an important social sector that became, according to Jorge 
Rodríguez Beruff, pro-Navy.33 
By the late 1940s Viequenses were trapped between weapons and bombardments.  
Sugar was still sown in fields around the island and in Navy lands, but without local mills 
the canes were shipped to the municipalities of Humacao and Fajardo.34  This was an 
expensive enterprise the Puerto Rican government subsided until 1967.35  Yet, the jobs 
these government subsidized assured could not revive the sugar industry in Vieques.  The 
sugar industry had been staggering during the 1930s and was for all purposes dead by 
1943.  The Navy-base construction boom had ended in the summer of that same year, and 
the future of alternative economic activities like cattle-raising was uncertain.  The 
municipality, in addition, lost 40% of its revenues after the first wave of expropriations.  
In a December 22, 1941 letter, Mayor Leoncio Davis recounted to the Puerto Rican 
Legislator Vicente Geigel about the dire fiscal situation of the Viequense municipality.  
He wrote that during the fiscal year 1941-1942 the municipality received $18,672.54 out 
                                                                                                                                                 
Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares, Cartapacio 55, 1962-1958, Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de 
Puerto Rico, FLMM. 
33 Rodríguez Beruff, “Luis Muñoz Marín,” Luis Muñoz Marín 85. 
34 According to the May 12, 1948 “Memorandum sobre rehabilitación de Vieques” written by a 
group of Viequenses seeking agricultural alternatives for the island’s economy, there were 3,061 acres of 
sugar cane fields in Vieques.  The group estimated that these acres, worked by 69 planters, could yield 
approximately 60,000 tons of cane for the 1948 harvest.  Among the planters was PRACO.  14, Serie 6, 
Partidos Políticos, Comités Municipales/Pueblos, Vieques, Cartapacio 862, 1948, Sección IV, LMM, 
Presidente del Senado, FLMM. 







of its $46,244.54 total income from property taxes.  These were collected, for the most 
part, from the sugar companies and landowners expropriated in late 1941.36  The 
expropriation wave at the onset of the 1940s thus decimated the municipal budget.  By 
the end of the decade Vieques’ economy had collapsed. 
During the socio-economic upheavals of the 1940s a total of 1,134 persons, or 
10.9% of the local population, left Vieques.  This meant that by 1950 only 9,228 people 
came to inhabit the 8,296-acre civilian strip.  Despite the overall population decrease, the 
population density rose from 3.25 acres per person in 1940 to .9 acre per person in 1950.  
The changes in population density might not seem radical if compared to modern 
metropolises.  However, in the mid 20th century Viequense context the changes were 
drastic.  The access to land was significantly reduced by three-fourths.  The reduction 
dealt a fatal blow to subsistence agriculture, activity that complemented the meager 
salaries of wage laborers in the island and that formed part of their idiosyncrasy. 
The 1940s had marked the rise of the Partido Popular Democrático (Popular 
Democratic Party or PPD) and its founding leader Luis Muñoz Marín.  The PPD, with its 
slogan “pan, tierra y libertad” (bread, land and liberty), focused on Puerto Rico’s 
problems with poverty, land concentration, dispossessed populations and the colonial 
status.37  While the colonial status was soon subordinated to socio-economic concerns, 
the access to land and the right to earn a decent living were made central to the platform.  
The PPD and its populist leader thus promoted in 1941 an agrarian reform designed to 
                                                 
36 1, Serie 7, Pueblos, Cartapacio 2669, 1941, Sección IV, LMM, Presidente del Senado, FLMM. 
37 Luis Muñoz Marín coined the PPD’s slogan “pan, tierra y libertad” in a July 17, 1938 speech 
delivered in honor of his father Luis Muñoz Rivera.  That was the same year the Party was officially 
registered.  Although the PPD originally favored independence as a solution to Puerto Rico’s colonial 
status, the stance was soon discarded in favor of socio-economic programs.  Luis Muñoz Marín, “Palabras 
de Luis Muñoz Marín ante la tumba de su padre-17 de julio de 1938,” Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín, 2006, 







limit corporate landholding to 500 acres and to give land to agregados and small and 
medium-sized farmers.38  Such measures secured the support of the peasantry and 
facilitated the PPD’s overwhelming victories in 1944 and 1948, and maybe well into the 
1960s.  The appeal of “pan, tierra y libertad,” however, also fed from work-the-land 
ethics and discourses of Puerto Rican nationhood and masculinity. 
In Puerto Rico, like in other places in Latin America, rural dwellers were despised 
for their supposed backwardness and simultaneously celebrated as embodiments of 
national culture in its purest manifestation.  These dwellers called jíbaros were idealized 
as the national subjects untouched by foreign civilizations and technological advances.39  
Their uncorrupted state was assured by the, inaccessible, national spaces jíbaros were 
thought to inhabit.  These national spaces were foremost the mountain ranges where the 
big sugar companies did not penetrate.  There the jíbaros could establish both a pseudo-
mystical bond with the land they worked and an independent way of life.  Through the 
bond with the land a man was thought to make himself a man.  His self-worth was linked 
                                                 
38 According to Francisco Scarano, the agrarian reform was more successful in giving small plots of 
land to former agregados than in expropriating corporate land and distributing land among small and 
medium-sized farmers.  Francisco Scarano, Puerto Rico: Cinco siglos de historia (San Juan: McGraw-Hill, 
1993) 717-718. 
39 The jíbaros in Puerto Rico can be understood through Partha Chatterjee’s arguments about 
nationalist thought in the colonial world.  Chatterjee argues that the construction of the nation responded to 
the necessities of an industrial or industrializing society in need of a kind of homogenized culture that 
converged with a political unit.  Thus, nations are historical constructs imagined by the intelligentsia and 
appropriated by the masses.  Chatterjee then distinguishes between “western” and “eastern” nationalisms.  
He argues that in both nationalisms there is an implied common set of standards by which the state of 
development of a particular national culture is measured.  In other words, there is an acceptance of a 
universal standard of progress.  It is also tacitly agreed that nationalism is primarily a cultural phenomenon 
that often takes a political form.  In western nationalism, however, there is a feeling that the nation is at 
disadvantage with respect to others but is still culturally equipped.  Thus, the universal standard is not seen 
as alien to the national culture.  In eastern nationalism, on the other hand, there is an awareness that the 
universal standard comes from an alien culture and that the inherited culture of the nation is not equipped to 
reach the standard by itself.  Therefore, eastern nationalism is a search for the regeneration of the national 
culture.  The regeneration is adapted to the requirements of progress but not by simple imitation of the alien 
culture because the nation would loose its identity and distinctiveness.  The jíbaros, in turn, represented the 
cultural-spiritual domain of the Puerto Rican nation that needed to be safeguarded as the archipelago 
underwent a rapid process of industrialization.  Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial 






to the fruits such a bond yielded.  The land, after all, was the means to provide sustenance 
for a family and to achieve an independent life where the man felt like a “patriarchal 
cacique.”40 
The jíbaros were ultimately Puerto Rican peasants toiling the land.  The PPD, 
ironically, severed peasants’ ties to the land with its aggressive industrialization and 
immigration policies of the 1940s-1960s.  The tie, however, continued to be coveted in 
the Puerto Rican imaginary well into the 21st century.  As evidenced in Juan Morales 
Ramos’ (Moralito) 1950s song “Allá en la altura” (“There in the Mountain”), the bond 
was hard to break even when technological advances threatened to alienate the jíbaro 
from the land. 
I have in the mountains 
a well sowed farm 
from purple malanga, 
yam, plantain and yautía. 
After the day has come out 
I immediately take the plow 
once the soil is ready 
gentlemen I farm it 
and that is how happy I live 
better off than a rich man. 
 
One torch made with tabonuco 
I have to give me light, 
to guard my farm 
I also have a tail-less dog. 
If I don’t know the trick 
of air conditioning 
because nature has given me 
that fresh and pure breeze 
and I live here in the mountain 
better than a rich man. 
 
                                                 
40 I take the term “patriarchal cacique” from Felipe Rosario Goyco’s (Don Felo) late 1940s song “Mi 
jaragual” (“My Plot of Land”).  The term in the song is used to identify an ideal masculine role where the 
man is the owner and head of a plot of land, wife and dog.  The song has been interpreted by artists like 








And in my wood house 
luxuries I don’t possess 
because I live according to my will, 
far from the road. 
And my wife and companion 
provides me all the care, 
what does it matter if 
Petroleum and gasoline are all used up 
if I live here in the mountaintop 
better than a rich man.41 
 
Moralito praised the jíbaro life, isolated from commodities and civilization, as the ideal 
state of the Puerto Rican man.  It was a life very much grounded on known everyday 
spaces and routines.  In the 1950s context of rapid industrialization and rural-to-urban 
and Puerto Rico-to-U.S. migrations, Morales’ song testified to the continued currency of 
land in Puerto Rican nationalist and gender discourses.42 
The PPD’s Operation Bootstrap, launched in late 1940s with the Puerto Rico 
Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) and the Industrial Incentives Law, sought 
to turn peasants into industrial workers.  The fiscal incentives to U.S. industrial 
companies, and the attractive pool of cheap labor, helped replace sugar landscapes with 
                                                 
41 “Yo tengo en la serranía/una finca bien sembrada/desde malanga morada,/ñame, plátano y 
yautía./Después de salir el día/seguida cojo el arado/ya el terreno preparado/señores yo lo cultivo/y así de 
feliz yo vivo/mejor que un adinerado./Un jacho de tabonuco/yo tengo para alumbrarme,/para mi finca 
cuidarme/también tengo un perro tuco./Si yo no conozco el truco/del aire acondicionado/pues la natura me 
ha dado/esa brisa fresca y pura/y yo vivo aquí en la altura/mejor que un adinerado./…/Y en mi casa de 
madera/los lujos yo no poseo/porque vivo a mi deseo,/lejos de la carretera./Y mi esposa y compañera/me 
brinda todo el cuidado,/qué importa si se ha acabado/el petróleo o gasolina/si yo vivo aquí en la cima/mejor 
que un adinerado.”  Juan Morales, “Allá en la altura,” Cancioneros.com, 2008, Cancioneros de Trovadores, 
28 January 2008 <http://www.trovadores.net/nc.php?NM=5005>. 
42 Later songs like Catalino “Tite” Curet Alonso and Tony Croatto’s 1980 “A pico y pala” (“By 
pickaxe and shovel”) reemphasized on the centrality of land and work ethics in the makings of the Puerto 
Rican man.  Yet, in the 1970s and 1980s these celebrations of men, work and land represented a nostalgic 
nationalist discourse.  By the 1980s the Puerto Rican population was overwhelmingly urban and 
agriculture, as a viable large-scale economic activity, was long dead.  Catalino Curet Alonso and Tony 






factories.43  In Vieques companies like General Electric would be one of the few constant 
sources of employment during the Navy years.  The company, however, established itself 
in the island in 1969, closing its doors in 2003.44  As could be suggested by GE’s 
trajectory, the initial effects of Operation Bootstrap in the island were minimal.  In the 
late 1940s and 1950s Vieques’ peasants were not turned into industrial workers, but into 
migrants and into slum dwellers.  As Nemencio Regalado López wrote in March 20, 1944 
to the then President of the Senate Luis Muñoz Marín, “today we small and large farmers 
see ourselves with the only hope of abandoning our lands and venturing where luck takes 
us.”45  “Luck” led many Viequense “small farmers” to slums.  The 1940s expropriations 
channeled displaced people into Navy-owned tracts of land near Isabel II.  These tracts, 
previously used for cattle grazing, lacked basic infrastructure to support a human 
community.  Thus, even when the communities bore the tragically wistful names of Santa 
María (Saint Mary) and Monte Santo (Holy Mount), they might not have had appeared 
too blessed in the post-expropriation period. 
                                                 
43 The Compañía de Fomento Económico, today the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, 
was created in 1942 under the auspices of the PPD.  Five years later the Puerto Rican government passed 
the Industrial Incentives Law designed to attract U.S. industrial companies.  The Puerto Rican government 
offered these companies fiscal incentives, available infrastructure and a cheap and disciplined labor force 
without leaving U.S. sovereignty.  The passing of the Industrial Incentives Law in 1947 marked the official 
launching of Operation Bootstrap.  Scarano, Puerto Rico 740-749. 
44 The General Electric Company established itself in Vieques during the second stage of Operation 
Bootstrap.  This second stage involved a transition from labor intensive to more capital intensive industries.  
Perhaps the first stage of Operation Bootstrap had such a limited reach in Vieques because the labor pool 
was more restricted than in the main island.  Although James Dietz argued that most of the factories 
established during the first stage remained in the archipelago’s urban centers due to the convenience of 
accessible infrastructure.  James L. Dietz, Historia Económica de Puerto Rico (Río Piedras: Ediciones 
Huracán, 1997) 265-275. 
45 “hoy nos vemos los pequeños y grandes agricultores con la única esperanza de abandonar nuestras 
tierras e irnos aventurar donde la suerte nos lleve.”  19, Serie 6, Partidos Políticos, Comités 







In these grassy plains the expropriated Viequenses hastily reassembled their zinc 
and wood houses.46  Others not so fortunate dwelled under the skies for a long time.47  
Many were unemployed, or became so in the expropriation process, and many others 
were single women heads of households.48  The people expropriated to Monte Santo and 
Santa María, nonetheless, shared many experiences in common.  They were assigned a 
lot for which they were not given an ownership title.  They were further warned in 
writing that they occupied Navy lands that could be taken away at any given moment.  
The lots, in addition, did not provide space for subsistence agriculture making the 
expropriated totally dependent on wage labor or charity.  With communities dispersed 
along numbered lots, everyday communal networks were broken.  Neighbors did not 
necessarily know each other and new relationships of solidarity had to be established.  
Therefore, there were little incentives or leeway to improve the conditions of these 
improvised slums.  These were, after all, places where people lacked jobs, property titles 
to ask for loans and the security and support to invest themselves in long-term communal 
projects.  The Navy, making clear again that its role in the island was far from that of a 
social benefactor, paid no heed to the needs of the expropriated population.  The Puerto 
                                                 
46 Given the frequency of hurricanes that hit the island, the majority of Viequenses were fairly 
accustomed to the assembling and reassembling of zinc and wood houses.  Every time these houses were 
reassembled, however, their already fragile structural integrity weakened. 
47 The local committee of the Red Cross signed a resolution on August 23, 1943 asking government 
and federal agencies for aid to the displaced people in Monte Santo who were living without a roof over 
their heads.  The committee described the situation as “chaotic” because, among other things, people could 
not find work to finish their houses and neither could the municipality, with its diminished revenues, help 
them.  31, Serie 6, Partidos Políticos, Comités Municipales/Pueblos, Vieques, Cartapacio 866, 1943, 
Sección IV, LMM, Presidente del Senado, FLMM. 
48 For an account of the expropriation process of a single woman household see Tere Villegas Pagán, 






Rican government, with its new emphasis on living standards, was forced to assume the 
task and costs of providing these Navy-owned slums with the basic infrastructure.49 
Monte Santo and Santa María were not the only slums that surfaced in Vieques 
after the Navy expropriations.  On the southern coast of the civilian sector was the 
Esperanza (Hope).  Its name seemed to bear witness to the population’s hope in the 
coming of better days.  The proliferation of slums, in fact, altered the modest but orderly 
urban landscape Spanish officials and other members of the municipal council had 
envisioned in the 19th century.  Slums were by definition the antitheses of an “ordered 
city.”50  These were spaces that defied not only the grid city model inherited from the 
Roman Empire but effective state surveillance and regulation.  Slums helped concentrate 
a local population accustomed since early colonial times to live dispersed throughout the 
island.  The disorderliness of the space, however, made it difficult for the state to exercise 
authority over its population.51  This population, in turn, represented Vieques’ working 
class.  Whatever was left of the local economy depended on the, cheap, labor of this 
sector.  Slums were thus a major source of concern to the Viequense government and 
elites.  Such was the concern that in the May 12, 1948 “Memorandum about the 
Rehabilitation of Vieques” a committee headed by the Mayor and President of the Local 
Association of Cane Farmers and Planters Antonio Rivera collectively wrote that the 
majority of PRACO workers lived in a “slum that is one focus of diseases, in addition the 
misery and promiscuity that these workers live in is the cause and origin of ugly vices 
                                                 
49 15, Serie 6, Partidos Políticos, Comités Municipales/Pueblos, Vieques, Cartapacio 864, 1944, 
diciembre-mayo, Sección IV, LMM, Presidente del Senado, FLMM. 
50 Ángel Rama, The Lettered City, trans. and ed. John Charles Chasteen (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1996). 






and crimes.”52  The committee was referring here to La Esperanza.  Yet, their ideas about 
La Esperanza were probably similar to those of other slums that had surfaced in the 
civilian sector.  They interpreted that the lack and disorderliness of the space led to 
diseases, promiscuity and crime.  Therefore, slums were unsanitary spaces of sexual and 
moral deviance.  These spaces could not breed a healthy and disciplined working class 
capable of being molded to the industrial work ethics brought by Operation Bootstrap. 
The Navy expropriations broke communities, altered communal ties, severed 
peasants’ relationship to the land, closed down the island’s main source of employment 
and squeezed Viequenses into a middle civilian sector.  These changes bred in the island 
a feeling of enclosure and desolation for neither Isabel II nor the slums could sustain the 
population influx.  The pessimism prevalent among the population is portrayed in Juan 
Antonio Figueroa’s 1944 poem to Luis Muñoz Marín titled “Vieques and its Situation.” 
I 
Here nobody notices 
This fatal crisis 
That we have come to pass 
Strong as a storm 
The situation presents itself 
Like migratory birds 
We will leave this corner 
To seek life in another place 
Because it has never been seen 
Vieques turned into ruin. 
 
II 
What grief it gives me 
To have to leave Vieques. 
Men what do you think 
This is the need. 
In Vieques there is no charity. 
                                                 
52 “arrabal que es un foco de enfermedades, amén de que en la miseria y promiscuidad en que viven 
estos trabajadores es causa y origen de feos vicios y delitos.”  “Memorando sobre rehabilitación de 
Vieques,” 14, Serie 6, Partidos Políticos, Comités Municipales/Pueblos, Vieques, Cartapacio 862, 1948, 






And the government nothing assigns 
We will forget our slogans 
With great pain 
Always from worse to worst. 
Vieques turned into ruins.53 
 
Figueroa wrote to the populist leader that the situation was so desperate in Vieques 
people were forced to leave the island.  These were people that became known as Hijos 
or Viequenses Ausentes (Absent Sons and Daughters or Absent Viequenses).  They were 
physically absent from the island but still part of the Viequense community.  Indeed, in 
the mid 20th century those who the island’s middle stretch could not sustain were free and 
very much encouraged to emigrate.  Between 1940 and 1960 3,152 Viequenses 
emigrated.  This number represents a 30% population decrease in two decades. 
The most common destinations of Viequense emigrants were the Puerto Rican 
main island, St. Croix and the United States mainland, especially New York City.  
Viequenses’ migration to St. Croix began with the deceleration of Vieques’ sugar 
economy in the late 1920s.54  Clarence Senior argued that Viequenses migrated 
specifically to St. Croix because in that neighboring island sugar cane continued to 
demand seasonal workers.  The island was, in addition, under the U.S. sovereignty since 
the year 1917.55  So that by 1946, according to Senior, there were 3,108 Puerto Ricans in 
an island of 12,200 inhabitants.  In other words, by 1946 25% of St. Croix’s population 
                                                 
53 “I/Aquí nadie se da cuenta/De esta crisis tan fatal/Que hemos venido a pasar/Fuerte como una 
tormenta/La situación se presenta/Como aves peregrinas/Pues saliremos de esquina/A buscar vida a otro 
sitio/Porque nunca se habia visto/A Vieques convertido en ruina./II/Que mucha pena me da/Tener que salir 
de Vieques./Señores que le parece/Esto es la necesidad./En Vieques no hay caridad./Y el gobierno nada 
asigna/Olvidaremos nuestras consignas/Con grandisimo dolor/Siempre de peor en peor./Vieques convertido 
en ruinas.”  4, Serie 7, Pueblos, Sub-Serie Vieques, Cartapacio 2664, abril-enero 1944, Sección IV, LMM, 
Presidente del Senado, FLMM. 
54 For Viequense population figures see Appendix 18. 
55 Viequenses never left U.S. sovereignty as St. Croix was part of the U.S. Virgin Islands since the 






was Puerto Rican.  The great majority of this 25% were Viequenses.56  Viequense 
emigrants to the U.S. mainland, on the other hand, formed part of a larger post-World 
War II trend of Puerto Rican migration.  The decline of agricultural activity with the 
onset of Operation Bootstrap and the rapid industrialization of Puerto Rican society 
created a dispossessed sector that migrated to urban centers in the archipelago and the 
U.S. mainland.  These Puerto Ricans were attracted to the U.S. postwar economic boom 
made accessible by the lowered costs of air transportation.  Yet, they were also enticed by 
the government’s policy to encourage migration as a means to alleviate the problems of 
unemployment and overpopulation in the archipelago.  The Puerto Rican government, in 
fact, created the Bureau of Employment and Emigration ascribed to the Department of 
Labor.  The Bureau was assigned to oversee the flow of people between Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. mainland and the working conditions of these immigrants in the U.S.  
Viequenses were thus part of a mid 20th century Puerto Rican exodus to U.S. 
metropolises like New York City.57 
Viequense emigrants formed exiled communities that kept in touch with the 
island left behind through civic organizations like New York City’s Club Viequense 
(Viequense Club) and San Juan’s Asociación Hijos de Vieques (Sons and Daughters of 
Vieques Association).  Through these organizations exiled Viequenses helped re-imagine 
Vieques, and made it difficult for the island community to forget its Ausentes.  These 
organs not only provided a space for the nostalgic reminisce of past Viequense days, but 
                                                 
56 According to Clarence Senior, the Danes had employed free labor from neighboring British 
colonies after their 1848 abolition of slavery.  Once the U.S. bought the Danish Virgin Islands in 1917, the 
immigration laws enforced after 1927 made sugar cane grower seek U.S. citizen workers.  Viequenses, with 
their depressed sugar economy, came to fill in the work force void in St. Croix.  Clarence Senior, The 
Puerto Rican Migrant in St. Croix (Río Piedras: Social Science Research Center, Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, 1947). 
57 Fernando Picó, Historia general de Puerto Rico (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1988) 263-267.  






also played a role in the future of the island.  The Asociación Hijos de Vieques, for 
example, constituted themselves early on as a lobbying group in San Juan.  The 
Asociación, in fact, was constituted in November 1946 in the Carnegie Library.  The 
Library, located just east of the Puerto Rican Capitol building, had a history of 
accommodating within its walls such groups like the Liga Femínea Puertorriqueña 
(Puerto Rican Feminist League).58  The Asociación, like the Puerto Rican suffragists had 
done two decades earlier, lobbied in San Juan and in Washington.  The Asociación, 
however, had better luck engaging San Juan politicians.  Its spokesperson Germán 
Rieckehoff communicated with Luis Muñoz Marín and other Puerto Rican politicians.59  
Among the measures Rieckehoff and the Asociación lobbied for were the construction of 
a port in Isabel II’s Puerto Mulas, the establishment of telephone lines between Vieques 
and Puerto Rico, the remodeling of City Hall, the building of a library, and the setting up 
of a more efficient power plant.60 
The Asociación may have gotten its best opportunity to voice its opinion during 
an April 1, 1947 presentation to the Puerto Rican Legislature.  The presentation, made in 
conjunction with other Viequense organizations and leaders, emphasized on the 
rehabilitation of Vieques.  It, in turn, critiqued and proposed solutions to the workings of 
PRACO and the land problem in the island.61  The discontent the presenters portrayed 
                                                 
58 The Liga Femínea Puertorriqueña, association from which the most important Puerto Rican 
women suffragist groups surfaced, held its first meeting in August 13, 1917 in the Carnegie Library.  Marie 
Cruz Soto, “Ciudadanas puertorriqueñas/ciudadanas americanas: el nacionalismo cultural en el discurso 
sobre la femeneidad y la ciudadanía de la Liga Social Sufragista,” diss., Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2000, 
41. 
59 Germán Rieckehoff served in the Puerto Rican House of Representatives for the District of 
Vieques, Fajardo and Culebra from 1925 to 1928.  Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico 105. 
60 Justo Pastor Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno: 1493-1946 (Santurce: JAY-CE Printing, 1987) 
213. 
61 6, Serie 7, Pueblos, Sub-Serie Vieques, Cartapacio 2656, abril-enero 1947, Sección IV, LMM, 






against PRACO’s “monopolistic” practices foreshadowed the January 1948 separation of 
the cattle ranchers from the corporation.  However, the influence the presentation had on 
Puerto Rican policy makers is unclear.  As previously stated, during the months of 
December 1947 and January 1948 the Navy took back the 13,000 acres of PRACO-leased 
lands and expropriated another 4,340 acres.  In the process PRACO lost its prominent 
role in the island without any other government-sponsored plan for agricultural 
production or land intensive economic activity to take its place.  The sugar mill and 
distillery offered by the Puerto Rican Legislature and lobbied for by the Asociación, for 
example, were never established.62 
The Asociación Hijos de Vieques publicized their struggle and further pushed 
their agenda through the publication titled El Eco de Vieques.  This publication displayed 
in the first page the group’s slogan:  “Defender of an effective rehabilitation program – 
The rehabilitation of our island, will be the work of the sons of Vieques.”63  The slogan 
announced the political intentions of the Asociación as well as its identity based 
activism.64  The main membership requisite, whether in San Juan, New York or 
wherever, was the claiming of a Viequense identity.  More precisely, the members had to 
be “sons of Vieques.”  To the extent the Asociación’s crusade was identified as a 
masculine struggle, the object to be saved was coded feminine.  In other words, the island 
                                                 
62 The sugar mill and distillery had been part of the March 1944 Laws 89 and 90 designed by the 
Puerto Rican Legislature to offset the economic problems of Vieques.  The establishment and workings of 
the mill and distillery were originally assigned to PRIDCO and the Land Authority.  The Corporation and 
Authority, although assigned with $2,000,000 for the project, did not develop it.  Pastor Ruiz, Vieques 
antiguo y moderno 214.  6, Serie 7, Pueblos, Sub-Serie Vieques, Cartapacio 2656, abril-enero 1947, 
Sección IV, LMM, Presidente del Senado, FLMM, 10-12.  Ayala and Bolívar, “The Cold War,” CENTRO 
Journal 14. 
63 “Defensora de un programa de rehabilitación efectiva - La rehabilitación de nuestra isla, habrá de 
ser obra de los hijos de Vieques.”  8, Serie 7, Pueblos, Sub-serie Vieques, Cartapacio 2657, julio-diciembre 
1946, Sección IV, LMM, Presidente del Senado, FLMM.  11, Serie 7, Pueblos, Sub-serie Vieques, 
Cartapacio 2657, julio-diciembre 1946, Sección IV, LMM, Presidente del Senado, FLMM. 
64  I use the term political in this context to refer to activities related to government policies and 






was again imagined in gendered terms.  Yet, if Luis Lloréns Torres had written about an 
island daughter, the Asociación defended an island mother.  The Isla Nena Lloréns Torres 
had baptized a few years earlier was not a child anymore, but a mother.  The Asociación, 
in fact, did not employ the name Isla Nena when referring to Vieques.  The name Isla 
Nena, as conceived by the main island poet and politician, metaphorically characterized 
Vieques as a Puerto Rican dependency.  This was a characterization the Asociación did 
not embrace.  The “Hijos de Vieques,” on the contrary, endowed agency to the smaller 
island and its community through the appropriation of motherhood.  Vieques, in this 
context, had nurtured children who were being impoverished and forced into exile.  
These children, nonetheless, could defend the welfare of their mother island, even if to do 
so they had to face the U.S. Navy and Puerto Rican politicians.  In this sense, the 
Asociación and its publication El Eco helped both empower and redefine the Viequense 
community as one unbounded by territorial boundaries.  If in the 19th century the island 
of Vieques had encompassed a transnational community within its shores, by the late 
1940s the Viequense community itself was transnational.65 
The Asociación and its San Juan-based publication helped imagine a Viequense 
community that inhabited and surpassed Vieques’ civilian stretch.  Following Benedict 
Anderson’s arguments about the centrality of print-capitalism in the imagining of 
communities, El Eco de Vieques helped establish a bond across people who did not 
necessarily know each other or share spaces on a regular basis.66  El Eco, though, bonded 
Viequenses through historical narratives linking the people to the island.  Thus, even if 
                                                 
65 Even though I use the term transnational to refer to the post-1930s Viequense community, 
Viequenses technically remained within U.S. territorial boundaries when they migrated to St. Croix, the 
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the publication united a Viequense community across territorial boundaries, it still 
constructed the collective identity in terms of its historical relationship to the island.  In 
1947, for example, the Asociación published in El Eco an article titled “From the history 
of Vieques.”  The article narrated the colony’s January 1, 1844 foundational ceremonies.  
It recounted the placing of the cross where the Catholic parish would be located and the 
settler’s oaths of allegiance to the Spanish Empire.  The colonists, according to the 
article, took the oath: 
Swear by God our lord and by the holy scripts to be faithful and loyal to 
the queen D. Isabel the Second (A.D.G.) defend the nation to the point of 
loosing your lives to keep it in everyone’s enjoyment.  And maintain with 
courage and perseverance the possession of this island as an integral part 
of the Spanish territory, against any foreign aggressor that might present 
itself…Yes, we swear.67 
 
The Viequense readers were thus reminded that their ancestors had once sworn not only 
allegiance to Spain, but to defend, with their lives if necessary, the island against foreign 
aggressors.  This may have been an oath the Asociación wished to revive in the late 
1940s critical context when the island’s population faced unfavorable policies dictated 
from Washington and San Juan.  The formulation of such policies outside Vieques may 
have influenced Germán Rieckehoff and others cultural and political nationalists 
members of the Asociación to appropriate the early 20th century Puerto Rican’s elite 
nostalgic discourse about the good old days under the Spanish Empire.68  Spanish 
                                                 
67 “Juráis por Dios nuestro señor y por los santos evangelios ser fieles y leales a la reina D. Isabel 
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Sección IV, LMM, Presidente del Senado, FLMM. 
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colonialism, in turn, was normalized at the expense of U.S. colonialism that was coded as 
foreign. 
The year 1947 when “From the History of Vieques” was published is incidentally 
the same year that Justo Pastor Ruiz published his Vieques antiguo y moderno.69  This 
book, first one ever written about the history of Vieques, presents a rather folkloric 
interpretation of the island’s past and culture as seen through the eyes of the Ponce-born 
Episcopalian priest.  Pastor Ruiz nonetheless portrayed in the book a critical attitude 
towards the U.S. presence in the island, Puerto Rican policy makers and Vieques’ future.  
He applauded instead the Asociación’s efforts and Rieckehoff’s leadership.  The 
launching of Vieques antiguo y moderno, in fact, had been announced in El Eco.  That 
these two publications surfaced around the same time evidences that in the late 1940s 
there was indeed an audience willing to consume Vieques’ history.  Perhaps in this 
context of crisis there was an audience curious to know more about Vieques or 
demanding narratives that instilled pride to the dispossessed population.  The question to 
ask would be what portions of this audience considered themselves Viequense or actually 
lived in the island.  Yet, even if a significant part of the mostly illiterate and poor 
Viequense audience did not have direct access to these texts, by the 1970s the editor F. 
Ortiz Nieves reminisced that Vieques antiguo y moderno: 
filled a void in the evolution of the inhabitants of that small island that 
even though part of Puerto Rico…it still has an undecipherable something, 
that makes it a little different from the other municipalities.70 
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Rico…aún tiene un no sé que, que la hace un poco diferente de los otros municipios.”  Pastor Ruiz, 






Even if the effect was not immediate, Ortiz Nieves argued that the book acquired a 
central place in Viequense narratives. 
“From the History of Vieques” and Vieques antiguo y moderno were potentially 
empowering texts for the Viequense community to the extent they identified and 
celebrated Viequenses’ cultural uniqueness.  More so, the texts gave visibility to this 
uniqueness through the legitimized space of representation of print media.  Print, in this 
1940s context, safeguarded a culture perceived to be threatened.  The written word 
provide Viequense culture and history a more perdurable and static form.  The static 
quality normalized certain narratives, like the 1844 oath of allegiance, as central to the 
Viequense identity.  It made these narratives readily identifiable to the Viequense 
community.  In this sense, the written word was also able to transform memories and 
other oral stories into history.  After all, the main difference between memory and history 
lies, following Peter Burke, in writing.  It is the act of writing, he argues, that endows 
memories with a more perdurable and selective character.71  Thus, these late 1940s texts 
validated, for example, people’s claims about the bygone times of sugar-driven 
prosperity.  This was a prosperity that they contrasted to the 1940s.72 
By the late 1940s Vieques had become an island of voids, forbidden spaces and 
absences.  The Plaza Hijos Ausentes (Plaza of the Absent Sons) has come to embody 
collective longings for such lost spaces and people (Figure 6.2).73  The pale obelisk-like 
lighthouse in the middle of the small plaza stands next to the Isabel II port, as if to guide 
                                                 
71 Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” Varieties of Cultural History (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997) 43-59. 
72 Pastor Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno 33-36.  6, Serie 7, Pueblos, Sub-Serie Vieques, 
Cartapacio 2656, abril-enero 1947, Sección IV, LMM, Presidente del Senado, FLMM, 2-4. 
73 The Plaza Hijos Ausentes is one of the “placitas” (small plazas) constructed under the 
Administration of Mayor Manuela Santiago.  Mayor Santiago was famous among Viequenses for the 






those who left back to the island.  Yet, this place of remembrance is more likely to shelter 
the dreams of a local drunk taking a midday nap than to guide the return of Viequenses 
Ausentes.  The memorial to the absent sons has instead materialized the scar migration 
imprinted on the local population.  It further symbolizes the broken promises of returns, 
like those my parents made to my grandparents and themselves when they left the island 
in the 1960s.  The Plaza Hijos Ausentes, however, may give the occasional Viequense 
Ausente-turned-visitor the feeling of not being completely forgotten.  The stroll from the 
port to the town may furthermore remind such Ausentes that they still belong to the 
Viequense community.  The Plaza may remind them that they are still the sons and 
daughters of Vieques. 
 





I had barely opened the first folder of documents in the Fundación Luis Muñoz 
Marín when I met my paternal grandfather Flor.  I encountered him in letters and 
                                                 






telegrams he had sent to Muñoz Marín 60 years earlier.  As I handled the yellowish 
documents in the privacy of my research cubicle I fantasized about my grandfather’s life 
after the U.S. Navy made its entrance into Vieques.  I knew Abuelo Flor had been a taxi 
driver, merchant, owner of a small sloop, cattle rancher and even the president of the 
PPD’s municipal committee.  So I envisioned him writing down his frustration with 
partisan politics, with PRIDCO and PRACO’s practices and with everyday life in 
Vieques.  All this he wrote down with the hope Luis Muñoz Marín helped remedy the 
situation.  Apparently, my grandfather had been a muñocista.  He had been a believer in 
the Puerto Rican populist leader and the PPD.  So much I could tell from the historical 
traces I handled.  Yet, there were other traces that could not be so easily grasped, but that 
had accompanied me all my life.  One such trace involved my father.  My father was born 
in November 1944 amidst the commotion surrounding the PPD’s overwhelming victory 
across the archipelago, and amidst Vieques’ worst socio-economic crisis.  My 
grandfather, who I never suspected as the optimist type, named my father Luis for the 
populist leader.  This is a name that my older brother inherited.  Thus, my family can still 
hear the echoes of the 1940s promises of development and social justice. 
My maternal great-grandfather Manuel did not share my Abuelo Flor’s optimism 
in the 1940s.  Still, I have never found him or any of my mother’s family members in the 
dusty documents of an archive.  My great-grandparents and my grandmother Paca were 
illiterate, agregados and very poor.  These are three powerful reasons why historical 
archives forgot them.  They did not produce written texts nor were they, for the most part, 
recorded in legal paperwork.  Yet, I have found them in those historical traces that are not 






great-grandfather’s name, in fact, has been inscribed in the Viequense landscape he was 
expropriated from in the late 1940s.  He did not have a legal title to the land he occupied.  
The Navy, however, after 60 years of practicing amphibious landing through the same 
waters and land, could not erase Manuelquí through the more neutral English name Blue 
Beach (Figures 6.3 and 6.4).  Viequenses, even if most do not remember my great-
grandfather Manuel, have clung to Manuelquí.  The name, moreover, has gained currency 
in post-Navy days and maps perhaps because to some people it is an invitation to imagine 
pre-Navy days. 
 
Figure 6.3: Contemporary photograph of Manuelquí, Vieques75 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Photograph of Manuelquí during 1950s military maneuvers76 
                                                 
75 “Manuelquí (also known as Playa de la Chiva or Blue Beach),” St. John Beach Guide.  St. John 
Beach Guide, 21 November 2007 <http://www.stjohnbeachguide.com/Vieques_HTML/Manuelqui.htm>. 
76 William Warner Harris, Puerto Rico’s Fighting 65th Infantry: From San Juan to Chorwan (San 







For my mother’s family there was no turning back time.  They were expropriated 
during the second 1947-1948 wave.  Most of Abuela Paca’s siblings migrated to St. 
Croix, others went to the U.S. and another one, Uncle or Tío Isá, quickly left for the 
Korean War.  Abuela, as the youngest of the group, followed my great-grandparents to 
the barrio of Pueblo Nuevo in the eastern outskirts of Isabel II.  It was there, in the year 
1950, that my mother María was born.  She did not live the actual expropriation, but was 
still very much trapped in its ripples.  Her childhood, for example, was marked by 
displacement.  Once my great-grandfather died in 1955, she moved with Abuela 
Cocoroco and Abuela Paca from place to place until finally reaching the caserío in 1965.  
The public housing project, an epitome of muñocista development, would be my abuelas’ 
final dwelling.77  It was in that two bedroom apartment in the caserío where I spent most 
of my childhood summers, running past the mural of the PRIDCO man moving the wheel 
of industrialization and picking at my grandmother’s plants all around the apartment.  
Abuela Paca, as if not accepting that the batey days were long gone, grew whatever she 
could put her hands on.  The front lawn of her apartment, then facing the PRIDCO 
                                                 
77 The sociologist Zaire Dinzey-Flores argues that public housing projects in Puerto Rico were 
initially designed, under the auspices of the Puerto Rico Housing Authority created in 1938, to be 
temporary dwellings in the transition of indigent people to home owners.  The projects, however, ended up 
being the permanent residence of many of its dwellers and their descendants due, among other things, to the 
establishment of strong communal bonds among the residents and to the difficulty of making the transition 
to home ownership.  In the case of my grandmother’s stay in the only caserío in the island, named Jardines 
de Vieques (Gardens of Vieques), I do not think it had anything to do with establishing communal bonds 
with her neighbors.  On the contrary, she lived a rather isolated life and most of her friends were not from 
the caserío.  I think that she did not move out because she had nowhere else to go, and simply did not 
aspire to be anywhere else.  She had roamed the island, and as much as she loved to visit us in San Juan, 
she could not stand to be more than two weeks in the Isla Grande.  For my grandmother, her arrival at the 
caserío never represented an echelon in the ladder for self-improvement that urban planners envisioned.  
She arrived there with my mother and great-grandmother after years of being continuously displaced and 
destituted.  I therefore think she understood the caserio as a consolation price for places she had lost.  Zaire 
Z. Dinzey-Flores, “Temporary Housing, Permanent Communities: Public Housing Policy and Design in 






factory, was full of marigolds, herbs and palm trees.  I think she tried to make herself at 
home, but not my mother.  She kept on moving.  In 1966 my mother left Vieques to 
finish high school in Fajardo.  She never moved back and by 1973 had settled to live in 
San Juan with my father.  After 23 years of constantly moving, she finally made herself a 
home in San Juan. 
My mother was not only caught in the inertia of displacement, but in the power of 
stories that predated her birth.  Most of these stories were woven through the memories of 
my abuelas.  These women, who could not read or write, were great storytellers.  They 
told my mother about pre-Navy days in Manuelquí and about the expropriation process.  
My mother, seduced by such powerful narratives, inserted herself in them.  She was, after 
all, their outcome and rightful owner and in such terms she has shared the memories with 
me.  So I hear my own postmemories through my mother’s voice.78 
I was born in 1950 in Pueblo Nuevo where they moved the people, but 
mom [Abuela Paca] was born in 1924…She, Cocoroco and Papá [great-
grandfather Manuel] lived in Manuelquí to the southeast of the island.  
Papá had growing there cassava, sweet potatoes, yam…It must have been 
around the late 1940s when they expropriated them.  They never received 
any money…Papá did not want to leave.  He resisted, so one day they [the 
Navy] came with tractors and destroyed the house and burnt it with his 
plants so he would never return…He never understood that was no more 
his.  I remember he would put me inside the baskets in the horse and take 
me up through Bastimento [to Manuelquí].79 
 
                                                 
78 Marianne Hirsch, “Projected Memory: Holocaust Photographs in Personal and Public Fantasy,” 
Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present, eds., Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe and Leo Spitzer 
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1999) 3-24.  For a discussion of the term postmemory as a 
powerful nonwitness or second-generation memory in the negotiation of personal and collective identities 
see “Chapter 1: Introduction” and “Chapter 7: Isla Nena, Island of Memories and the Dead, 1953-2003.” 
79 “Yo nací en el cinquenta en Pueblo Nuevo donde reubicaban a la gente, pero mami nació en el 
1924…Ella, Cocoroco y Papá [Abuelo Manuel] vivían en Manuelquí al sureste de la isla.  Papá tenía allí 
una tala de yuca, batatas, ñame…Tiene que haber sido alrededor del cuarenta y tanto cuando los 
expropiaron.  Ellos nunca recibieron el dinero…Papá no se quería ir.  El se resistía, así que un día vinieron 
[de la Marina] con tractores y le tumbaron la casa y luego se la quemaron con la tala para que no 
volviera…El nunca entendió que eso no era de él.  Me acuerdo que me montaba en las banastas de la yegua 






I will not inherit a beachfront property from my mother’s family.  I have, nonetheless, 
been given by these extraordinary women something more valuable: memories.  These 
memories, intimately handed down from generation to generation, have allowed me to 
decipher as well as to inscribe myself in the Viequense landscape and history…and to 










Isla Nena, Island of Memories and the Dead, 1953-2003 
 
In a small place, people cultivate small events.  The small event is isolated, blown up, 
turned over and over, and then absorbed into the everyday, so that at any moment it can 
and will roll off the inhabitants of the small place’s tongues. 
Jamaica Kincaid, A Small Place (1988)1 
 
On the night of April 4, 1953 approximately eight U.S. sailors and marines were 
involved in the death of Julián Felipe Francis and the beating of Julio Bermúdez.  The 68 
years old Julián, known as Pepé Christian or simply as Mapepe, was found unconscious 
that Holy Saturday in his bar in the barrio Destino (Destiny).  He had, “multiple fractures 
in the skull –caused by external beatings- in the two areas parietal and occipital.”2  
Mapepe died of a cerebral hemorrhage the following Easter Sunday.  The death, 
prosecutor Lieutenant Robert E. Dunne later argued, was caused by the beating Mapepe 
received at the hands of U.S. marines armed with mango tree branches from the back of 
his bar El Bosque (The Forest).3  The killing, people in Vieques whispered, was caused 
by Mapepe’s defense of a woman. 
The death of an old man in a small place could have been a small event.  Yet, as 
the Antiguan-born Jamaica Kincaid has so keenly noted, “in a small place, people 
                                                 
1 Jamaica Kincaid, A Small Place (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1988) 52. 
2 Eddie Vázquez Otero, “Consejo de Guerra: Militar dice vió compañero acusado arrancar ramas 
con que alegan mataron anciano Vieques,” El mundo [San Juan] 20 May 1953: 12. 
3 “Van a Acusar Dos Marinos Caso Vieques: Acusación Será por Homicidio,” El mundo [San Juan] 






cultivate small events.”  Indeed, in a small place like Vieques people cultivate small 
events until they are not small anymore.  The killing of Mapepe is the perfect example of 
such a small event that people in Vieques did not let go.  They isolated it, turned it over 
and over and blew it up until the killing of Mapepe became part of their everyday lives, 
ready to roll off their tongues at any moment.  In turn, the small event, or more 
accurately, the memory of the small event became emblematic of the Viequense-U.S. 
Navy relationship in the late 20th century. 
The killing of Mapepe is a formative postmemory in the Viequense collective 
memory negotiated over the last 65 years with the presence and practices of their once 
Navy neighbor.4  In these collective yet very personal negotiations the Navy has served 
as an oppositional masculine text.  This has been a contradictory text despised for its 
violent and lustful demeanor, but also admired for its military and technological might.  
Around and despite this oppositional text, Viequenses have imagined memories and 
identities of resistance.  The imagining has often taken the form of cultural productions 
and social movements narrating the killing of Mapepe as an empowering postmemory of 
a brave man that, although old and outnumbered, stood up to defend “his” woman against 
sailors and marines.  In this sense, the postmemory of the killing of Mapepe is as an act 
of resistance grounded in the present that, nonetheless, shapes a past where Mapepe’s 
physical death takes a secondary place to the continuous intergenerational performance of 
the gerund killing.  The gerund killing, after all, is a noun made of the verb “kill” and the 
ending “ing” that invokes an action that has not ended.  In this light, Mapepe is not really 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of the term postmemory as a powerful nonwitness or second-generation memory 
in the negotiation of personal and collective identities see “Chapter 1: Introduction” and Marianne Hirsch, 
“Projected Memory: Holocaust Photographs in Personal and Public Fantasy,” Acts of Memory: Cultural 
Recall in the Present, eds. Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe and Leo Spitzer (Hanover: University Press of New 






dead but incessantly revived, only to be killed again and again by those who appropriate 
the memory of his killing to narrate, like me, their own histories. 
The Killing of Mapepe was, in many ways, set to happen since the year 1948.  
The event even had the poetic qualities of a tragic destiny at work.  As if guided by a 
carefully planned script: during the Catholic Holy Week in Destino the man known as 
Pepé Christian was killed with branches from the back of El Bosque.  Yet, what happened 
to Mapepe could have taken place anywhere in Vieques’ civilian sector after 1948.  The 
second expropriation wave of 1947-1948 both squeezed Viequenses into an 8,296-acre 
land strip between two naval bases and marked the beginning of massive military 
practices in the island.5  The first exercise, according to Arturo Meléndez López, brought 
in January 16, 1948 approximately 60 warships, 350 airplanes and thousands of sailors, 
marines, pilots and soldiers to Vieques.6  By February 25, 1950, 160 ships, 700 planes 
and 80,000 Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force personnel coincided in Vieques for, “the 
nation’s biggest peacetime amphibious maneuver.”7  In time, the sound of explosions, the 
sight of warships and jets and the overwhelming presence of servicemen became part of 
everyday life for Viequenses.  The military practices, in fact, were never really confined 
to NASD and AFWTA.  The Navy, for example, used civilian roads to transport their 
personnel and equipment between the bases.  The Navy also reserved the right to use 
Vieques’ airspace and surrounding waters.8  Viequenses, therefore, were accustomed to 
                                                 
5 See “Chapter 6: The Arrival of the U.S. Navy, 1930-1950.” 
6 Arturo Meléndez López, La batalla de Vieques (México: COPEC-CECOPE) 78. 
7 The exercise commenced on February 25, 1950 lasted until March 11, 1950.  It was such a huge 
event that seven lives were lost due to accidents during the military maneuvers.  United States, Department 
of the Navy, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1947-1964, by Ralph W. Donnelly, 
Gabrielle M. Neufeld and Carolyn A. Tyson, vol. III (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1971) 11. 
8 The Navy not only reserved for itself the right to use Vieques’ airspace and surrounding waters, 






seeing military convoys drive through their roads, warships navigate through their shores 
and jets fly through their skies.  The military personnel, in addition, were given leaves to 
recreate themselves in the island’s civilian sector. 
The leaves of absence Navy officers granted to servicemen was, according to 
Vice Admiral Daniel Barbey, “the most important contribution [the Navy made] to the 
economy of the Island.”9  He estimated that during the 1948-1949 exercises military 
personnel spent approximately $4,000,000 in the local economy.  Thus, the Navy, 
following Barbey, was actually doing local residents a favor when after January 16, 1948 
thousands of sailors, marines, pilots and soldiers roamed the streets of civilian Vieques.  
However, the social cost of dropping off men from all over the United States by the 
truckloads in the middle of Isabel II was silenced.10  Placed in a colonial context where 
the majority of the local population, including Mapepe, was colored according to U.S. 
standards, these men swelled the streets of Isabel II and surrounding barrios in their 
search for amusement.11  This was, as high-ranking Navy officials were well aware, a 
                                                 
9 “C40-6-VI-1,” Folder Vieques C40-6-VI, Puerto Rico 40PR, Box 1106, Bureau of Yards and 
Docks, Naval Property Case Files, 1941-1958, RG 71, NARA, College Park, MD, 3. 
10 Military personnel usually flocked to Isabel II because the town of Esperanza in the island’s 
southern coast was much smaller.  In 1964, for example, only 75 families were established in Esperanza.  
Asamblea Municipal de Vieques, “Resolución Núm. 62.  Serie 1963-1964,” 36, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 
13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 54, 1964-1963, Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de 
Puerto Rico, FLMM, San Juan, 1. 
11 According to Arturo Meléndez López, the January 16, 1948 exercise brought thousands of 
servicemen to Vieques among which were 2,000 Puerto Ricans.  Considering that Puerto Ricans were a 
minority in the armed forces and, in fact, not allowed to officially enroll in the Navy, the exercise must 
have brought at least 4,000 men to Vieques.  If the February 21, 1950 exercise brought 80,000 men to 
Vieques, it could be argued that the average exercise during the late 1940s and 1950s must have brought at 
least 3,000 men to Vieques.  Considering that the population of Isabel II in 1950 was approximately 3,100, 
it can furthermore be argued that the urban population grew exponentially during the times of exercises in 
the 1950s.  Meléndez López, La batalla de Vieques 78.  Puerto Rico, Junta de Planificación, Plano 






potentially dangerous situation.12  Yet, in April of 1953 4,000 to 32,000 of military men 
traversed civilian Vieques.13  The stage was then set for the killing of Mapepe. 
In the 1950s Vieques, spaces like the Ocean View Hotel and Mapepe’s bar El 
Bosque allowed for a mixed civilian-military coexistence.  This was a tense, if not 
outright hostile, coexistence in which the consumption of alcohol set the tone (Figure 
7.1).  The nights, therefore, usually ended in these places with some degree of violence, 
or, as Viequenses say, like the rosario de la aurora. (dawn’s rosary).14  The brawls many 
times took to the streets and ended only when the local and the Military Police (MP) 
appeared to separate the combatants.  The Municipal Police dealt with Viequenses and 
the MP with the servicemen (Figure 7.2).  Inside such a volatile atmosphere, the death of 
Mapepe was neither the first nor last fatal incident between U.S. servicemen and 
Viequenses.  According to the Mayor of Vieques Dámaso Serrano, Mapepe forms part of 
                                                 
12 The Navy was well aware of the tensions that arose in colonial contexts where white military men, 
especially from the U.S. south, encountered a “colored population.”  On March 31, 1919 the then Secretary 
of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote about racial incidents in St. Thomas to the Maryland lawyer 
James C. Waters Jr.  In order to address Waters concerns about the transplantation of U.S. racism in St. 
Thomas, Roosevelt cited a report from the Governor of the Virgin Islands Rear Admiral J.H. Oliver of the 
U.S. Navy.  Roosevelt cited that: “The worst element of the colored population is always out [in Christmas] 
and the Policemaster reports that on Christmas Eve each year there are several, more or less, serious 
fights…During last Christmas Eve street fights took place between some of the marines stationed at St. 
Thomas with sailors from the U.S.S. Baltimore on one side and some of the colored population on the 
other…stones were thrown by both enlisted personnel and natives…Statements have been made that the 
marines and sailors planned the assault upon the negroes.”  352, Folder 28759 (350) to (402), Box 2742, 
Secretary of the Navy, General Correspondence, 1916-1926, RG 80, NARA, Washington, D.C. 
13 Viequense merchants informally cited the 4,000 figure during an April 9, 1953 conversation with 
Coronel F.B. Loomis of the Marine Corps.  Confidential Navy records, however, recorded that 32,000 men 
coincided in Vieques between February 15 and May 7, 1953 for the PHIBEX 2-53 and TRAEX III 
exercises.  “Comerciantes De Vieques Repudian Actitud Alcalde,” El Imparcial [San Juan] 10 April 1953: 
29.  “C40-6-VI-1,” Folder Vieques C40-6-VI #2 Puerto Rico 40PR, Box 1106, Bureau of Yards and Docks, 
Naval Property Case Files, 1941-1958, RG 71, NARA, College Park, MD, Enclosure (1). 
14 The rosarios de la aurora were religious as well as social events in Vieques where people 
gathered to pray until until the early dawn.  The host of the event usually provided the prayers with 
alcoholic drinks and even children, if lucky, could have a sip.  It was supposedly a common occurrence for 
people to show up not only to pray but for the free alcohol and for the rosarios to end with a brawl between 
intoxicated prayers.  Therefore, sealing the night with a brawl came to be known in Vieques as “like the 






an extensive list of deaths that tie the 1940s to the present.15  The Mayor himself 
remembers how in 1963 the stationed officer at Camp García’s entrance gate, when dared 
by a third person, shot 12 years old Aníbal Correa.16  He recalls that Aníbal was playing 
around, begging for money, when the young black man shot him and how, as if by a 
tragic twist of fate, the Navy gave his family approximately $10,000 to settle the matter.17  
Yet, the fisherman Carlos Ventura goes back to the times predating the military bases to 
tell the story of how one day father and son Domingo and Anastacio Acosta, while riding 
back home from the “corrals” the Navy had kept them in during the day, stepped on a 
land mine that killed them both.18  Then one day in July 1940 Juan Martínez and Johnny 
Maisonet were run over by a military truck.19  One day Urbano Rosario was stabbed, and 
one day in 1953 Mapepe was beaten to death. 
 
Figure 7.1: Military personnel drinking outside the Ocean View Hotel in 1942, Isabel II, Vieques20 
 
                                                 
15 For an actual list of Viequenses whose deaths were reportedly related to the Navy presence in the 
island see 1, Agresiones Físicas-Marina, Archivo Vertical, FCM, Vieques. 
16 Dámaso Serrano, personal interview, 27 February 2001. 
17 According to my father Luis Cruz, the Navy burried expired rations inside their bases.  Viequense 
youth, poor, hungry and maybe a little bored, used to traspass into Navy property in search of these rations.  
The enterprise of gathering the food the Navy had deemed unfit for its personnel was very risky.  
Apparently military personnel did not have a problem with shoting at these young scavengers.  María Soto 
and Luis Cruz, personal interview, 25 February 2001. 
18 Carlos Ventura, personal interview, 28 February 2001.  For a discussion of the “corrals” and the 
Navy practices in Vieques before the formal establishment of bases see “Chapter 6: The Arrival of the U.S. 
Navy, 1930-1950.” 
19 The U.S. House of Representatives discussed in May 5, 1953 a project to award $15,000 to each 
of the families of Juan Martínez and Johnny Maisonet for the loss of their sons on July 14, 1940.  “Piden 
Indemnicen Familias Vieques,” El mundo [San Juan] 6 May 1953: 20. 







Figure 7.2: Military Policeman, young lady and Municipal Policeman in the Ocean View Hotel in 
1942, Isabel II, Vieques21 
 
The way Mapepe died is not clear.  Following what could be considered the 
official version posted in the Museum and Archive Fortín Conde de Mirasol, Julián 
Felipe Francis and 73 years old Julio Bermúdez were beaten because of the first’s refusal 
to sell beer to some U.S. marines in his bar El Bosque.  The Fortín, managed by historian 
and community activist Robert Rabin, might be the legitimized space for the narration of 
Vieques’ history.22  Yet, the undisciplined versions that circulate outside the Fortín deny 
such an official story.  It is common belief among Viequenses that Mapepe was killed 
because he refused the U.S. sailors sexual access to a Viequense woman.  The woman 
was a famous prostitute renowned throughout the island for being incredibly beautiful, so 
beautiful that clients asked for her by name.  She was also racially white, which might 
have been rare among the island’s prostitute population and which might also explain her 
popularity with the local and U.S. clients.  As the rumours go, the night of April 4, 1953 
marines and sailors came to El Bosque asking for the señorita.  Yet, Mapepe had fallen in 
                                                 
21 Cantazaro 54. 
22 In 1991 the Fortín Conde de Mirasol was refurbished with the aid of the Institute of Puerto Rican 
Culture and transformed into a museum and archive.  The efforts of its director Robert Rabin have 
transformed the Fortín into an important site for historical research about Vieques.  The Fortín’s archive, 
however, is a community project without hired personnel or official funding.  Ignacio Olazagasti and 
Robert Rabin, Notas para la historia del Fortín Conde de Mirasol y la isla de Vieques, 2nd ed. (San Juan: 






love with the prostitute and planned to honor her through marriage.  Echoing the story of 
Jesus Christ and Mary Magdalene, that night Mapepe stood up to approximately eight 
military men and saved the young woman hiding behind the wooden door of the only 
room in the bar.23 
If the Fortín posted the sexually cleansed version, the whispers of Viequenses 
circulated the romantic one.24  What happened that night might be lost to the inquisitive 
historian so fascinated with the world of the dead.  Some conclusions, however, can be 
made about the killing of Mapepe by navigating the different versions surrounding the 
event.  For example, these diverging narratives coincide that Mapepe owned a bar that 
sold alcohol in the barrio Destino.  Its location near the entrance gate of Camp García 
made it a likely spot for military personnel to stop by on their way to and from Isabel II, 
more so considering that the bar was one third up the road to Isabel II.  The bar, 
furthermore, was apparently open the night of the Holy Saturday.  This was a special 
night that Viequenses celebrated with music and dancing.  Mapepe, therefore, opened his 
establishment and Julio Bermúdez and Zenón Camacho Morales came in, as well as at 
least another eight sailors and marines.25  The rest of what transpired that night between 
Mapepe and the sailors is up to pure speculation.  Yet, I can envision a hardened old man 
used to the tension of managing a place where Viequenses and sailors converged.  He 
was probably accustomed to infuse his voice with a harshness that could cover up his age.  
                                                 
23 Antonio, Flor Hiram Cruz, María Soto and Luis Cruz, personal interview, 25 February 2001. 
24 The whispered versions, for example, tend to omit that Mapepe was a married man.  Manuel 
Pérez, Pedro Delerme and Mari Jo Gutiérrez, personal interview, 28 February 2001. 
25 Zenón Camacho Morales is usually not mentioned in relation to the killing of Mapepe.  Yet, he 







For when the tough act did not work, he must have kept a machete hidden but handy.26  I 
also envision drunken sailors and marines, on their way back from Isabel II, stopping at 
El Bosque for a last drink or maybe for the white señorita.27  They found, however, “dark 
skinned” Mapepe poised with, “his arms crossed and a machete in his hand.”28  It was the 
68 years old and dark skinned Mapepe standing between them and the señorita.  Calling 
on Mapepe’s bluff, their intoxicated minds must have flown back home to access racial 
registers that would not tolerate any attitude from a black man, much less from a Puerto 
Rican black man.29  Perhaps their minds went back to the long tradition of lynching 
unruly subjects in the U.S.30  Sergeant Merl F. Bennett’s mind, in fact, could have easily 
travelled back to the famous 1930 lynching of Thomas Shipp and Abram Smith in 
Marion, Indiana, because Mapepe that night embodied both an unruly colonized and 
                                                 
26 During the court-martial the defense attorneys produced a machete that the Police supposedly 
found in El Bosque.  The ownership of a machete was a fairly common practice among the owners of 
establishment in mid 20th century Vieques.  Eddie Vázquez Otero, “Bennett Admite Golpeó a Civil: 
Acusado en el Crimen Vieques Dió Testimonio,” El mundo [San Juan] 22 May 1953: 21. 
27 During an ensuing court-martial, the Private First Class John A. Bailey of the Marine Corps 
testified that six marines, including him, were dropped off at El Bosque the night of the killing of Mapepe.  
He further admitted to being very drunk that night.  Private First Class Edward G. Whitbeck, part of 
Bailey’s group that night, also admitted during the court-martial to being very drunk.  Presumably, the 
other marines were drunk too since they were all returning from an outing in Isabel II.  Private First Class 
Neil R. Jenkins of the Marine Corps, part of the six-marines group, later testified that he went into El 
Bosque, bought some whiskey and fell asleep.  Vázquez Otero, “Consejo de Guerra,” El mundo 1.  
Vázquez Otero, “Bennett Admite,” El mundo 1, 21.  Eddie Vázquez Otero, “Caso de Vieques: Juez 
Reprende Fiscal Que Hizo Corrección a Plano Presentado,” El mundo [San Juan] 21 May 1953: 22. 
28 “de tez oscura que tenía los brazos cruzados y un machete en la mano.”  Vázquez Otero, “Caso de 
Vieques,” El mundo 22. 
29 According to Pedro Delerme and Manuel Perez, the U.S. sailors and marines attempted to 
interpellate Viequenses through terms like “blacks” and “Puerto Rican Fuket.”  These terms must have 
echoed previous experiences with other African American and Puerto Rican groups in the U.S. mainland.  
Thus, the usage of such terms represented a transplantation of racial and ethnic registers into the Viequense 
colonial context.  Pedro Delerme further remembers that the derogative terms were soon appropriated and 
made readily available by Viequenses as responses in future encounters with military personnel.  Pérez, 
Delerme and Gutiérrez, personal interview. 
30 During the 1950s the practice of lynching black people was still commonplace in some states of 
the U.S.  The practice, more than a crime of hate, was usually designed as a violent spectacle that could 
impart fear to the surviving black population.  Such was the case, according to the journalist William 
Bradford Huie, in the August 1955 murder of the 14 years old black boy Emmett Till in the state of 
Mississippi.  Bradford Huie published an article based on the confession of the acquitted killers.  William 
Bradford Huie, “The Shocking Story of Approved Killing in Mississippi,” American Experience, 2003, 






racialized subject.31  Private First Class Edward G. Whitbeck might have travelled back 
to experiences with Puerto Ricans in Brooklyn, New York.32  The killing of Mapepe was 
indeed a crime of hate.  If the sailors and marines sought either beer or a woman, they 
could have forced the old man into submission to take what they wanted.  Still, the 
marines smashed Mapepe’s brain, in the process trashed his bar, and then fled the 
establishment.33  The violent act, thus, had the qualities of a lesson imparted on an 
insolent black man that dared to curtail sexual access to a colonized yet white woman. 
People in Vieques might have believed and whispered that Mapepe was a 
procurer of prostitutes and El Bosque a bar-brothel.  Five days after his death, however, 
Mapepe’s reputation was officially wiped clean by the Municipal Council.  The Council 
endowed the victim with a posthumous eulogy in the form of the April 10, 1953 
Resolución Núm. 12 (Resolution No. 12). 
To strengthen more our demand for justice and our Protest, [the U.S. 
marines] criminally kill an honest man, a working man, of irreproachable 
conduct, noble heart and a man of good, they take his precious life through 
blows and kicks, and not satisfied with this, they wreck his business and 
badly assault, also, another old man from our town (very respectable), by 
                                                 
31 Sergeant Merl F. Bennett of the Marine Corps, who later during a court-martial admitted to 
beating Mapepe with the branch from a mango tree, was a native of Allen, Indiana.  Born in 1932, he was 
only two years and less than 50 miles north from the August 7, 1930 lynching in Marion, Indiana.  Vázquez 
Otero, “Bennett Admite,” El mundo 1.  “Jurado Exonera Los 2 Marinos Caso de Vieques,” El mundo [San 
Juan] 25 May 1953: 23. 
32 Private First Class Edward G. Whitbeck of the Marine Corps, involved in the beating of Mapepe, 
was a native of Brooklyn, New York.  According to Kal Wagenheim in the year 1950 there were 301,375 
Puerto Ricans in the United States.  The overwhelming majority of this Puerto Rican migrant population of 
the late 1940s and early 1950s settled in New York, especially in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Harlem.  
Mapepe’s nephew and foster child, in fact, lived in New York since 1927.  The immigration trend to New 
York was so strong that among the May 2, 1953 front-page articles of the newspaper El mundo was one 
titled “New York Tiene Más Boricuas Que San Juan” (“New York Has More Puerto Ricans than San 
Juan”).  The article cited 375,000 Puerto Ricans living in New York by 1953.  Therefore, Whitbeck must 
have had previous experiences with Puerto Ricans in New York prior to his arrival in Vieques.  “Jurado 
Exonera,” El mundo 23.  Benjamín Santana, “Lamentan Civiles Isla Vieques No Cooperen Aclaración 
Crimen.”  El mundo [San Juan] 15 April 1953: 2.  “Van a Acusar Dos Marinos,” El mundo 1.  See 
Appendix 21. 
33 Dr. Edgardo Ortiz that attended Mapepe on the day he died and later performed his autopsy stated 
that the multiple fractures in Mapepe’s skull must have resulted from repeated blows.  He noted that a 






beating him in the head and other parts of the body, saved miraculously 
from the criminal hands of the assailants.34 
 
The resolution publicly stated that Mapepe, an innocent victim of U.S. marines, died an 
honest and working man of irreproachable conduct.  The Municipal Council did not 
attempt through the document to explain the actual killing of Mapepe, but instead 
concentrated on the unacceptable collective behavior of drunken marines in the civilian 
sector.  Such a sanitized version voided the killing of its particularities and made it 
emblematic of the violent relationship between Viequenses and the U.S. marines and 
sailors.  The document, furthermore, opened the door for the Fortín’s version 
emphasizing on the general drunkenness of the military in Vieques.  Although, it is 
unlikely that Mapepe was killed for refusing to sell beer since Private First Class Neil R. 
Jenkins later testified in a court-martial that he bought whiskey in El Bosque just prior to 
the violent events of April 4, 1953.35 
Mapepe was not the first Viequense to die at the hands of U.S. military personnel.  
His death was, nonetheless, the first to be brought to justice.  Justice, however, is a 
problematical concept when applied to the U.S. military’s actions in a colonial context.  
The Navy, as personally approved by Rear Admiral Austin K. Doyle, indicted two 
marines for the voluntary homicide of Mapepe: Sergeant Merl F. Bennett and Private 
First Class Edward G. Whitbeck.  Rear Admiral Doyle, in fact, appointed the judge, 
prosecutor and defenders for the public court-martial that took place between May 19th 
                                                 
34 “Para robustecer más nuestra demanda de justicia y nuestra Protesta, [los marinos 
estadounidenses] matan criminalmente a un hombre honrado, trabajador, de conducta intachable, corazón 
noble y hombre de bien, tronchan su preciosa vida a palos y patadas, y no conforme con esto, le destrozan 
su negocio y atropellan, además, malamente a otro anciano de nuestro pueblo (muy respetable), dándole 
golpes por la cabeza y otras partes del cuerpo, salvándose milagrosamente de las manos criminales de sus 
asaltantes.”  Asamblea Municipal de Vieques, “Resolución Núm. 12.  Serie 1952-1953,” April 10, 1953, 
14, Agresiones Físicas-Marina, Archivo Vertical, FCM, 2. 






and May 23rd of 1953 in the San Juan Naval Base.36  In the trial that ensued two marines 
testified to witnessing how Sergeant Bennett took down two branches from a mango tree 
behind El Bosque.  One of them, who happened to be Puerto Rican, further stated that a 
group of marines had tried to force their entrance to the bedroom adjoined to the bar, but 
that Mapepe, unarmed, confronted them.  Then, the Puerto Rican continued, Bennett and 
another marine named John A. Bailey took down two branches from the mango tree and 
returned to the bar.  Still, a third marine testified to having seen Bennett and Whitbeck 
argue with Mapepe and to later seeing two marines beat the old man with sticks.  
Sergeant Bennett himself confessed to beating Mapepe with the branch of a mango tree 
and to watching Whitbeck hit Mapepe with the other branch.  It even came up in the trial 
that he had previously confessed to making a pass that night to the aforementioned 
señorita.  Private First Class Whitbeck, for his part, testified that he had been too drunk 
to remember much.37  Notwithstanding the witnesses, possible motive and confessions, 
both Bennett and Whitbeck were declared not guilty on May 23, 1953.  The court-
martial, therefore, put forth another version of the killing of Mapepe.  In this version, the 
marines were not guilty.  On the contrary, the defense attorneys argued, the outcome 
proved that while the marines accused never had malicious intentions and could not be 
connected to the crime, civilians with machetes had portrayed a hostile attitude towards 
the servicemen.38  Whatever the divergent versions surrounding the killing of Mapepe, 
Viequenses have remembered that for the first time in approximately 15 years of tense 
military-civilian coexistence suspects appeared from behind the fences of the Navy bases 
                                                 
36 “Van a Acusar Dos Marinos,” El mundo 1. 
37 Vázquez Otero, “Consejo de Guerra,” El mundo 1.  Vázquez Otero, “Caso de Vieques,” El mundo 
22.  Vázquez Otero, “Bennett Admite,” El mundo 1, 21. 






to be publicly court-martial.39  More importantly, Viequenses have remembered that the 
suspects were later acquitted.  Without probably knowing it, the U.S. Navy created in 
1953 the first Viequense martyr.  Later, other martyrs would come to accompany 
Mapepe’s memory; and transform Isla Nena into an island of martyrs or an island-martyr.  
The transformation, however, took some decades in the making. 
The outcome of the 1953 trial did not stir Viequenses into a cohesive social 
movement that could critique and challenge Navy practices in the island, especially not in 
the magnitude of the movement that followed the 1999 death of David Sanes.  If people 
resented the court-martial verdict, they did so quietly.  Their whispers of alternative 
versions of the killing vented their silenced rebelliousness.  Those 50 years wedged 
between the two deaths made all the difference.  The killing of Mapepe, just like the 
second expropriation wave of 1947-1948, took place within a larger Cold War context 
that made difficult the surfacing of vocal dissenting stances against U.S. policies.  
Stemming from the capitalism vs. communism dichotomy, Cold War discourses 
constructed binary oppositions that marginalized those considered on the wrong side of a 
black-and-white world.  These hegemonic discourses, in turn, combined with a particular 
brand of Puerto Rican cultural nationalism to both redefine the archipelago’s relationship 
to the American hemisphere and to cast suspicion at the enemy within the colonial 
borders.40 
                                                 
39 According to Manuel Pérez, Pedro Delerme, Carlos Ventura and others, when a civilian filed 
charges against a sailor or marine, which was not that common, Navy officials hid the accused person and 
brought out instead a handful of similar looking men for the civilian to identify. Pérez, Delerme and 
Gutiérrez, personal interview.  Ventura, personal interview. 
40 For an analysis of the early Cold War context, memory and the Puerto Rican national imaginary 






The 1950s was a pivotal decade in Puerto Rican history.  Luis Muñoz Marín, 
Governor of Puerto Rico from 1949 to 1964, surrounded by a group of idealist public 
servants like Teodoro Moscoso formulated the three big government projects of the time: 
Operation Bootstrap, the Estado Libre Asociado (Associated Free State or ELA) and 
Operation Serenity.41  The ELA, formally inaugurated on July 25, 1952, transformed the 
archipelago into the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.42  To the extent the commonwealth 
status implied a voluntary association to the U.S., the ELA ideologues had to refashion 
political and nationalist discourses surrounding Puerto Rico.  The institutionalization of 
the ELA, in other words, required the redefinition of Puerto Rican cultural nationalism 
while discouraging, or outrightly repressing, expressions of its political version.43  
Cultural and political nationalism had been inseparable in the Puerto Rican imaginary 
until then, especially during the 1930s heyday of the Nationalist Party and its leader 
Pedro Albizu Campos.  In the 1950s, however, ELA ideologues were engaged in a 
nation-building project within a colonial context that did not support the 
nation=state=people equation.  Instead, they pushed forth a new political identity for 
Puerto Rico under the commonwealth status and a new cultural one under Operation 
                                                 
41 The Operation Bootstrap under Teodoro Moscoso was put into place in the late 1940s.  For a 
discussion of Operation Bootstrap see “Chapter 6: The Arrival of the U.S. Navy, 1930-1950.” 
42 Luis Muñoz Marín help found the PPD on separatist ideals.  These, however, were soon 
abandoned in order to privilege socio-economic reforms for Puerto Rico.  Historians like Francisco Scarano 
have argued that Muñoz was deeply influenced by what he considered the unfavorable economic terms of 
the 1946 independence of the Philippines from the U.S.  In turn, once Governor of Puerto Rico, Muñoz 
lobbied for a Puerto Rican-made constitution that would rule the internal workings of the Puerto Rican 
government.  In 1950 the U.S. Congress approved Law 600 allowing for such a Constitutional Assembly.  
The creation of the Assembly was approved by a 1951 referendum and the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that the Assembly drafted was subsequently approved through a 1952 
referendum.  The Constitution was put into effect on July 25, 1952, exactly 54 years after the U.S. invasion 
of Puerto Rico.  Francisco Scarano, Puerto Rico: Cinco siglos de historia (San Juan: McGraw-Hill, 1993) 
772-733. 
43 The Nationalist Party, for example, opposed the creation of a Constitutional Assembly.  They 
regarded the Assembly as a colonial farce.  In turn, members of the Nationalist Party staged an armed 
revolt in October of 1950.  The revolt, however, was put down through an impressive show of force and did 






Serenity.44  The nation-building project was adapted to the early panamericanism of the 
Cold War context.  Puerto Rico, these men argued, came to embody in the 1950s “the 
best of two worlds.”  It boasted the Spanish heritage and Latin American culture while 
upholding, once the ELA was approved and the archipelago was supposedly no longer a 
colony, the democratic and economic principles of the U.S.45  The privileged position, 
these ideologues continued, dictated that Puerto Rico assume a leadership role in 
establishing an intra-hemispheric dialogue.46  While this was mostly a self-appointed 
role, U.S. politicians saw the opportunity of advancing their regional interests.  A stable, 
capitalist and prosperous Puerto Rico could, after all, showcase the benefits of U.S. 
influence.  Such a showcase became more convenient, and even mandatory, after 1959 
when the Cuban Revolution threatened to spread its revolutionary influence to other Latin 
American nations.47 
                                                 
44 Operation Serenity was a cultural nationalist initiative designed to accompany the economic and 
political changes the Puerto Rican society was undergoing in the mid 20th century.  It was a cultural 
nationalist project defined in opposition to political nationalism.  Luis Muñoz Marín and his aides wanted 
to foster Puerto Rican cultural expressions and pride, without inspiring secessionist ideals.  Operation 
Serenity, in fact, was carried out without the word nation.  Puerto Ricans, instead, were referred to by 
Operation Serenity ideologues as a “people.”  This is an important distinction, because the word nation 
carry certain territorial and sovereignty expectations.  See, for example, Lenny A. Ureña Valerio, “Arturo 
Morales Carrión: el intelectual autonomista y la construcción del imaginario nacional puertorriqueño en los 
años de la posguerra (1945-1965),” diss., Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2000. 
45 The ELA ideologues must have been influenced by intellectuals like José Enrique Rodó who 
argued for the superiority of Latin American culture over U.S. materialism.  These ideologues also 
responded to Puerto Rican nationalist discourses, as expressed by Pedro Albizu Campos, that emphasized 
on the Spanish and to a lesser degree the mixed-race heritage to the expense of an African one.  See, for 
example, José Enrique Rodó, Ariel (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2000).  And Pedro Albizu Campos, La 
conciencia nacional puertorriqueña (México: Siglo veintiuno editores, sa., 1972). 
46 Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, for example, met in the White House during May of 1953 with 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and other staff members like the Director of the Phsychological Strategy 
Board C.D. Jackson to emphasize the prominent role Puerto Rico could play in U.S. foreign policies 
towards Latin America.  Henry Raymont, “Muñoz Discute Con Asesor de Ike Papel Isla en 
Latinoamérica,” El mundo [San Juan] 9 May 1953: 1. 
47 Puerto Rico was a double-edged sword to the U.S.  It could showcase the benefits of U.S. 
influence or be a weak point through which to criticize U.S. imperialism.  Luis Muñoz Marín, aware of this 







The 1950s nation-building project, as carried out within the colonial and Cold War 
context, depended on disciplined subjects that did not challenge the Puerto Rican or U.S. 
governments.48  There could be no dissenters within the commonwealth borders.  The 
Government of Puerto Rico thus employed the ley de la mordaza (Gag Law) that made it 
illegal to plan or attempt to overthrow the government.49  Given the militancy of the 
Nationalist Party, the Gag Law was expanded to proscribe nationalist expressions or any 
type of critique towards the Puerto Rican or U.S. governments.  Puerto Rican nationalists 
and critics of the status quo were therefore quickly casted on the wrong side of Cold War, 
and colonial, dichotomies.  Caught inside such Manichean oppositions, Puerto Ricans 
were simultaneously victims and perpetrators.  The pleas of Viequenses, in this sense, 
were many times silenced in the main island as well as in Vieques under a discourse of 
the sacrifices to be made for the free world.  This was a world ELA ideologues hoped 
Puerto Rico would belong to.  Thus, Viequenses in the 1950s, already lacking physical 
space, lacked spaces for political maneuvering.  The limited spaces available were full of 
contradictions.  On the one hand, the island was defined as central to the Puerto Rican-
                                                 
48 The establishment of the ELA was a clear “from above” nation-building project.  The ELA 
ideologues, working within the restrictions of a colonial state, still had the state apparatus at their disposal 
with its resources and monopolistic claims to violence.  Among the resources was the public education 
system. 
49 The Government of Puerto Rico passed on June 10, 1948 Law #43, otherwise known as the Gag 
Law.  It was also known as the Little Smith Act since it was modeled after the U.S. Smith Act of 1940.  
The Gag Law made it illegal to plan or attempt to overthrow the government in the island.  Given the 
colonial context in Puerto Rico, nationalist expressions like raising the Puerto Rican flag were also made 
illegal.  The Law, in fact, curtailed the freedom of expression and was therefore revoked in 1957.  
Nonetheless, scholars like Ivonne Acosta have argued that the Gag Law was an instrument of Luis Muñoz 
Marín and the ELA designed to silence opposition, especially in the form of the Nationalist Party and its 
leader Pedro Albizu Campos.  The Gag Law, in fact, allowed the government to imprision Albizu Campos 
in 1950.  The Gag Law made clear it that in the 1950s Puerto Rican nationalists, not on board with ELA 
ideologues, were on the wrong side of Cold War dichotomies.  The Gag Law had long-lasting 
consecuences that carried into the 1980s and the problem with profiling “subversives.”  Ivonne Acosta-
Lespier, “The Smith Act Goes to San Juan: La Mordaza, 1948-1957,” Puerto Rico under Colonial 
Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights, eds. Ramón Bosque-Pérez and José Javier 
Colón Morera (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) 59-65.  Also see Ramón Bosque Pérez 
and José Javier Colón Morera, eds., Las Carpetas: Persecución política y derechos civiles en Puerto Rico 






U.S. relationship due to the obvious military interests of the U.S.  On the other hand, 
those same interests rendered invisible Viequenses’ pleas about lack of lands, 
unemployment, ghettoization of Viequense communities and civilian-military tensions.  
There simply could not exist dissenting voices against the embodiment of the free world, 
which was, of course, the U.S. military.  Such discursive transfiguration of the U.S. 
serviceman into the embodiment of the free world must discouraged public condemnation 
of the outcome of the Bennett-Whitbeck court-martial. 
The U.S. military was not the only transfigured entity in the 1950s Viequense 
scenario.  Decades earlier Luis Lloréns Torres had transfigured Vieques into Isla Nena 
through a poem of the same name.50  The poem, subsequently echoed by different 
cultural texts, originated an enduring myth of origins about mother and daughter islands 
that by the 1950s had captured Viequense’ imaginations.51  The myth, in turn, translated 
into a concrete political project establishing a feminine familial bond between Vieques 
and Puerto Rico.  Vieques was the infant and Puerto Rico the protective parent.  Yet, 
after the 1940s the mother island could not deny having sacrificed Isla Nena to the free 
world.  If martyrdom, however, implies suffering for some greater and nobler cause, the 
embodiments of the greater and nobler cause could not be deemed as unruly.  Thus, when 
the U.S. sailors and marines became violent and disrespectful in the 1950s Vieques, there 
                                                 
50 Luis Lloréns Torres, “La Isla Nena,” Obras Completas, vol. I (Barcelona: Editorial Cordillera, 
1967) 488-489. 
51 The programs handed out for the patron saint festivities were perhaps the single most important 
text for imagining a mid 20th century Viequense identity.  It was an accessible pamphlet meant to 
interpellate a Viequense community through readily identifiable poems like Isla Nena and other narratives 
about the island’s history and idiosyncrasy.  The programs, in fact, helped to make texts readily 
identifiably.  In this sense, the act of reading the programs represented a collective ritual uniting a 
community that, as Benedict Anderson argues, did not necessarily know each other or physically coincide.  
See, for example, Municipio de Vieques, “Programa de las Solemnes Fiestas en honor a nuestra santísima 
virgen del Carmen,” (Puerto Rico: n.p., 1956).  And Municipio de Vieques, “Fiestas Patronales de Vieques 
En Honor A La Virgen del Carmen Julio 19 al 28 1974,” (Puerto Rico: n.p., 1974).  Benedict Anderson, 







was an uncomfortable silence.  Only whispers like those surrounding the killing of 
Mapepe were allowed to stir. 
Amidst the intolerant Cold War and colonial context arose the rather solitary but 
still strong voices of the main islanders Pedro Albizu Campos and Pedro Juan Soto.  
Albizu Campos denounced in a 1948 article that: 
In Vieques the government of the United States is carrying out the 
vivisection of our nation.  The Viequense society is dying, extinguishing 
itself before the cold, deliberated and intentional attack of the government 
of the United States [that] have chosen Vieques in the plain light of 
contemporary civilization the crime of genocide.52 
 
In his critique of the Navy’s actions in Vieques, Albizu Campos made the small island a 
synecdoche of the Puerto Rican nation.  Puerto Ricans, he added, should not be 
indifferent to what happened in Vieques because it was a warning as well as a 
manifestation of U.S. imperialism in the archipelago.  One decade later Pedro Juan Soto 
picked up the critique of the man who spent most of the 1950s in jail.  Yet, Soto added a 
cynical edge.  Through his 1959 novel Usmaíl Pedro Juan Soto made famous the 
characterization of Vieques as the “colony of the colony.”53  Vieques, in the novel, was a 
militarized island that mirrored the main island.  The reflection was so unpleasant that 
main islanders looked uncomfortably away.54 
                                                 
52 “En Vieques lleva a cabo el gobierno de los Estados Unidos la vivisección de nuestra nación.  La 
sociedad de Vieques va muriendo, extinguiéndose ante el ataque frío, deliberado e intencionado del 
gobierno de los Estados Unidos [que] han escogido a Vieques para repetir a plena luz de la civilización 
contemporánea el crimen del genocidio.”  Albizu Campos, “Colaboradores del despotismo yanqui asienten 
tácitamente al crimen de Estados Unidos en Vieques,” La conciencia nacional puertorriqueña 50-51. 
53 Pedro Juan Soto, Usmaíl (Río Piedras: Editorial Cultural, 1973). 
54 Pedro Albizu Campos and Pedro Juan Soto paid the critiques they made to the Puerto Rican and 
U.S. governments with their own flesh.  Albizu Campos was imprisioned for most of the 1950s.  While in 
jail he was supposedly tortured and experimented upon.  Soto, on the other hand, lost his son Carlos Soto 







Pedro Albizu Campos’ employed the word genocide to describe the Navy’s 
actions in Vieques during the 1940s.  His choice of word might not be justified when 
comparing 1940s Vieques to Nazi Germany.  Yet, by the 1950s the term genocide 
definitely had some relevance.  While the Navy did not systematically kill Viequenses, it 
did meticulously conspire to break up the community and eliminate the population from 
the island.  Contrary to the outright massacre the Spanish Empire carried out in the year 
1514, the U.S. Navy imaginatively plotted to rid the island of inhabitants.55  It wielded, 
under a public good neighbor discourse, unquestioned authority in the island to the 
detriment of the local population.  Perhaps the most serious plot undertaken by the Navy 
to the detriment of Viequenses came during the late 1950s in the form of Project V-C.56 
During 1958-1964 the Department of Defense and the White House secretly 
pushed forth plans to expropriate the complete islands of Vieques and Culebra.  The 
plans came to be known as Project V-C.  The negotiations of Project V-C were conducted 
confidentially between the Washington-based group headed by the Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara and the San Juan-based committee led by the Governor Luis Muñoz 
Marín.  In these negotiations the Puerto Rican Governor, careful not to appear 
uncooperative or anti-American but obliged to look after the welfare of Viequenses, 
skillfully argued against the expropriations.  In a December 28, 1961 letter to President 
John F. Kennedy Governor Marín wrote that among the many adverse political, social 
and human repercussions of expropriating Vieques was the fact that: 
                                                 
55 See “Chapter 2: Myths of Origin and Foundational Figures, 1514.” 
56 For an analysis of Project V-C see Evelyn Vélez Rodríguez, Proyecto V-C Negociaciones Secretas 
entre Luis Muñoz Marín y La Marina: Plan Drácula (Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, Inc, 2002).  See also 
Meléndez López, La batalla de Vieques 130-136.  Documents relating to the Project V-C negotiations can 






There are about 8,000 people in Vieques.  They and their ancestors have 
lived there for many generations.  Their roots have grown around family, 
neighbors, schools, churches, houses, land and jobs.  The project involves 
forcible uprooting of these people -- even removal of the bodies from the 
cemeteries because, we are told, the people of Vieques will not be allowed 
to return to visit the graves.57 
 
The Governor’s letter had the purpose of recapitulating his concerns about Project V-C as 
he had expressed them to the President in a December 16th conversation.  In these 
occasions Muñoz Marín emphasized to President Kennedy that Viequenses had inhabited 
the island for many generations.  This people, Muñoz added, were very serious about 
paying tribute to their dead, especially in All Saints’ Day.  If removed from the island 
Viequenses would have to be allowed back at least once every year, or their dead would 
have to be unearthed and expropriated with them.  The prospect of expropriating dead 
bodies, Muñoz noted in his letter, had not deterred the DOD’s plans.  On the contrary, the 
DOD seemed willing to unearth the dead.  This was the reason why the San Juan 
committee mockingly renamed the project as the Dracula Plan.58  The Governor’s 
                                                 
57 Luis Muñoz Marín, “December 28, 1961 letter to President John F. Kennedy,” 7, Serie 8, Status, 
Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 55, 1962-1958, Sección V, LMM, 
Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM. 
58 The atoll of Diego García in the Chagos Islands provides an example through which to compare 
U.S. policies towards Vieques.  The local population of this Indian Ocean atoll, known as the Ilois, was 
completely expropriated in 1967-1971 by the British Empire.  The British Government owns the 
archipelago but leased part of it to the U.S. until the year 2016.  The British Empire, therefore, expropriated 
the Ilois for the U.S. Empire.  The expropriation of the Ilois people provides a perfect example of imperial 
cooperation.  In addition, it evidences that while the U.S. stayed clear of expropriating U.S. citizens in 
Vieques, it had no qualms with the British Empire’s expropriation of British citizens in a very similar 
situation across the globe.  Perhaps the expropriations in Diego García also suggest that the U.S. Empire, as 
embodied in the DOD, had no problems with engaging intermediaries to do their dirty work.  In fact, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Belieu had proposed to the San Juan committee on October 12, 
1961 that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico should be in charge of the public relations of Project V-C.  
The request portrayed a reluctance of the DOD to undergo public scrutiny and offered the Commonwealth 
instead as a buffer.  In this sense, the 1977-1980 Mayor of Vieques Radamés Tirado states that, “the Navy 
never shows its face.  The Navy always uses other persons and other agencies to do what they want.”  It 
should be noted, however, that the British Empire did not unearth cemeteries in Diego García.  The locals, 
nonetheless, were only allowed to return in 2006 to tend their family graves.  “Emotional Return for 
Chagossians,” BBC News, 2006, BBC, 4 July 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4909264.stm>.  
30, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 55, 1962-1958, Sección 






arguments, however, did convince President Kennedy.  The President, weighing in the 
negative international attention that such an expropriation would entail, decided to stay 
clear of the dead.59 
Governor Luis Muñoz Marín’s play with the centrality of the dead for Viequenses 
might have saved the island community in 1962.  Yet, the DOD revived the project when 
President Kennedy died in 1963.  Puerto Rican politicians then found out that the DOD 
had, in fact, never discarded the project.  The Assistant Secretary of the Navy Kenneth 
Belieu, ignoring the President’s decision, went directly to Congress for funds and 
authorization.  In 1964 the Armed Services Committee secretly approved $4,000,000 for 
the acquisition of Culebra and 1,400 acres in Vieques.60  The project thus evolved into 
the expropriation of Vieques southern coast as opposed to the whole civilian stretch.  The 
Puerto Rican politicians again engaged DOD officials on the matter.  Yet, this time the 
expropriation plans were leaked to the Mayor and people of Vieques.  Viequenses 
frantically organized to impede the project through picketing, lobbying in Washington 
and general stirring of the transnational Viequense community.61  The project was 
                                                                                                                                                 
otras personas o de otras agencias para que hagan lo que ellos quieren.”  Radamés Tirado, personal 
interview, 4 November 2003. 
59 Governor Muñoz Marín argued to President Kennedy in his December 28, 1961 letter that Project 
V-C would provide an instrument for “our enemies” and “Castro-Cubans” to critique the Puerto Rico-U.S. 
relationship as “vassalage.”  President Kennedy must have been concerned about negative international 
attention considering the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April of that year and the possible presence 
in Vieques of paramilitary groups.  Luis Muñoz Marín, “December 28, 1961 letter to President John F. 
Kennedy,” 7, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 55, 1962-
1958, Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM.  John F. Kennedy, “January 16, 1962 letter to 
Governor Luis Muñoz Marín,” 6, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, 
Cartapacio 55, 1962-1958, Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM.  39, Serie 8, Status.  
Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 55, 1962-1958, Sección V, LMM, 
Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM. 
60 58, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 54, 1964-1963, 
Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM. 
61 The Municipal Assembly and Mayor Antonio Rivera drafted documents specifically calling for 
the help of the Viequense populations in New York, Spain, St. Croix, St. Thomas, the main island and any 
other part of the world.  The call recognized a Viequense transnational community and the political 






nonetheless dropped on May of 1964 when the San Juan committee unilaterally struck a 
secret bargain with the DOD.  The accord stipulated that the DOD renounced to future 
expropriation plans if the Commonwealth deferred from sponsoring touristic 
development in Vieques.  If the 1960s Puerto Rico at the pinnacle of Operation Bootstrap 
could be showcased by U.S. officials and ELA supporters, Vieques with its rampant 
unemployment and below poverty level population could not.62  Viequenses, not aware of 
the San Juan-DOD bargain, celebrated the success of their mobilization.  They might 
have celebrated too soon.  The Navy thereafter continued to formulate unfriendly 
measures designed to strangle the Viequense population.63  As the Mayor of Vieques 
Antonio Rivera publicly denounced in 1964, the Navy wished the “SAVAGE MURDER” 
of the Viequense community and to force Viequenses to leave their island without openly 
kicking them out themselves.64  By the 1960s the Mayor of Vieques and Pedro Albizu 
Campos coincided, the Navy sought the genocide of the Viequense people. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Vieques, “Resolución Núm. 62.  Serie 1963-1964,” 36, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares 
en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 54, 1964-1963, Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM, 2. 
62 James Dietz wrote that during the 1950s-1960s heyday of Operation Bootstrap people from all 
over the world came to Puerto Rico to witness and study the economic miracle.  In roughly 20 years of the 
Operation Bootstrap’s implementation in Puerto Rico: unemployment decreased, agriculture was 
abandoned as a viable economic activity and the socio-economic landscape became highly industrialized, 
urban and inextricable from the U.S.  Perhaps the biggest accomplishment that the ideologues of Operation 
Bootstrap boasted was that the exponential growth of the Gross National Product (GNP) and per capita 
incomes.  These results, however, either did not apply to Vieques or reached the island’s shores belatedly.  
In fact, Arturo Meléndez López wrote that Mayor Antonio Rivera complained to Teodoro Moscoso in 
August of 1953 about the exclusion of Vieques from all the maps in the PRIDCO “I am Puerto Rico” 
brochure.  James L. Dietz, Historia Económica de Puerto Rico (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1997) 258-
329.  Meléndez López, La batalla de Vieques 121. 
63 In accordance with the no touristic development stance, the Navy consistently hindered 
improvements to the civilian airport.  The only civilian airport in Vieques was located in Navy-owned land.  
The Navy, nonetheless, had its own airport in which jets could land.  The Navy, in addition, controlled and 
thus restricted access to the civilian airspace, especially over the island’s southern strip. 
64 “SALVAJE ASESINATO.”  Antonio Rivera, “Carta 31 de marzo de 1964 Al PUEBLO DE 
VIEQUES,” 54, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 54, 1964-
1963, Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM, 1.  9, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, 







Mayor Antonio Rivera took office with the start of massive military practices in 
1948 and left the position in 1972 just prior to a marked Navy withdrawal from civilian 
Vieques.65  His 24-year incumbency thus marked a very controversial period in 
Viequense history.  In the Vieques of Mayor Don Toño, for example, social order was 
maintained by the Municipal and the Military Police.  These organs, echoing the late 19th 
century Vieques divided between foreigner and native workers, catered to two separate 
but somewhat equal populations.66  Officially at least, the local Police only exercised 
authority over civilians and vice versa.  In practice, however, their jurisdictions might not 
have been so clear-cut, and their reliability highly questionable.67  Government 
institutions under Mayor Rivera were embodied by local individuals like Pepe el juez (the 
judge) and Teniente (Lieutenant) Guardiola.  The personalistic way in which these 
individuals wielded state power was resented by Viequenses who understood that these 
persons complied with the U.S. military in detriment of the local population.  In turn, 
many Viequenses came to regard these institutions as biased and generally inaccessible to 
them.  Civilians’ inaccessibility, real or perceived, to official spaces of dissent such as the 
courts and the police facilitated an everyday grassroots politics based on violence.  To the 
unanswered claims of public insults, beatings, murders, undignified conduct, 
drunkenness, disrespectful conduct against women, forced entries, rapes and others, 
                                                 
65 Pedro Delerme remembers that the Navy stopped giving hordes of servicemen passes to civilian 
Vieques around the year 1976.  It might, however, have been sooner since in 1973 civilian protests forced 
the Navy to withdraw from the fiestas patronales and subsequently from the Viequense cultural sphere.  A 
more limited numbers of military personnel still received passes during the 1980s and 1990s and fights 
continued to erupt between Viequenses and the military in civilian Vieques.  Pérez, Delerme and Gutiérrez, 
personal interview.  Ismael Guadalupe, personal interview, 28 February 2001.  Joscan Ramos, “Marinos 
borrachos atacan viequenses,” Claridad [San Juan] 19-25 August 1983: 1-3. 
66 See “Chapter 5: The Sugar Baptism of Isla Nena, Late 1800s-1930.” 
67 The MP and the local Police shared headquarters in an Isabel II building.  Although the MP was 
not allowed to exercise authority over civilians unless in military territory, Carlos Ventura claims to having 






Manuel Pérez remembers that, “we [Viequense men] had to hit hard because we knew we 
would loose in court.”68  This might have been a belief that the Bennet-Whitbeck court-
martial created and everyday life in post-Mapepe Vieques confirmed.69  “People,” Ismael 
Guadalupe recalls, “gained their respect by fighting on the streets.”70  There was no real 
expectation for justice or vindication from the part of the local law enforcement organs.  
So for more than two decades Viequense men went to courts as the accused, rather than 
as the accuser.71 
If Viequense men avoided official spaces of dissent, Viequense women were 
discouraged to even leave their houses.  Antonio Rivera, son of Mayor Rivera, recalls 
that after 5pm men sent women to their rooms.72  They then remained, as in a spatial 
compromise between the inside and outside, circumscribed to their balconies.  While an 
official curfew was enforced by the local government during the 1950s, the unofficial 
curfew Rivera remembers was self-imposed.73  People understood that in the nights the 
town belonged to the sailors and marines and that no respectable person was to be seen 
outside.  According to Antonio, complex networks of prostitution ruled the nights.  Kids, 
called mulas (mules), led servicemen to prostitutes waiting for them in the outskirts of 
Isabel II.  There were unofficial brothels, but the sexual acts were many times 
                                                 
68 Pérez, Delerme and Gutiérrez, personal interview. 
69 While murder represented the worst type of aggression, making it almost impossible for the 
authorities to not engage in an investigation, the most earnest followers of the Bennet-Whitbeck trial was 
Mapepe’s nephew and foster child who lived in New York.  Perhaps his ignorance of the Viequense 
context made him hope for justice.  Santana, “Lamentan Civiles Isla Vieques,” El mundo 2. 
70 “La gente peleando en las calles se dió a respetar.”  Ismael Guadalupe, personal interview. 
71 Antonio, Cruz, Soto and Cruz, personal interview. 
72 Rafael Antonio Rivera, personal interview, 27 February 2001. 
73 According to my mother María Soto, in the 1950s civilians were forced to return to their homes 
every night to the sound of sirens.  The origin of the curfew is unclear, but my mother María Soto 
speculates that the local government enforced the curfew at 8 or 9pm every night to protect the population 
from the military personnel.  If this was the case, the curfew was an outright acknowledgemet by the local 
government of its impotency to resolve civilian-military tensions and impose order on civilian Vieques.  






consummated under the Viequense sky.  Still, people generally understood that 
prostitution was somehow circumscribed to the Cañon (Cannon).  This was a poor 
neighborhood of humble houses and crooked streets wedged in the southwestern outskirts 
of Isabel II between the municipal cemetery and the Cerro Tamarindo (Tamarind Hill).74  
The local population thus stigmatized the neighborhood and its inhabitants as if the rules 
of the ordered city applied to post-1940s Isabel II.  The farther a dwelling was from the 
town’s plaza, the less respectable were its dwellers, and the less reputable its passer-by.  
Navigating Isabel II, in turn, was complex exercise guided by temporal and spatial 
considerations that dictated reputations and potentially life threatening situations.75  Yet, 
shrewdness took travellers only so far because, as Pedro Delerme states, the servicemen 
did not know how nor cared to distinguish between “decent” people and “happy” 
women.76   
Pedro Juan Soto portrayed the tense situation lived in civilian Vieques through his 
novel Usmaíl.  In a moment of desperation, Cisa, the archetypical Viequense woman, 
breaks the silent code of spatial dominion.  She wanders at night into the streets of Isabel 
II searching for her lover Usmaíl.  As if responding to her transgression, two marines 
sexually assault her.  Yet, Usmaíl, who happened to walk by, stops them and diverts their 
wrath upon himself.  Unwillingly, Cisa and Usmaíl take up the assault to the proper 
authorities.  The deed, nonetheless, goes unpunished.  It is even suggested that the assault 
would not be investigated.  They are both unavenged and publicly humiliated.  Cisa, then, 
                                                 
74 The Cerro Tamarindo has long been a landmark in Isabel II.  It is a grassy hill that used to have a 
lonely tamarind tree in the top.  Viequenses arriving from Fajardo, for example, knew they were reaching 
home once they saw the tree from the sea.  Hurricane Hugo, however, knocked down the tree in 1989.  
Since then there have been various attempts to substitute the fallen tree, as if the fate of Viequenses 
depended on the stubborness of a tree. 
75 Antonio, personal interview, 26 February 2001.  Ismael Guadalupe, personal interview. 






is left to endure Usmaíl’s recriminations for the consequences of her spatial 
transgression.  In fact, once they reach Cisa’s house Usmaíl beats her until the woman is 
reduced to a kneeling position.  The wrath of the marines, completing a circle of violence, 
makes it back to Cisa.  The beating, furthermore, is Usmaíl’s assertion that he, even if 
only in the private space of her house, still controls her body.77  If, as Michel Foucault 
argued, power is ultimately expressed and wielded over very material bodies, the civilian-
military tension was being worked out on the bodies of Viequense women.78 
Vieques’ intricate geography of civilian-military spatial dominions set into 
collision conflicting notions of masculinity.  These were notions influenced by colonial 
as well as racial considerations.  In this sense, U.S. sailors and marines, assuming the role 
of imperial agents, claimed authority over colonized subjects and especially targeted, 
perhaps as the most disciplining spectacle of violence, the bodies of colonized women.  
Viequense men, in turn, assuming the role of fathers, husbands and significant others 
bound to the honor of their women, claimed an obligation to defend Viequense women.  
Caught in the complex geography of gendered performances, the narrator of Carmelo 
Rodríguez Torres’ Veinte siglos después del homicidio desperately searched for la nena 
(the girl). 
That night I looked for la nena, and did not see her. “An attack has taken 
her again, and misled her”. –I thought. That is why I looked for her. I 
could not find her. It is not difficult to look for a person in a small handful 
of earth like this one…A fear that ran through my bones. You know, there 
are no houses from Monte Santo to Luján. And it is here where the 
Nephilim have made their camp. I could no longer live with the idea of la 
nena in the arms of a man…When I got to the gate I asked one of them for 
la nena. There were three with guns. Ah, and now I remember, with some 
                                                 
77 Soto, Usmaíl 270-280. 
78 See, for example, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prision, trans. Alan 






letters like M.P. in their arms. “Where is my nena”? –I asked them again. 
Since they laughed, I got angry.79 
 
In many ways, Rodríguez Torres’ 1971 novel portrays the anxieties of an emasculated 
man.  This is a man affronted by the Nephilim that took la nena, as in Isla Nena, and then 
laughed at him.80  This narrator, offered by Rodríguez Torres as a synecdoche of 
Viequense men, is angry and fearful for la nena’s fate.  Yet, he does not rise to the 
situation because, “Again my old age.  These weak testicles, one cramped over the other 
–as if hiding- are capable of nothing, even less of making a new life.”81  This is a 
Viequense man that simply felt impotent to fight the U.S. Navy imagined as the biblical 
Nephilim, a wicked race of giants. 
When Carmelo Rodríguez Torres wrote his novel almost two decades had passed 
since the killing of Mapepe.  The Navy, however, continued to own 75% of Vieques, 
marines and sailors still roamed the civilian stretch and no major touristic establishment 
had been developed in the island that had instead decreased its population by 16%.82  It is 
thus understandable that Rodríguez Torres, the most renowned Viequense author, painted 
a bleak Viequense world.83  Yet, something very fundamental within the people of 
Vieques had changed and it was brought up by Project V-C.  Once news of the 
                                                 
79 Carmelo Rodríguez Torres, Veinte siglos después del homicidio (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillano, 
1980) 270-276. 
80 For a discussion of the Nephilim see “Chapter 6: The Arrival of the U.S. Navy, 1930-1950.” 
81 Rodríguez Torres, Veinte siglos 112. 
82 See Appendix 18. 
83 Carmelo Rodríguez Torres recalls that some literary critics deemed his novel Veinte siglos 
después del homicidio too dark and difficult to understand.  Rodríguez Torres, however, ties the criticism to 
the prevalent ignorance about Vieques.  He says, “hubos muchos momentos en que ellos decían que mi 
obra era muy Quevediana, muy oscura y que nadie la entendía.  Y yo dije, pero si aquí nadie tampoco ha 
entendido del mundo Viequense.  Este era un mundo tan oscuro y tan dificil, con tan ausencias de luces, y 
de necesidades, que yo los llevé a mi natal isla.”  “There were many instances in which they said that my 
work was very Quevedian, very dark and that nobody understood it.  And I said, but if here nobody 
understands either about the Viequense world.  This was a world so dark and so difficult, with so many 
absences of lights, and of necessities, that I brought them to my native island.”  Carmelo Rodríguez Torres, 






expropriation plans leaked to the people in 1964, Viequenses mobilized and decided to 
circumvent San Juan in order to lobby for their interests directly in Washington.  It was a 
bold statement casting doubt upon how well the Puerto Rican government defended the 
community’s interests.84  Perhaps Viequenses realized at the time that their very survival 
depended upon their collective actions.  So in 1964, faced with the Navy’s claims over 
the island, Viequenses organized under the cross partisan Comité de la Defensa de 
Vieques (Vieques’ Defense Committee) and collectively denounced the Navy’s schemes 
as contrary to the community’s progress.85  In turn, Viequenses celebrated what they 
thought were the rewards of their own actions.  The social mobilization against the 1964 
expropriation plan was therefore an empowering experience for the Viequense 
community. 
Nine years after the final demise of Project V-C, Viequenses again mobilized to 
denounce the Navy’s actions in the island.  This time they forced the Navy to withdraw 
from the municipality’s patron saint festivities and, subsequently, from the island’s 
cultural activities.86  This 1973 mobilization differed from the 1964 one insofar as the 
group had a strong presence of the Viequense youth and the political left.  The left, in this 
context, mostly included members of the Puerto Rican socialist (PSP) and independence 
                                                 
84 When visited by the Vieques’ Defense Committee, Governor Luis Muñoz Marín told them to look 
into the constitution for guidance on citizenship rights.  He either wanted to quickly dismiss them with a 
quest or expected them to mobilize and maybe directly challenge the U.S. Navy and government in ways 
Muñoz felt he could not.  12, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, 
Cartapacio 54, 1964-1963, Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM. 
85 9, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 54, 1964-1963, 
Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM.  Individuals like Mayor Antonio Rivera and 
members of the Municipal Assembly had been criticizing the Navy’s actions in Vieques and the indifferent 
stance of the Puerto Rican government since the 1940s.  However, Viequenses did not collectively mobilize 
against the Navy until 1964.  For the critiques made by Mayor Antonio Rivera, the Municipal Council and 
others see, for example, El mundo during the months of April and May 1953. 
86 The Navy had until then publicly maintained a good neighbor discourse that included its presence 
in Viequense cultural activities.  The Navy, for example, usually put forth a contingent for the carnavals 






(PIP) parties.  It was the left, in fact, that had kept on denouncing the Navy’s presence in 
the island.  In those 10 years that elapsed between the 1964 mobilization and the 1973 
one, center and right sectors refrained from making and publicly disavowed 
denunciations against the Navy’s activities in the island.  In a political context that had 
become more polarized center stances disappeared.  Perhaps the most critical members of 
the center were disillusioned by the inability of the PPD to address the community’s 
problems and therefore moved to the left.  One thing was for sure.  By the 1970s, as the 
PPD had become institutionalized, the optimism of the 1940s was definitely lost.87  Thus, 
my uncle, part of the Comité in 1964 as a representative of the Juventud Popular (PPD 
Youth) in the 1964 Comité, identified himself as a non-affiliated independence supporter 
in 1973.88  The left, marginalized from the state apparatus, allowed for critical stances 
against both the U.S. and Puerto Rican governments.  So the left dominated the 1973 
anti-Navy mobilization and the right, with one very vocal U.S. resident in the island, 
responded by attacking, mocking and dismissing the protesters as communists.89  Maybe 
20 years had passed since the killing of Mapepe, but the Cold War context still weighed 
heavily over the island’s population. 
In 1977 the left ceded way to another cross-partisan mobilization.  Viequenses, 
under pro-statehood Mayor Radamés Tirado, fought to prevent the approval by the Puerto 
Rican government of a Navy aviation easement over Vieques’ southern coast.  The 
Puerto Rican government headed by the PPD Governor Rafael Hernández Colón 
                                                 
87 The PPD was definitely institutionalized in Vieques under Mayor Antonio Rivera (1948-1972) 
who was followed by another PPD Mayor Carlos Castaño (1973-1976).  See Appendix 19. 
88 “En Fiestas de Vieques Comité combatirá presencia Marina,” Claridad [San Juan] 8 July 1973: 8. 







conducted secret negotiations with the Navy.90  This time the Navy offered the land titles 
for the Monte Santo and Santa María tracts in exchange for the aviation easement over 
the same civilian stretch that was going to be expropriated in 1964.91  Again the people of 
Vieques were not consulted and again rose the question of just how well the Puerto Rican 
government defended the community’s interests.92 
In the 1970s opposition to the Navy presence and practices in Vieques grew 
increasingly vocal and militant.  In 1971 and again in 1976, for example, people took 
back Navy-owned tracts of land in Camp García.  These two squatter movements 
founded the communities of Bravos de Boston (Braves from Boston) and Villa Borínquen 
(Borinquen Villa).93  The communities became very material and permanent challenges 
to the Navy’s authority in the island.  Such open challenges facilitated the growth of 
opposition.  So by the late 1970s the Viequense sectors openly critical of the Navy, 
although marked by the left, defied allegiances to political parties.  The presence of 
Mayor Tirado in the 1977 mobilization, for example, challenged some of the 
presumptions about protesters being a group of communists.94  His actions, in addition, 
made it thinkable that pro-statehood sympathizers, associated with the political right, 
                                                 
90 The negotiations regarding the aviation easements were actually conducted between the Puerto 
Rican government and the General Services Administration (GSA).  The absence of the Navy from the 
negotiations, according to Mayor Tirado, followed its general trend to use other persons and agencies to get 
what it wants.  Interview with Tirado. 
91 The Navy had been offering the return of those same tracts of land to the Puerto Rican government 
at least since the 1960s but was asked to do so since the 1940s.  The late 1970s offer evidenced that for 
almost three decades the Navy had kept ownership, but not care, of a land that it did not use.  The Puerto 
Rican government had cared for those lands and provided the dwellers with adequate infrastructure since 
the 1940s.  The transfer of the lands was finally begun in 1978-1979.  Yet, the Municipality of Vieques did 
not receive titles to the land until under the Administration of Mayor Manuela Santiago.  Interview with 
Tirado.  See “Chapter 6: The Arrival of the U.S. Navy, 1930-1950.” 
92 Tirado, personal interview.  See Appendix 19. 
93 Victor Emeric, “Algunas fechas significativas en la historia de Vieques,” 2. 
94 The anti-Navy stance that Mayor Radamés Tirado assumed created tensions in the island.  He 
recalls being called a “comunista enmascarado” (undercover communist) and being asked how a PPD or 






could openly denounce the U.S. Navy.  The Navy, after all, was the embodiment of the 
U.S. government in Vieques.  Yet, opposition to the Navy slowly became more visible 
and widespread. 
Then, one day in February 1978, David decided it was time to face up to Goliath 
and respond to Isla Nena’s pleas.  As if to refute Rodríguez Torres’ claims of impotency, 
Viequense fishermen decided to tell the U.S. Navy and its North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) allies that there was indeed going to be a fight.  So, facing a three 
week-long fishing prohibition due to NATO exercises in the island, the fishermen took to 
the sea on February 6, 1978 with slingshots literally in hand.  For hours their small boats 
outmaneuvered the NATO ships and interposed themselves as human barriers between 
the military vessels and Isla Nena.  Their grassroots and very desperate act of civil 
disobedience was successful in stopping, if only momentarily, the live ammunition 
practice.95  For a couple of hours Isla Nena breathed more easily. 
From 1978 to 1983, fishermen retook the community activism ignited in 1964 and 
revived in the 1970s.  Their activism was not framed in partisan or outright anti-imperial 
terms.  Instead, they justified their grassroots acts of civil disobedience as the defense of 
                                                 
95 The February 1978 events have been immortalized through narrations like those published in the 
Internet by the organization Vieques Libre.  In their website they published that:  “Vieques’ fishermen are 
extremely courageous. They have confronted the warships at sea several times. In February 1978, U.S. 
admiral Robert Fanagan told the fisherman that they would not be allowed to fish during 3 weeks. All 
NATO countries had planned an intensive military maneuver along all of Vieques’ coastline. Carlos Zenón 
informed him that they would protest. “Imagine me, a Puerto Rican fisherman, telling a US Navy admiral 
that we’re going to cause problems for them” he said. On 6 February 1978, fed-up with the Navy’s 
arrogance, the fishermen of Vieques took a desperate gamble. Forty fishing boats “invaded” waters where 
target practice with live ammunition were about to begin. They were carrying out a struggle with the 
slingshot of David against the Goliath of NATO. They were successful detaining the maneuvers and 
awakening the support of the entire Puerto Rican nation. This activism at sea has won important victories 
for the people of Vieques during their struggle against the U.S. Navy.”  “Struggle and Resistance: The 
Struggle between David and Goliath,” Vieques Libre, 2003, Vieques Libre, 8 July 2007 
<http://www.viequeslibre.addr.com/oldviequeslibre/legacy.htm>.  For an analysis of the fishermen’s 
movement and of civilian mobilizations against the U.S. Navy in Vieques see Katherine T. McCaffrey, 
Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico (New Brunswick: Rutgers 






their right to perform a craft and make an honest living.  The ability to fish, the fishermen 
concretely argued, depended on access to Navy-restricted waters and the upkeeping of 
those same waters in an unpolluted state.  So there was indeed an environmental edge to 
the fishermen’s movement.96  The fishermen’s arguments represented a very concrete and 
broad enough cause that Viequenses could relate to.  It further helped that the leadership 
of the Asociación de Pescadores de Vieques (Vieques Fishermen’s Association) was 
markedly pro-statehood as was Mayor Radamés Tirado and the Governor of Puerto Rico 
Carlos Romero Barceló.97  The left had already been involved in anti-Navy activities.  
The 1977-1978 mobilizations opened the door to the political right.  That the most 
intense anti-Navy mobilization yet was led by pro-statehood sympathizers suggests that 
political inclinations were not clear-cut so as to avoid left and rightist sectors from 
                                                 
96 Katherine McCaffrey writes that the fishermen framed their concerns in very specific material 
terms.  She argues that environmental concerns occupied a more emblematic, as opposed to vital, role in 
the fishermen’s protest.  In this sense, she proposes that fishermen used environmental arguments like the 
destruction of marine life to really address the destruction of the Viequense community.  While there is 
indeed a discursive connection between the destruction of the environment and the destruction of the 
Viequense community, I would argue that environmental concerns in themselves were a central part of the 
fishermen’s movement to the extent that these fishermen made the connection between a healthy 
environment and the availability of healthy fish.  Therefore, environmental concerns were vital to the 
protest and could not be detached from their ability to perform their craft and make a living.  Viequense 
fishermen Cecilio Camacho, for example, stated in March of 1978 that, “the Navy shelling is poisoning the 
fish catches.”  Poisoned fish, Camacho acknowledged, meant sick people and the boycotting of Viequense 
fishermen’s craft.  In addition, fishermen and Viequenses in general must have been aware of the surfacing 
of environmentalist concerns in Puerto Rico with the rise, for example, of Misión Industrial in the 1970s.  
The environmental edge of the late 1970s and early 1980s mobilizations is also evidenced in the 1983 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Puerto Rican government and the Navy.  The section IV of 
the accord is in fact titled “Environmental Matters.”  McCaffrey, Military Power 78-81.  Jane R. Baird, 
“Viequens tell CRB panel of Navy ‘tentacles,’” The San Juan Star [San Juan] 7 March 1978: 3.  
Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Island of Vieques in Puerto Rico, Commonwealth and 
Conservation Trust, United States, Department of the Interior, Management Plan for the Western Vieques 
Conservation Areas.  Vieques, Puerto Rico (N.p.: n.p., November 2002) 70-76. 
97 Governor Romero Barceló, although involved in right-winged scandals like those of the Cerro 
Maravilla, expressed support early on to the Viequense fishermen.  He even filed suit against Navy 
practices in the island as early as 1978.  Grupo de Apoyo Técnico y Profesional para el Desarrollo 
Sustentable de Vieques, Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques (Colombia: Publicaciones 






coming together in pro-democratic and ultimately anti-imperial stances.98  Although not 
stated outright, the pro-statehood sympathizers were criticizing the colonial conditions of 
U.S. citizenship under the ELA and as applied specifically in Vieques.99  Their 
mobilization, in fact, helped rethink what U.S. citizenship meant in the island.  As the 
now Special Sub commissioner for Vieques Radamés Tirado recalls, “the people 
understood that being an American citizen was to be a slave to the Americans…and they 
do not know that the American over there [in the mainland] demands his rights.”100  The 
change in understanding might have been hard to come in such a militarized colonial 
context.  Yet, Viequenses slowly conceived that U.S. citizenship implied not only going 
to war but also engaging the U.S. government in all its ramifications.  This meant 
engaging head-on the Navy.101  Thus, the fishermen’s mobilization successfully 
interpellated a significant portion of Viequense society into action.  Out of this context 
arose the Cruzada Pro Rescate de Vieques (Crusade to Rescue Vieques) that worked 
                                                 
98 The PPD supporters in this context came to embody the most conservative sector that for the most 
part refrained from critiques to the U.S. government and was the most invested in the status quo.  The pro-
independence and pro-statehood sectors assumed an anti-imperial stance that had divergent meanings.  The 
indepence supporters defined anti-imperial in terms of creating a Puerto Rican nation-states.  Statehood 
supporters’ anti-imperial stance, on the other hand, implied the integration of Puerto Rico as an equal state 
in the union and the endowment to Puerto Ricans of a U.S. citizenship with equal rights as those enjoyed by 
citizens in the U.S. mainland. 
99 The colonial conditions of the U.S. citizenship in Vieques had been part of the debate during the 
Viequense mobilizations against Project V-C.  The Municipal Council stated in 1964 that the Navy wished 
to, “take to the people of Vieques, the hunger and the misery, to the extreme poverty, exterminating EIGHT 
THOUSAND (8,000) American citizens and citizens of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” “llevar al 
pueblo de Vieques, el hambre y la miseria, a la extrema pobreza, exterminando OCHO MIL (8,000) 
ciudadanos americanos y ciudadanos del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico.”  Asamblea Municipal de 
Vieques, “Resolución Núm. 62.  Serie 1963-1964,” 36, Serie 8, Status, Sub-Serie 13, Propiedades Militares 
en Puerto Rico, Cartapacio 54, 1964-1963, Sección V, LMM, Gobernador de Puerto Rico, FLMM, 2. 
100 “la gente entendía que ser ciudadano americano es ser esclavo de los americanos…y ellos no 
saben que el americano alla reclama sus derechos.”  Tirado, personal interview. 
101 The Korean veteran Pablo Hernández López, for example, stated to the San Juan Star in March of 
1978 that, “We have said no…The Navy is our Navy, but is has come to the point that the Navy has to 
leave so that our children can have progress on the island.”  Baird, “Viequens tell CRB panel of Navy 






alongside with the Fishermen’s Association.102  People, according to Mayor Dámaso 
Serrano, began to shed their fears and react to the Navy’s abuse.103  By the side of 
Viequense women, these men, constructed as old, weak and impotent, started to believe 
they could put up a fight (Figure 7.3).104  In turn, the fishermen’s fight against the Navy 
practices in Vieques became known as “the struggle between David and Goliath.”105 
 
Figure 7.3: Viequense fisherman and woman at sea106 
 
The coinage of the fishermen’s movement as David versus Goliath continued to 
articulate the Viequense-Navy relationship in biblical terms.  The emphasis of the 
metaphor, as with Carmelo Rodríguez Torres’ Nephilim, was on the unequal standing of 
the contenders.  Goliath and the Nephilim were ultimately giants crossbred between 
fallen angels and women.  These narratives that, while acknowledging the difficulties of 
the endeavour, encouraged the disadvantaged could not but echo the story of a brave man 
that, old and outnumbered, stood up against the servicemen to defend “his” woman.  Yet, 
                                                 
102 GATP, Guías 14-15. 
103 Serrano, personal interview. 
104 Viequense women were an important part of the late 1970s and early 1980s anti-Navy 
mobilization.  However, the discourse surrounding their participation emphasized on their subordinated 
role to the daring activism of the Viequense men.  Therefore, women were constructed more as the support, 
in land, making possible the men’s civil disobedience, at sea.  However, women also performed acts of 
civil disobedience and took to the sea.  Yet, they were again conceived as men’s support and not 
necessarily active participants.  “‘ni pa’ cojer impulso:’ Testimonios de mujeres de Vieques,” spec. issue of 
Los Triunfos del Pueblo 1 (enero 1984): 18 (Puerto Rico: PRISA, 1984). 
105 “Struggle and Resistance,” Vieques Libre. 






Mapepe, although not destined to vanquish his enemies, presented Viequenses with a 
more attractive empowering figure.  His victimizers were their victimizers and his story 
was their own postmemory.  In addition, even though Mapepe died and his killers 
escaped justice, the woman was saved and his mission was accomplished.  The death, if 
anything, made Mapepe’s actions even more laudable and his transfiguration into the first 
local martyr possible.  The appeal of the killing of Mapepe assured its postmemory a 
foundational place in future Viequense narratives related to local acts of resistance 
against the U.S. Navy.  Thus, once David took on Goliath in 1978, the killing of Mapepe 
came forcefully to life. 
The resurfacing of the killing of Mapepe depended on the availability of 
representational spaces through which to perform the killing.  By the late 1970s the Navy 
had restricted physical access to Viequense land for almost four decades.  Yet, 
technological developments were multiplying and making more democratic the access to 
spaces of representation the Navy could not efficiently control.  The proliferation and 
accessibility of representational spaces favored the production of counter narratives 
challenging the Navy’s good neighbor discourse.  This was a discourse Navy officials 
grounded on the supposedly peaceful and amicable relationship established over the years 
with the local population.107  Navy officials, furthermore, argued about the economic 
benefits their presence had brought to the island.108  Acting as public historians, Navy 
                                                 
107 Special Subcommissioner Radamés Tirados recalls that during his time as Mayor of Vieques the 
Rear Admiral Arthur Knoizen asked him if Tirado knew who his friends were.  The question, as interpreted 
by Tirado, was meant to dissuade him from antagonizing the Navy for Knoizen suggested that the Navy 
was his powerful friend.  Tirado recalls answering Knoizen with, “I might not know who my friends are, 
but you are not one.  I am sure that youy are not one.”  “Yo quizás no sepa quiénes son mis amigos, pero tú 
no eres uno.  Yo estoy seguro que tú no eres uno.”  Tirado, personal interview. 
108 Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, for example, responded to the concerns about the Navy’s 
disregard for the welfare of Viequenses of Senator John J. Williams of Delaware with a four-page letter.  






officials had publicized such historical interpretations through letters, press conferences, 
articles and other mediums that the average Viequense could not as easily manipulate.109  
The proliferation and accessibility of representational spaces, in turn, threatened Navy-
sponsored histories by, for example, expanding the places where the killing of Mapepe 
could be performed and the audience that could witness the postmemory.  Thus, the role 
of technology, especially after 1978, has been central in defining the Viequense-Navy 
relationship and in assuring the foundational place of the killing of Mapepe inside it. 
Documentary photography assumed a central role in the fishermen’s movement 
and the general re-imainging of late 1970s and 1980s Vieques.110  The representational 
spaces the Navy wielded when referring to Vieques were usually not of a visual 
character.  If anything, the Navy kept away from visual texts, perhaps because it had 
things to hide.  This was a representational field that the fishermen exploited.  
Documentary photographs like those that appeared in El mundo newspaper between 1979 
and 1980 visually portray the fishermen in confrontation (Figures 7.4 and 7.5).111  These 
photographs depict the President of the Fishermen’s Association Carlos Zenón and other 
                                                                                                                                                 
mediated poverty due to the Navy’s help.  Barbey wrote that, “the Island of Vieques…has presented an 
economic problem ever since its early discovery by the Spaniards in the fifteen hundreds.  It is interesting 
to note that history records that the Carib Indians abandoned the Island because they faced starvation 
previous to its discovery by the Spaniards.”  Barbey thus reinterpreted the Carib myth of origins by stating 
that the island had always been a problem and that indigenous groups did not want to inhabit it.  “C40-6-
VI-1,” Folder Vieques C40-6-VI, Puerto Rico 40PR, Box 1106, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Naval 
Property Case Files, 1941-1958, RG 71, NARA, College Park, MD. 
109 The average Viequense, if able to read and write, could hardly get an article published in a local 
newspaper or convoke a press conference as easily as Navy officials could.  Local newspapers and 
television programs offer more legitimated spaces of representation than, for example, light post in some 
street. 
110 I define documentary photography as the practice of taking photographs with the intention of 
capturing an accurate visual representacion of reality.  
111 For documentary photographs taken for El mundo by Lou Alers and Mauricio Pascual see “Otro 
Desafío en Aguas de Vieques,” El mundo [San Juan] 20 January 1980: 16C.  For Lou Alers photographs 
see “La Confrontación: Pescadores Interrumpen Maniobras Marina en Vieques,” El mundo [San Juan] 18 






more anonymous fishermen outmaneuvering warships with their small boats.112  One of 
these photographs is particularly revealing in the way it portrays the struggle of David 
against Goliath.  In this 1980 photograph, one Viequense fisherman daringly stands in a 
small boat to face anonymous sailors hiding their faces behind binoculars, helmets and 
water hoses.  These sailors represent an enemy the fisherman taunts.  This is an enemy 
that seems to compensate its lack of manhood with artifacts, with a water hose, with a 
bigger boat.  This is an enemy that seems uncomfortable in the surroundings and unable 
to fend for himself and master the sea.  This is an enemy that we, the witnessing 
audience, are encouraged to face through the positioning of our gaze behind the upright 
fisherman.  We are witnesses trusted, as through a gesture of intimacy, with the 
fisherman’s turned back, witnesses invited to not transgress the outnumbered fishermen’s 
trust and to join their brave, although somewhat futile, struggle against the military that 
wants to rape Isla Nena with bombs and prostitute her to NATO and other countries.  In 
this sense, the postmemory of Mapepe was re-enacted in 1980 as it is being re-enacted 
now through the reading of this page and handling of the documentary photograph. 
 
Figure 7.4: Fisherman Carlos Zenón at sea, Vieques113 
                                                 
112 Carlos Zenón cannot be considered an anonymous fisherman to the late 1970s and 1980s Puerto 
Rican public since he was the very vocal spokesperson of the Fishermen’s Association.  The combination 
of known and anonymous subjects makes it possible for the viewer to be somewhat familiar with the 
context but still have the opportunity to project itself into that context.  “Otro Desafío en Aguas de 
Vieques,” El mundo 16C. 









Figure 7.5: Viequense fishermen at sea, Vieques114 
 
In the militant context of the late 1970 and 1980s, anti-Navy sectors of Viequense 
society were collectively imagining a different Isla Nena from the one Luis Lloréns 
Torres described.  This was a new Isla Nena with an Albizu-Soto twist.  For Pedro Albizu 
Campos, the Navy’s activities in Vieques were a vivisection of the Puerto Rican nation 
carried out with the consent of the archipelago’s colonial government.  Pedro Juan Soto 
echoed the critique and further emphasized the role of Puerto Ricans as victimizers 
through his term “colony of a colony.”  Viequenses thus embraced Vieques as an island 
child, an island daughter.  The daughter, however, had been abandoned by its mother who 
handed over the child to a foreigner.  The 1980s poem “Vieques, Visión de Isla” 
(“Vieques, Vision of an Island”) exemplifies the new imagining. 
Vieques: You are no longer the Isla Nena 
that Eden-like described 
the great poet Lloréns. 
You are no longer the cane song 
of don Pepe Benítez 
neither the Santa María of Carlos Lebrún. 
You are now the enraged scream of fishermen 
that throw to the wind their clamor 
for your return to the people 
                                                 







whole and pure 




Island of the Carib cacique: 
avenger of Cacimar. 
Your sons, today, imitate your feats; 
tanned in the struggle by seaweeds. 
 
And, before the northern eagle, 
are their emblems the swordfish, 
the song of conch 
and the Viequense ringdove. 115 
 
Isla Nena had been handed over to the “northern eagle” that threatened her wholeness and 
purity.  Perhaps it was more than a threat because Isla Nena had lost her innocence.  
Perhaps the foreigner had already raped her since Isla Nena was no longer Eden-like.  
She was no longer productive, and she definitely was no longer sweet.  Gradually, the 
Isla Nena sacrificed by the mother island for a nobler good became the martyr abandoned 
to face a masculine military evil that had made her a captive.  As the Viequense poet 
Ángel Rigau wrote: 
With its sea circumscribed, as her land; 
fenced her best lands 
by the “U.S.A. Property” and the “No Trespassing” 
Vieques for the native is enemy soil 
and even her own pastures relegated, 
with her island and sea, no more kinship, 
and driven to not finding any given day 
sepulchral earth for her dead 
since the land, in its maximum existence 
belongs to the Naval Base and her 
empire.116 
                                                 
115 “Vieques: Ya no eres la Isla Nena/que edénicamente nombrara/el gran poeta Lloréns./Ya no eres 
canción de caña/de don Pepe Benítez/ni la Santa María de Carlos Lebrún./Eres ahora grito iracundo de 
pescadores/que lanzan al viento el clamor/de que se te devuelva a tu pueblo/íntegra y pura/cual tu madre te 
parió./…/Isla del cacique caribe:/vengador de Cacimar./Tus hijos, hoy, imitan sus proezas;/curtidos en la 
lucha por algas de mar./Y, frente al águila norteña,/son sus enseñas el pez espada,/el canto de caracola/y la 








Isla Nena’s body, raped, prostituted and scarred with barbwire, then read “U.S.A 
Property” and “No Trespassing.”117  These were both inscriptions on Isla Nena’s body 
and very concrete prohibitions to Viequense land and waters (Figure 7.6).  In a culture 
like so many others where honor and manhood depend on the worth and protection of 
women, the Navy’s abuse of Isla Nena was emasculating Viequense man.  Isla Nena, 
dissected and enclosed, represented the most injurious affront Viequense men could 
receive since the feminized island was the epitome of all Viequense women.  So the 
fishermen, with their very masculine feats, had finally responded in 1978 to Isla Nena’s 
pleas. 
 
Figure 7.6: “Warning” sign in former Navy-owned lands in Vieques118 
 
The fishermen’s feats, as ingenious as they were rebellious, attracted the attention 
of the Puerto Rican media and audience in a way that previous Viequense mobilizations 
against Navy practices had not.  The charisma of their spokesperson Carlos Zenón and 
the theatricality of the fishermen’s feats so well recorded by mediums like documentary 
                                                                                                                                                 
116 “Con su mar circunscrito, ídem sus campos;/alambrados sus óptimos terrenos/por el “U.S.A 
Property” y el “No Trespassing”/Vieques para el nativo es suelo adverso/y hasta en sus propios lares, 
relegado,/ya con su isla y su mar, ni el parentesco,/y abocado a no hallar un día cualquiera/ni un terrón 
sepulcral para sus muertos/pues la tierra, en su máxima existencia/es de la Base Naval y de su imperio.”  
Ángel Rigau,  “II,” Isla y mar de Vieques (San Juan: Editorial Laurel, 1984). 
117 The Navy employed phrases like “U.S.A. Property” and “No Trespassing” to demarcate their 
territory.  Subsequently, Viequenses like Ángel Rigau appropriated the phrases to denounce the island’s 
militarization and the alienation of the local people.  Such Navy signs were also photographed and 
incorporated into protest art for the same denunciatory purpose. 






photography drew the Puerto Rican public, whether approving or disapproving of the 
events, into the drama of a small island many had never visited.  This public, in turn, took 
an active part in the re-imagining of Isla Nena.  The Puerto Rican left appeared at the 
forefront of the initiative.  This sector encompassed different groups like the PSP and PIP 
that had come together during the early 1970s to protest the Navy’s presence in Culebra.  
Through mobilizations and cultural productions these groups infused the historical 
conjuncture with a nationalist and anti-imperialist motif not provided by the fishermen.  It 
was, furthermore, as if these groups were trying to prove Isla Nena had never been 
orphaned.  In the words of the Vega Alta-born activist Nilda Medina, former PIP and PSP 
partisan, Vieques, “was an island that like Culebra was totally ignored by us the Puerto 
Ricans from the Isla Grande.”119  This was a situation she personally addressed when she 
moved to Vieques in 1981 with the clear intention of joining the struggle against the 
Navy.  Out of this context arose Silverio Pérez’s 1978 song “Isla Nena.” 
There is an Isla Nena in the horizon, 
that is like the Isla Grande in flesh. 
There are bird songs in Esperanza 
and desires to love and give life. 
Tranquility interrupted at every instant, 
children woken up at dawn, 
the sun is surfacing in the east 
and in the warm morning there’s a lullaby. 
There are a thousand pieces of this earth 
with a thousand occasions of injustices. 
There is a little island in which war 
steals time from love and for a caress. 
One day my song made itself into waves 
one day that I rested on its white sands 
I gave my heart and my courage 
to the people and the feeling of Isla Nena. 
                                                 
119 “fue una isla que como Culebra fue totalmente ignorada por nosotros los puertorriqueños de la Isla 






There is an Isla Nena in the horizon .120 
 
Written by the Guaynabo-born Silverio Pérez, “Isla Nena” evidences the uncomfortable 
apprehension of the distance separating Puerto Rico from Vieques and main islanders 
from Viequenses.  Pérez, as the main island viewer, acknowledges that he looks at Isla 
Nena from a distance.  Yet, his gaze brings the island closer and him to the realization 
that the militarized Isla Nena is one of the “thousand pieces of this earth.”  If Vieques 
was indeed an integral part of Puerto Rico, then Pérez, as a fellow Puerto Rican, could 
not but become one with the Viequenses.  Still, the song ends with Isla Nena again 
watched from a distance.  To the extent that Pérez vindicates the Isla Nena-Isla Grande 
relationship, Viequenses remain trapped between the categories of “us” and “others.” The 
relationship, in turn, distances as well as subordinates Vieques to Puerto Rico.  The 
separation expressed between the narrator and Isla Nena, however, did not deter 
Viequenses from appropriating the song as their municipal hymn.  Isla Nena was again 
imagined by a main islander. 
Even though Viequenses in the early 1980s had the vocal support of the Puerto 
Rican left, a significant portion of Puerto Rican society considered the fishermen’s 
protest anti-American and regarded the events unfolding in Vieques with disapproving 
eyes.  Yet, neither the internal division of Viequenses nor the disapproval of a 
considerable sector of Puerto Rican society provoked the grassroots movement’s demise.  
The movement finally receded in 1983 with the signing of the Memorandum of 
                                                 
120 “Hay una Isla Nena en lontananza,/que es como la Isla Grande en carne viva./Hay cantos de pitirre 
en la Esperanza/y hay deseos de amar y dar la vida./Quietud interrumpida a cada instante,/niños despiertos 
en la madrugada,/el sol va despuntando por el este/y en la tibia mañana se oye una nana./Hay miles de 
pedazos de esta tierra,/con miles de ocasiones de injusticia./Hay una isla chica en que la guerra,/roba 
tiempo al amor y a la caricia./Un día que mi canción se hizo oleaje,/un día, que reposé en la blanca arena,/le 
dí mi corazón y mi coraje,/al pueblo y al sentir de la Isla Nena. Hay una Isla Nena en lontananza.”  Silverio 







Understanding Regarding the Island of Vieques between Governor Carlos Romero 
Barceló and the Navy.121  The accord, ending the legal battle between the signing parties, 
basically stipulated that the Navy would cooperate with the civilian population and help 
protect the local environment if allowed to continue their military practices in Vieques.  
The Navy, however, did not abide to what it had signed and the Puerto Rican government 
did not oversee or enforce the agreement.122  The Memorandum, thus, resulted in the 
perpetuation of the status quo.  The expectation surrounding the conciliatory pact 
undercut the impulse of the fishermen’s movement. 
During the 1980s and 1990s civil resistance to the Navy’s presence and practices 
in Vieques resurfaced.  The mobilizations, however, were not as widely followed inside 
and outside the island as the fishermen’s movement.  The renewed protests against the 
installation of the Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) in the Naval 
Ammunition Facility, nonetheless, marked a shift in the way Isla Nena was imagined.123  
Environmentalist sensibilities took center stage as community activists denounced the 
ROTHR as toxic to human beings and the Viequense environment in general.  Isla Nena, 
dissected, enclosed and bombarded was rapidly becoming unrecognizable to Viequenses, 
and not only because they were unable to roam two thirds of the island as Ángel Rigau 
had complained during the early 1980s.  What had been a highly sexualized island 
constructed through a feminized discourse of bright lushness and fertility continued to be 
                                                 
121 For the October 11, 1983 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Island of Vieques see 
Commonwealth, Conservation Trust and Department of the Interior, Management Plan for the Western 
Vieques 65-76. 
122 Humberto García Muñiz, “Goliat contra David: La batalla de Vieques en la encrucijada final.”  
Anuario Social y Político de América Latina y El Caribe 4 (2001): 102. 
123 Although community activists denounced the ROTHR as highly toxic to the environment and 
humans, the Navy justified its establishment in Vieques by arguing it was an important weapon in the war 
on drugs.  Rafael A. Rivera Castaño, “March 20, 1998 Letter to Jeffrey Farrow,” On the Navy Presence, 






so only in tourist brochures (Figure 7.7).  In the second half of the 20th century Isla 
Nena’s springs had dried up and the thorny bayahonda (mesquite) slowly replaced the 
island’s fruit trees.  The environmental changes were accompanied by a sharp growth, 
especially noticeable by the mid 1980s, of cancer and heart and cerebral vascular diseases 
among Viequenses.  These were diseases that people like Rafael A. Rivera Castaño, 
M.D., and Rafael Cruz Pérez, environmental engineer, had been linking to the polluting 
practices of the Navy in the island.124  The Isla Nena that had been sunshine, sugar cane 
and coconuts was evolving at the close of the 20th century into a barren and polluted 
landscape, into one big graveyard unable to reproduce anything that was not death.  Isla 
Nena, orphaned and moribund, agonized as the cancer-stricken bodies multiplied. 
 
Figure 7.7: Tourist brochure produced by the Vieques Chamber of Commerce125 
 
Cancer, however devastating an illness, represents a silent and somewhat gradual 
process of loss endured by individuals and families who usually confine their suffering to 
domestic spaces.  The confinement can render invisible the sickness and its effects.  In 
                                                 
124 Rivera, personal interview.  Rafael Cruz Pérez, “Contaminación producida por explosivos y 
residuos de explosivos en Vieques, Puerto Rico.”  Dimensión 2:8 (1988): 37-42.  For the death rates related 
to cancer and heart and cerebral vascular diseases in Vieques and for a comparison with the rest of Puerto 
Rico see, for example, Puerto Rico, Junta de Planificación, Indicadores económicos y sociales por 
Municipios.  (Puerto Rico: n.p., April and December 1988) 3, 453.  For an overview of socio-economic and 
health-related problems in Vieques also see GATP, Guías. 






Vieques, the deadly invisibility of cancer did not provide the stimulus needed for the 
community to collectively engage in Isla Nena’s revival process.  The engagement 
followed the April 19, 1999 death of David Sanes.  The erroneous bombing of the 
Viequense’s watch post inside Camp García ignited four years of civil disobedience 
against the Navy’s activities in Vieques.  The unprecedented union of Viequenses and 
Puerto Ricans cemented a strong network of civil disobedience groups that with ample 
international support established camps in Navy-restricted territory.  If the Viequense 
fishermen had been human barriers in the sea, the civil disobedience camps were 
community barriers in the shores. 
The civil disobedience groups were not centrally organized.  Yet, they 
collectively accomplished one very important feat: the inscription with Viequense-Puerto 
Rican meaning of the two thirds of Vieques that had been voided of such geographical 
imaginings.  The ceremonial placing of a white wooden cross where David Sanes died 
and the subsequently re-baptizing of the site as Mount David began the ingenious 
appropriation of a space that had been sealed for more than 60 years (Figure 7.8).  The 
symbolic white crosses proliferated along the island claiming places like Mount David 
and the entrance of Camp García (Figure 7.9).  The crosses were not the sole landscape 
markers with a religious motif.  Deep in restricted territory the civil disobedients built a 
rustic chapel (Figure 7.10).  The crosses and chapel had the effect of consecrating Navy 
land.  This was a strategy previously employed in Culebra.  The chapel, in addition, 
provided to witnesses of the unfolding drama a contrast of land usage: the Navy 
destroyed while Viequenses communed.  Civil disobedients made the contrast a central 






documentary videos and photographs of a polluted landscape filled with missile craters, 
rusted airplanes and dead wildlife (Figure 7.11).126  These visual texts portrayed a clear 
intention to expose the affected landscape and wildlife that the Navy had agreed to 
protect in the 1983 Memorandum and whose conditions were unacceptable for 
contemporary environmental sensibilities.  Civil disobedients further appropriated Navy 
sites through subversions.  Disobedients, for example, inserted the Puerto Rican flag and 
hanged hammocks from the cannon of abandoned tanks (Figure 7.12).  The 
transformation added a sense of tense domesticity and Puerto Rican-ness to the site.  
These visual subversions captured in photographs and videos were posted, for example, 
in the webpage of Vieques Libre.  To the extent they were made public, these texts 
helped a wider community physically absent from the island still be able to claim the 
Viequense landscape.  The claiming was done through particular visual representations of 
what the Navy had tried so hard to conceal for so many years: a craterous landscape filled 
with military junk. 
                                                 
126 If, as Benedict Anderson suggests, national communities have been imagined through print 
capitalism, technological advances in the last couple of decades collapsing time and space constraints 
through rapidly travelling images have made possible the imag-ining of transnational communities.  In 
Vieques, these communities, positioned against and in favor of the Navy presence, both fought and resulted 
from an image war waged through a complex interplay of revealing and concealing.  In the midst of this 
politics of visual seduction, anti-Navy communities performed the pseudo-evangelical role of revealers of 
hidden truths.  The visuality assigned to these truths responded to the privileged employment of 
documentary photography.  According to Susan Sontag, documentary photographs are generally perceived 
as images or copies of the world these artefacts are meant to record, diagnose and inform.  The belief in an 
unmediated relationship between the object represented and the text produced has the effect of legitimizing 
documentary photographs as depositories of fragments of reality or as traces of the past.  Anderson, 







Figure 7.8: Mount David in the former Camp García, Vieques127 
 
 
Figure 7.9: Viequense landscape inscribed with white crosses128 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Rustic chapel in former Navy-owned land in Vieques129 
 
                                                 
127 “Vieques: A Visual Journey,”  Vieques Libre. 
128 “Vieques: A Visual Journey,”  Vieques Libre. 







Figure 7.11: Rusted military junk in former Navy-owned land in Vieques130 
 
 
Figure 7.12: Civil disobedients hanging in hammocks from an abandoned tank131 
 
If Isla Nena had indeed evolved into a big graveyard, no site conveyed better the 
idea than the cemetery in the entrance gate of Camp García.  The cemetery is composed 
of symbolic white crosses bearing the names of those Viequenses dead due to military 
accidents.  The cemetery, in fact, was established and dedicated on February 24, 2001 
“To the memory of the Viequenses that have been victims of the military accidents and 
the environmental pollution” (Figure 7.13).  Yet, Camp García’s cemetery was made 
really in honor of the Viequense girl named Milivy.  A large poster with the words 
“Peace and Health for Vieques” portrayed her bald little head and cancer-stricken 
countenance (Figure 7.14).  Looming near the numerous crosses, her face looked 
forward, somewhat defiantly and somewhat pleading, as if asking the transient viewer to 
make sure she did not literally make the cross over.  Milivy was the only living person 
                                                 
130 “Vieques: A Visual Journey,”  Vieques Libre. 






represented in the cemetery.  Her centrality in the consecration of the military base’s 
entrance was not random.  She embodied the unrecognizable Isla Nena.  She was the 
young daughter who had not had the chance to fully live, but was already agonizing.  In 
fact, Milivy and Isla Nena were united by the sickness they shared.  The same pollutants 
that lodged in Isla Nena’s mango trees, not readily visible but imagined in all their 
pervasiveness, circulated through Milivy’s veins.  Thus, Milivy’s pleas could not but 
appeal to Viequenses in general, especially to parents.  Sadly, the five year old died on 
November 17, 2002.  Meanwhile Vieques, some say, still convalesces.  The Navy 
formally left Vieques in 2003 with the closing of the ammunition depot in May of 2001 
and of the live fire range in May of 2003.  Traces of their presence, however, remain.132 
 
Figure 7.13: Symbolic cemetery established in the entrance of Camp García133 
 
 
Figure 7.14: Poster with drawing of Milivy’s face in the entrance of Camp García134 
                                                 
132 See Appendix 5 and “Chapter 8: Conclusion.” 







Throughout the last six centuries the inhabitants of Vieques have engaged in a 
long and violent process to forge a stable island community.  From the times of the 
Caribs to those of the U.S. Navy, with the possible exception of the late 19th and early 
20th century, different empires have opposed such plans for very different reasons.  The 
two recurring themes in this colonial history have been the strategic importance assigned 
to Vieques with respect to European maritime voyages to the Caribbean and the 
definition of Vieques’ identity as subordinated to the Puerto Rican main island.  In this 
sense, the attempts to colonize Vieques have been exceedingly militaristic and the 
welfare of its inhabitants has come in second place to the needs of distant and not so 
distant metropolises.  To meet such challenges and survive would-be Viequenses have 
had to define and redefine themselves and their community in close dialogue with 
definitions from outside the island.  In the midst of the ingenious maneuvering Isla Nena 
was conceived and born, evolved, and several times almost died.  Such a capacity to be 
born, to react and adapt to the environment and to possibly perish, presents Isla Nena as a 
living being.  The life endowed by Viequenses and non-Viequenses to the representation 
has established an organic relationship between the island and the community Isla Nena 
embodies.  Viequenses and Isla Nena are thought to have lived together as one 
throughout the last six to three centuries in the northeastern Caribbean.  The temporal and 
spatial character of Isla Nena, an island-community imagined through an infantile and 
feminine metaphor, have legitimated the islanders’ claims on Vieques’ history and 
landscape.  To the extent that Isla Nena occupies and is the island as it has evolved over 
the past centuries, so Viequenses have too come to inhabit that space and time.  These 
                                                                                                                                                 






claims to inhabiting Isla Nena have translated into concrete political projects designed to 
face challenges like those posed by the U.S. Navy, coercive arm of the U.S. global 




I grew up with the words, “Behave yourselves.  I don’t want to call the MP!”  It 
was one of my father’s disciplining pleas that came with a smile.  Little did I know or 
wondered then what memories the words revived for him.  Did he remember the times 
when the words were used as a conjure against the U.S. servicemen?  Was the conjure, 
that naming of the Military Police, expected to be answered or was it more of a desperate 
and hopeless plea for some other ulterior power?  I have never asked him.  Still, I have 
appropriated the conjure as my own and proceeded to encrypt it with my own memories. 
I have, however, asked my father about Mapepe and in long conversations we 
have undertaken the Viequense rite of killing Mapepe.  I might not have been born in 
Vieques.  No, I was displaced like so many others, if not physically expropriated at least 
emotionally so.  I could, nonetheless, kill Mapepe in San Juan, and kill him again and 
again in Michigan while undertaking the long and lonely process of writing this 
dissertation.  As a historian I remain a necrophiliac populating my world with memories 
of the dead. 
The killing of Mapepe can come forcefully to life in Michigan decades after the 
event physically occurred because, following Marianne Hirsch, memory does not need to 






conflate as if through a superimposition of disparate images.  The conflation makes it 
possible for people to share experiences across temporal and physical boundaries and for 
certain traumas to be collectively experienced.  Postmemories, as developed by Hirsch, 
are memories of collective traumas.  They address the experiences of people who grow 
up dominated by narratives that predated their birth and whose own stories are displaced 
by the traumatic stories of preceding generations.  Postmemories, furthermore, are 
remembered only as images and stories people grew up with, but that are so powerful 
they constitute memories in their own right.  Their power lies precisely in the mediated 
connection between the person who remembers and the source of the memory.  Thus, 
postmemories are not so much about recollection, as they are about projection, 
investment and creation.135 
The killing of Mapepe is precisely a postmemory for Viequenses. Most of them 
did not live the 1953 event, but those witnesses that did wove such compelling narratives 
that subsequent generations like myself have appropriated the history of the brave old 
man as a personal memory that defines them to the extent that they define themselves as 
Viequenses.  The power, centrality and elusiveness of Mapepe’s postmemory are 
captured in a February 2001 conversation with community activist and personal friend of 
my parents Ismael Guadalupe.  His words, moving back and forth in time and bridging 
generations as he spoke to me and invoked my father Luis, made me understand how 
embedded I was in the history I was trying to narrate.  In the words of Guadalupe: 
Mapepe only one generation has knowledge of him and maybe my 
generation because we learned it from the preceding generation.  I did not 
know him…I was born in 1944.  I have 56 years.  I have very little 
memory of the death of Mapepe.  But, for example, I have always known 
about the death of Mapepe.  My generation, that generation, I think Luis 
                                                 






must remember that, not of the moment when they killed him, but of the 
way he had died.  Mapepe has been something in history that the Navy has 
tried to erase and the accomplices of the Navy have tried to erase and they 
have not been able to…And I think it is important because we cannot 
permit its erasure...we have a responsibility that it does not die. Mapepe 
died physically, but the fact cannot die. And it must be placed inside the 
reality of that military presence…I do not know how much Luis has talked 
to you about the riots that happened here. Here there were many many 
riots. Fights with civilians, the streets, one had to run for one’s life, the 
tensions that people lived. In other words, Mapepe marks a period of the 
aggressiveness of the Navy with the people of Vieques. From Mapepe on 
people lived a state of insecurity. From Mapepe on if you were on the 
streets and if you were alone and you saw five, six soldiers, you knew that 
you had to take another route.  The fear, the preoccupation, will they kill 
me? will they beat me up? was enormous.136 
 
As Guadalupe states, the generation that could have lived the traumatic experience passed 
it on to subsequent generations who became owners in their own terms of the killing of 
Mapepe.  In this manner, my grandmother passed the memory on to my father Luis, and 
my father passed it on to me.  The details might have been lost along the way, but it does 
not matter anymore, if it ever did, the year of the murder, the murder weapons or the 
name of the murderers, or at least of the two sailors acquitted by the court-martial.  
Sergeant Major Merl Bennett and the Private First Class Edward Whitbeck could have 
been and became any U.S. serviceman at any given point in the past 54 years because in 
                                                 
136 “Mapepe solamente una generación tiene conocimiento de él y quizas mi generación porque la 
aprendimos de la anterior generación.  Yo mismo no lo conocía…Yo nací en el 1944.  Tengo 56 años.  Yo 
tengo muy poca memoria de la muerte de Mapepe.  Pero, por ejemplo, yo sí siempre he sabido de la muerte 
de Mapepe.  Mi generación, esa generación de, yo creo que Luis debe recordarse de eso, no del momento 
cuando lo mataron, sino de que así había muerto…Mapepe ha sido algo en la historia que la Marina ha 
tratado de borrar y los cómplices de la Marina han tratado de borrar y no han podido…Y yo creo que es 
importante porque no podemos permitir que se borre…nosotros tenemos una responsabilidad de que eso no 
muera.  Murió Mapepe físicamente pero el hecho no puede morir.  Y es que hay que ubicarlo dentro de lo 
que es la realidad de esa presencia militar, de los motines.  Yo creo que este pueblo tuvo suerte que no hubo 
más muertes pero era para haber más muertes.  Yo no sé cuánto Luis te ha hablado de los motines que se 
daban aquí.  Aquí se daban muchos pero que muchos motines.  Peleas con civiles, las calles eso era un 
corre y corre, las tensiones que vivía la gente.  O sea, Mapepe marca un periodo de la agresividad de la 
Marina con la gente de Vieques.  De Mapepe para acá se vivía un estado de inseguridad.  De Mapepe para 
acá tú te tirabas por las calles y si tu ibas solo y tu veías por ejemplo si yo venía por aqui por esta calle y 
por ahí venían cinco, seis soldados, ya yo sabía que me tenía que ir por otro lado.  El temor, la 






the performance of the postmemory details like the names of Mapepe’s murderers have 
been rendered unimportant.137  The “when,” like Ismael Guadalupe suggests, became 
secondary to “the way he died” and the postmemory came to define a pre and post 
Mapepe Viequense history based on violence and fear. 
The postmemory of the killing of Mapepe has survived because Viequenses have 
wanted it to survive.  They have appropriated it and passed it on because something in the 
memory spoke to them.  That something is and at the same time is more than the tragic 
story of an old man killed while defending the beautiful prostitute he wanted to honor; 
than the charismatic appeal of a first local martyr whose victimizers, the first to appear 
from behind Navy fences, escaped justice.  To really delve into the postmemory of 
Mapepe, it should be read through the broader history of Vieques.  Isla Nena is then 
revealed as the prostitute hiding behind the door of the bar El Bosque, as the one fearfully 
listening to the blows directed at her defender, as the one that although beautiful, has 
been mistreated.  Viequense men, in turn, are revealed as the ones standing up against all 
odds to face the powerful U.S. Navy.  The postmemory of the killing of Mapepe is then a 
narrative about the possibility of heroism in everyday people. 
                                                 
137 Mapepe’s postmemory has survived through great silences.  Such silences have fostered the 
collective forgetting that soon after Mapepe’s death his bar was looted twice and, more importantly, that 
Viequenses were supposedly unwilling to cooperate with the police investigation.  Such unwillingness, of 
course, could have responded to people’s fear of the U.S. Navy.  Santana, “Lamentan Civiles Isla Vieques,” 












Arriving in the Isla Nena is like crossing the veil that covers civilization and suddenly 
entering a magical world, where everything is clearer, brighter, purer…We distinguish 
easily where everything starts and ends, except fantasy.  In the Isla Nena we are never 
sure of being completely awake, since dreams and reality playfully intertwine to 
introduce us, like in few occasions, to the perfect order of the Universe. 
High School Students, “Isla Nena: Municipio de Vieques” (1990s)1 
 
Vieques is a small island among so many other small islands in the Caribbean 
Sea.  It boasts the sunny landscapes, crystal water beaches and, some would say, 
somnolent atmosphere.  Viequense high school students, in fact, wrote in the 1990s that 
people in Isla Nena, “are never sure of being completely awake.”  These students, that 
could have very well been followers of Alejo Carpentier, argued that in Vieques the 
intertwining of dreams and reality allows for the perception of a magical world.  In 
Vieques, they further implied, people could get a glimpse of the perfect universal order 
                                                 
1 “Llegar a la Isla Nena es como traspasar el velo que cubre la civilización y entrar de repente en un 
mundo mágico, donde todo es más claro, más brillante, más puro…Distinguimos con facilidad donde 
comienza y termina todo, excepto la fantasía.  En la Isla Nena nunca estamos seguros de estar 
completamente despiertos, pues el sueño y la realidad se entrelazan juguetonamente para compenetrarnos, 
como pocas veces, en el perfecto orden del Universo.”  “Isla Nena: Municipio de Vieques,” (Biblioteca 
Pública José Gautier Benítez, Vieques, Puerto Rico).  The cited text was taken from a twenty-page 
anonymous and untitled pamphlet representing the only source of information about Vieques in the 
Municipal Library.  The employee who lent me the pamphlet did not know anything about the origins of 
the text.  Nonetheless, I found information about its makings by pure coincidence.  While searching for a 
photocopier in the Cooperative Bank across the street, a young lady recognized a two-page essay on typical 
Viequense food.  She told me she had written the text as an assignment for a high school Spanish class.  As 
to the rest of the pamphlet she could not tell me more.  Neither did she know how her essay ended up in the 
Municipal Library.  Notwithstanding the many uncertainties, I have assumed that the rest of the pamphlet I 
have named “Isla Nena: Muncipio de Vieques” was written by Vieques’ high school students.  “Isla Nena: 






because the island was “clearer, brighter, purer.”  The words employed to describe Isla 
Nena portrayed an uncorrupted paradise.  This paradise was juxtaposed to an unidentified 
elsewhere otherwise less perfect, magical and pure.  The comparison suggested that Isla 
Nena was an exceptional place and, perhaps, not just another small island among many.  
Isla Nena was, furthermore, not the cursed island Pedro Juan Soto imagined in his 1959 
novel Usmaíl.2  One of the guiding assumptions behind such a portrayal was the idea that 
Vieques has been immune to change and thus remains in an uncorrupted state.  Probably 
without knowing it, these high school students were engaging a debate that has 
surrounded Vieques for at least 200 years.  The question all this time has been just how 
pure and uncorrupted has Vieques remained after thousands of years of human presence 
and at least 500 years of imperial claims. 
Throughout the last six centuries, and maybe more, the inhabitants of Vieques 
have engaged in a long and violent process to forge a stable island community.  From the 
times of the Caribs to those of the U.S. Navy various empires opposed such plans for 
very different reasons.  The only possible exceptions to this historical trend have occurred 
soon after the foundation of the Spanish colony of Vieques in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries and in the post-Navy years of the early 21st century.  Coincidentally, both of 
these periods have been marked by what I term the virginity debate. 
While most Caribbean islands were European colonies by the 17th century, 
Vieques remained a contested space disputed by the French, Danish, British and Spanish 
empires until well into the 19th century.  The Spanish Empire discouraged further French 
colonization attempts through the late 17th century violent expulsions of European 
settlements from Vieques.  The claims of the Danish and British empires, however, 
                                                 






carried into the 1800s.  Once Spain devised a colonization plan for Vieques in 1811, first 
one in 300 years, the three imperial powers locked in a diplomatic war.  The issue at 
stake was whether Vieques was an integral part of the Puerto Rican archipelago or of the 
neighboring Virgin Islands controlled by Denmark and Great Britain.  The Danish 
Empire succumbed early on to the Spanish intransigent stance.  British diplomats, 
nonetheless, continued to debate with their Spanish counterparts until the year 1864 when 
the British Empire formally renounced to its claims over the island.  The withdrawal of 
British claims allowed the inhabitants of the island, for the first time in 450 years, to 
concentrate on the community’s development without the fear of an imperial attack or 
intervention.  It also allowed the Spanish colonial government in San Juan to formally 
incorporate the island to the Puerto Rican archipelago, and thus dispel any doubts about 
Vieques being a Virgin Island.  Spain’s confidence, however, was unfounded.  Only 34 
years after the British withdrawal the U.S. invaded the island.  The Hispanic American 
War of 1898 changed imperial sovereignties in the Puerto Rican archipelago.  Yet, the 
U.S. allowed, after a period of adjustment, the Viequense community to prosper under 
the auspices of an early 20th century sugar boom.3  The situation changed in 1941 when 
the Navy officially entered the island and quickly became the largest landowner, always 
wanting more. 
The 19th century imperial struggle to control Vieques depended on violence and 
coercion as well as on wit.  The diplomatic war between the Spanish, Danish and British 
empires, in fact, was waged through sexual puns and metaphors.  These discursive 
                                                 
3 The prosperity allowed under the early 20th century sugar boom benefited, for the most part, 
certain sectors of Viequense society.  The trickle down effect, even during the 1920s climax of the sugar 
industry, was minimal in Vieques.  While agregados lived in precarious conditions, families like the 
Benítez of the Benítez Sugar Company reaped the rewards of the sugar industry.  See Juan A. Bonnet 






strategies were meant to characterize the island as pure and virginal or as possessed and 
married.  Such dichotomous characterizations, always emphasizing on the desirability of 
the feminized space, were designed to make the island fit into the schemes of empires.  
The Governor of Vieques Teophile Le Guillou, for example, attested to the Governor of 
the British Virgin Islands Isaac Hay in 1840 that, “Vieques was not a virgin after her 
marriage with Spain.”4  Virginity, in this context, implied not only a state of purity and of 
being uncorrupted, but also the condition of not having an owner.  The feminization of 
the space, in addition, ensured that the island could be considered capable of being 
disciplined, made docile and domesticated.  The Spanish Empire, in turn, played the part 
of the owning husband.  Thus, the virginity debate surrounding Vieques was ultimately 
about imperial possession. 
The Le Guillou-Hay’s conversation further exemplifies how the virginity debate 
was premised on erasures.  The Spanish Empire, as much as the British and Danish 
empires, was invested in erasing the indigenous cultures that had previously occupied the 
island.  Even if Le Guillou thought in 1840 that the island was no longer virginal, the loss 
of purity happened according to him only after the marriage with Spain.  Before the union 
with the Spanish Empire, he had argued in other texts, the island was a savage 
labyrinthine space.5  This was, for Le Guillou and other Spanish officials, an untamed 
space waiting to be conquered.  This refusal to recognize the passing of human cultures 
through the island was ultimately an erasure of historical and environmental change.  The 
                                                 
4 “Vieques no era virgen después de su matrimonio con la España.”  Documentación sobre Vieques: 
Transcripciones de documentos procedentes del AHN/U Madrid, CIH, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Río 
Piedras, 642.  For a discussion of the origins of the virginity debate see “Chapter 4: The Spanish Colony of 
Vieques, 19th Century.” 
5 For a discussion of Vieques as a labyrinthines space see “Chapter 3: Claims to the Labyrinthine 






virginal characterization erased, for example, thousands of years of human interaction 
with the local environment as well as approximately 300 years of indigenous, African and 
European coexistence in the island prior to the 1811 Spanish colonization attempt.  In 
those 300 years of coexistence the island’s natural resources had been exploited.  Its 
woods, in particular, were deforested for coal by both dwellers and passersby.  The 
coexistence, moreover, created a heterogeneous population that officials like Governor 
Le Guillou tried to ignore in the process of founding and affirming the basis of the 
Spanish colony of Vieques.6 
At the opening of the 21st century, the Navy has formally left Vieques.  The 
political lobbying, social mobilization and civil disobedience following the death of 
David Sanes in April 19, 1999 forced President William J. Clinton to order the cease, if 
the people of Vieques agreed, of all naval trainings in the island by May 1, 2003.7  
President George W. Bush further expressed in June 14, 2001 its support for the shut 
down of the naval facilities in Vieques.8  In turn, the ammunition depot closed in May 
2001 and the live fire range followed in May 2003.  Yet, the struggle to inhabit Isla Nena, 
                                                 
6 The Spanish colony of Vieques was officially founded in the year 1844.  See “Chapter 4: The 
Spanish Colony of Vieques, 19th Century.” 
7 For a detailed chronology of the events leading to President Clinton’s January 31, 2000 Directive 
see History of the Navy in Vieques, 2006, Vieques Island Travel Guide, 12 May 2007 
<http://www.vieques-island.com/navy/>.  For the Presidential Directive, which included the transfer of the 
western Navy lands to the Government of Puerto Rico by December 31, 2000, see William J. Clinton, 
“January 31, 2000 Directive to the Secretary of Defense, Office of Management and Budget,” Federation of 
American Scientists, 2005, Federation of American Scientists, 12 May 2007 
<http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/000131-vieques.htm>. 
8 The support of the Bush Administration for the close down of the naval facilities by May 2003 
rendered null the need for a referendum as stipulated by President Clinton’s Directive.  The Governor of 
Puerto Rico Sila María Calderón (2001-2004), nonetheless, favored the immediate withdrawal of the Navy 
from Vieques and sponsored a non-binding referendum in July 29, 2001.  In this referendum the option of 
immediate cease of naval activities in Vieques, not offered in the original Clinton referendum, won by 
68%.  Another 2% voted for the cease of activities by May 2003.  Ronald O’Rourke, “Vieques, Puerto Rico 
Naval Training Range: Background and Issues for Congress,” Naval Historical Center, 2005, U.S. Navy, 






as noted by community activists, is far from over.9  The effects of 60 years of military 
presence are widely felt today.  A significant portion of the former Navy land, for 
example, is currently too polluted for human use and the cancer rate in Vieques remains 
the highest in Puerto Rico. 
While the Navy is undertaking the long process of decontamination, Viequenses 
still have no control over most of the island.  It is unlikely the situation will change any 
time soon.  As stipulated by President Clinton in 1999, the Navy has maintained 
ownership of the 100 acres encompassing the ROTHR and Monte Pirata 
telecommunications facilities.10  Between 2001 and 2003, in addition, the U.S. Congress 
transferred 800 acres of ex-Navy land to the Puerto Rico Conservation Trust and another 
17,673 acres to the Department of the Interior.11  The federal agency, with a long history 
of dealing with non-incorporable populations and territories, assigned the land to its Fish 
and Wildlife Bureau.12  The Bureau, in turn, has been managing 53% of the island as a 
                                                 
9 See the Spring 2006 volume dedicated to Vieques of the CENTRO Journal.  The volume has 
articles by Sherrie L. Baver, Déborah Berman Santana and Katherine T. McCaffrey dedicated to the 
problems faced by Viequense residents in the post-Navy years.  CENTRO Journal XVIII:I (Spring 2006).  
See also Liv Gold, “In Vieques, Puerto Rico, La Lucha Continua,” NACLA News, 2007, NACLA, 14 May 
2007 <http://news.nacla.org/2007/01/15/in-vieques-puerto-rico-la-lucha-continua/>.  And Sherrie L. Baver, 
“‘Peace Is More Than the End of Bombing:’  The Second Stage of the Vieques Struggle,” Latin American 
Perspectives 146:33:1 (January 2006): 102-115. 
10 The Navy has, in addition to the 100 acres encompassing the ROTHR (98.5 acres) and Monte 
Pirata (1.5 acres) facilities, retained restrictive easement rights and usage agreements over 719.4 acres of 
land surrounding these sites.  These easements posed permanent restrictions to the kinds of land usage and 
development permitted in these areas conveyed to the Municipality of Vieques, the Puerto Rico 
Conservation Trust and the Department of Interior.  United States, Department of the Navy, Environmental 
Assessment for Transfer of the Naval Ammunition Support Detachment Property, Vieques, Puerto Rico.  
(GPO, November 2000) 1-7, 2-2. 
11 See Commonwealth, Conservation Trust and Department of the Interior, Management Plan for the 
Western Vieques. 
12 See Appendix 5.  The Department of Interior, created in 1849, has been in charge of insular 
territories like Guam through the Office of Insular Affairs and of Native American lands and populations 
through the Native American Lands and Needs Bureau.  U.S. Department of the Interior, 2007, U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 14 May 2007 <www.doi.gov>.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife, created in 1940, 
assumed control of 3,100 acres in the western part of Vieques in May 1, 2001 and of 14,573 acres in the 
east in May 1, 2003.  “Vieques National Wildlife Refuge,” U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2007, U.S. Fish 






National Wildlife Refuge since 2003.  The rest of the ex-Navy land is either sealed off 
until the decontamination process is completed or under study by the Municipal 
government so as to decide its best use.  The decontamination process, according to Navy 
cost estimates, could extend well beyond 2012.13  The Municipality, on the other hand, 
has three land use plans available and a very limited municipal budget to act upon them. 
The different land use plans were produced by the JPPR, the Municipality of 
Vieques, the Grupo de Apoyo Técnico y Profesional para el Desarollo Sustentable de 
Vieques (Technical and Professional Support Group for the Sustainable Development of 
Vieques, or GATP) and the Estudios Técnicos, Inc. (Technical Studies, Inc.).  The 
Municipality in collaboration with the JPPR drafted the Plan de Ordenación Territorial de 
Vieques approved in 2000.14  The emphasis of the document lies on the strategic planning 
of land usage for an orderly municipal development.  In 2002 the GATP finished their 
Guías para el Desarollo Sustentable de Vieques.15  The GATP is composed of an 
                                                 
13 For an assessment of the costs and duration of the current decontamination process in Vieques see 
the March 26, 2007 letter from the Government Accountability Office to the Representative Charles B. 
Rangel.  Brian Lepore, “GAO-07-552R Defense Infrastructure: Environmental Cleanup of Former Naval 
Facilities on Vieques,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, Government Accountability Office, 
14 May 2007 <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07552r.pdf>. 
14 The Municipality of Vieques under Mayor Manuela Santiago began drafting the Plan de 
Ordenación in 1993 as a requisite to Law #81 of August 30, 1991 otherwise known as the Autonomous 
Municipalities Law.  The Law, representing a decentralization effort from the part of the Puerto Rican 
government, authorized municipalities to establish land usage plans that facilitate the municipalities’ 
involvement in their own development.  The original drafting process was finished in 1999, but the return 
of Navy lands to the municipality made it necessary to revise the Plan in 2000.  Mayor Dámaso Serrano, 
elected to office in November 2000, promised to revise the document during his administration.  The Plan 
was again revisited in 2004 for the approval of the Master Plan for Sustainable Development of Vieques 
and Culebra for the Special Economic Development Zone.  Puerto Rico, Municipio de Vieques, Plan Final 
- Plan de Ordenación Territorial de Vieques (Documento para Vista Pública) (Vieques: n.p., 2000) 2-3.  
Déborah Berman Santana, “La lucha continúa: Challenges for a post-Navy Vieques” CENTRO Journal 
XVIII:I (Spring 2006): 117-118. 
15 The GATP argue that they propose guidelines instead of a plan in order to make the document 
more flexible and capable of being adapted to future situations.  The Plan de Ordenación Territorial, 
however, was drafted with similar intentions of being adapted to changing situations.  For such a reason, it 
was written into the Plan that it should be revised every 5 years.  See Grupo de Apoyo Técnico y 
Profesional para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques, Guías para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques.  






independent group of scholars and professionals, mostly from the Puerto Rican main 
island, that came together after 1999 to propose alternatives for the sustainable 
development of Vieques.  Their guidelines are based on: 
a development that integrates the economic development, the social 
equity, and the conservation and protection of the natural environment.  It 
seeks to elevate people’s quality of life without compromising the future 
of coming generations.16 
 
Finally, in 2004 Technical Studies, Inc. drafted the Master Plan for Sustainable 
Development of Vieques and Culebra approved by the Puerto Rican government for the 
Special Economic Development Zone.  The Zone, encompassing the municipalities of 
Vieques and Culebra, was created by Law #153 of August 10, 2002 to facilitate the area’s 
integrated, sustainable and community-oriented development.  The Zone’s Master Plan 
was influenced by the GATP’s Guías.  One of the associates of the San Juan-based firm 
Estudios Técnicos, Inc., in fact, had formed part of the GATP initiative.  Furthermore, the 
Guías were established as the basis for the Master Plan in a 2003 meeting between the 
licensed planner José Rivera Santana and the Chief of Staff to the Sila Maria Calderón 
Administration César Miranda.17  Still, the 2004 Master Plan was a government-
sponsored document that had to harmonize with the 2000 municipal Plan.18  The 
existence of these different land use plans with diverging aims and proposals led to 
conflicts among Viequense residents and the Municipal and Puerto Rican governments.  
In this, local activists originally favored the GATP’s guidelines as being compatible with 
                                                 
16 “un desarollo que integra el desarollo económico, la equidad social y la conservación y protección 
del ambiente natural.  Persigue elevar la calidad de vida de la gente sin comprometer el futuro de las 
generaciones venideras.”  GATP, Guías XII. 
17 GATP, Guías.  Prólogo 2005 2. 






the vision of, “an island developed for the Viequenses and by the Viequenses.”19  This is 
a vision of development community activist Nilda Medina summarizes as ecologically 
friendly, culturally conscious and locally run.  Nonetheless, local organizations like the 
Comité Pro Rescate y Desarollo de Vieques (Committee for the Rescue and Development 
of Vieques), of which Medina is a member, later backed the approval of the Master 
Plan.20  The Master Plan, after all, provides Viequenses with a legal instrument guided by 
the vision of sustainable development.  The establishment of a land use plan is thus 
inextricably linked to the definition of a developmental path for the island.  Both are 
means through which to imagine the future of Vieques. 
Imagining Isla Nena’s future has not become an easier task for Viequenses even 
though the Navy, coercive arm of the U.S. Empire, renounced its attempts to remove the 
island community.21  While Viequenses discuss land usages and developmental paths and 
the Navy undertakes the decontamination process, the island’s civilian stretch has 
become the object of an unrestrained land grab by U.S. capitalists looking to invest in the 
                                                 
19 “una isla desarollada para los Viequenses y por los Viequenses.”  Nilda Medina, personal 
interview, 9 November 2003.  The GATP was initially formed by request of the CPRDV.  The CPRDV 
asked in May of 1999 a group of Puerto Rican professionals for help in devising alternatives for the socio-
economic development of Vieques.  The GATP and community activists worked from then on together in 
drafting the Guías.  GATP, Guías, II.  Berman, “La lucha,” CENTRO 117. 
20 The Comité Pro Rescate y Desarollo de Vieques evolved from the Cruzada Pro Rescate de 
Vieques that had surfaced out of the late 1970s and early 1980s fishermen’s movement.  Although the name 
and some members established continuities between the organizations, Katherine McCaffrey argues that the 
organizations responded to two very different contexts.  She argues that the Cruzada’s demise was partly 
due to the Cold War context that made the members vulnerable to communist accusations.  The Comité’s 
success, on the other hand, was due to the less polarized political climate after the end of the Cold War in 
1991.  The Comité can be considered s successful organization since it has survived until the present day 
and had a central role in the protests and civil disobedience campaigns that led to the close down of the 
Navy bases in Vieques.  Katherine T. McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in 
Vieques, Puerto Rico (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002) 125-130.  See “Chapter 7: Isla 
Nena, Island of Memories and the Dead, 1953-2003.” 
21 I use the word “remove” in this context to refer to the Navy’s attempts to both physically 






“undiscovered Spanish Virgin Island.”22  Their search proves that the virginity debate 
first engaged in 1816 by Lord Castlereagh and Conde de Fernán Núnez on behalf of the 
British and Spanish empires is far from settled.  In the 21st century the virginity debate 
might be more about speculators and global trends of leisure tourism than about imperial 
claims.  Yet, like in the 19th century the debate is ultimately about possession, more 
precisely about the possession of space through the erasure of human cultures and related 
historical and environmental change.  The construction of Vieques as the “undiscovered 
Spanish Virgin Island” erases 500 years of post-Columbian history with the word 
“undiscovered,” 100 years of U.S. rule with the word “Spanish” and 140 years of 
Viequense-Puerto Rican relationship with the words “Virgin Island.”  The “virgin” pun, 
furthermore, plays with the visibility of 200 years of imperial rule, 100 years of sugar 
production and 60 years of continuous bombings.  All these activities, nonetheless, have 
left unlikely historical traces along the Viequense landscape such as the thorn scrub that 
has replaced the sugar fields the Navy expropriated in the 1940s.23  Some of these traces, 
like the 73% poverty level and the lack of adequate housing, could instead be considered 
                                                 
22 Charlie Connelly, personal interview, 5 November 2003.  For references to Vieques as the 
“undiscovered Spanish Virgin Island” see, for example, Internet tourism sites like the Vieques Travel 
Guide site.  Such sites are usually managed by U.S. North Americans with business interests in Vieques.  
Vieques Travel Guide.com, 2007, Vieques Travel Guide.com, 10 May 2007 
<http:www.viequestravelguide.com/vieques-and-culebra.html>. 
23 The study of vegetation in the western third of Vieques reveals 200 years of human interactions.  
Recent environmental studies propose that a subtropical moist coastal forest once covered much of 
Vieques.  Most of the forest, however, was taken down during the 19th and early 20th centuries to make way 
for sugar cane fields.  The sugar industry was particularly intensive in the west of the island.  Once the 
Navy expropriated these sugar fields in 1941-1942 agricultural activities were abandoned.  The Navy then 
allowed for limited cattle grazing in these lands.  As a result of these two centuries of interaction, a thick 
thorn scrub has grown in the area.  The scrub has thrived to such an extent that it currently covers almost in 
it entirety the lands of the former Naval Ammunition Support Detachment.  The Navy acknowledged both 
the environmental changes and the contamination of sites in the western area in its 2000 Environmental 
Assessment.  Yet, it still employs the word “pristine” to describe the area.  Department of the Navy, 






scars in the Viequense landscape.24  Thus, in the midst of the resuscitated virginity 
debate, Vieques is being submitted to cosmetic surgeries designed to make Isla Nena 
appear the part.  Contaminated sites, for example, are fenced off as fish and wildlife 
refuges while the civilian stretch is gentrified.25  In the last four to seven years, 
Viequenses have been witnessing the rapid gentrification of the mostly untitled land of 
that same civilian one third they have now occupied for generations.26  If they were 
uncomfortably squeezed for the last 60 years between two military bases, they are now 
being pushed out of the civilian one third they can hardly afford to inhabit.  In terms of 
imagining Isla Nena’s future after the closing of the Navy bases, community activist 
Robert Rabin notes that the struggle for Vieques has not ended and that the battlefront 
has become fragmented.  The local population, in turn, has to fight nowadays not only the 
Navy for an adequate cleanup process, but the Fish and Wildlife Service for land usage 
rights as well as speculators, real estate agents, foreign investors and the Puerto Rican 
government for access to adequate housing and sustainable development.27 
The challenges faced by the Viequense community at the start of the 21st century 
are informed by the rather particular history that, in many ways, has set the community 
apart from other island communities in the region.  The European colonization of 
Vieques, for example, was a long process that spanned over three centuries.  The Spanish 
Empire claimed to have discovered the island in 1493, but different empires and fringe 
                                                 
24 The 73% poverty level for the year 1990 is provided by the Navy and is based on figures from the 
U.S. Census Bureau.  Department of the Navy, Environmental Assessment 3-37.  For an analysis of the 
lack of adequate housing units see GATP, Guías 89. 
25 See Katherine T. McCaffrey, “The battle for Vieques’ future,” CENTRO Journal XVIII:I (Spring 
2006): 124-147. 
26 Berman, “La lucha,” CENTRO 117-120. 
27 Coqui Santaliz, “Juntos su corazón y Vieques,” Nuevo día [San Juan] n.d.: n.p.  Robert Rabin, 
“[CPRDV] FW: [ViequesLibre] Juntos su corazón y Vieques: Robert Rabin (El Nuevo Dia),” e-mail to 






populations disputed the space until 1864.  So that while neighboring island colonies 
sought ways to maximize the yield of exhausted soils, settlers in 19th century Vieques 
debated over where to establish the colony’s town.  Vieques, in addition, has experienced 
an extreme militarization not shared by other islands.  Still, Vieques is in so many ways a 
small island among so many other small islands in the Caribbean Sea. 
Even though defining the region has long been the obsession of intellectuals, the 
Caribbean defies easy categorizations.  Alejo Carpentier might have exoticized the region 
through magical narrations, but he understood that to approach America and its history 
there was the need to believe in alternate realities.  In my own approach to Vieques, I 
have come to believe in the fantastic, the dreamlike, the nightmarish, the serious and the 
ludicrous of the everyday.  I have, furthermore, come to believe that the particularities of 
Vieques have resonance elsewhere.  In this sense, I take Vieques to be very Caribbean, if 
not an epitome of the Caribbean.  Following Stuart Hall, the Caribbean is a diasporic 
space historically constructed through violent ruptures, constant movement and 
interchange.28  The Caribbean, I would add, is a non-continuous space of violence, 
displacements and mélange where surviving is many times an act of defiance.29  In this 
reduced space different empires have clashed and cultures, races and languages have 
uneasily merged.  At the turn of the 21st century, moreover, the Caribbean has been 
transformed into a space for global leisure tourism.  The process facilitates a two-ways 
migratory pattern characterized by the emigration of local communities forged through 
centuries of colonialism to their imperial metropolises and the immigration of European 
                                                 
28 Stuart Hall, “Negotiating Caribbean Identities,” New Left Review 209 (January-February 1995): 
6.  See “Chapter 1: Introduction.” 
29 By the usage of “non-continuous” I refer to the Caribbean space as a transnational one that can be 






and U.S. citizens seeking to discover the Caribbean.  In the case of Vieques, the local 
youth is being replaced by an English-speaking enclave of, according to the geographer 
Déborah Berman, “ex-Marines, aging hippies and entrepreneurs who dominate the 
island’s tourism and real estate economic sectors, as well as part-time resident vacation 
homeowners.”30  In many ways, this new global scenario is a re-colonization of the 
Caribbean in which qualities like virginal, unspoiled and pure, even if only cosmetic, are 
valuable assets.  The virginity debate has consequently taken a hold of the burgeoning 
real estate market in Vieques. 
My delving into Vieques’ past and present has also led me to believe that this 
small Caribbean island has a global resonance that extends beyond current trends of 
leisure tourism.  Vieques’ extreme militarization might be unmatched in the Caribbean.  
Yet, on the other side of the globe the atoll of Diego García in the Chagos Islands attests 
to the fact that Vieques has not been alone.  The marginal, once worded, can be shown to 
be global.  The atoll of Diego García, with its Iberian name, bore witness to a similar 
encounter of Portuguese, French, British and U.S. empires.  Yet, this time the imperial 
encounter occurred in a small speck of land in the Indian Ocean.  Probably no other place 
in the world provides a better example through which to view U.S. policies towards 
Vieques.  The local population of the atoll, known as Ilois, was completely expropriated 
in 1967-1971 by the British Government.  The British Empire owns the Chagos 
archipelago but leased part of it to the U.S. until the year 2016.  The U.S., in turn, has 
established in Diego García a naval facility.31  The expropriation of the Ilois, who were 
                                                 
30 Déborah Berman proposes that there are currently 1,000 to 2,000 U.S. North Americans living in 
Vieques.  Berman, “La lucha,” CENTRO 118. 







only allowed back in 2006 to visit their family graves, makes me think that my family 
and my own displaced experiences resulting from militarized colonialism might also be 
global in reach.32  As such, I wonder about other people across the world dominated by 
postmemories of militarized lands their predecessors were forced to leave behind. 
                                                 








































Map of Vieques 1940s-20032 
 
                                                 
1 Justo Pastor Ruiz, Vieques antiguo y moderno: 1493-1946 (Santurce: JAY-CE Printing, 1987) 19. 








Map of Vieques’ Population Distribution before 1941 and after 1943, 





Map of the Caribbean4 
 
                                                 
3 Vieques: A Long Way Home, eds. César Ayala and Bonnie Donohue, 2006, Casa de la 
Cultura/Center for Latino Arts, 21 January 2007 
<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/ayala/vieques/bdonohue/index.htm>. 








Map of Vieques since 20035 
 
 
                                                 
5 United States, Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, “Vieques National Wildlife 







Outline of the Indigenous Caribbean Cultures, 
as proposed by Sebastián Robiou Lamarche6 
Cultures Time Span Characteristics 
First Settlers 
(Archaic) 
6000 B.C. Originally from Central America, they settled in Cuba and 
La Hispaniola while dedicating to hunting and the 




4000 B.C. Originally from South America, they settled in the Lesser 
Antilles and Puerto Rico while dedicating to fishing and 









Originally from South America, they introduced pottery 
making and the cultivation of cassava throughout the 








A mixture of the previous agro-ceramists with new South 
American migratory waves adapt to the Antillean 
ecosystem while were developing new techniques in 
agriculture and pottery making.  They extend throughout 







The societies became more complex, especially in La 
Hispaniola and Puerto Rico, developing characteristics 






Originally from the South American coasts, they invaded 
the Lesser Antilles taking Arawak women captive while 









                                                 
6 Sebastián Robiou Lamarche, Taínos y Caribes: Las culturas aborigínes antillanas (San Juan: 







Outline of the Indigenous Caribbean Cultures, 
as proposed by Luis Chanlatte Baik and Yvonne Narganes Storde7 
Outline of the Caribbean Indigenous Cultures 
(6000 B.C.-1492 A.D.) 
Archaic 
Period 
Pre-pottery (6000 B.C.) 






Agro-ceramist I and II (500 B.C.-?) 
This period is composed of two successive migratory waves of the 
Huecoides and the Saladoides-Igneris. 
Formative 
Antillean 
Agro-ceramist III (460 A.D.) 
Through the transculturation of all the cultures above an 
indigenous Antillean culture and ceramic is born. 
Agro-ceramist IV (1025 A.D.-1492 A.D.) 
The indigenous society further evolves and is 














                                                 
7 Luis A. Chanlatte Baik and Yvonne M. Narganes Storde, La nueva arqueología de Puerto Rico (su 
proyección en las Antillas) (Santo Domingo: Editora Taller, C. por A., 1990).  Luis A. Chanlatte Baik and 
Yvonne M. Narganes Storde, Vieques, Puerto Rico: Asiento de una Nueva Cultura Aborigen Antillana 







Population of Puerto Rico 1765-1897, 
as proposed by José L. Vázquez Calzada8 








1765 * * 39,846 5,037 44,833 
1776 30,709 31,909 62,618 7,592 70,210 
1800 * * * * 155,426 
1812 85,662 79,806 165,468 17,536 183,004 
1815 * * * * 220,892 
1820 102,432 106,460 208,892 21,730 230,622 
1827 150,311 120,487 270,798 31,874 302,672 
1830 162,311 127,287 289,598 34,240 323,838 
1834 188,869 128,149 317,018 41,818 358,836 
1846 216,083 175,791 391,874 51,265 443,139 
1860 300,406 241,037 541,443 41,738 583,308*** 
1877 411,712 319,936 731,648 ** 731,648 
1887 474,933 323,632 798,565 ** 798,565 
1897 570,187 315,632 885,819 ** 894,302*** 
* No information available 
** Slavery abolished in 1873 










                                                 
8 While Vázquez Calzada writes that the total population (Total Free Population + Black Slaves) of 
the year 1765 was 44,833, my calculations place the figure at 44,883.  There is a difference of 50 between 
the two figures.  José L. Vázquez Calzada, La población de Puerto Rico y su trayectoria histórica (San 







Slave Population in Puerto Rico 1531-1873, 
as proposed by Francisco Moscoso, José L. Vázquez Calzada and the 1899 Census9 
Year Number of Slaves Percentage of the Total 
Population 
1531 2,284 54.8 
1765 5,037 11.2 
1776 7,592 10.8 
1794 17,500 * 
1802 13,333 8.2 
1812 17,536 9.6 
1820 21,730 9.4 
1827 31,874 10.5 
1830 34,240 10.5 
1834 41,818 11.7 
1846 51,265 11.6 
1854 46,918 9.5 
1860 41,738 7.2 
1873 29,229 4.2 










                                                 
9 The information for the year 1531 is offered by Francisco Moscoso based on the 1530-1531 
census performed by the Governor Francisco Manuel de Lando.  Moscoso, “Presentación,” Cuaderno de 
Investigación Histórica.  V.  Vázquez Calzada, La población de Puerto Rico.  12.  The information for the 
year 1794 appears on the Informe sobre el censo de Puerto Rico, 1899.  Estados Unidos, Departamento de 
la Guerra, Dirección del Censo de Puerto Rico, Informe sobre el Censo de Puerto Rico 1899 (Colombia: 







Population of Puerto Rico 1899-2000, 
as proposed by José L. Vázquez Calzada and the U.S. Census Bureau10 
Date Population Annual Growth 
Percentage 
November 10, 1899 953,243 --- 
April 15, 1910 1,118,012 1.54% 
January 1, 1920 1,299,809 1.57% 
April 1, 1930 1,543,913 1.69% 
April 1, 1940 1,869,255 1.94% 
April 1, 1950 2,210,703 1.69% 
April 1, 1960 2,349,544 0.61% 
April 1, 1970 2,712,033 1.45% 
April 1, 1980 3,196,520 1.66% 
1990 3,522,037  













                                                 
10 Vázquez Calzada, La población de Puerto Rico 13.  The population information for the year 1990 
is from Censo de población de 1990, and for the year 2000 is from the Internet site of the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Estados Unidos, Departamento de Comercio, Negociado del Censo, Censo de población de 1990: 
Características Generales de la Población Puerto Rico (Washington: GPO, 1992) 2.  United States, 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Puerto Rico: 2000.  Summary Population and Housing 







Commercial Traffic between Puerto Rico and Seville 1512-1699, 
as proposed by Fernando Picó11 
 
Period 
Departures to Puerto Rico Arrivals from Puerto Rico 
Number of 
Ships 
Total Tonnage Number of 
Ships 
Total Tonnage
Until 1525 18 1710 9 930 
1526-1550 171 2100 28 3440 
1551-1575 192 2230 105 13190 
1576-1600 35 3645 105 13605 
1601-1625 503 5715 1364 16363 
1626-1650 185 2462 25 2965 
1651-1675 8 Not Indicated 15 Not Indicated 
1676-1699 8 Not Indicated 4 Not Indicated 
1 Includes 1 ship through Puerto Real and 1 with Puerto Plata as its final destiny 
2 Includes 1 ship to Puerto Plata through Puerto Rico 
3 Includes 13 ships in route to La Havana with a total tonnage of 1020 
4 Includes 1 ship from the Orinoco through Puerto Rico 
5 Includes 1 ship in route to Saint Martin 
 
Appendix 12 
Puerto Rican Sugar Exported to Seville 1568-1594 and 1650-1670, 
as proposed by Fernando Picó12 
Year Boxes Arrobas/Tons Year Arrobas/Tons 
1568 740 22,200/277.5 1650 333/4.1625 
1569 379 11,370/142.125 1651 534/6.675 
1570 267 8,010/100.125 1652 230/2.875 
1571 284 8,520/106.5 1654 308/3.85 
1583 79 2,370/29.625 1660 1,100/13.75 
1584 186 5,580/69.75 1663 216/2.7 
1589 --- 1,170/14.625 1670 132/1.65 
1593 --- 5,640/70.5   
1594 --- 9,105/113.8125   
                                                 
11 Fernando Picó’s chart is based on figures provided by separate studies from Huguette and Pierre 
Chaunu and Lutgardo García Fuentes.  Fernando Picó, Historia general de Puerto Rico (Río Piedras: 
Ediciones Huracán, 1988) 79. 
12 Fernando Picó’s chart is based on figures provided by separate studies from Huguette and Pierre 
Chaunu and Lutgardo García Fuentes.  Picó used Chaunu for the years 1568 to 1594 and García Fuentes for 
the years 1650 to 1670.  The figures provided by Chaunu are based on an estimate of 30 arrobas per box.  
The original charts provided by Picó used the measurement unit arroba instead of tons.  Using the formula 
provided by Picó equaling 1 arroba to 25 pounds, I converted the arrobas to tons by multiplying the 





































































































1  3  2        20    
2. Patricio 
Ramos 
  5          24 3   
3. Mr. 
Mofret 
                
4. Antonio 
Romero 




1  3 1 4   1    50 24    
6. Pantaleón 
Hernández 
1 2 2  2   1     50 2  2 
7. Juan 
Antonio 
2  1          20 2   
8. Antonio 
Montalvo 
3 6 3          40 6   
9. Hijo de 
Mr. Mofret 
  1           2  3 
10.Esteban 
de Torres 
1 2 1   1       24 1   
11.Juan Opio              2   
12.Mr. 
Duple 
  1          12 2   
13.Manuel 
Sánchez 
1       1     18 1   
14.Antonio 
Troche 
2  2        25  24 1   
                                                 
13 According to my calculations there were a total of 72 Field Workers, 12 Calves, 14 Horses, 647 
Chickens and 45 cuerdas of grass in 1828.  These figures represent a difference of -1, +2, -2, +1 and -1 
with the respective figures of the 1828 Census.  Documentación sobre Vieques: Transcripciones de 








  12  2 5 5 1     36 4  4 
16.Antonio 
Torres 
3 2           24 1   
17.Faustino 
Alvarez 
1 4 2     1     20 2   
18.Mr. Esmit    4         13   3 
19.María 
Hernández 
  3  2   1     24    
20.Mr. 
Cadelán 
1 1 2 5 2  2      24 3  3 
21.Mr. 
Reynal 
  2              
22.Juan 
Carlos 
  2 1 4 2  1   4 100 20 1   
23.Madam 
Bequer 
                
24.Guillermo 
Opio 
9 15 10 1 8 2 2 1  50 12 100 50 5   
25.Don José 
Ma Guillot** 
1  17 26 20 3 3 6 12  25  150 30 10 30
Totals (25) 27 32 73 38 46 13 10 16 12 50 66 250 646 68 10 46
* Cuerdas 




1. Mr. Esmit 40 tons schooner 
2. Don Guillot 41 tons pailebot (small steam boat) and small boat 
3. G. Opio small boat 
4. A. Montalvo small boat 
5. F. Alvarez small boat 

















Ox Cows Calves Horses Mares Colts Mules Donkeys 








Blacks People of 
Color 




English, Danes & 
Frenchmen 
(1/3 of Population)
533 or 432* 267 or 216* 
38 42 568 152 800 
* These figures do not include the 152 slave population. 
Land Distribution by Cuerdas 
Sugar cane Tobacco Cotton Coffee Food 
Supplies 
Grass Total 








                                                 
14 Documentación sobre Vieques 803-804. 







Vieques’ Population Census of August 4, 184516 
Of Families Whites Free 
Mulattos
Blacks Slaves Totals 
Fathers 62 80 3 0 145 
Mothers 45 91 1 0 137 
Sons 82 130 3 0 215 
Daughters 60 110 1 0 171 
Singles 0 0 0 369 369 
Totals 249 411 8 369 1,036 
 
Divided by Labor 







563 6 6 4 3 454 1,036 
 






France England Denmark Philippines Different 
Nations 
Total 










                                                 
16 According to my calculations the grand population total for the 1845 Census should be 1,037.  The 








Vieques’ Population and Finances around the Year 1851, 






















1,676 518,806 73,479 14 8,000 57,947 17,000 
* The customs and subsidio taxes for Puerto Rico represented 30% of its total 
annual exportations.  Vieques, as a freeport, did not have to pay these taxes.  However, 
the Marqués de España proposed in November 1851 that the 30% of Vieques’ annual 
exportations (17,000 pesos) would more than double its administrative costs (8,000 
pesos) paid at the time with Puerto Rico’s finances. 
 
Appendix 18 
Population of Vieques 1838-2000, 
as proposed by Juan Bonnet Benítez and the U.S. Census Bureau18 
Year Population Increase % Decrease % Density m2* 
1838 120 - - 2.1 
1845 1,036 763.3 - 19.9 
1899 5,938 473.1 - 114.2 
1900 6,642 11.9 - 127.0 
1910 10,425 57.0 - 200.5 
1920 11,651 11.8 - 224.0 
1930 10,582 - 9.2 203.5 
1940** 10,362 - .2 199.3 
1950 9,228 - 10.9 181.3 
1960 7,210 - 21.9 138.7 
1970 7,762 7.7 - 149.4 
1980 7,662  1.4  
1990 8,602    
2000 9,106    
* The total surface of Vieques is 52 square miles. 
** The distribution of the 1940 is in the town and neighborhoods. 
                                                 
17 Documentación sobre Vieques 209. 
18 I could not find any records about the 1838 population total.  Yet, if there were 195 inhabitants in 
1828 and 1,036 in 1945, it is unlikely that the 1838 population was 120.  The 1900 figure includes Culebra, 
incorporated to Vieques during 1902-1917.  Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico 118.  The 1980 
figures are from United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of 
Population, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GOP, 1983) 53B-11.  The 1990 total is from Negociado del Censo, 







Governors and Mayors of Vieques 1811-200319 
Years in 
Office 




Mayors under the U.S. 
Empire 
1811- Juan Roselló 1898-1899 José A. Díaz 
1828-32 Francisco Roselló 1899-1902 Leopoldo Venegas 
1832-43 Teophile J. J. Le Guillou 1902-1910 Luis Amedée Bonnet 
1844-51 Francisco Sainz 1910- Victor Dúteil (died) 
1851- José Astorga -1914 Carlos Benítez 
1856- Gregorio Tenorio 1914-1920 Luis Amedée Bonnet 
1857- Luis de Oñativia 1920-1928 Zoilo Benítez Castaño 
1860- Francisco Gómez de Mercado 1928-1932 Miguel Simons 
1862- Manuel Iturriaga 1932-1933 Diego Meléndez 
1864-66 Francisco Gómez de Mercado 1933- Juan Bermúdez (resigned) 
1867- Luis de Riego y Pica 1933-1936 Aureo Díaz 
1870- Manuel Iturriaga & Luis Prats 1936-1943 Leoncio T. Davis (resigned) 
1871- Tomás Font, Juan Campos & 
Federico Marangues y Chavar 
1943-1948 Antonio Avila 
1872- Cayetano Bola y Carbonell 1948-1972 Antonio Rivera 
1873 Benigno Alvarez & Félix Nieto 1972-1976 Carlos Luis Castaño 
1873-74 Manuel E. Benítez 1976-1980 Radamés Tirado 
1874- Juan Luján, Francisco Sánchez 
& Lucas Jiménez Mestre 
1980-1984 Carlos Luis Castaño 
1874-78 Alejandro Montestruque 1984-2000 Manuela Santiago 
1879-82 Anselmo Aragón 2000-2008 Dámaso Serrano 
1883- José Marina  
1884- Andrés Teruel Gallardo 
1885- José Valensuela 
1886- Valiente & Laureano Sierra 
1887- Lorenzo Garbo 
1888- José Miró 
1891- Enrique Gallardo y Fragoso 
1892- Manuel Vázquez Alayón 
1894- Arturo García Villanueva 
1895- Molinari & Antonio Llabrés 
1897- Santiago Paz & Laureano Sierra 
1898 Luis García Alpuente, Idelfonso 
Leguillou & Laureano Sierra 
                                                 
19 Carmelo McFaline y Cintrón, Vieques pintoresco (Bayamón: Bayamón Offset, 1980) 21.  La 
Página WEB de ALOG, 2007, ALOG, 5 February 2007 <http://www.ortizal.com/puertorico.htm>.  The list 
of Governors and Mayors under the Spanish Empire provided in Vieques pintoresco and in The Ángel L. 
Ortiz González webpage differ substantially.  I fashioned the list by combining both sources and 







Tons of sugar produced by three centrales in Vieques 1913-1922, 
as proposed by Juan Bonnet Benítez20 
Harvest Year Santa María Puerto Real Playa Grande 
1913 762 2,920 3,689 
1914 --- 5,225 5,738 
1915 600 4,627 5,655 
1916 638 4,941 6,702 
1917 850 5,693 7,375 
1918 285 2,964 5,328 
1919 959 6,000 8,209 
1920 1,300 6,073 9,903 
1921 1,031 5,250 9,774 




Puerto Ricans living in the United States 1910-1970, 
as proposed by Kal Wagenheim21 
Year Number of Puerto 
Ricans in the U.S. 
Year Number of Puerto 
Ricans in the U.S. 
1910 1,513 1950 301,375 
1920 11,811 1960 887,662 
1930 52,774 1970 1,429,396 








                                                 
20 Bonnet, Vieques en la historia de Puerto Rico 128. 
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